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ABSTRACT
Humans are social animals. Human societies emerge from vast networks of
cooperative interactions between many different individuals. In this respect, humans
are similar to most other primates. However, human societies are unusual among
primates in the number of different types of cooperative relationships that are
involved. In humans, males and females form strong pair bonds within large multi-
male, multi-female societies in which many other cooperative relationships are also
important. How and when did human social systems arise? Do males and females use
different types of cooperative strategies? Under what conditions does paternal care
evolve? Do males and females have different constraints, and how do these affect the
types of social strategies they employ? How do factors such as environment quality
and seasonality modify these strategies? This thesis seeks answers to these questions
using computer simulations based on the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. The
hypotheses generated by these models are tested using data from living primates.
They are then used to investigate the kinds of societies that our hominid ancestors
may have lived in.
The theoretical and empirical evidence presented in this thesis suggests that
sex differences in the energetic cost of reproduction determine the cooperative
strategies, and ultimately the types of social groups, that evolve. It is proposed that
during hominid evolution female energetic costs increased greatly, in comparison to
male energetic costs, due to changes in body size dimorphism, diet and brain size. A
two-stage model of hominid social structure is developed. The first stage, at the
transition from the australopithecines to Homo erectus, would have involved an
increase in female cooperation, especially food sharing. The second stage, occurring
between 500,000 and 100,000 years ago, would have involved male care giving, the
formation of pair bonds and the sexual division of labour within the context of a
wider cooperative network.
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PREFACE
~'The ~b~u~dly ambitious ultimate aim of a gamester [game theorist] is
imperialistic: to provide a universally applicable theory of conflict and
cooperation, both in animal and human societies."
(Binmore et al. p.2).
I am not a gamester. I am an anthropologist. Yet, it seems to me that my aims
in this thesis are coincident with those of game theorists. This research models the
processes of cooperation and competition in animals, especially primates, and in
doing so attempts to understand how societies emerge. The ultimate aim is to build
models of how human society has evolved, and to explore what the social groups of
our hominid ancestors might have been like. In order to do this I borrow one of the
methods used by game theorists to view cooperation and conflict: a game called the
Prisoner's Dilemma. I am now aware that there are many other games, or ways of
viewing the world, that I could have chosen. Furthermore, in doing this research I
have not been transformed from an anthropologist into a game theorist. My hope is
that by combining the approaches of anthropology and game theory I have created a
piece of work that people from both fields will find thought-provoking. None the
less, this research lacks the formalism of game theory and I apologise to game
theorists who may find my approach rather unusual.
While writing a thesis about cooperation, I became very aware of the number
of people who have helped and supported me. Indeed, this thesis could not have been
written without considerable help and support from colleagues, friends and family.
The following is a list of people who have given me data, discussed this research and
other research questions with me, read through parts of my work, or who have
provided friendship and support: Louise Barrett, Adam Biran, Mukesh Chalise,
Maxine Chappell, Margaret Clegg, Mark Collard, Guy Cowlishaw, Robin Dunbar,
Claire Imber, Kristen Hawkes, Katherine Homewood, Kate Jones, Tania King,
Andreas Koenig, Nicola Koyama, Mark Lewis, Ann MacLarnon, Heidi Marriott,
Theya Molleson, Amy Parish, Camilla Power, Ruth Mace, Steven Mithen, Phil Neil,
Dan Nettle, Jim O'Connell, Sara Randall, Caroline Ross, Dan Sellen, Buck
Schieffren:> Volker Sommer, Simon Strickland, Tom Westerdale, Daisy Williamson,
and Bernard Wood. Thank you all.
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I would also like to take this opportunity to thank two organisations: the
Leverhulme Trust, and the Santa Fe Institute. The Leverhulme Trust funded me as a
research assistant during the first years of my research. The Santa Fe Institute gave
me the opportunity to attend a 'Complex Systems' summer school, in June 1994.
This gave me a wonderful opportunity to develop the ideas and models that
eventually became this dissertation.
I wish to extend a very special thanks to my supervisor, Leslie Aiello, who
has always been encouraging, challenging, inspirational, ready to listen,
unwaveringly supportive and a wonderful source of calm during moments of panic.
My family: Mum, Dad and my brother Steven, also deserve a bigger thank you than
I can express just in words. They have never faltered in their love and support, and I
could never have done this without them. Mum also took on the unenviable task of
being editor on the final draft, and did a wonderful job of it too.
On balance I have greatly enjoyed doing this research. However, there have
been times when it has seemed like too huge a mountain to climb. During these
times, my husband, David Taylor, has been my safety net. He has been a constant
source of happiness when I am sad, confidence when I am unsure, and moreover has
not complained at the long hours I have spent at the computer that would otherwise
have been spent with him. Thank you.
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CHAPTER 1
Modelling the Evolution of Human Social Organisation:
Questions, Assumptions and Implications
1.1: Introduction
Humans, like the majority of other primate species, live in social groups.
These groups are often large and involve complex cooperative relationships between
individuals of every age and sex: mothers and offspring; husbands and wives; fathers
and offspring; siblings; unrelated friends of both sexes; grandmothers and
grandchildren; even total strangers. It may be that language and ritual evolved to help
us develop and maintain our relationships with individuals whose goals and desires
are very different from our own (Dunbar 1993; Knight et al. 1995). Humans are
unique amongst primates in the range and extent of their social relationships,
although the behavioural and cognitive origins of human cooperation are clear
throughout the primate order.
There is wide cross-cultural variation in the size and structure of human
social groups. This means that it is difficult to define human social organisation as
simply "monogamous" or "polygamous". None the less there are several important
characteristics which most human societies have in common. Humans usually live in
fairly large groups which contain many adults of both sexes. Within these groups
pair-bonds are usually formed between males and females which involve rules about
mating access and a commitment by the male to assist the female in offspring care.
Finally, human groups usually involve complex networks of cooperation that extend
beyond immediate family. In short, human social structure typically involves strong
bonds between reproductive partners within a wider network of social relationships.
There are two ways in which this type of social structure is unusual. Firstly, male
involvement in offspring care is very rare amongst primates, occurring in just 15% of
primate species (Rutberg 1983). Secondly, human society involves extensive
cooperative networks, involving non-relatives as well as relatives, that cross all
boundaries of age and sex to an extent not seen in any other primate group. Together
these two factors make human social organisation unique. Herein lies the challenge
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of this thesis. On the one hand, human social structure must be understood in terms
of the processes that underlie the structure of all primate societies. That is, we must
ask ourselves under what general conditions we would expect a) intense cooperation
between a male and female in offspring care, and b) widespread cooperation between
individuals of different age, sex and relatedness. However, we must also determine
what kinds of exceptional conditions could shape a social system which involves
both of these processes.
The following sections will focus on male care giving and the evolution of
cooperation. Since both of these topics are discussed at length throughout this thesis
this introduction will not be comprehensive. Instead, it will look at how these
processes have been incorporated into theories about the evolution of hominid social
groups.
1.1.1. The evolution of male care giving
In 1972 Robert Trivers wrote a highly influential and frequently quoted paper
entitled ''Parental investment and sexual selection". In it he argued that breeding
systems are a function of one main variable: the relative parental investment made by
each sex. Trivers defined parental investment as (1972 p.139):
"any investment by the parent in an individual offspring that increases
the offspring's chance of surviving (and hence reproductive success) at
the cost of the parent's ability to invest in other offspring."
Trivers showed that the sex that has invested most in an offspring at any given time
is the most likely to continue that investment. Since mammalian females are
responsible for gestation and lactation, parental investment is high in comparison to
the male. As a result, females are more likely than males to continue to invest in any
given offspring. Because the mating success of males is limited by their ability to
fertilise females, they are likely to compete amongst themselves for mating
opportunities rather than investing in individual offspring. For these reasons it is not
surprising that care giving is a highly unusual male mating strategy in mammals.
Maynard Smith (1977) suggests that there are three circumstances in which males
may contribute to offspring care. Firstly, male investment may be necessary if a
female has already invested so much in reproduction that she is unable to provide the
rest of the investment required to raise the offspring to maturity. Secondly, if two
12
parents can raise twice as many offspring as a single parent then it may be to the
male's advantage to forego other mating opportunities. Finally, males may choose
not to desert the mother and her offspring if the chances ofre-mating are small.
The work of Trivers and Maynard Smith provides the framework from which
many theories of male care-giving are derived. Kleiman (1977) argues that paternal
care occurs whenever a female is unable to rear her offspring successfully without
male help, for instance with carrying infants or territory defence. Dunbar (1988)
suggests that high energetic costs associated with lactation are likely to determine
whether or not males participate in infant care. Among primates, paternal care is
most common in the cebids (e.g. owl and titi monkeys) and callitrichids (tamarins
and marmosets). Explanations for paternal care in the callitrichids generally focus
on the high costs incurred by females who usually give birth to twins and often
produce two litters per year (Goldizen 1990; Leutenegger 1980; Ross 1991; Tardif
1994; Tardif et al. 1993). Ross (1991), for example, argues that in callitrichids,
females can only sustain high birth rates, litter weights and high litter growth rates if
males assist in infant transport. Rylands points out that these are not complete
explanations (1996 p.6): "the argument that males show parental care because
females have large twins does not answer the question of why females have large
twins." Furthermore, these explanations are not applicable to non-twinning species
such as the cebids and the siamang.
Paternity certainty is often assumed to be an important condition for the
evolution of male care (see for example Alexander and Noonan 1979; Bales 1980;
Busse 1984; Kurland 1977). Yet, even in tamarins and marmosets paternity certainty
is not a straightforward issue. There is considerable intra- and inter-specific variation
in the composition of tamarin and marmoset groups, but typically they will contain
between 5 and 18 individuals including more than one adult of each sex (Garber
1997). Even though only a single female reproduces at anyone time, males do not
appear to compete for reproductive access and all adult males mate with the breeding
female. The implication of this is that there is no way that a male can ascertain
whether he has fathered a particular offspring. None the less all adults, including the
males, assist in offspring care. Garber (1997) describes tamarin groups as immensely
cooperative. His studies of Saguinus mystax indicate that cooperative interactions,
such as food sharing, group defence and infant transport, are over 50 times more
likely than aggressive ones.
13
How can paternal care evolve without paternity certainty? This is an issue not
only for the callitrichids, but for most species in which male care occurs. Particularly
intriguing are those cases in which male care giving occurs in the context of a multi-
male group (e.g. black-capped capuchin, olive baboon, yellow baboon, chacma
baboon, barbary macaque, stumptail macaque and Japanese macaque (Smuts and
Gubernick 1992)). In olive baboons, males form special friendships with particular
females and their offspring. These friendships involve substantial benefits for the
infants in terms of protection from predators and other male baboons and access to
the best feeding sites (Smuts 1985). Males are unlikely to be related to the infants
that they care for, however, females are likely to reward their special friend with
future mating opportunities. Thus, Smuts and Gubernick (1992) describe this type of
male care as mating effort rather than paternal investment. Further data on rhesus
macaques (Berenstain et al. 1981), Japanese macaques (Gouzoules 1984; Takahata
1982) and yellow baboons (Altmann 1980; Stein 1984) supports their conclusion that
(Smuts and Gubernick 1992 p.16, their italics):
"male care of infants represents mating effort rather than parental
investment whenever selection favours male care because of the benefits
males receive in exchange for this care rather than because of enhanced
survivorship of their own infants."
Affiliated infants will often cooperate with the male, particularly during aggressive
interactions with other males when the infants may be used as "agonistic buffers"
(Collins 1986; Packer 1980; Stein 1984; Strum 1984). Furthermore, in species such
as chimpanzees (de Waal 1982), rhesus macaques (Chapais 1983) and vervets
(Raliegh and McGuire 1989) support from a female ally can be important in
determining a male's rank. Thus, male macaques seek to establish affiliative
relationships with the infants of high ranking females (Gouzoules 1975; Manson
1994). In short, male care giving is not necessarily directly related to parental
investment. Rather, male care giving may often be characterised as one aspect of a
reciprocally cooperative relationship between a male, female and her offspring where
all parties stand to gain substantial benefits.
Humans are unusual amongst catarrhines (Old World monkeys and apes) in
that there is extensive male investment in offspring, particularly in the form of
provisioning. However, in keeping with the preceding discussion, there is much
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debate as to whether this is really parental investment, or a male mating strategy.
Hawkes (1990, 1991, 1993, see also Hawkes et al. 1991) argues that large animal
hunting by males is a method of intra-sexual competition, whereby successful
hunters hope to gain status and attract mates. Hawkes and her co-workers show that
among the Hadza, hunting large game benefits the group as a whole by providing
more calories per head than other hunting or foraging strategies. But, at an individual
level, it is a risky strategy, as the likelihood of catching an animal on any given day
is very low. Hunting small game would be a more reliable strategy; moreover since
small animals are not shared with the whole group (as large animals are) the entire
products of the hunt would go to the hunter's family. Hawkes argues that since men
target those resources that are most widely shared, the purpose of hunting is to "show
off' to potential mates. Unlike Smuts and Gubernick (1992), Hawkes does not view
male hunting as part of cooperative relationship since the sharing of game is not
reciprocated in kind. However, as Hawkes herself states (1993 p.341):
"if those who provide public goods are listened to and watched more
closely than others and favoured as neighbours and associates, they have
a larger, readier pool ofpotential allies and mates."
In other words, males are providing meat in exchange for allies and reproductive
access to females.
In contrast to Hawkes and colleagues, male provisionmg of offspring in
human groups is usually viewed as male investment. Indeed, the evolution of
paternal care is often portrayed as the key element in the evolution of human society.
For example, Lovejoy (1981) suggests that bipedalism, by freeing the hands, was an
adaptation to aid male provisioning and that sexual dimorphism in body size and
locomotor style in Australopithecus afarensis is the first evidence of a sexual
division of labour. Male provisioning and monogamous social groups are generally
viewed as evolving in parallel with biological and behavioural changes in females
that manipulate the chances of paternity certainty. For instance, continuous female
sexual receptivity and concealed ovulation are expected to reinforce the pair bond by
encouraging mate guarding (Turke 1984).
Unfortunately, social systems leave little trace in the fossil and archaeological
record, making it very difficult to judge exactly when male provisioning may have
evolved. Hence theories differ enormously in terms of the timing of this change in
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social organisation, but most assume that male provisioning was a response to an
increase in costs to the female of raising altricial, large brained offspring. Over the
course of human evolution there has been a three-fold increase in the size of the
brain, a change which has important energetic implications (Aiello and Wheeler
1995; Aiello 1997). The brain is one of the most energetically expensive organs in
the body since brain tissue has over 22 times the mass specific metabolic rate of
skeletal muscle. Other energetically expensive organs are the gastrointestinal tract,
heart liver and kidney which, together with the brain, are responsible for nearly 70%
of the human body's energy requirements (Aiello and Wheeler 1995; Aiello 1997).
However, while humans have larger brains than would be expected for an average
primate of our body mass, the mass of the gastrointestinal tract is only 60% of the
size expected. It appears that in humans the high metabolic costs of having a large
brain are balanced by a reduction in the energetic costs of the gastrointestinal tract.
Aiello and Wheeler (1995) argue that a change in gut size must have been
accompanied by a change in diet to a less bulky, more digestible food source. Animal
based products (e.g. meat or bone marrow) would satisfy this criterion.
The adaptive complex of an increase in brain size and a reduction in gut size,
mediated by a change to an animal-based diet, implies a profound change in the
energetic costs incurred by females. Firstly, an increase in brain size directly
increases the energetic load on the mother, since the main period of brain growth
occurs in utero and during the post-natal period prior to weaning (Martin 1981, 1983,
1996). Foley and Lee (1991) estimate that up to the age of 18 months human infants
are around 9% more energetically costly than chimpanzee infants. Secondly, a
change to a diet with a high meat component requires that females provision their
offspring until they have gained the necessary skills to acquire meat for themselves
(Aiello 1998). The dual loads of extensive food-sharing between mother and
offspring, and the training necessary for the offspring to find its own resources would
significantly increase the period of maternal investment beyond the weaning period.
There have been two main periods of brain expansion when male care giving
may have evolved (see figure 1.1). The first of these coincides with the appearance
ofHomo erectus' 2 million years ago. Homo erectus had an average cranial capacity
of 1000cc, considerably larger than that of its australopithecine predecessors,
1 Homo erectus is assumed here to include both the African and Asian Homo erectus grade hominids.
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although this is somewhat compensated for by a corresponding increase in body size.
The transition from the australopithecines to Homo erectus marks perhaps the
greatest suite of anatomical and behavioural changes seen in hominid history. In
sharp contrast to the smaller overall size, ape-like body proportions and arboreal-
bipedal mix of postcranial adaptations seen in the australopithecines, Homo erectus
was tall, slim and a fully committed biped. The Homo erectus mandible, robust by
modern human standards, was slight in comparison to that of both gracile and robust
australopithecines indicating a change in diet. Homo erectus had the abilities to
produce quite sophisticated tools, typified by the hand axe whose carefully crafted,
symmetrical form indicates fairly advanced tool making abilities. Finally, Homo
erectus was the first hominid to leave Africa, colonising a substantial portion of Asia.
Given these considerable physiological and behavioural adaptations, it is likely that
substantial changes in social organisation also occurred during the Australopithecus-
Homo transition.
Isaac (1978) used the archaeological record to establish that early Homo
transported meat (that had either been hunted or scavenged) to a central site or home
base. He points out that food transport in modern groups is associated with a sexual
division of labour and food sharing and goes on to suggest that (1978 p.l06):
"in early protohuman populations the males and females divided
subsistence labour between them so that each sex was preferentially
tapping a different kind of food resource and then sharing within a social
group some of what had been obtained. In such circumstances a mating
system that involved at least one male in "family" food procurement on
behalf of each child-rearing female in the group would have a clear
selective advantage over, for example, the chimpanzees pattern of
opportunistic relations between the sexes."
Detailed taphonomic analysis of the timing of the distribution of bones and artefacts
suggests that the sites which inspired Isaac's model were not home-bases at all
(Binfold 1981). None the less, Deacon (1997) also suggests that food sharing, sexual
division of labour and male provisioning of a female and her offspring arose in early
Homo. He proposes that in an unpredictable environment, meat provides an
important and consistent food source. However, females burdened with offspring
cannot access meat other than through males. This means that pair bonding is
required to ensure adequate provisioning of females and their offspring. Deacon
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further suggests that this behaviour evolved in tandem with changes in symbolic
thought and tool use.
The second possible period during which male care-giving may have evolved
began around 500,000 years ago. During this time there was a period of exponential
brain expansion (figure 1.1.). This was the era of archaic Homo sapiens, who
continued the process of migration begun by Homo erectus by expanding into
Europe. During this time there is a diversification in the archaeological record, and
finds at Schoningen and Boxgrove provide the first irrefutable evidence of hunting
around 500,000 to 400,000 years ago (Thieme 1997). Knight, Power and Watts argue
that it was during this time that male provisioning became important (Knight 1991;
Knight et al. 1995; Power and Watts 1996). They propose that females formed kin
based coalitions whose purpose was to manipulate males into providing meat by
using deceptive sexual signals. It is likely that individual females were able to extract
meat from males in exchange for sexual access, but a female who is pregnant or
lactating will be unable to use such a strategy. This means that it is in the interests of
females to mislead males about their fertility state through processes such as
concealed ovulation, continuous sexual receptivity and ovulatory synchrony (Turke
1984; Power and Watts 1996). Ovulatory synchrony, in particular, prevents mate-
guarding and encourages attention from a large number of males. There is, however,
one sure sign of reproductive status, menstruation, the absence of which indicates
that a female is not currently fertile. How, then, can females attract continual male
investment? Knight, Power and Watts hypothesise that to confuse males, coalitions
of females used blood from other females, and at a later stage red ochre, to simulate
synchronised menstruation and thus ensure continued male support. Thus, brain
expansion in archaic Homo sapiens provoked a fundamental change in human
behaviour and possible kick-started the evolution of ritual behaviour.
The archaeological record confounds any simple correlation between brain
expansion and behavioural change. Neandertals are the most well known of the
archaic Homo sapiens species and provide a very interesting contrast with
anatomically modern Homo sapiens groups. Neandertal sites are generally small and
undifferentiated with little evidence of symbolic artefacts or of food transport (Steele
and Shennan 1996). Soffer (1994) argues that both sexes were skeletally robust and
that Neandertals lived in small, regionalized groups without a sexual division of
labour or social differentiation. Archaeological remains associated with anatomically
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modern Homo sapiens are much more variable from site to site, food transport is
indicated and there is clear evidence of symbolism. Soffer suggests that it is only at
this point that human social organisation emerged. It is true that archaeological
contrasts between Neandertals and anatomical modern Homo sapiens produces an
interesting conundrum (Mithen 1996). However, the appearance of anatomically
modern humans around 100,000 years ago is out of phase with the symbolic
explosion in the archaeological record, known as the Upper Palaeolithic transition,
around 50.000 years ago. This is a sharp reminder that the relationships between
anatomy, social organisation and cognition are still poorly understood.
1.1.2 The evolution of cooperation
Most primates live in social groups, although the size and composition of
these groups vary widely. The advantages of group living may be predator defence
and/or group defence of resources and there may be further advantages in terms of
opportunities for non-maternal offspring care (Dunbar 1988). Conversely, group
living carries with it substantial disadvantages. Individuals within groups are in
direct competition with each other for resources and mates. Also, for a group to
remain cohesive, individual group members must synchronise activities such as
feeding, moving and sleeping with those of the rest of the group. Since individuals of
different age, sex and reproductive status have different needs, this may require
considerable compromise.
To counteract within-group competition, cooperation plays a vital role in
primate groups. Individuals cooperate in numerous ways, the most common ofwhich
are supporting each other in agonistic conflicts, group defence, feeding together,
sleeping together and grooming. An individual's position in the dominance hierarchy
is determined by the quality and quantity of his or her allies. To a large extent, the
ability to maintain cooperative relationships is a more important determinant of
reproductive success in primate groups than physical characteristics such as body
size. The importance of maintaining good relations with other group members is such
that some primate species have special reconciliation mechanisms. De Waal and
Roosmalen (1979) found that after aggressive interactions opponents would engage
in a great deal of contact, especially kissing and gentle contact. Stump-tail macaques
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have a special "hold-bottom ritual" in which the subject of aggression presents his or
her rear to the aggressor to be grasped at the hips (de Waal and Ren 1988). De Waal
and Aureli (1996 p.90) believe that "both macaques and chimpanzees follow what
seems a general rule among primates; that is, reconciliation aims to restore valuable
relationships. "
Cooperation is particularly important during agonistic conflicts, where the
number of allies an individual can call upon determines his or her competitiveness
(van Hooff and van Schaik 1992). Coalitions provide protection to the individual and
there can be intense competition for alliance partners. Many primates, especially Old
World monkeys, use grooming to establish and maintain social bonds (Seyfarth
1976, 1977, 1983). In some instances, individuals will sacrifice time spent on other
activities in favour of servicing their alliances through grooming. Dunbar and
Dunbar (1988) found that lactating gelada females, whose time budgets are seriously
constrained due to high feeding requirements, sacrificed resting time rather than
reduce their time spent in social activities. Certain individuals within a group,
especially those well placed within the dominance hierarchy, are particularly
attractive alliance partners, and thus there may be considerable competition to groom
them (Fairbanks 1980; Seyfarth 1977, 1980; Stammbach 1978). Additional benefits
of alliances with high ranking animals include access to resources, predator defence
and information sharing (Fairbanks 1980). In vervet monkeys, competition for allies
is so intense that adult females attempt to prevent other females from grooming high
ranking animals (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990; Seyfarth 1980). Alliances with
subordinate animals can also be valuable when the balance of power is delicate
(Harcourt 1992) and macaque females actively try to prevent the development of
coalitions between subordinates (de Waal and Luttrell 1986; Silk 1982).
Cooperation and competition are two sides of the same coin. Competition for
food, mates, allies, sleeping sites, position in the heirachy and so on create the need
for cooperation. This cooperation, in turn, becomes the principal means by which
primates compete with each other. Thus, in groups where competition is great, as is
the case for many of the Old World monkeys, there is a great dependence on
coalitionary support and thus strong cooperative bonds (van Hooff and van Schaik
1992). Conversely, when conflicts are rare there is little need for cooperative
alliances and groups are more likely to be egalitarian, as is the case for many
colobine monkeys. Patterns of female migration reflect the degree of importance
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attached to coalitions, for instance female macaques, vervets and baboons are highly
unlikely to emigrate from their natal group, adding a further degree of stability to the
social hierarchy. These considerations suggest that an appropriate description of the
structure of a primate group would be in terms of the cooperative and competitive
bonds from which it arises. This reasoning follows Hinde (1976, 1983) in viewing a
social system as the emergent outcome of a consistent set of social relationships
which are the product of individual interactions. Of course, many different factors
will affect the behaviour of group members, and will affect them in different ways
depending on their sex, age, kinship and social status. The aim, therefore, is to look
for consistent patterns within these relationships.
Perhaps the most telling predictor of cooperative behaviour is gender. In the
previous section, sex differences in parental investment were discussed. Because
mammalian females are biologically committed to high investment in offspring, their
principal means of maximising their reproductive success is to ensure a good quality
diet and protection from predators and other group members. Cooperative bonds or
hostile interactions between females should reflect these needs. Because females are
often smaller than males, in some species female coalitions are an important buffer
against male aggression, for example in bonobos (Parish 1994), capuchins (Perry
1997) and vervet monkeys (Cheney 1983). Males, on the other hand, can best
maximise their reproductive success by mating with as many females as possible.
This means that cooperation is much less likely between males since reproductive
access to a female is less easily shared than, say, food. There are exceptions to the
rule, for instance male alliances have been reported in baboons (Packer 1977),
bonnet macaques (Silk 1994) and chimpanzees (de Waal 1984). Even in these cases
sex differences in the nature of cooperation are clear. De Waal (1984) found that
while chimpanzee females formed long term alliances with female friends involving
mutual support, male coalitions were more opportunistic and were used to improve
status.
Foley and Lee (1989, 1996) mapped out the distribution of same sex alliances
for a wide variety of primate species in order to ascertain the most likely pattern of
alliances in the hominids. They found that the backbone of Old World monkey
societies tends to be kin-based female alliances, whilst in the apes there is a switch to
male-based associations. Our closest ancestor, the chimpanzee, lives in social groups
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that centre on alliances between male kin and Foley and Lee predict that the early
hominids would have had a similar social system (Foley and Lee 1989 p.904):
"The. most p~obable social organisation for the early australopithecines
consists of mixed sex groups, with males linked by a network of kinship.
Females, forced to forage over larger areas to find dispersed and
seasonally limited food and to aggregate in the face of some predation,
would be expected to form more stable associations with either specific
males within the alliance or with the entire alliance of males."
Foley and Lee depict male-female bonds as becoming gradually stronger over the
course of hominid evolution as a response to increasing costs to the female
associated with brain expansion. Here their argument parallels the discussion in the
previous section of the possible links between brain size and male provisioning. They
pinpoint two key time periods during which there was considerable brain expansion
and thus possible changes in social organisation (see figure 1.1). The first period of
significant brain expansion is with the appearance of Homo erectus around 2.0
million years ago. It is at this time that "initial increases in male-female bonding may
have occurred" (Foley and Lee 1996 p.63). The second, and most dramatic period of
brain expansion began around 500,000 years ago. Foley and Lee argue that at this
point females would be under considerable stress due to the energetic costs of
nurturing large brained, altricial infants, with slow growth rates and prolonged
periods of dependence. As a response to this male-female bonds would intensify and
become more stable.
Wrangham (1987) also takes a phylogenetic approach to modelling hominid
social structure. In agreement with Foley and Lee, Wrangham emphasises the
importance of male-male alliances, particularly in human and chimpanzee groups.
Hence, he concurs that early hominid group structure was based upon closed social
networks of related males. Foley, Lee and Wrangham place little importance on the
development of female based associations. Wrangham justifies this using evidence
that female alliances are "rare" in gorillas, chimpanzees and humans, particularly
because female migration means that adult females are usually unrelated to other
group members.
The problem with using phylogenetic methods to determine social structure is
that no consideration is given to ecological context. The social structure of
chimpanzees appears to arise from the dispersed nature of food resources that
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prevents females from forming cohesive groups (Dunbar 1988; van Hooff and van
Schaik 1992). Close male bonds allow males to defend large numbers of highly
dispersed females as a team. Evidence from a group at Bossou, West Africa,
suggests that when the habitat permits chimpanzees to live in more compact groups,
female bonds are stronger than male bonds and males may emigrate (Sugiyama
1981). This implies that ecology, rather than phylogeny, shapes the nature of
chimpanzee social groups. Williamson (1997) has shown that the australopithecines
would not have been able to survive if they were living in the same habitats as
present day chimpanzees. Furthermore, changes in aridity and seasonality during the
PlioPleistocene indicate that much of human evolution has occurred in rather
different ecological settings to the African apes. The ecological context of human
evolution was almost certainly very different to that of the African apes. This means
that phylogenetic models alone are not appropriate for modelling hominid social
structure.
Wrangham, Foley and Lee, who emphasise the importance of male bonds,
may have underestimated the importance of female alliances in both apes and
humans. Unrelated female bonobos form strong alliances (Parish 1994), and female
coalitions are not uncommon in chimpanzees (de Waal 1982, 1984). Human females
certainly form strong cooperative bonds, however, Wrangham describes these as
"friendships" rather than "competitive alliances" and thus discounts their importance.
To disregard female-female relationships in this way oversimplifies the evolution of
human society. It is exactly these types of relationships, between unrelated females,
that demand an explanation beyond that offered by kin selection. Moreover, these
relationships are of special interest because of the cognitive demands they place on
the individual.
Living in a social world requires sophisticated social intelligence: the larger
and more complex that world is, the greater the intelligence required (Dunbar 1992,
1993). Living in a social groups requires the ability to monitor and predict social
relationships and to be able to manipulate those relationships (Byrne and Whiten
1988; Whiten and Byrne 1997a). Dunbar argues that as the social world becomes
more complex, each individual needs more complex mental mechanisms for
managing their social relationships. The neocortex appears to play a major role in
this. Dunbar (1992) has shown that the size of the neocortex, relative to the size of
the rest of the brain, is closely correlated with group size. In effect, the size of the
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neocortex limits the number of relationships that an individual can monitor, and thus
ultimately limits group size. Aiello and Dunbar (1993) extend the social intelligence
model to the evolution of hominid social groups. They argue that the large brain
sizes ofHomo erectus and Homo sapiens are indicative of large group sizes, possibly
due to factors such as predation pressure or intra-group conflict. They further suggest
that such large groups would require a more efficient mechanism for social bonding
than grooming, the time consuming method employed by Old World monkeys and
apes. Vocalisation and, eventually, language would fulfil such a role.
Strum et al. (1997) and Gigerenzer (1997) point out that the definition of
what makes a social world 'complex' is rather fuzzy: "the existence of social
complexity does not guarantee the existence of behavioural or cognitive complexity
in individuals" (Strum et al. 1997 p.61). The quantity of relationships an individual
must monitor tells us nothing of their quality and thus the social complexity
involved. This is an important distinction it: as seems likely, different types of
relationship impose different cognitive demands. For instance, the rule "always
cooperate with my daughters" is simple and robust, due to the clear fitness benefits
of helping your own kin. However, decisions about when to cooperate are likely to
be more complex when non-relatives are involved, as individuals must take into
account past interactions, rank effects, and the likelihood of other individuals
becoming involved. Vervet females appear to apply different rules depending on
relatedness: Seyfarth and Cheney (1984) found that vervet females would respond to
pleas of support from non-relatives on the basis of previous cooperative encounters
(in this case whether that animal had recently groomed them) but supported relatives
unconditionally.
Byrne (1997) also suggests that the relationship between neocortex size,
intelligence and social relationships is more subtle than Dunbar's model suggests. He
concurs that the social intelligence hypothesis is a good explanation for cognitive
differences between strepsirhines (lemurs and lorises) and haplorhines (monkeys and
apes) . However, distinct differences in social intelligence between monkeys and apes
do not coincide with differences in either neocortex ratio or social complexity. In
fact, in terms of the number and types of relationships found there is very little
difference between monkey and ape social groups. But, "differences emerge, not in
what great apes do - which in practice is often much the same as what monkeys do -
but in how they do it" (Byrne 1997 p.295). It appears that the apes have something
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which monkeys do not: a theory of mind or, in other words, the ability to see the
world from another animal's point of view (Premack and Woodruff 1978). Theory of
mind is a powerful mental tool which can be used either to trick conspecifics (Byrne
and Whiten 1992) or to determine the best individuals with whom to forge
cooperative relationships (Strum et al. 1997). Experiments in the laboratory and
observations in the wild, of deception and social manipulation, suggest that
chimpanzees could have a theory of mind, but that monkeys are unable to attribute
mental states to others (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990). How can we explain these
differences in social intelligence, in the absence of differences in social complexity?
Byrne (1997) points out that there are distinct differences between monkeys and apes
beyond the social arena (Byrne 1997 p.306 his italics):
"very large body size, locomotion by brachiation, the representational
use of tools, construction of sleeping beds, and the ability to build
hierarchical programs of actions, are all unique to great apes: separately
or in some combination they are then in principle suitable candidate
hypotheses to explain a special adaptation of the great apes."
Byrne's point is that one or more of these factors have changed the way that apes
think so that apes are able to mentally represent the world and its problems. Once an
animal has this ability in one sphere, say technical intelligence, it can be extended to
other spheres such as social intelligence (and hence the creation of theory of mind).
This point of view sits uncomfortably with a modular view of the brain, in which
each mental faculty is seen as distinct and purpose-built. Tooby and Cosmides
(1992), in their "Swiss army knife" view of the brain, argue that having distinct
mental mechanisms, purpose built for particular activities, is a more efficient way of
solving problems than having a single 'general purpose' brain. However, Karmiloff-
Smith (1992, 1993) takes a rather different perspective on the modularity of the
brain. She does not argue against a modular structure to the adult brain, rather she
focuses on the process of modularization during development. Karmiloff-Smith
proposes that the while the human brain is structured in a modular way which
involves localised mental processes, there is a general process at work which
organises, and more to the point re-organises, the way these local modules are
connected. This process, which she terms representational redescription, allows the
mind to sort out the information it receives into theories about the way the world
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works. In this way, large amounts of small scale, context specific, information can be
re-formatted into organising principles which are available to other mental modules.
If Karmiloff-Smith is correct, then Byrne's hypothesis is indeed feasible.
Most telling may be the long periods of infant dependency in the great apes which
would provide enough time for the process of mental re-representation to occur.
Longer periods of growth and development could allow more sophisticated mental
representation in all domains of knowledge. We should then expect that dramatic
changes in body size, brain size and the timing of growth and development during
hominid evolution would have affected all realms of behaviour, including those
pertinent to the social and technical worlds. And here we return to the issue of
energetic costs, since females are unlikely to be able to support extended periods of
offspring dependency without considerable help from other group members. The
evolution of extensive networks of cooperation in humans may have allowed
significant changes in life histories with profound knock-on effects for the evolution
of cognitive abilities.
1.1.3. Cooperation, paternal care and the evolution of hominid social
groups
In the previous two sections it has been shown that the social structure of a
primate group arises from the cooperative and competitive interactions of the group
members. It has been shown that paternal care is also a form of cooperation between
males and females, although the units of exchange may be rather different for each
sex. In fact, as Strum and Mitchell discovered in their observations on baboons,
cooperation is a part of primate life for individuals of all ages and sexes (Strum and
Mitchell 1987 p.101):
"A big male, although built as a fighting machine, needs.t~e cooper~tion
of the small infant or the female that he uses as an agomstic buffer If he
is to defend himself successfully against the aggression of another male.
This same big male needs a female's cooperation to be reproductively
successful even if he aggressively claimed her from another male.
Females and infants have powerful leverage through the system of social
reciprocity created by social relationships. Pumpho~se baboons ce~ainly
appear to develop and manage social resources In order to gam an
advantage in the short and longer term."
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If cooperation underlies the lives of non-human primates, it suggests that the study of
cooperation may be fruitful in formulating predictions about the evolution of
hominid social structure. Erda! and Whiten believe that cooperation is a unifying
theme in modern hunter-gatherer groups (1996 p.140):
cc students of hunter-gatherers have discerned a cluster of features which
appear t? act as the functional core of the societies: egalitarianism,
cooperation, and sharing, on a scale unprecedented in primate
evolution."
Why should Erdal and Whiten state that human cooperation occurs on an
"unprecedented" scale? They point out that there is almost no hierarchy or
dominance in hunter-gatherer groups, and that food sharing, especially of meat is
universal. While there are exceptions among the callitrichids (Brown and Mack
1978; Feistner and Price 1990, 1991) food sharing between adults and young is very
rare in primates. Food-sharing has been observed in chimpanzees (de Waal 1989)
and capuchin monkeys (Perry and Rose 1994; de Waal 1997; de Waal et al. 1993),
however, these instances are more akin to 'tolerated theft' (Blurton-Jones 1987) than
active sharing. Humans do not only share food, but they also cooperate in capturing
food. Again this is unusual rather than unknown primate behaviour: cooperative
hunting is known in baboons (Strum and Mitchell 1987) and chimpanzees (Boesch
and Boesch 1989).
We have seen already that different researchers have focused on different
aspects of human cooperation: Foley, Lee and Wrangham on male-male kin
associations; Knight, Power and Watts on kin-based female coalitions; Lovejoy and
Isaac on male-female bonds. I would contend that all of these different types of
cooperative relationships in humans are important. Furthermore, there are other types
of cooperative relationships found in humans that are not considered by these
authors. In some societies, such as the Hadza, senior post-menopausal women play
an important role in provisioning their daughter's offspring (Hawkes et al. 1997a, b,
c). Furthermore, humans do not restrict their friendly interactions to relatives. Non-
relatives and even total strangers participate in cooperative exchanges. Nettle and
Dunbar (1997) suggest that dialects and other "social markers" may have evolved to
help us determine the honest or dishonest tendencies, and hence cooperativeness, of
people we meet on an infrequent basis. In short, unlike any other single primate
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specres, human cooperative relationships span all combinations of age, sex and
relatedness.
Why are humans so cooperative? When and why did human patterns of
cooperation evolve? Answers to these questions may only be found when we can
answer the more general question: under what conditions do different types of
cooperative relationships evolve? Most of this thesis is dedicated to exploring this
latter question. Rather than concentrate on any particular primate species, this
research looks for underlying mechanisms that could be applied to any primate
group. The advantage of this type of model is that it can be tested on data from extant
species, before being applied to extinct ones. The first stage in this process is to find,
and develop, a good model of cooperation.
29
1.2: Modelling the Evolution of Cooperation
In the preVIOUS section it was argued that an appropriate approach to
understanding social organisation is to study patterns of cooperation and competition.
This could be done using referential modelling, where extant species are used as
analogues for extinct hominids. This is a common approach, and several candidate
species have been proposed: chimpanzees (Tanner 1981, 1987), baboons (Strum and
Mitchell 1987), the social carnivores (Thompson 1975, 1976) and humans (Isaac
1978). These models stress the similarities between the analogue species and
hominids. However, because little attention is paid to differences, it is very difficult
to falsify even widely divergent theories. For instance, Washburn and DeVore's
(1961) baboon model emphasises the importance of male dominance relationships,
while Erdal and Whiten's (1996) hunter-gather model stresses the importance of
cooperation and lack of a dominance hierarchy. It is very difficult to falsify either of
these models, since they are both correct with respect to their chosen analogue
species. Furthermore, most referential models entirely ignore those features which
are unique to hominid evolution: exponential brain expansion, language, extensive
tool use and culture. As Tooby and DeVore state (1987 p.187):
"Only uniqueness can explain uniqueness; one cannot invoke the
features species have in common to explain their differences. By their
nature, referential models tend to ignore or obscure the most important
question in human evolution: where did our most crucial and novel
adaptations come from?"
Tooby and DeVore (1987) promote, instead, the use of "conceptual modelling". This
approach uses extant species to derive fundamental principles that are applicable to
any species, at any time. It is this second approach that is followed here. Models will
be generated based upon general principles, that can then be applied to specific
species. However, Tooby and Devore warn that (1987 p.186):
"At its worst, a conceptual model is highly artificial and obscure; it rests
on unstated, unrealistic, or shifting assumptions; it leaves unintegrated,
or absent, factors known to be important; it yields conclusions that are
trivial, obvious, or absurd."
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A model is only as good as the assumptions upon which it rests. It is crucially
important to make explicit these assumptions so that they are open for criticism and
debate. It is to this end that the following sections are written.
1.2.1 Assumption 1: Social structure is the emergent outcome of the
cooperative and competitive interactions of group members.
This first assumption has already been explored in the previous section, and
no time will be wasted re-justifying it here. However, it is important because it
defines the form of the model. Viewing a system in this way demands a "bottom-up"
approach. It is the decisions of individual animals that determines how the system
will develop. The strategic decisions made by any single agent are based upon the
actions of other members of the group, which in tum are contingent upon the
behaviour of the original agent. This means that this is a dynamic system, in which
the actions of all of its parts are essentially inter-connected. Such "complex adaptive
systems" (Holland 1992a) are certainly not restricted to primate social groups. Any
system which is produced from the actions of smaller components may be described
in such a way. For example cells consist of proteins and DNA; organs consist of
interacting cells; brains consist of neurons; people consist of interacting organs. One
of the interesting things about these systems is that the basic component may only be
capable of very simple behaviours and decision making processes, yet the patterns of
interaction of these components creates complex and often unexpected overall
structures (for reviews see Waldrop 1992; Lewin 1993).
Because complex adaptive systems contain many agents, each of which is
making individual decisions about strategy, the most practical way of modelling
them is by using computer simulations. That is, by creating an "artificial world" or a
"computer ecosystem" (Conrad and Rizki 1989). Conrad and Rizki describe the
important features of such a simulation (1989 p.248):
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"The chie~groun~ rule is that an artificial world's ecosystem should be a
self-c~ntalned microcosm, capable of autonomously generating its own
evolutionary development. In principle it could be closed to the
modeller ~fter its creation in the same way that a real microecosystem
enclos~d In a laboratory flask might be. The population and ecosystem
dyna~lcs should em~rge from simple rules of interaction governing the
behaviour of organisms rather than being imposed by fiat by the
mo~eller. These .rules should themselves be under genetic control and
subject t~ evolution to a degree that approaches as near as practical to
the genetic control exerted by organisms in nature. Constructs such as
fitness should not enter into the model. They should emerge in the same
way that fitness emerges in nature."
All of these rules are followed in this research. However, many other requirements
identified by Conrad and Rizki are not. For instance, they specify that artificial
worlds should include a detailed spatial environment, which is graded with respect to
energy and mass which flows through the system in a well defined manner.
Furthermore, they prescribe that the physical environment should be "multifaceted"
including attributes such as temperature, light intensity and spatial boundaries (1989
p.248). These, and many other features, have been incorporated into a set of models
called EVOLYE. These models, and others like them (for example SFI Echo
(Holland 1992; Jones and Forrest 1993)) are typically created and then set in motion
"as a means of predicting and discovering new features of the natural world" (Conrad
and Rizki 1989). These models certainly have resonances with processes that occur
in real world populations, for example co-evolution and population expansions and
contractions. But, for all their computational sophistication, it is debatable whether
these models have told us anything new about natural systems. In fact, these models
contain within them so many different variables that it is difficult to discern which of
them are important determinants of the observed phenomena. I would contend that
these projects have been overly concerned with creating realistic models, and have
failed to identify interesting research questions to which these models should be
applied. These simulations are, after all, only models; they can never approach the
rich variety of forms and processes found in the real world. Rather, the purpose of
models should be to create abstract forms of the real world, in which isolated
processes can be studied in the absence of many other confounding factors. This is
not to say that the resulting models will not be complex, rather that we should be able
to clearly identify the processes from which this complexity arises.
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Hogeweg and Hesper (1985; see also Hogeweg 1988, 1989) have shown that
the complex adaptive systems approach can be fruitful in modelling social structure.
They used bottom-up models of individual decision making to simulate the social
world ofbumble bees and dominance relationships in monkeys. These models can be
particularly useful in testing hypotheses about individual processes within larger
social structures. As far as I am aware, these types of models have not been used
before to predict the social structure of extinct groups.
1.2.2. Assumption 2: The Prisoner's Dilemma is an appropriate
model of cooperation.
"Game theory has great potential. Perhaps it is not too much to say
that, unless and until major advances are made in game theory, the
social sciences are doomed to remain but a poor relation of the physical
sciences. On the other hand, our current state of ignorance on so many
relevant subjects imposes heavy limitations on the extent to which game
theory as it stands at present can be applied."
(Binmore 1990 p.6)
The basis of the computer simulations used in this thesis is taken from game theory.
Binmore (1990) notes how difficult it is to apply game theory to real life situations.
This is because we have imperfect knowledge of the important variables within the
system of interest. But, the purpose here is to extract from complex scenarios the
important variables of interest, and it is to this end that game theory is most useful, as
Binmore notes (1990 p.9):
"A game-theoretic study based on hypothetical data about the
institutional framework may be useful, for example, as a guide to an
empirical worker who is bewildered by the richness of the available data
and needs assistance in making judgements about what is likely to be
significant and hence worthy of close attention and what is likely to be
of only secondary importance."
Primate social groups are, indeed, "bewildering" in complexity. We require a
model which will allow us to focus only on cooperative interactions in the absence of
other confounding variables. It will be argued here that a game known as the
Prisoner's Dilemma is ideal for this purpose. But first it is important to understand
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why cooperation 1S such an interesting problem. From our peculiarly human
perspective, cooperation seems quite logical: if everyone in a group cooperates then
everyone in that group benefits and is, surely, better off than a group of individuals
who act only in self-interest? To illustrate why such a view is fallacious, let us
consider a hypothetical example of such a society. Imagine a group who practice
extensive food sharing. Each day, every individual in the group goes out to hunt and
forage and at the end of the day all of the food is pooled in a communal feast.
Everyone benefits, because the quantity and variety of food is greater than any
individual could have found on their own and each individual is buffered from
fluctuations in foraging success. But, one individual in the group is a cheat who
never foragers but still shares in the feast each day. This person gains all the
advantages of group cooperation, but pays none of the costs. Since the forces of
evolution are more powerful at an individual level than they are at the group level
(Soltis et al. 1995) the cheat will do better than the rest ofhis or her companions. It is
easy to see how such cheating behaviour, if unchecked, would proliferate and swamp
the nice behaviour of the cooperators (see Dugatkin 1997 for a review of group
versus individual selection in relation to cooperation).
The model developed here will consider only two-person interactions, m
which the individuals concerned must decide whether to cooperate or not. Again, this
scenario will be illustrated with a story: Imagine two individuals, Romeo and Juliet,
who simultaneously arrive at a particularly rich food source. Both animals have two
options open to them: they may either offer to share the food or they can threaten the
other individual in the hope of gaining all the food for themselves. If one individual
threatens, and the other offers to share (i.e. cooperate) then the aggressive individual
will gain everything at the expense of the cooperator. If both individuals threaten
then both do badly since they will each be forced to expend time and energy fighting
for the food. Finally, if both individuals offer to cooperate, then the food is shared
and both animals do quite well. We can assign pay-offs to each possible outcome as
follows: the highest pay-off (5 points) applies when an animal threatens against a
potential sharer; the next highest (3 points) applies if both animals share; a fairly low
pay-off (1 point) applies if both individuals threaten; the lowest payoff (0 points)
applies when a cooperator faces a threatener. As long as the pay-offs are ranked in
this order of magnitude then this situation is equivalent to a 'Prisoner's Dilemma'
(Axelrod and Dion 1988; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Binmore 1992, 1994; Trivers
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1971) I th Prisoner" DOlo,
. n e nsoner s I emma shanng IS known as cooperating, and threatening
as defecting. Figure 1.2 shows the relevant pay-offs.
Romeo
c D
Juliet
C 3 5
3 0
D 0 1
5 1
Figure 1.2: The pay-ofT matrix for the Prisoner's Dilemma. Cooperation (C) and
defection (D) are equivalent to sharing and threatening respectively (see text).
Juliet Romeo Romeo's pay-off
Cooperates Cooperates 3
Defects 5
Defects Cooperates 0
Defects 1
Figure 1.3: Strategy choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma. The table shows Romeo's
possible pay-offs in relation to Juliet's decision to cooperate (share) or defect
(threaten). Whatever Romeo assumes Juliet will do, he will always gain a higher pay-
off if he defects.
35
What should Romeo do, cooperate (share) or defect (threaten)? The possible
pay-offs of each course of action are shown in figure 1.3. If Romeo assumes that
Juliet is going to cooperate (share), then his best course of action is to defect
(threaten) and thus gain 5 points (rather than 3). If, on the other hand, Romeo
assumes that Juliet will defect (threaten) he should also defect: he will only gain 1
point, but this is at least better than getting nothing. In fact, whatever Romeo
assumes Juliet is going to do, it is always better for him to defect (threaten). Here lies
the paradox of the game. If we assume that Juliet is as rational as Romeo then she,
will also conclude that her best option is to defect (threaten). The inevitable outcome
is that they will both defect and gain a pay-off of just 1 point, far worse than the 3
points they would have gained if they had both cooperated.
While in the "one-shot" Prisoner's Dilemma it is always best to defect, the
repeated (or iterated) Prisoner's Dilemma opens a doorway for cooperation to emerge.
The expectation of future interactions makes cooperation an attractive option. If for two
players the probability future interactions, w, is high, then there is no single best
strategy. Strategy choice depends critically upon the behaviour of the other player, and
the stability of a strategy depends upon the frequency of other strategies in the
population (there is no evolutionary stable strategy, Boyd and Lorberbaum 1987). None
the less, the higher the value of w the better it is to adopt some kind of cooperative
strategy. Axelrod and Hamilton ran a series of computer tournaments in order to
determine the best, most robust strategies for playing the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
(Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984). One of the simplest and most effective is
called ''TIT-FOR-TAT' where a player reciprocates the behaviour ofthe other player in
their previous game so that cooperation is rewarded with cooperation and defection is
punished with defection.
While TIT-FOR-TAT has become synonymous with the Prisoner's Dilemma
it is not necessarily the best strategy, there are others that can do even better. One of
the problems with TIT-FOR-TAT is that if two TIT-FOR-TAT players meet, and
one of them makes a mistake, then it can result in a continuous cycle of punishment
and thus low pay-offs. This continual recrimination can be avoided by TIT-FOR-
TWO-TATS2 which is the same as TIT-FOR-TAT but defects only after the other
2 Other solutions to this problem are 'generous' TIT-FOR-TAT (Nowak and Sigmund 1992) and
FIRM-BUT-FAIR (Frean 1996).
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player has defected twice. Another problem with TIT-FOR-TAT (and also TIT-FOR-
TWO TATS) is that it can be invaded by a population of players who always
cooperate (ALLC) whose behaviour is indistinguishable from TIT-FOR-TAT in the
absence of more nasty strategies. The problem with this is that ALLC weakens the
TIT-FOR-TAT population because ALLC is vulnerable to exploitation by invading
defecting strategies. PAVLOV, proposed by Nowak and Sigmund (1993) avoids this
problem, as well as the problem of cycles of recrimination. PAVLOV players
cooperate only if both players chose the same action in the previous round, hence
they can establish cooperative relationships with TIT-FOR-TAT-like players, but
will also exploit ALLC players. Even so, TIT-FOR-TAT is still a robust strategy and
can be very important in establishing cooperation, in particular Nowak and Sigmund
(1992) have found that it can act as a catalyst for other cooperative strategies.
Trivers brought the Prisoner's Dilemma to the attention of biologists in 1971,
demonstrating its value as a model of "reciprocal altruism'". This was particularly
important in explaining how cooperation might evolve between non-relatives,
following in the footsteps of Hamilton's (1964a,b) earlier work which showed the
clear gene-level benefits that could arise from cooperation between kin. Trivers
predicted that altruism was most likely to occur when: 1) an animal has a long life-
span (i.e. w is potentially large); 2) small numbers of individuals repeatedly interact
with each other; and 3) the costs and benefits for a pair of altruists are roughly
similar, or if there is a high degree of mutual dependence (e.g. for avoidance of
predators). As Trivers noted, most primate species fulfil all of these criteria, and thus
"primates are almost an ideal species in which to search for reciprocal altruism"
(Trivers 1971 p.37). Trivers' paper stimulated an enormous amount of research, both
practical and theoretical. While many instances of cooperation have been observed
in the field, relatively few of these obey the rules of TIT-FOR-TAT, or are clear cut
cases of reciprocal altruism (these will be discussed in chapter 2). This has lead to
some criticism ofthe Prisoner's Dilemma as a model of cooperation.
Connor (1995) and Connor and Curry (1995) argue that many cases that look
like altruism are actually pseudo-reciprocal since the 'altruist' also gains a benefit
from the altruistic act. For instance, food calls in cliff swallows (Hirundo
3 Outside of the biological community, the Prisoner's Dilemma was a well known, and well studied,
game well before this time. Accordin~ to Binmore (1994~ the gam~ w~s first formulated by Dresher
and Flood in 1950. It is also very similar to Maynard-Sooth and Price s (1973) Hawk-Dove game.
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pyrrhonota) which appear to be altruistic since they alert other birds to a food source,
actually serve to increase the caller's foraging efficiency. Dugatkin et al. (1992) call
this by-product mutualism, where selfishness results in cooperation because the
environment, or some agent within it, is so adverse that it forms a common enemy.
At the crux of this argument are two factors. Firstly, for an exchange to be truly
reciprocal there should be a net loser and a net winner whose roles are exchanged in
future interactions (Noe 1990). To clarify this issue, Nunney (1985) draws attention
to the difference between strong and weak altruism. A weakly altruistic, or
'benevolent', act is one that increase the fitness of an individual but also increases the
fitness of its neighbours, whilst in strong altruism there is a direct cost to the altruist.
However, in practice it may be very difficult to distinguish the two, since repeated
rounds of reciprocal altruism look like mutualism (Boyd 1988).
The second argument in favour of mutualism as an explanation of
cooperation is that in reciprocal altruism there should be a time delay between
exchange of favours (Trivers 1971 p.39):
" Reciprocal altruism can also be viewed as a symbiosis, each partner
helping the other while he helps himself The symbiosis has a time lag,
however; one partner helps the other and then must wait a period of time
before he is helped in tum."
Although in the Prisoner's Dilemma players appear to make their decision to cooperate
or defect simultaneously, the opportunity to reward cooperation or punish defection
does not present itself until the players meet again in the next game (Boyd 1988).
Cooperation is contingent on the other players past behaviour and in that sense there is a
time delay. Mesterton-Gibbons and Dugatkin suggest that the consideration of time
scale may be a useful way of distinguishing by-product mutualism from reciprocal
altruism (Mesterton-Gibbons and Dugatkin 1997 p.553):
''The importance of two time scales, a shorter one on which cooperation is
perceived as a problem and a longer one in which it is perceived as the
solution, is hard to overemphasise. An important difference between
reciprocal altruism and by-product mutualism is that the first categ?ry
always invokes a long time scale to resolve a problem of cooperation
perceived on an intermediate time scale, whereas the second c~tegory
often invokes an intermediate time scale to resolve a problem perceived on
a short time scale."
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At the bottom line, whether a particular situation is by-product mutualism or reciprocal
altruism in the longer term, in the short term, the behaviour of each player should be
regarded with respect to the alternative behaviour i.e. defection. It will always pay in
the short term to defect (Boyd 1988). In fact, the Prisoner's Dilemma is neither
mutualistic or antagonistic but some where in-between (Sigmund 1995 p.186):
"The interests of the players are neither diametrically opposed, or identical
..... Most social and biological interactions are closer to the Prisoner's
Dilemma than to poker. Even if the interests conflict, they usually do not
clash head on."
Dugatkin et al. (1992) believe that the major weakness of the Prisoner's
Dilemma is that it does not permit communication. They argue that cooperation
requires explicit signalling of intentions, such as the wish to collaborate or the threat of
terminating the collaboration. Yet, the Prisoner's Dilemma model implicitly implies
communication. Willingness to cooperate, forgiveness and punishment are
communicated through actions rather than signals. The addition of more complex
signalling to Prisoner's Dilemma models is often accompanied by partner choice and
other more elaborate behaviours (Casti 1994). The addition of communication to the
Prisoner's Dilemma certainly refines the game, but it does not dramatically change the
nature of the results. For instance, communication allows more associative patterns of
behaviour so that cooperators can avoid defectors, whilst defectors can home in on and
exploit suckers (Casti 1994; Nettle and Dunbar 1997).
Noe (1990, 1992) also points out that the lack of communication in the
Prisoner's Dilemma is a major short-falling, but believes that communication is not
appropriate to a Prisoner's Dilemma type model. The reason for this is that cheats could
send out false signals, indicating a willingness to cooperate, but would defect as soon as
the other decided to cooperate. There is clearly a risk associated with communication
that affects many different species in many different contexts besides cooperation.
Warning signals in insects, which indicate that they are poisonous or carry a sting, are
constantly evolving and changing due to mimics diluting the power of the signal. This
effect has not prevented the evolution of communication, but has made its evolution a
dynamic ever changing process as the signaller, the signalled and the cheaters compete
in an evolutionary arms race (Dawkins, 1989). Nettle and Dunbar (1997) argue that
human dialects may have emerged from just such a process.
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The first primate study into reciprocal altruism was done by Packer (1977) with
olive baboons. Male olive baboons, when in conflict with another male, will often
solicit aid from a third, previously uninvolved, male. This action often results in support
from the solicited male. Packer found that such situations arise over access to estrous
females, and that on those occasions when coalitions 'won' the female, it was always
the soliciting male that gained reproductive access. In other words, helping males gain
no immediate benefit from the interaction, but risk substantial costs. Packer postulated
that these coalitions must be reciprocal and found that individual males gave support
most often to those that supported them. These results were also found by Smuts (1985)
but are disputed by Noe (1990) on the grounds that the sample sizes are too small to
show a reciprocal effect.
Noe (1986, 1992; see also Noe and Hammerstein 1994) argues that reciprocal
altruism is not a good model of baboon coalitions because: 1) the division of benefits
can range from symmetrical to very asymmetrical; 2) bargaining is crucial to the
transfer of'pay-offs; and 3) no two allies are likely to have the same options, moreover,
the more options that you have the more power you can yield. Generally, there is
considerable disagreement over whether baboons are exhibiting reciprocal altruism or
not. Bercovitch (1988) has looked at coalitions in male savannah baboons, who also
form alliances to gain access to estrous females. He found that whilst males had
preferred allies, this preference was not necessarily reciprocal (although there were
individual cases where it clearly was). While male coalitions are indubitable examples
of cooperation, reciprocal altruism may be too simple to explain the complex patterns of
coalition formation especially in cases where individuals can differ dramatically in their
aid-giving potential.
It is, in retrospect, not surprising that the evidence for reciprocal altruism is
scant and controversial (but see discussion in chapter 2). Reciprocity is expected in the
same contexts as kin selection and tit-for-tat behaviour looks identical to unconditional
altruism (Boyd 1992). Furthermore, reciprocal altruism becomes difficult to monitor in
the wild when it involves the exchange of different cooperative acts. For example,
grooming may be rewarded by help during an agonistic dispute as happens in vervets
(Seyfarth and Cheney 1984) and macaques (Hemelrijk 1990, 1994). In these cases
assessment ofcosts, benefits and fitness effects becomes difficult.
Problems in applying the Prisoner's Dilemma are further magnified when we
recognise that different individuals have different abilities to give and receive aid,
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depending on their sex, age and rank. For instance, a high ranking individual has the
capacity to confer significant benefits to a subordinate by helping them, at a relatively
small cost to themselves. On the other hand, the dominant individual may actually
receive very little benefit from cooperation by the subordinate, although the costs to that
individual may be great. Boyd (1992) has found that when the costs and benefits of
cooperation vary in this way unbalanced reciprocity may result, where some individuals
cooperate more often than others. For example, a dominant animal may cooperate
infrequently with a subordinate, while the subordinate cooperates at every opportunity.
In primates age, rank and sex are likely to affect fundamentally cooperative strategies.
For instance, Hemelrijk and Ek (1991) found that female chimpanzees use different
cooperative strategies to males. Both males and females are good reciprocal altruists
when it comes to exchanging grooming. Females also exchanged grooming for support.
However, the coalitionary behaviour of males was dependent upon the social context.
Males only reciprocated support during periods when the dominance hierarchy was
unstable. Hemelrijk and Ek suggest that contradictory results on reciprocal altruism in
baboons (described above) may be caused by different social contexts.
Finally, it may be too much to expect that animals will behave exactly as game
theorists predict. Binmore et al. (1991 p.314) note that even humans are not "natural
gamesmen", capable of computing all the possible repercussions of a behaviour, and
perfectly predicting the behaviours of others. Yet, humans and other animals regularly
find themselves in situations that mirror the Prisoner's Dilemma. Therefore, it is
reasonable to suppose that evolution" has equipped them with rules of thumb, or
predispositions to behaviours, that enable them to cope with these situations. It is in
predicting which 'rules of thumb' will confer the greatest benefits to the animal or
person concerned that game theory comes into its own. Game theory looks at what
people (and/or animals) ought to do, not what they actually do. However, evolution
pushes organisms towards the behaviours that game theory predicts (Binmore 1990).
In sum: the Prisoner's Dilemma encapsulates the problem of cooperation: that
is, that the long term benefits of cooperation are outweighed by the short term
advantages of cheating or defecting. In the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, cooperation
can emerge if the expectation of future interactions is high. The Prisoner's Dilemma
model is usually associated with reciprocal altruism, however, there are many other
4 Social learning may also be important in this respect. This will be discussed further in chapter 6.
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possible strategies. This fact has not been well recognised in field studies and has
therefore led to rather mixed results. Social context is likely to affect the kinds of
cooperative strategies that individuals employ: sex, age, status and the stability of the
dominance heirachy are likely to be especially important in primates. However,
despite a vast literature exploring many different refinements to the Prisoner's
Dilemma (see Dugatkin 1997 for a summary) this particular problem has received
very little attention. For this reason, this research uses the Prisoner's Dilemma game
to explore a particularly important social factor that is likely to affect an individual's
strategy choice: gender. What kinds of cooperative strategies are best in groups of
mixed sex?
1.2.3. Assumption 3: Sex differences in behaviour arise from sex
differences in the energetic cost of reproduction
Trivers' parental investment theory was introduced in section 1.1. To recap,
Trivers (1972) showed that breeding systems could best be understood in terms of
the relative reproductive effort of both sexes. Reproductive effort measures the cost
of reproduction as the extent to which a single reproductive event detracts from an
individual's ability to invest in future offspring. It consists of two components,
parental investment and mating costs. Because of the constraints of gestation and
lactation, mammalian females are likely to invest most heavily in parental care. In
contrast, males are not biologically obliged to invest heavily in offspring, and are
more likely to incur costs that are related to finding, attracting and defending a mate.
In short, sex differences in reproductive effort translate into sex differences in
behaviour.
Reproductive effort is not an easy quantity to measure (as we shall see in
chapter 4), especially since it can involve many different types of behaviour.
However, there are two common currencies that cross all categories of behaviour:
time and energy. Since different activities may take equivalent amounts of time, but
involve very different amounts ofenergy (fighting, for instance, is more energetically
costly than grooming) energetic costs may provide a closer approximation to the true
costs of reproduction. In reality, the true cost of reproduction is impossible to
measure, since it includes potential as well as actual events. For instance, a male
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baboon that defends an infant from another individual may incur rather low energetic
costs, but risks the potentially high costs of injury. It is, however, impossible to
measure potential costs, and energetic costs may provide a meaningful estimate of
reproductive effort. In fact, energetic costs associated with reproduction can be quite
substantial, and influence the behaviour and reproductive success of both males and
females.
The energetic cost of reproduction is rarely measured directly, however, there
are many indirect indications that energetic costs are substantial. There is a
considerable body of evidence suggesting that access to resources is an important
factor in determining female reproductive success. McFarland (1997) found that both
time to conception and infant survivorship were influenced by female body condition
in pigtail macaques. Females with higher percentages of body fat conceived after a
shorter time consorting with males than those females with less fat. What is more,
still births, abortions and infant deaths were reduced in those females that were
heavier and fatter. Improved nutrition has been found to increase infant survivorship
in a number of other primate species. Among provisioned Japanese macaques at
Koshima, infant survivorship to one year of age was 85.10/0, compared to 31.2%
when this group was not provisioned (Mori 1979; Watanabe et al. 1992). In vervets
at Amboseli 61% of infants in the highest quality environment survived their first
year, compared with just 42% in the group in the lowest quality habitat (Cheney et
al. 1988). It is possible that availability of resources limits a mothers ability to
produce milk for her offspring, for instance in baboons milk production is reduced in
underfed mothers (Roberts and Coward 1985). Furthermore, a mothers ability to feed
her offspring may be crucial in the long as well as short term. A ten year study on
baboons by Altmann (1991) showed a correlation between an individual's diet at
weaning and the number of surviving offspring born to that individual. This suggests
the intriguing possibility that diet during weaning may affect lifetime reproductive
success.
McFarland (1997) found that in pigtail macaques fluctuations in female body
weight correspond with different reproductive stages. On this basis, McFarland
concluded that lactation is the most demanding phase of the reproductive cycle.
Lactation imposes enormous energetic demands on the female, and females lose
weight during lactation in most wild populations (Altmann 1980; Bercovitch 1987).
Muruthi et al. (1991) found that in baboons female energy intake increases by 570/0
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when pregnant or lactating. Gittleman and Thompson (1988) estimate that across all
mammalian species calorific intake during lactation is between 66% and 188%
greater than at other times. Increased energy intake during the reproductive cycle can
minimise the impact of lactation and gestation on a female's energy reserves,
allowing her to reproduce again sooner. Improved access to resources has been
shown to reduce inter-birth interval in Japanese macaques (Fedigan 1997), baboons
(Bercovitch 1987; Strum and Western 1982) and vervets (Lee 1987). For example,
Strum and Western (1982) found that inter-birth intervals almost doubled in baboons
over a five year period of declining food availability, from 17.4 months to 30.3
months. Humans are no exception; in Guatemalan and Gambian women diet
supplements have the effect of shortening inter-birth interval (Chavez and Martinez
1973: Delgado et al. 1978; Prentice et al. 1986).
Availability of food and physical condition also influence age of sexual
maturity and age of first reproduction (McFarland 1997). Captive primates reach
sexual maturity and conceive earlier than those in the wild. For instance captive
baboons (Altmann et al. 1977; Altmann and Alberts 1987) and chimpanzees (Coe et
al. 1973; Goodall 1986) conceive around two years earlier than their wild
counterparts. In free-ranging baboons at Amboseli, females of a group that had
access to a garbage pit achieved estrous at just 3.3 years of age, around two years
earlier than females in all other wild groups (Altmann and Muruthi 1988). In wild
vervets, groups living in higher quality habitats have a mean age at first reproduction
more than one year younger than those females in the lowest quality habitat (Cheney
et al. 1988).
Female primates may adjust either their behaviour or their energy intake to
compensate for increased energetic demands of reproduction. Lactating howler
monkeys spend more time feeding than other females (C.C. Smith 1977) and in
baboons feeding time increases during the later stages of pregnancy (Silk 1986).
Other baboon studies have found that lactating females sacrifice either social or
resting time in favour of longer feeding bouts (Altmann 1980; Dunbar and Dunbar
1988). Captive galagos and wild guenons eat food of higher protein content during
pregnancy and lactation (Sauther and Nash 1987; Gautier-Hion 1980).
Taken together, the evidence clearly suggests that females incur considerable
energetic costs associated with reproduction, especially gestation and lactation.
Energetic costs incurred by males are likely to arise from rather different activities
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but may be substantial none the less. Males in multi-male mating systems tend to
have larger testes, both in primates (Harcourt et al. (1981) and mammals in general
(Kenagy and Trombulak 1986). The energetic costs of maintaining mature-sized
testes is more demanding than the energetic costs of growth (Kenagy and Trombulak
1986) and in humans sperm production ceases following dramatic weight loss (Frisch
1984). This implies that at least in some instances, males will have relatively high
energetic costs associated with the production of sperm.
Males will also incur energetic costs due to the demands of courtship, mate-
guarding and male-male competition. Salsbury and Armitage (1995) found that
variation in energy expenditure in male yellow-bellied marmots was best explained
by the number and dispersion of the females defended by males. In male red deer,
grazing time is reduced to 50/0 during the breeding season, as compared with 44% at
other times (Clutton-Brock et al. 1988) and male elephant seals do not feed at all
during the two to three month breeding season and hence lose around a third of their
body mass (Reiter 1997). In polygynous species such as red deer and elephant seals,
larger males gain greater reproductive success.
In primates larger males do not necessarily have a reproductive advantage
(Bercovitch 1989). Rather, factors such as age, duration of residency, coalitions with
other males, friendships with females and other social skills may have a greater
influence on a male primate's reproductive success than size alone. The energetic
costs of these activities have not been studied. But, while male body size per se may
not be as important in primates as in other mammals, body fat and body condition
may be as important for primate males as it is for primate females. Male squirrell
monkeys show seasonal fluctuations in weight, gaining at least 20% of their body
weight during the reproductive period (Kinzey 1997). Bercovitch and Nurnberg
(1996) found that only 8 out of 21 male vervets in their study group sired offspring.
While sires and non-sires did not differ in body size, sires began the mating season
with considerably more body fat than non-sires. This excess fat was lost during
mating so that, by the end of the mating season, sires had the same amount of body
fat as non-sires. Bercovitch and Nurnberg suggest that as with females, body fat
provides males with a buffer against the energetic stress associated with
reproduction. Observations on baboons support this conclusion. Alberts et al. (1996)
found that in savannah baboons mate-guarding compromised male feeding
efficiency. Packer (1977) noted a similar phenomena, commenting that consorting
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males would often appear exhausted due to lack of food and sleep. Rasmussen
(1985) has shown that the amount of time male baboons (Papio cynocephalus) spend
feeding increases with rank, and that during consortships higher ranking males suffer
a greater decrease in feeding time compared with low ranking males. Similar
energetic costs are likely to apply to other primate genera. In gold lion tamarins male
body mass decreases by 120/0 during June, when male aggression chasing and mate
guarding is greatest (Dietz et al. 1993).
In the light of these studies it would be fair to suggest that males, as well as
females, must meet the energetic costs of reproduction if they are to reproduce
successully. There are very few studies that have compared male and female
energetic costs although there are a handful of observations that suggest that they
may be greater for females. Hiraiwa-Hasegawa (1997) observes that in many species
adult females feed for longer than males, and that they prefer higher-calorie foods,
and suggests that "this is probably due to their higher calorific need for maintaining
pregnancy and lactation" (Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, 1997 p.72). Female siamangs feed for
longer periods and at a faster rate than males (Chivers 1977), and female mangabeys
spend a greater proportion of time feeding than males (Waser 1977). It has been
suggested that female vervets (Baldellou and Adan 1997; Lee 1984) and baboons
(Dunbar and Dunbar 1988) spend more time feeding in the mating season in order to
outweigh the costs of reproduction.
Human women are consistently found to be fatter than men (McFarland
1997). For instance Forbes (1987) found that between the ages of 16 and 18 the body
composition of a well-nourished woman is 26-280/0 fat, whilst that of a man is about
14% fat. It is likely that in human females a certain minimal level of body fat is
required for successful ovarian function (Frisch and Revelle 1970; Frisch 1988) and
lactation (McFarland 1997) although the exact nature of this relationship may be
quite complex (McFarland 1997; Pond 1997). Sex differences in the amount of fat in
non-human primates have also been found (e.g. baboons, Rutenberg et al. 1987;
pigtail macaques, Walike et al. 1977; orangutans, Morbeck and Zihlman 1988)
although not to the same magnitude as is found in humans. Again, these studies
suggest that energetic demands of reproduction are greater for females. However,
none of this evidence is conclusive since each study focuses on only a single aspect
of reproduction whereas a true measure of energetic costs should account for all
activities that contribute to reproductive success.
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In sum, there is a growing body of evidence demonstrating that both males
and females incur an energetic cost of reproduction. Since the ability to pay this cost
can have a serious effect on reproductive success it is surprising that there has been
very little research that explores either how energetic costs for males and females
compare, or how sex differences in energetic costs can affect behaviour. In part, this
is because energetic costs are very difficult to measure in practice and in this respect
modelling is a particularly valuable means of formulating predictions. Therefore, my
third and final assumption, that "sex differences in behaviour arise from sex
differences in the energetic cost of reproduction", is a hypothesis rather than a fact. It
is this hypothesis that lies at the heart of this research and from which its central
question arises: How do sex differences in the energetic cost of reproduction affect
the evolution of cooperation, and ultimately the structure of social groups.
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1.3. From Theory to Practice
In this thesis models will be developed, based on the Prisoner's Dilemma,
which examine how the energetic costs of reproduction for males and females affect
the evolution of cooperation. In doing so, a framework will be built from which we
can begin to understand how sex differences in energetic costs affect the structure of
social groups. This work is particularly relevant with respect to the evolution of
hominid social groups, which are in many ways so different from those of other
primates because of the great changes in energetic costs that have arisen during
hominid evolution.
Since the energetic cost of reproduction is an abstract and universal variable
there is no reason why these models could not be applied to other, non-primate
species. Indeed, since many of the ideas dealt with here are new, it will be necessary
on occasion to use data from the non-primate literature for additional support. In
some cases my choice of examples may appear rather ad hoc, and arguments
developed should certainly be taken as suggestions or predictions, rather than
conclusions. My only claim is that this work is an attempt to create a general model,
and its application to particular situations awaits further testing.
The thesis will proceed as follows. In chapters 2 and 3 computer models are
used to examine the conditions under which different cooperative strategies emerge.
It will be shown that differences in the energetic cost of reproduction for males and
females affect cooperative strategies both between members of the same sex, and of
different sex. In the fourth chapter data from living primates will be used to estimate
energetic costs of reproduction for each sex for a wide variety of species. These
estimates will then be used to test the predictions that arise from the previous
chapters. Of particular interest will be the conditions under which male care giving
occurs. Chapter 5 is, again, largely theoretical and explores the robusticity of the
model under different environmental conditions. In particular, how environment
quality and seasonality affect cooperative strategies. Finally, in chapter 6, we will
return to the evolution of hominid social groups.
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CHAPTER 2
The Evolution of Cooperation in Groups of Mixed Sex
The Prisoner's Dilemma is an excellent tool for modelling the evolution of
cooperation as it reflects both the long term benefits of cooperation and the short
term benefits of defection. However, its weakness is that it assumes that all individuals
are identical, while in the real world differences in rank, age and sex are likely to
affect an individual's capacity both to give and receive aid (see chapter 1). This
chapter examines how sex differences affect the evolution of cooperation, where it is
assumed that the fundamental difference between males and females is in their
energetic cost of reproduction. This assumption has been discussed in chapter 1, and
will be examined in detail in chapter 4.
A model of cooperation will be developed for a population of mixed sex,
where individuals interact regularly, and have a memory of the outcomes of these
interactions. The model, as described below, forms the basis of most of the
experiments presented in this thesis. All experiments use the principal of natural
selection to find the fittest strategies within a population of individuals. Every
individual has the programming equivalent of a genetic code which not only
determines its behaviour, but is also passed onto its offspring through a process
analogous to sexual reproduction. Over thousands of generations those individuals
with the fittest genetic codes have the most offspring, so that the model evolves over
time.
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2.1 The Basic Model
Every model in this thesis has the same general format, which is described
here. They are all evolutionary models in which a population of agents is created, and
the most successful agents are those that produce the most offspring. In order to
reproduce agents must pay a reproductive cost, RC, and the only way to pay this cost
is to gain points by playing the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with other members of the
population. When an agent has accumulated enough points it is able to reproduce with
an agent of the opposite sex who also has enough points. Hence the players with the
best strategies for playing the Prisoner's Dilemma will have the most offspring. Each
agent has a set of chromosomes or 'strategy strings' which dictate its strategy for
playing the game. During reproduction the strategy strings of each parent are 'crossed
over' (see fig. 2.1) and may mutate (with a chance of 1/5000). In this way each
offspring inherits a combination of its parents strategy strings and strategies evolve
oyer time. The model is, in effect, a genetic algorithm (Goldberg 1989; Holland,
1992a, 1992b) to determine the best strategies for playing the Prisoner's Dilemma in
groups of mixed sex.
A player's strategy is determined by two factors: 1) the history of interactions
between the players, and 2) the sex of the players. Ikegami (1993) has found that
robust and unexploitable strategies for playing the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ideally
require a memory of the outcomes of the last two games played (strategies with
longer memory lengths were often too specific and thus inflexible). Since this involves
recording two moves (a play of cooperate or defect) for each player it is called a
memory length of size 4. Following Lindgren (1991), the strategy string provides a
response for every possible situation that could arise from a memory length of 4, i.e.
16 possible situations, where a response is encoded as '1' for cooperate and '0' for
defect. For example, if the point on the strategy string labelled 'CCCC' reads '1', this
is interpreted to mean "if both players cooperated on their last two moves, then
cooperate on the next move" (fig. 2.2). Aside from these 16 alleles or bits, the
strategy string must also provide one allele for when an agent meets a new player for
the first time (either 'always cooperate on first move' or 'always defect on first
move'), and four alleles for the second game (responses to histories CC, DD, CD and
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Figure 2.1: Reproduction by crossover
Reproduction involves crossover of the parent's strategy strings. A random point is chosen
at the same point on each string (a), and the parent strings are cut (b). The two parts of the
parent strings are swapped (c) to produce two new offspring (d).
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\
strategy string
1o 1
My opponent cooperated
in game (x-I)
I cooperated in game (x-I)
o
c
1o
If history = CCCC
Then cooperate (1)
/c c
I cooperated in game x I
My opponent
cooperated in game x
If history
Then response
Figure 2.2 The strategy string
The strategy string must provide a response for every possible situation that can arise
during a game, where 1 codes for cooperate and 0 codes for defect. The strategy string is
essentially a look-up table. In this case the rule 'If there has been a history ofCCCC then
cooperate' is being activated.
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DC). In total the strategy string must be 21 bits long (16 + 1+ 4) to cover all possible
situations.
The other important factor is the gender of each player. It cannot be assumed
that a female will behave in the same way with another female as she would with a
male. Four possible situations could arise, which from the point of view of the agent
are:
( 1) I am male, my opponent is male
(2) I am female, my opponent is female
(3) I am male, my opponent is female
(4-) I am female, my opponent is male
Each player carries four strategy strings, one for each of these possible situations.
Although a male, for instance, only requires strategy strings 1 and 3, his daughters
will require information from strings 2 and 4. By carrying all 4 strategy strings a
player contributes to the behaviour of all its children regardless of their sex.
Reproduction occurs through crossover and mutation of the strategy strings.
Crossover is an important part of this process as it creates new strategies through
combination of other, previously successful strategies. During reproduction there is
also a chance that one of the alleles on the strategy strings will mutate, that is switch
from cooperate to defect or visa versa. These mutations create "noise" in the model
which prevents strategies becoming fixed at sub-optimum equilibrium. This means
that the model converges on good strategies more quickly (Binmore and Samuelson
1997). In a population of 650 agents, each of which is comprised of 84 (4 x 21)
different alleles, a mutation rate of 1/5000 yields around 11 mutations per generation.
The program, written in C programming language, is summarised in fig. 2.3.
At the start of each experiment 650 agents are created randomly, i.e. their strategy
strings are generated at random and they are assigned a sex. Each agent also has a
score, which at the start of the experiment is O. Also at the start of the experiment the
cost of reproduction is set for males and females (MRC and FRC respectively). Two
agents are then selected at random to play 100 rounds of the Prisoner's Dilemma.
They gain points according to the pay-off matrix in fig. 1.2 and these are added to
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Start
User sets female cost of reproduction (FRC).
User sets male cost of reproduction (MRC).
Generate 650 agents at random, where each agent has:
- 4 strategy strings.
- sex (male/female).
- score =O.
set generation counter = 0
While generation counter < 20,000 do this:
{
set offspring counter =0
while offspring counter < 650 do this:
{
1. Pick two agents at random.
2. These agents play 100 games of the Prisoner's Dilemma
according to their strategy strings. Each game is scored
according to the pay-off matrix in fig. 1.2. Points gained are
added to the each agent's score.
3. Pick two new agents at random.
4. If agents are of opposite sex, and each have enough points
to reproduce (FRC or MRC) they reproduce by crossover
and mutation of their strategy strings.
Two new offspring are added to a separate offspring array
(randomly assign offspring sex).
FRC or MRC is subtracted from each player's score.
The offspring counter is increased by +2.
}
if offspring counter >= 650 do this:
{
Replace adult population with offspring.
Set offspring counter = O.
Set all scores =O.
Generation counter is increased by +1.
}
}
If generation counter =20,000 do this:
{
Collate and print results.
End.
}
Figure 2.3: The basic model .
The outline for the basic program, used in most of the models descnbed.
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their score. Two newl agents are then selected, and if they are of opposite sex, and
each have enough points they reproduce to create two new offspring. The cost of
reproduction (MRC or FRC) is deducted from each player's score according to their
sex and they are returned to the pool of agents. The offspring are randomly assigned
a sex and put into an offspring array. Any single agent may reproduce several times,
provided it has accumulated enough points during games of the Prisoner's Dilemma.
This process of interaction and reproduction continues until 650 new offspring have
been created. At this point the first generation is complete, and the offspring become
the new parent population who begin a new cycle. This continues for 20,000
generations.
It is important to understand that in this model, the cost of reproduction is the
minimum amount of energy required to produce an offspring. Investment below the
minimum value would result in the death of the infant, and it is assumed that agents
do not waste energy (points) in this way. Agents could invest more than the minimum
amount of energy. Instead it is assumed here that any excess energy is conserved and
contributes to the production of the next offspring. For example, if the cost of
reproduction is 500 and an agent has 700 points, after reproduction its score will be
reduced to 200 points and it must gain only another 300 points (through games of the
Prisoner's Dilemma) in order to reproduce again.
The programs were run on 486 PCs. Simulations would take anywhere from a
few hours to a few days to complete. Each program was extensively tested by fixing
strategy strings to values in which there were known outcomes, and by meticulously
following through each stage of interaction and reproduction when strategy strings
were randomly generated.
1 It is important to note that in this experiment agents are likely to interact with, and reproduce with,
different partners.
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2.2 The Control Experiment
2.2.1 Method
The experiment was first run with male reproductive cost (MRC) equal to
female reproductive cost (FRC). Since this makes males indistinguishable from
females the program was simplified. Agents were not assigned a sex, and were given
only one strategy string which they used in all situations. This means that strategies
are based solely on the history of the interactions, not the sexes of the players. This
functioned to reduce the running times of the programs', and also to simplify the
processing of results. The program code and outline are given in Appendix 1.
The simulation was run for reproductive costs of 1, 100, 200, 500, 1000 and
2000. The results are analysed using the average score per player per game of
Prisoner's Dilemma over the entire experiment. For example, an average score of 3.00
would indicate that players are cooperating, while an average score of 1.00 would
show that players are defecting (see the payoff matrix in fig. 1.2). Intermediate scores
represent intermediate behaviours. Each control experiment was run 30 times.
2.2.2 Results and discussion
The results are presented as a percentage bar chart (fig. 2.4) showing the
percentage of simulations where individuals evolved to be "defectors" (average score
= 1.00 - 1.49), "weak defectors" (average score = 1.5 - 1.99), "weak cooperators"
(average score = 2.00 - 2.49) and "cooperators" (average score = 2.5 - 3.00) for
different costs of reproduction. These categorisations are used throughout this thesis,
along with two further categories: "suckers" (average score < 1.00) and "exploiters"
(average score> 3.00). For brevity these average scores are summarised as <1.00,
1.25, 1.75, 2.25, 2.75 and> 3.00. Note that some of these scores are not obvious
outcomes of the Prisoner's Dilemma pay-off matrix, and this is because over repeated
games many different average scores are possible. For example if on the first tum each
player cooperated, and on the second each player defected, and on the third each
player cooperated and so on, after 100 games they would have scored 200 points
each, or an average of2.00 points per game.
2 In general, each experiment was run for 20,000 generations at least 150 times. Each run lasts from
four hours to two days depending on the model and the parameters used.
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Figure 2.4: The Control Experiment
Each bar represents a summary of the average scores over 30 simulations. An
average score of 1.25 (interval 1.00 - 1.49) indicates most individuals were
defectors, 1.75 (1.50 -1.99) indicates weak defection, 2.25 (2 .00 - 2.49) indicates
weak cooperation and 2.75 (1.50 - 3.00) indicates cooperation. For example, at RC
= 1, in 30% of experiments the average score per agent per game was 1.25, which
means that in most of these games players were playing a strategy of defection.
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Figure 2.5: Fluctuations in average score over the course of an experiment.
Each graph shows three examples of how the average scores change over 20,000
generations when scores are: (a) low RC = 100; and (b) high RC = 500.
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Gene REPRODUCTIVE COST
Locus 1 100 200 500 1000 2000 TFT
CCCC C C C C C
DCCC C C C C
CDCC 0 0 0 0 0
CCDC C C
CCCD C
CCDD C C C C
DDCC C 0
CDDC 0 0 0 0 0
DCCD C C C
DCDC C C C
CDCD 0 0 0 0 0
CDDD C 0 0
DCDD C C 0 C
DDCD 0 0 0 0
DDDC C C 0 0 0
DDDD C C C 0 0
Interpreting the' gene locus', an example:
IF ....
C
I cooperated in the last game /
D
I
D c
and my opponent defected in the last game
and I defected in the game before last
and my opponent cooperated in the game before last
THEN ....
c
cooperate
Table 2.1: The most common alleles on the strategy string
A gene locus is described as cooperative (C), or defective (D), if cooperation or defection is
the most common allele at that locus in at least 60% of exeriments. The columns for RC = 1
and RC = 100 are blank because there was no strong selection for either allele at any locus.
The shaded rows indicate those cases where there is strong selection for a particular allele at
reproductive costs greater than, or equal to 200. TFT shows the alleles expected for a TIT-
FOR-TAT strategist.
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A reproductive cost of 1 is practically no cost at all, and as would be expected
no particular strategy is selected at this cost. Around 25% of simulations resulted in
the evolution of defection strategies, while a similar number evolved cooperative
strategies. At a reproductive cost of 100, cooperation is more common, evolving in
around 500/0 of experiments. At higher reproductive costs there is strong selection for
cooperation. When the reproductive cost is greater than or equal to 200, in almost
every case some kind of cooperative strategy evolved. This clearly indicates that a
reproductive cost of 200 marks the threshold, at or beyond which cooperation is
strongly selected.
Fig. 2.5 shows how typical simulations progress over 20,000 generations. Fig.
2.5a gives 3 examples of how the average scores fluctuate when reproductive cost is
low (RC=100). The graphs are erratic, indicating that the populations never fully
stabilise onto anyone strategy, and new mutations can easily invade the population. In
contrast, at high RC (e.g. RC = 500, fig. 2.5b), all experiments quickly stabilise on a
strategy of cooperation which is very hard to invade. This suggests that as the selection
pressure on agents increases (as the cost of reproduction increases) the model stabilises
more quickly onto good equilibrium.
Given that cooperative strategies are being selected as the cost of
reproduction increases, what kinds of cooperation are being favoured? Are the agents
reciprocal altruists? Does TIT-FOR-TAT evolve? In order to answer these questions, for
each experiment, the frequency of cooperate alleles, averaged over the whole experiment
(i.e. 20,000 generations) was calculated for each ofthe 21 gene-bits on the strategy string.
For instance, if every individual in every generation in every experiment had a cooperate
allele at the gene CCDD, the frequency of cooperate alleles at CCDD would be 100%
indicating strong selection for cooperation at this locus. The null hypothesis is that there is
no selection pressure, which would mean we would expect 50% of alleles at this locus to
be cooperate, and 50% to be defect. The results are summarised in table 2.1. If the
frequency of cooperate alleles is greater than 60%, then that locus is described as being
selected for cooperation (C). If the frequency is less than 40%, then that locus is described
as being selected for defection (D).
When reproductive costs are low (RC=l, RC = 100) there is no consistent
selection for either cooperation or defection, at any locus, across the experiments
(indicated by the blank: columns in table 2.1). This does not mean there is no selection
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within a simulation. Rather, because each run is unique and there are many different
possible strategies, no single strategy is emerging as the best. When reproductive costs are
high., that is greater than 200, strong general patterns do emerge. Cooperation is strongly
selected at the locus CCCC, i.e. runs ofcooperation are being rewarded with cooperation.
Defect alleles are dominant at loci CDCC, CDDC and CDCD, i.e. if an agent cooperates
and its opponent defects it will reply with defection. It appears that players are rewarding
co-operators and punishing detectors, which is consistent with a strategy of TIT-FOR-
TAT (see table 2.1)
There is an interesting way in which the strategies appear to differ from TIT-FOR-
TAT. In three out of four cases at high cost, cooperation is the dominant allele at the
DDDD loci. This means that if both players have played defect for the previous two
rounds they will cooperate. If they were playing TIT-FOR-TAT we would expect
defection after a run of defection. This result was also found by Lindgren (1992), and
indicates a capacity for 'forgiveness'. Its principle advantage is that two TIT-FOR-TAT
players do not become locked into a cycle of punishing defection with defection following
a mistake (or mutation). This is a very interesting result. One of the very few strategies
that is known to beat TIT-FOR-TAT is generous TIT-FOR-TAT (Nowak and Sigmund
1993) which occasionally forgives defections. Nowak and Sigmund (1993) found that in a
world where players occasionally make mistakes generous TIT-FOR-TAT out-competes
TIT-FOR-TAT. It appears that this model is very good at discovering successful
strategies.
Although the strategies that evolve for reproductive costs between 200 and 2000
are broadly similar, there are some subtle differences. Defect alleles are far more common
when RC = 1000 and RC = 2000 as compared with lower reproductive costs. As
reproductive cost increases players become much tougher on defectors and more likely to
exploit potential suckers. This is reminiscent of another strategy called Pavlov, or 'win-
stay/lose-shift' (Nowak and Sigmund 1993). Pavlov is a nice strategy that reciprocates
cooperation, punishes defectors and is forgiving like generous TIT-FOR-TAT. However,
ifPavlov finds a sucker that will always cooperate, it will keep on defecting and exploit
that player. It seems that the higher the cost of reproduction, the greater the incentive to
find winning strategies.
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2.2.3 Summary: Control experiment
The results above show that as the cost of reproduction increases players are more
likely to behave cooperatively during the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Furthermore,
increasing the cost of reproduction effectively strengthens the selection pressure to find
good strategies: populations fix on good solutions in fewer generations, and are more
resistant to new mutations. Variations on the theme of TIT-FOR-TAT dominate over
nastier strategies. At high reproductive costs players are likely to forgive runs of
defection, although as reproductive cost increases players are also more likely to exploit
suckers. The emergence of forgiveness and exploitation in these experiments lS an
indication ofthe power ofthis technique for discovering good strategies.
The results provide a benchmark for looking at a population where there is an
imbalance in male and female reproductive cost, and indicate that RC=200 is the cut-
off value, at or beyond which, reciprocal altruism is expected.
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2.3: The Evolution of Cooperation in Groups of
Mixed Sex (Model I)
2.3.1 Method
This model follows exactly the format described in section 2.2 (the basic
model). An outline of the program, and the program code, is given in appendix 2. In
these experiments male and female costs differ, and the cooperative and competitive
strategies that emerge are compared with the control experiment. The results are very
surprising: strategies deviate greatly from expectations, not only when males play
females but also in games between members of the same sex. In all of these
experiments female cost (FRC) is kept constant at FRC = 1000, while male cost
(MRC) is varied between MRC =1 and MRC = 600. As in the control experiment,
results are summarised as the average score per player per game recorded over the
entire simulation (see section 2.1). The most common strategies have also been
determined using the same methodology as used in the control experiment (again, see
section 2.1). Results will be described by interaction type.
Note that the experiments were also repeated for different population sizes,
numbers of interactions (i.e. the number of rounds of the Prisoner's Dilemma that a
pair play) and mutation rates. None of these factors were found to affect the results in
any important way. At smaller population sizes the time it takes to produce a new
generation is less and so the simulation runs much more quickly. At higher mutation
rates new strategies are generated more quickly, and this speeds up the rate at which
new strategies are selected. However, the types of strategies that evolve are similar
regardless of mutation rate. Also, the affects of mutation rate and population size
interact: small populations with high mutation rates will have similar numbers of
mutations per generation as large populations with low mutation rates.
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2.3.2 Female-female interactions
Interactions between two females evolve in exactly the way expected from the
control study at FRC = 1000. Fig. 2.6 compares the distribution of average scores
from the control experiment (RC = 1000) with this experiment when MRC is at its
highest and lowest values (1 and 600). These graphs show that female-female
interactions are unaffected by the level of male reproductive cost, and that when
female cost is high females almost always adopt a strategy of TIT-FOR-TAT against
other females.
The strategies used by females are very similar to TIT-FOR-TAT, as would be
expected from the control experiment at RC = 1000 (see table 2.2a). Note that in this
instance the capacity for "forgiveness", that is, cooperating after runs of defection,
does not evolve as it did in the control experiment.
2.3.3 Male-male interactions
Interactions between males are considerably different from those expected on
the basis of the control study and are indicative of considerable competition between
males (fig. 2.7 and table 2.2b). When MRC = 1 (2.7a), the expected and observed
results are similar, however at MRC = 100 and above the observed scores are much
lower than those expected from the control experiment. For instance, at MRC = 100
(fig. 2.7b), cooperation is expected in more than half of the experiments, but actually
evolved in less than a quarter. The control experiment strongly predicts cooperation
when MRC >= 200, yet in the mixed sex environment when MRC = 200 (fig. 2.7c)
reciprocal altruism was the dominant strategy in just 27% of the experiments.
Referring to table 2.2b, cooperation is not strongly selected at any gene-locus when
MRC = 200, not even after runs of cooperation (gene locus CCCC).
Even at MRC = 400 (fig. 2.7d) males cooperated in less than half of the runs
and adopt nastier strategies than TIT-FOR-TAT (table 2.2b). While these males are
likely to cooperate after runs of cooperation (CCCC), there is strong selection for
defection at the gene loci CCDC, CCCD and CCDD. That is, males are obeying the
rule "if both players cooperated in the last game then defect". This strategy is quite
opposite to how a TIT-FOR-TAT player would react. Only at very high reproductive
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Expected FRC = 1000
MRC=l
o
o
1
FRC = 1000
MRC=600
Average score per player, per game:
0<1 .00 0 1.25 0 1.75 02.25 2.75 _ > 3.00
Figure 2.6: Female-female interactions (FRC = 1000)
Each pi-chart summarises 30 experiments in terms of the average score per player per game
of Prisoner's Dilemma. In nearly every experiment females were reciprocal altruists.
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MALE REPRODUCTIVE COST
1 100 200 400 600 TFTCCCC C C C C C CDCCC C D C C C CCDCC D C D D D DCCDC D D D D CCCCD C CCCDD C D CDOCC C DCDDC D D D D D DDCCD D C C CDCDC D D D D CCOCO D D D D D DCDDO D D D D D DOCDD C D CDDCD D D D D D D
DDDC D D D D D DDODD D D D D D D
a) Female-female interactions
MALE REPRODUCTIVE COST
1 100 200 400 600 TFT
CCCC C C C
DCCC D D C
CDCC D D D D
CCDC D C
CCCD D D D C
CCDD D D C
DDCC D D
CDDC D D D D D
DCCD C
DCDC D D C
COCO D D D D D
CDDD D D D
DCDD C D C
DDCD D D D D
DDDC D D
DODD D D D D
b) Male-male interactions
Table 2.2: The most common alleles on the (a) female-female and (b) male-male
strategy strings.
The tables show the most common alleles for different values of male reproductive
costs where female reproductive costs are constant at FRC = 1000. The table should
be interpreted in the same way as table 2.1.
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Expected
Average score per player, per game:
Observed
o
o
1
a) MRC= 1
b) MRC = 100
c) MRC = 200
o < 1.00 0 1.25 0 1.75 0 2.25
Figure 2.7: Male-male interactions (FRC = 1000)
Expected results are derived from the control experiment.
2.75 _ > 3.00
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Expected Observed
o
o
1
d) MRC = 400
e) MRC = 600
Average score per player, per game:
o < 1.00 0 1.25 0 1.75 0 2.25 2.75 _ > 3.00
Figure 2.7: Male-male interactions (FRC = 1000) continued
Expected results are derived from the control experiment.
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costs do males tend to cooperate. At MRC = 600 males evolved cooperative
strategies in around two thirds of the experiments.
Overall these results indicate that males behave much less cooperatively in the
presence of females than they would in a single sex population. Even in this relatively
simple model there is greater competition between males than between females due to
sex differences in the energetic cost of reproduction. For females, gaining enough
points to reproduce is the primary concern. Males also have to acquire enough points
to meet the male cost of reproduction by the time that the females are ready to
reproduce. But. if the female cost of reproduction is much higher than the male cost
of reproduction, this should be a relatively simple task. Males may stand a better
chance of maximising their fitness if they prevent other males from acquiring points.
This means that males may be defecting in order to minimise their opponent's fitness,
rather than to maximise their own. Another factor is that at lower values of MRC the
selection pressures on male strategy strings are considerably weaker than those acting
on female strategy strings. Whether or not a male scores 100 points or 300 points in
each bout of male-male interactions may make little difference if it takes females 3 or
4 bouts of interactions to gain the 1000 points required to reproduce. Thus, males
may be able to afford more risky, competitive strategies.
2.3.4 Mixed sex interactions
Interactions between males and females are far more complex than those of
single sex interactions and are crucially dependent on the ratio of male and female
reproductive costs. Depending on the ratio of FRC to MRC three different patterns of
behaviour emerge (fig. 2.8). Reciprocal altruism evolves when MRC approaches FRC,
for example when MRC = 600 both males and females participate in a reciprocally
cooperative relationship in two-thirds of the experiments (fig. 2.8a). The second
pattern occurs when MRC is greater than 100, but less than 600. There is
considerable variation between these experiments indicating a wide variety of
behaviour patterns and in many cases high levels of competition (figs 2.8b & c). At
MRC = 400 (fig. 2.8b) while the overall level of cooperation is quite high, males
consistently score more highly than females. At MRC = 200 (fig. 2.8c), cooperative
relationships are established in only a third of cases. These results may reflect the fact
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Expected Observed
D
o
1
a) FRC = 1000
MRC=600
b) FRC = 1000
MRC=400
c) FRC = 1000
MRC=200
Average score per player, per game:
0<1 .00 0 1.25 0 1.75 0 2.25
Figur e 2.8: Mixed sex interactions (FRC = 1000)
2.75 _ > 3.00
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d) FRC = 1000
MRC= 100
e) FRC = 1000
MRC=I
Average score per player, per game:
0<1 .00 0 1.25 0 1.75 1....-....... 2.25 2.75 _ > 3.00
Figur e 2.8: Mixed sex interactions (FRC = 1000) continued
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MALE REPRODUCTIVE COST
1 100 200 400 600 TFTCCCC C CDCCC
COCC C CD D D DCCDC D D CCCCD
CCDD D C
DDCC C CD D DCDDC D D D D DDCCD D C C COCOC C D D CCOCO D D D D D DCDDD D DDCDD D D CDDCD D D D D DDDDC D D D D DDODD D D D D D
a) Males
MALE REPRODUCTIVE COST
1 100 200 400 600 TFT
CCCC D C C C C
DCCC C C C C C
CDCC D D D D D D
CCOC D D D D D C
CCCO D D C
CCDO D D D D D C
ODCC D D D D D
CDDC D D D D D D
DCCO D D C C C
DCDC D D D D D C
COCO D D D D D D
CDOO D D
DCDD D D D D C
DDCD D D D D D D
DDOC D D D D D
DODD C C D
b) Females
Table 2.3: The most common alleles used during male-female interactions
The tables show the most common alleles for different values of male reproductive
costs where female reproductive costs are constant at FRC = 1000. Table (a) shows the
strategies males most commonly use against females, and (b) shows those that females
use against males. The table should be interpreted in the same way as table 2.1.
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that males, because of their lower reproductive cost, are more able to take the risk of
defecting.
The third pattern of male-female behaviour is very distinctive. When male
costs are much lower than female costs, pay-offs become skewed in favour of females
(figs 2.8.d & e). When MRC = 100, females consistently achieve higher scores than
males. In nearly 75% of experiments females receive an average pay-off of 2.75 or
more points, often scoring more than 3.00 points per game. Males, on the other hand,
receive low scores in most of the runs. This situation is particularly marked when
MRC = 1. when females attain a score greater than 3.00 in 80% of cases, while the
majority of males get very low scores in return (1.00, or less than 1.00). These scores
reflect a behaviour pattern where males always cooperate with females even though
the females do not return the same level of cooperation i.e. females are exploiting
male "suckers". Because males do not get an equal pay-back for their cooperation,
this behaviour cannot be described as reciprocal altruism. It would be more accurate
to describe males as non-reciprocal altruists''.
What strategies are males using against females and visa versa? Again, this is
dependent upon reproductive costs, and the strategy strings that evolve reflect the
three patterns ofbehaviour described above (table 2.3). When MRC = 600 both males
and females tend to follow TIT-FOR-TAT like strategies. However, there are
considerable sex differences in strategy when MRC = 200 and MRC = 400. Females
appear to try to follow some kind of cooperative strategy, with strong selection for
cooperation at the CCCC and DCCC loci. Males, on the other hand, are distinctly un-
cooperative with no strong selection for cooperation at any of the gene-loci except
DCCD when MRC = 400. This does not mean that males never cooperate, rather that
there is no typical situation after which males always cooperate, such as after CCCC.
This is reminiscent of male-male strategies at this level of reproductive costs,
indicating that males are generally more competitive.
The difference between male and female strategies at low male reproductive
costs (MRC <=100) is quite distinct (table 2.3). There is very strong selection for
3 Note that even at high reproductive costs, in some cases one sex will get more than three points a
game, that is, occasionally one sex will.be exploited by the other. The di.ff~rence is that while at high
reproductive costs both sexes are exploited equally, when MRC <= 100 It IS always the males that are
exploited to the advantage of the females.
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defect alleles on the female strategy string, in fact defect alleles dominate 81% of the
gene-loci. As already described, females consistently score more highly than males at
low male reproductive costs. In many cases males appear to be non-reciprocal
altruists, cooperating with females even when their cooperation is not reciprocated.
For MRC = 100 the strategy strings for those runs where non-reciprocal altruism
(NRA) evolved were compared with the strategy strings for all other runs (at this
level of MRC). This showed that while males in NRA populations are slightly more
cooperative, the deciding factor is the behaviour of the females. Females in NRA
populations alternate cooperation and defection while the male always cooperates,
leading to an average payoff of 1.50 to the male and 4.00 to the female (figure 2.9).
For males, the pay-off of 1.5 points is slightly better than the 1.00 point they would
receive if both parties defected all of the time. In order for females to maintain this
strategy of alternating cooperation and defection, they should cooperate after DCCC.
This is exactly what happened in 840/0 of simulations in which NRA evolved (as
opposed to 61% of simulations in which it did not). However the distinguishing
characteristic of females in NRA populations is that they will defect following CCCC,
while females in other populations cooperate in this situation.
In short, the evolution of non-reciprocal altruism IS driven by female
behaviour. Males who behave as non-reciprocal altruists are making the best of a bad
situation, gaining 1.5 points per interaction rather than 1.00 point. However, females
cannot afford to be totally nasty: they will often cooperate following a string of
defections (DDDD in table 2.3b) rather than get stuck on a very low scoring strategy.
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Figure 2.9: Examples of non-reciprocal altruism
Two examples of runs at MRC = 100, FRC = 1000, in which non-reciprocal altruism
evolved. Females gain an average score of approximately 4.00 points per game, whilst
males score only 1.5 points. The table below shows how these average scores result from a
strategy of alternating cooperation and defection by the female and continual cooperation
by the male. The second graph illustrates what can happen if a female is too greedy and
attempts to earn 5.00 points per game: there is a period of instability which ultimately
results in lower pay-offs Gust 1.00 point) for both sexes.
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2.4 Discussion
The model presented in this chapter has shown that a wide variety of
cooperative strategies are possible in social groups where individuals differ. It has also
shown that the cost of reproduction is crucially important in determining strategy
choice, and makes the following predictions:
1) Females, who have a consistently high reproductive cost, should be reciprocal
altruists when interacting with other females.
2) Male behaviour is likely to be mixed. On average, males will be more competitive
than expected, and certainly more competitive than females.
3) \,'hen male reproductive costs are similar to female reproductive costs, mixed sex
interactions will usually be cooperative.
4) When male reproductive costs are around half of female reproductive costs, male-
female interactions will be competitive. This is largely due to an unwillingness to
cooperate on the part of the male.
5) When male reproductive costs are much lower than female reproductive costs,
males will cooperate with females, even if females do not reciprocate. This
behaviour is called non-reciprocal altruism. This result is partially the outcome of a
female strategy to always defect against males, unless they behave as non-
reciprocal altruists in which case they will cooperate half of the time.
Each of these conclusions is discussed below, in the context of cooperative
strategies observed in the wild. This discussion will introduce ideas which will be
developed as the thesis progresses: the evolution of communal care, the interplay
between kin selection and reciprocity, the evolution of paternal care and the
importance of paternity certainty. Wherever possible examples from the primate
literature will be used although there is no reason why this model should not also
apply to non-primates. Throughout this thesis examples from other mammals, fish,
birds and even insects will be used to supplement the primate data.
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2.4.1. Female-female interactions
Trivers (1972) and Wrangham (1980) predicts that females should be more
cooperative than males. High female energetic costs mean that females can best
maximise their fitness by maximising their access to resources, and since food
resources are easily shared and better defended as a group, female cooperation is
expected. The model presented here also uses high female costs as a basis, and
confirms the conclusion that if females have high energetic costs relative to males,
then they will be predisposed to cooperate. Given these conclusions, it should not be a
surprise to find that the most well known and undisputed case of reciprocal altruism in
the wild, blood sharing in vampire bats, occurs between females (Wilkinson 1984,
1985, 1990). Without food, vampire bats will starve to death in just 60 hours, hence a
regular food supply is essential. Wilkinson found that females who have successfully
fed will regurgitate blood to other female bats who have not been so lucky. What is
more, the bats appear to recognise cheats and do not give blood to those who have
refused to donate a meal on a previous occasion. These females are reciprocal
altruists.
Blood sharing in bats occurs between unrelated females. Wilkinson (1984)
estimates that the average relatedness between the females is somewhere between
0.02 and 0.11. However, very often cooperation occurs between relatives. Trivers
(1971) points out that reciprocal altruism could operate between related, as well as
unrelated individuals and this makes it very difficult to distinguish between reciprocal
altruism and kin selection. According to Ligon (1991 p.43), kin selection and
reciprocal altruism are in fact impossible to separate, and "pure reciprocal altruism
and pure kin selection may be viewed as opposite and rarely realised ends of a
continuum." For instance, in the white-nosed coati, Nasua narica, females and their
immature offspring live together in groups composed of 30 or more adult females
(males are solitary). These groups tend to be extended families, but often contain
unrelated females and reciprocal altruism may play an important role in female-female
relationships (Gompper et al. 1997). Coalition formation is central to the group's
social structure, especially when there is feeding competition, agonistic encounters
with males, or attacks from predators. While kin are usually supported over non-kin,
unrelated females do gain some support. In the brown hyena, young males and
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females help in provisioning and guarding the younger cubs. Provisioning by males
appears to be determined by kin selection, males will not provision any individual
more distantly related than half sib (Owens and Owens 1984). Females, on the other
hand, provision all young, no matter how distantly related they are. This behaviour is
likely to be based on reciprocity, since most females remain in the clan and can thus
gain aid from the infants that they help, no matter what the relatedness. In both the
coati and the hyena kinship effects may support, but do not seem to determine,
reciprocity.
Several species have evolved high levels of female cooperation in infant care.
In elephants, lactating females feed infants other than their own (Douglas-Hamilton
and Douglas-Hamilton 1975). In lions, adult females rear their young together,
allowing any cub to suckle (Schaller, 1972). Notably, in lions, a major cause of infant
mortality is starvation, hence the benefits of sharing the burden of lactation are high.
In the red fox, sisters or mother-daughter pairs may den together and suckle each
others young (Ewer 1973). In each of these cases females are likely to be related.
Given high reproductive costs and strong selection for cooperation, it may pay an
individual to cooperate with relatives and in doing so reap additional inclusive fitness
benefits. In many other species non-offspring nursing is provided to non-kin as well as
kin (Packer et al. 1992). Packer et al., in a review of non-offspring nursing across the
mammalia, were unable to determine whether or not it was reciprocal. They suggest
that in many cases females may be unable to distinguish their own young and non-
offspring nursing is actually 'milk-theft'.
Baby-sitting is an effective form of female cooperation In many species
including African wild dogs, gray wolves, golden jackals, coyotes, lions, mongooses,
coatis, vespertilionid bats, elk, bison, pronghorns, mountain sheep and dolphins
(Riedman 1982). In the vespertilionid bats Myotis thysanodes and Antrozous pallidus,
o 'Farrell and Studier (1973) found that baby-sitting was such a successful strategy
that postnatal mortality was only one per cent.
Female cooperation in infant care between unrelated individuals is taken to
almost ridiculous extremes in the free-tailed bat, Tadaria brasiliensis (Davis et al.
1962). Millions of females may live in a single enormous cavern and females nurse
young bats indiscriminatingly. Females are unable to identify their own offspring and
form a "dairy herd" where each female produces up to 16% of her own weight in milk
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each day (Davis et al. 1962). It seems incredible that given the huge cost of nursing,
females do not 'defect' and minimise their milk output, or even cease nursing
altogether. Indiscriminate nursing can also occur with infant recognition. Wilkinson
(1992a) found that around 200/0 of nursing bouts in the evening bat (Nycticeius
humeraliss were between a female and unrelated offspring. In this case offspring
recognition is not a problem, and the females on first sight appear to be altruists.
However ~ females are not indiscriminate in their donations and favour unrelated
females over unrelated males, presumably to maximise opportunities for reciprocation
since males disperse when they reach maturity. This is especially significant since
Wilkinson (1992b) reports that females of the species exchange information about
foraging sites.
As can be seen from the discussions above, bats have provided a fruitful
hunting ground for altruism between females. A further case has been reported by
Kunz et al. (1994) for the Rodrigues fruit bat, Pteropus radricencis. They witnessed
female bats assisting in the birth of other, unrelated, females. The assisting bat
encourages the expectant mother to take the feet down posture, necessary for
birthing, by taking this position herself Furthermore, the midwife grooms the
pregnant female's anovaginal region, grasps her with her wings, grooms the newborn
infant, and helps to place the pup in suckling position. Midwives appear to be
particularly important during difficult births, and Kunz et al. (1994) suggest that they
may be particularly valuable to inexperienced mothers. Furthermore, familiarity, rather
than kinship, seems to govern these altruistic acts.
A common theme unites reports of cooperation in the non-primate literature.
In almost every case, female cooperation is manifested in behaviours that directly
benefit reproduction (baby-sitting, indiscriminate lactation, feeding of offspring). The
only examples of cooperative behaviours that do not directly impact on reprodcution
are food-sharing in vampire bats and coalitionary support in coatis. In primates,
cooperative mothering would be expected by virtue of their delayed maturity, low
fecundity, long life span and relatively long period of offspring dependency (Reidman
1982). However, unlike almost any other non-primate, female-female cooperation is
also widespread in social contexts. This is especially true in matrilineal groups such as
vervets, macaques and baboons where kinship reinforces the value of female-female
cooperation.
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Several primate studies have found cooperation between unrelated females.
De Waal (1984) describes how (unrelated) chimpanzee females band together to
protect themselves from overly aggressive males, and in bonobos unrelated females
partake in food-sharing and genito-genital rubbing (Parish 1994). In the latter case,
strong female bonds appear to serve as a defence against coalitions of related males.
Seyfarth and Cheney (1984) used play-back experiments to show that vervet females
will respond to the calls of help from unrelated individuals who have recently
groomed them. In contrast they would respond to the calls of relatives regardless of
prior grooming activity. Similarly, Hunte and Horrocks (1987) found that related
vervet females aided kin unconditionally during disputes, but that aid provided by
non-relatives was based upon reciprocal exchange.
While examples of cooperation between non-relatives could be found for most
primate groups, cooperation is usually kin directed. The prevalence of female
philopatry in Old World monkeys means that once again, hypotheses based on kin
selection are more parsimonious than those based on reciprocal cooperation. Few
studies have attempted to disentangle the effects of kin selection and reciprocity.
Perry and Rose (1994) tested for differences in food sharing between kin and non-kin
in capuchin monkeys. Their results were ambiguous: In one year (1992) they found
that food transfer was more common between kin, but in the following year there was
no kin-related effect. Schaub (1996) has explored food sharing in long-tailed
macaques by constructing an apparatus in which the animals could either monopolise
a food source, or share it with a partner. Out of 11 donors, 8 did not discriminate
between relatives (sisters or daughters) and non-relatives. Schaub concludes that kin
selection cannot explain the cooperation observed in this case. More studies of this
type are required before firm conclusions can be drawn, although it seems likely that
kin selection will tum out to be important in reinforcing, rather than causing,
cooperation.
In many primate species females will help each other in the care of offspring.
While these females may be related, as in marmosets and tamarins" (Goldizen 1987a,b;
Yamamoto et al. 1996) this is not always the case. For instance, in langurs adult
females will help other unrelated females in infant care (Stanford 1992). This
4 Male care in these species is discussed in chapter 3.
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behaviour, called allomothering, may provide substantial benefits to the recipient. In
langurs, Stanford found that female helpers usually have offspring of their own and
the mothers whose offspring are being cared for benefit by being able to spend more
time feeding. Stanford suggests that (1992 p.29) "allomothering may have adaptive
significance as altruistic behaviour among group females, in that it enables lactating
females to increase feeding time." He concludes that (Stanford 1992 pp.32-33):
"Allomaternal behaviour in capped langurs is best viewed as cooperative
alliances among group females, not necessarily close kin... ... The
adaptive significance of allomothering in at least some nonhuman
primates thus may lie in a reciprocal altruistic relationship between the
adult females of a group. Such intragroup cooperative behaviour would
add an additional benefit to the female-female bonding that is now seen
as the most important element of some primate species' social systems."
However, in other cases allomothering may be detrimental to the mother and her
offspring. Several studies suggest that allomatemal care may be a way for young
females to acquire mothering skills, thus side stepping the potentially high cost of
mistakes when it comes to the real thing (Hrdy 1976, 1977; Nishida 1983). If this is
the case then allomothering is far from altruistic. Rather, mothers should be wary of
inexperienced female 'carers' who may harm their offspring (e.g. vervets, Lancaster
1971; hanuman langurs, Hrdy 1977; chimpanzees, Nishida 1983).
As in other animals, baby-sitting is another form of cooperative infant care in
primates. Baby-sitting has been reported for patas monkeys (Hall and Mayer 1967),
rhesus macaques (Rowell 1963), vervets (Lancaster 1971), Nilgiri langurs (Poirier
1968), hanuman langurs (Hrydy 1977), mantled howlers (Glander 1974) and squirrel
monkeys (Rosenblum 1971). In the ring-tailed lemur, Lemur catta, Klopfer and
Boskoff (1979) suggest that baby-sitters may be particularly important in providing
protection for the infant during terrestrial feeding. The relatedness of the baby-sitters
to the mothers is usually unknown.
Mitani and Watts (1997) conducted a cross-species analysis of allomaternal
care in primates. They found that this type of cooperation has very clear benefits to
the recipient in terms of rapid infant growth and shortened inter-birth intervals. But if
the advantages of allocare are so great, why is this behaviour not more common? Or,
as Mitani and Watts ask (1997 p.217):
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"If uniform benefits in terms of infant growth and female reproduction
are derived through allocaretaking, why does non-maternal care occur
infrequently in those species in which (a) maternal costs are low due to
egalitarian female dominance relationships and reduced feeding
competition and (b) interest in infants and attempts to handle them are
high, e.g. in gorillas?"
Mitani and Watts point out that in many species which practise allocare predation
pressure is high (e.g. tamarins and squirrel monkeys). Furthermore, the only Old
WorId monkeys in which allocare occurs are vervets and patas monkeys which are
both terrestrial savanna-dwelling species in which predation risks are also high. High
predation risks may translate into increased costs to the female in guarding and
protecting her vulnerable infant. Furthermore, the potential costs to a female are very
high indeed since she risks the injury or death of herself or her infant. Allocare is a
mechanism by which both actual and potential costs can be limited.
A wide variety of animals have been covered here, and some very persuasive
examples of female-female altruism have been described. For behaviours to be
altruistic they must involve a cost to the giver, and a benefit to the receiver. The costs
and benefits of foodsharing, indiscriminate lactation, baby-sitting, allomothering,
coalitionary support and food sharing are in most cases quite clear (with the possible
exception of allomothering by juvenile primates). Given the benefits of cooperation it
is perhaps surprising that intra-female cooperation is not more common. The model
presented here suggests that only when females have very high reproductive costs can
the short-term temptation to defect be overcome. In most non-primates female-female
cooperation is manifest as care of young, where kinship effects can maximise the
benefits of cooperation. In primates, cooperation also occurs in contexts not directly
related to reproduction, such as coalitionary support.
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2.-t2. Male-male interactions
The model predicts that intra-male interactions should be very competitive, or
at least much more competitive than we would expect from the control scenario. In
most animals, competition is the most common form of intra-male interaction, and
primates are no exception. Regardless of social system or ecological context it is a basic
tenet that males in the vast majority of species compete with each other for access to
females. In fact, our whole understanding ofmale behaviour is based upon this principle. It
is, therefore, very satisfying to find that this model accords so well with biological
expectations. This is not to say that males never cooperate. The model suggests that
male-male strategies are mixed and can range from out-right defection to reciprocal
altruism. This means that if male costs are lower than female costs a mix of,
competitive and cooperative strategies are to be expected.
In primates, while male-male competition is always evident, cooperation between
males is not unusual. Reciprocal altruism was first reported in male baboons, who use
coalitions to gain access to estrous females (packer 1977). Packer found that males would
enlist the help of another, unrelated male and that the pair would attempt to steal a female
away from a third, usually more dominant, male. If successful, the soliciting male would
mate with the female. While the solicited male gains no immediate pay-oft: Packer (1977)
argues that those males who give support are most likely to receive support in the future.
Packer's findings, while supported by a subsequent study by Smuts (1985), have been
disputed by Bercovitch (1988) who failed to find reciprocity in his study of olive baboons,
although he did find strong reciprocity between certain pairs of males. As discussed in
chapter 1 (section 1.2.2), Hemelrijk and Ek (1991) suggest that these contradictory results
may be due to differing social contexts. They found that in chimpanzees males only
behaved as reciprocal altruists during times when the alpha male position was in dispute. If
baboon males are affected in a similarway this could explain the discrepancy in Packer and
Bercovitch's results.
Male bonding m chimpanzees is well known (e.g. de Waal 1982, 1992).
Chimpanzees live in multi-male groups, where the alpha male can dominate, but not
monopolise, matings. Male chimpanzees navigate the social hierarchy by manipulation of
social relationships, rather than physical competition, and de Waal paints a vivid picture of
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the importance ofmale-male coalitions. Male chimpanzees appear to trade support, and de
Waal concludes (1992, p.234):
cc There can be little doubt that these close alliances of male chimpanzees are
reciprocal in the sense that both parties invest in and benefit from the
relationship, although the nature of the investment and the pay-offs may be
different for each party."
Male chimpanzees groom each other, form alliances and cooperate in hunting and
group aggression. Males will even tolerate sexual promiscuity, at least in some
circumstances (e.g. Goodall 1965; Tutin 1979). De Waal (1982) describes how an alpha
male re-paid coalitionary support from another male by allowing him reproductive access
to females. This high level ofmale cooperation, as well as female philopatry, has led many
authors to suggest that male bonding in chimpanzees is an outcome of relatedness. For
example van Hooff and van Schaik state that "to achieve tolerance and cooperation, the
conflict over reproductive interests has to become subordinate to other interests. One of
these, indeed, can be the inclusive fitness interest" (van Hooff and van Schaik, 1994
p.317). A link between male cooperation and relatedness has been found in hamadryas
baboons (Stammbach 1987), and male bonnet macaques (Silk 1992a). Furthermore, in
species associated with male philopatry and female dispersal, such as red colobus
monkeys, gorillas, spider monkeys and hamadryas baboons, males tend to associate more
closely and form affiliations (Silk 1992a). For example, in a Costa Rican group of squirrel
monkeys, Boinski (1994) concluded that low rates of intra-male aggression and male
cooperationover estrous females were due to male philopatry. However, strong inter-male
affiliations should not be automatically associated with male philopatry. Gould (1997)
found inter-male affiliations in the setting of female philopatry and male dispersal in
ringtailed lemurs, and Starin (1994) reported weak male bonding with male philopatry in
red colobus.
Almost every studythat reports male affiliations between kin in monkeys and apes,
also reports support between unrelated individuals (Silk 1992b). In the case of
chimpanzees, inclusive fitness benefits may only partially contribute to male-male
cooperation. In fact, van Hoofand van Schaik (1994) note that relatedness between males
may be rather lower than usually assumed. Manymale group members will have emigrated
into the group with their mothers, furthermore, sexual promiscuity will counter high levels
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of relatedness. Male cooperation in chimpanzees is more likely to be mediated by
reciprocal altruism, and strengthened by kin selection.
Hill (1994), in a review of alliances between male macaques, found that alliance
formation was "not rare" in 7 out of 11 species. Male cooperation was most common in
the bonnet macaque, and virtually absent in the pig-tailed macaque with other species
showing intermediate levels of intra-male affiliations. In these cases, female philopatry
indicates that relatedness between males is unlikely, and male-male relationships are based
on familiarity. Bonnet macaque males sit together, groom, huddle, greet, and support each
other (Silk 1994), directing support to those with whom they generally associate. Silk
found that (1992b p.319):
"males selectively support those who support and groom them, intervene
most often against those who most often intervene against them, and are
most loyal to their relatives and those who are most loyal to them."
This type of cooperation between males is very unusual in non-primates. Coalitions of
male lions participate in joint defence of territories, and individuals in larger coalitions
father more offspring (packer et al. 1988). However, these coalitions are usually between
relatives, and when coalitions between non-relatives do occur they are usually formed by a
pair oflions rather than a larger pack (packer et al. 1991).
Cooperation between males is a more complicated issue than cooperation between
females. Cooperation between females may be easier to establish because of the nature of
the most valued resources: food is more easily shared than mates are. While the model
predicts that males ought to be more competitive than females, it also predicts both
cooperation and competition between males at the same level of reproductive costs. This
means that for males, decisions about when to cooperate and when to compete are likely
to be more complex than for females. Therefore, we should expect greater variability in the
cooperative behaviours ofmales. Furthermore, this discussion indicates that social context
may be a critical factor in determining when males cooperate, and with whom.
85
2.4.3. Mixed sex interactions
The mixed sex interactions produced some very interesting results. Three very
different types of interaction arose: reciprocal altruism, competition and non-
reciprocal altruism. The latter two categories are the most intriguing. Competition
occurs when male reproductive cost is greater than 100, but less that 600. Both sexes
gain lower scores than expected, and there appears to be a high temptation to defect.
Males appear to be less willing to cooperate than females, mirroring their more
competitive strategies in intra-male interactions. In the iterated Prisoners Dilemma,
defection may be viewed as a more risky strategy than cooperation (in sharp contrast
to the 'one shot' game). In a well established population of cooperators, a defector
gambles on being able to achieve the maximum pay-off of 5 points, at the risk of
ending up consistently scoring just 1 point per game. Males, by virtue of their lower
reproductive costs, may be more likely to take a risk on defection. Females, on the
other hand, are likely to be more conservative, favouring the long-term assurance of
cooperation over the short term benefits of defection. At the same time, of course,
they must ensure that they are well defended against potential male exploiters. In
short, females ought to behave as TIT-FOR-TAT strategists, seeking out cooperation
where possible but guarding against exploitation. Males, on the other hand, can afford
to opt for more risky strategies and are more likely to pursue the short-term
advantages of defection.
In many primate groups where there are high levels of male competition (and
hence fairly high male reproductive costs), interactions between males and females
can be quite nasty. Infanticide by males who have recently taken over a reproductive
group has been reported in langurs (Hrdy 1974), macaques (Wolf and Fleagle 1977),
colobus monkeys (Marsh 1979), guenons (Struhsaker 1977) and howler monkeys
(Sekulic 1983) in the wild. In other species, such as Barbary macaques (Deag and
Crook 1971) and baboons (Packer 1980), males may use infants as agonistic buffers
during confrontations to reduce tension (but see below for an alternative
interpretation of this behaviour). On the other hand, while male-female aggression is
one pattern of behaviour in harem groups, in many cases the alpha male is dependent
on female cooperation to maintain his position. Dunbar (1988) describes how gelada
females effectively vote for their favourite male during contests by grooming him. In
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these cases males have two possible ways of attracting female support, aggressive
cohesion or friendly attraction. The first solution is adopted in rhesus macaques and
hamadryas baboons, while gorilla males generally opt for the friendly approach.
This is not to say that the model can explain the evolution of behaviours such
as infanticide, agonistic buffering or complex patterns of male-female cooperation.
Rather. it predicts that when male reproductive effort is fairly high, there will exist
strongly opposing forces of cooperation and competition which will result in a wide
variety of patterns of behaviour. Ecological and demographic variables will determine
how these behaviours manifest themselves.
The most surprising result from these models is that when MRC is equal to, or
less than 100, males will behave as non-reciprocal altruists. That is, they will invest in
females and their offspring at a cost to themselves in terms of time, energy and
(implicitly) lost mating opportunities. This behaviour seems very like paternal care for
a female and her offspring. If this is the case, then this model implies that paternal care
could evolve as a response to relatively high female energetic costs, in the absence of
a genetic link between the male and the female's offspring.
It is generally assumed that whenever paternal investment occurs, the
likelihood that the caring male is the father of the offspring should be high (Trivers
1972). In recent years, DNA fingerprinting has allowed us to test this logic directly,
and has provided mixed results. At one extreme, in the rodent peromyscus polionotus,
a monogamous mating system ensures 100% paternity certainty to the male (Foltz
1981). At the other extreme, Dixon et al. (1994) found that in reed buntings
(Emberiza schoenic/us) 86% of nests contained extra pair young, and 55% of
offspring were being looked after by males other than the father. In some cases males
fed whole broods entirely unrelated to them. In Savannah sparrows, monogamous
males have only a 40% likelihood of being fathers to their brood, while polygynous
males have a 75% chance of paternity (Freeman-Gallant 1997). Male dunnocks, who
live in polyandrous or polygynandrous breeding groups, invest in all offspring,
regardless of the proportion of the brood that are their own, even if this proportion is
zero (Burke et a/. 1989).
Given the finding that cuckoldry is widespread, it is possible that males adjust
their levels of parental care in response to probability of parentage. Again, the
evidence for this is mixed. Meller and Birkhead (1993), in a cross species analysis of
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paternal investment in birds, found that the most energetically expensive paternal
activity, male feeding of offspring, was highly associated with paternity certainty.
However, other activities associated with costly male investment, such as nest
building, courtship feeding and incubation were unaffected by the frequency of extra-
pair matings by the females. Westneat et al. (1995) used DNA fingerprinting to show
that nestling red-winged blackbirds do not provide paternal care on the basis of
paternity. Male house martins invest heavily in females and their young, providing
food for the offspring, courtship feeding, incubation and brooding (Whittingham and
Lifjeld 1995b) even though extra-pair paternity occurs in 35% of broods
(Whittingham and Lifjeld 1995a). Whittingham and Lifjeld (1995b) found that male
house martins do not adjust their investment with their likelihood of paternity, which
means that in many cases males were labouring for the benefit of another male's
offspring. Whittingham and Lifjeld (1995b, p.l06) conclude that "any effect of
paternity on male parental care is likely to be very small, at best." It is quite likely that
birds are, in fact, unable to identify their own offspring (Beecher 1988). While it
would be in a male's best interests to be able to care preferentially for his own
offspring, Kempenaers and Sheldon (1996 p.1165) point out that males may be unable
to do so "because of conflicts between the male, female and offspring over signalling
identity." A newly born chick has no way to ascertain whether it is a product of an
extra-pair fertilisation, so in order to extract the maximum amount of care from the
male it should hide its identity. Pagel (1997) suggests that human infants may be
selected not to resemble their parents for the same reason.
Heterosexual cooperation has been most thoroughly studied in birds,
particularly with respect to the occurrence of paternal care. Two studies seem to
demonstrate male non-reciprocal altruism even when males are aware of their non-
paternity. In bell miners, individuals help at the nests of several neighbours, only
some of which are relatives, while maintaining their own brood (Clarke 1984). Clarke
found that while both males and females would act as helpers, only males reciprocated
cooperation. Males reciprocated on more than 50% of the occasions when
reciprocation could have taken place. In the pied kingfisher, Cerlyle rudis, Reyer
(1980, 1984) identified two types of male helpers. Primary care-givers are sons of
breeding pairs and provide extensive, energetically expensive care. In this case,
cooperation is clearly best explained in terms of inclusive fitness. Primary care givers
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are directly aiding their own genes. Secondary care-givers, on the other hand, are
unrelated to the breeding pair. The secondary helper provides energetically expensive
care (although not to the same extent as either the primary care-giver or the parents)
with a high benefit to the breeding pair in terms of offspring survival. The secondary
male probably has good selfish reasons for cooperation. Care giving allows him to
develop a bond with the breeding female, and he may eventually become accepted on
the territory. Secondary helpers are only tolerated by the primary-males when
conditions are poor.
The prediction that male care can occur without genetic paternity is not new.
Maynard Smith (1977) and Werren et al. (1980) claim that paternity certainty is only
an issue in the evolution of paternal care if care giving is costly to the male in terms of
missed mating opportunities. For example, in fish, males who establish spawning
territories actually have very few opportunities for promiscuous mating and hence
should provide care regardless of paternity (Werren et al. 1980). Similarly Busse, in a
review of paternal care in primates, suggests that (1985 p.878):
"males might profit from caring for young even when confidence of
paternity is relatively low, if there are few or no opportunities for mating.
Conversely, males might forego caring for young, even when confidence
of paternity is high, if there are opportunities for siring further offspring."
The relationship between the model presented here, and the mating opportunity
hypothesis is explored in the next chapter (section 3.4).
In primates, there is considerable confusion over what constitutes male care,
let alone who does the caring. For instance, male chacma baboons appear to protect
infants from aggressive, potentially infanticidal, immigrant males (Busse and
Hamilton, 1981). However Deag and Crook (1971) interpret this behaviour as
'agonistic buffering', claiming that males are using infants to defuse potentially violent
incidents, putting the infant involved at great risk. One of the most controversial
species in the male-caretaking debate is the Barbary macaque (Macaca sylvanus) in
which male carrying of infants during interactions with other males has been described
both as agonistic buffering (Deag and Crook, 1971) and as a side-effect of male
caretaking (Taub 1980). Taub (1980 p.196) believes that agonistic buffering is a
~'special, ritualised subset of a comprehensive system of male-infant caretaking so
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characteristic in this species." Paul et al. (1992) used DNA fingerprinting to show that
males are usually unrelated to the infants that they carry. This lack of paternity could
be taken as support for the agonistic buffering hypothesis. Alternatively, if this
beha\iour is care-taking in the absence of paternal relatedness, this is a clear example
of non-reciprocal altruism. Zhao (1996) studies male-infant relationships in Tibetan
macaques (Afacaca thibetanay He notes that interactions between two males that
involve an infant occur in a predictable and standardised manner. Infants involved in
these interactions, while excited, show no sign of fear or distress. Zhao compares
Barbary with Tibetan macaques and concludes (1996 p.135):
"Considering that the two triad-species Msylvanus and Mthibetana,
had different levels of paternity, but shared similar foraging conditions,
and showed similar intensities of male-infant caretaking, the triad was
very likely a by-product of male-infant caretaking, which was probably
shaped to compensate heavy maternal investment to young offspring in
harsh conditions."
If Zhao's conclusions are correct, then we have the first clear evidence for
non-reciprocal altruism in primates: (1) male care-taking, (2) high energetic costs for
the female, and (3) absence of a genetic relationship between male care-taker and his
charge (Paul et al. 1992).
Baboons are also well studied with respect to triadic interactions involving
two adult males and an infant. Again, adult male behaviour is variously interpreted as
exploitative or protective. Alternatively, males may be trying to develop a relationship
with the infant's mother. As with macaques, it is likely that all three explanations
apply, even within a single population. Numerous baboon studies have concluded that
males will both care for and exploit the same infants (e.g. in Papio anubis, Smuts
1985; chacma baboons, Collins 1986; yellow baboons, Klein 1983). Different adult-
infant pairs will have different characteristics and Ransom and Ransom (1971) found
that male-infant relationships arose in both friendly and antagonistic contexts. They
conclude that in both situations "these relationships appear to be highly influential in
directing the processes of social development and ultimately, adult bond formation"
(Ransom and Ransom, 1971 p.179). That is, even agonistic encounters are an
important part of an infants social development within a group.
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As with macaques, male-infant bonding in baboons occurs in the absence of
paternity. Smuts (1985) estimated that the carrying male was the likely father of the
infant in less than half of the observed relationships. Packer and Pusey (1985) found
that the carrying male was the probable father in only 40% of cases. However, other
studies have reached the opposite conclusion. For instance, Klein (1983) suggests that
in his study group, baboon males interacted primarily with their own offspring. To
date, no genetic studies have been published, and in most cases the genetic relatedness
between males and infants can only be guessed.
Relationships between males and infants may be an extension of a pair bond
between an adult male and female (Ransom and Ransom 1971). Ransom and
Ransom even suggest that relationships between adult males and infant females may
develop into an adult friendship when the female matures. No long term studies have
tested this hypothesis, but male-female friendships are common in both baboons and
macaques. BYrne et al. (1990) describe baboons as "cross-sex bonded" on the basis of
strong male-female affiliations and Takahata (1982) and Chapais (1983) report male-
female social relationships in some groups of macaques which endure beyond the
period offemale sexual receptivity.
As discussed in section 1.1.1, male care taking, in the context of a "friendship"
with a particular female, may be viewed as a long term mating strategy (Smuts and
Gubernick 1992). Palombit et al. (1997) have found that in baboons the major benefit
that females derive from these friendships is protection of their infants from
infanticide. Males may also reap substantial rewards from their relationships with
females and their offspring, including cooperation from the infant when used as an
agonistic buffer, support from the female and, most importantly, mating access to the
female (Smuts and Gubernick 1992). However, while some male friends may benefit
in this way, these benefits are not always guaranteed. Manson (1994) looked at male-
female relationships between non-kin in adult rhesus macaques. Nearly all females had
at least one "friendship" with a male, and the males would lend their friends support
during fights. Because male aggression is potentially a great cost to females, these
relationships are of great benefit to them. On the other hand, Manson (1994) found
that the benefits to the male friends were minimal. Females do not provide support for
males during aggressive encounters, nor is there a strong association between
friendship and mating. A third of friendships were between partners who had mated in
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the preceding season, and just 10.50/0 were between pairs who would mate in the
following season. Furthermore, males directed courtship signals at a lower rate
towards friends than towards other females. A similar result was found for Japanese
macaques (Takahata 1982), where mating rarely follows the formation of a friendship.
In this case male-female affiliations, with their associated benefits for both the female
and her offspring, could be interpreted as non-reciprocal altruism.
De Waal and colleagues used food-sharing experiments with capuchins to
examine cooperative relationships (de Waal et al. 1993; de Waal 1997). Capuchins
feed on animal and plant foods of high energetic value, and adult males are noted for
their tolerance and food-sharing, especially where infants and juveniles are involved
(de Waal et al. 1993). Vocalisations are sometimes used to advertise the presence of
food, and food transfers between individuals are common and are not necessarily
associated with either rank or relatedness. Pairs of subjects were placed in adjacent
cages, separated by wire mesh, where only one individual had access to food which
could be transferred to the other through the mesh. De Waal found that food sharing
occurred between all levels in the hierarchy, in both directions and between both
sexes. The most common food transfers were between partners of opposite sex.
Intrigued by these results, de Waal (1997) conducted a longer series of experiments in
which there was greater opportunity for food sharing to be reciprocated. In this study
it was found that, in comparison with females, adult males shared food more readily
and less discriminately. While females based their food sharing on principals of
reciprocal altruism, for males there was no correlation between amount of food
received in the first phase of the experiment, and food transferred in the second. De
Waal (1997 p.376) states that:
"Ifwe accept food transfer rate as an indicator of the possessor's sharing
tendency, the best way to put this is that males share more generously
and less discriminatingly than females, and that their sharing is not
necessarily mutual."
De Waal goes on to consider the possibility that this food sharing is a paternal
investment strategy. In the absence of genetic data he suggests that food sharing by
males must be the result of kin selection, although since capuchins live in multi-male
groups there is no reason to suppose that this is true. Non-reciprocal altruism may be
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a more accurate model for this behaviour. This is an exciting possibility given that
capuchins have relatively large brain sizes (Aiello and Wheeler 1995). Furthermore,
Fedigan and Rose (1995) have shown that capuchins invest more time into the
lactation and cycling phases of their reproductive cycle when compared with other
primates, even when corrected for body size, brain size and brain/body weight ratio.
This suggests that capuchin females have high reproductive costs. Male cooperation
may have evolved to help offset these costs.
2.4.4 Summary discussion
In this chapter computer simulations have been used to show that sex
differences in the cost of reproduction affect the kinds of cooperative strategies that
individuals employ. A wide variety of examples from the primate and non-primate
literature support this supposition. Females are more cooperative than males,
particularly in their interactions with each other, and this is likely to be due to a
number of factors. Firstly, female energetic costs are often very high due to a high
investment in gestation, lactation and offspring care. This fact in itself predisposes
females to cooperate. Furthermore, females can cooperate in a wide variety of
contexts, such as infant care, grooming and coalitionary support which can be
reciprocated in kind. Male-male cooperation is far less likely because there is often a
direct conflict of interest: access to mates is not a resource that is easily shared, and it
is not in a male's interests to help his rivals in any way. It has been hypothesised that
lower male energetic costs mean that males may be able to afford to take more risks in
their cooperative relationships both with males and with females. Male-female
cooperative relationships are perhaps the most complex of all, since they rarely
involve the exchange of similar commodities. The complexities of male-female
associations are reflected in the literature on male-female friendships which seems
unable to decide whether or not male care giving in species such as baboons is
exploitation, paternal care, a male mating strategy, or part of a wider cooperative
relationship between the individuals involved.
In both same-sex and inter-sex interactions primates can be distinguished from
non-primates in terms of the types of cooperative relationships in which they are
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involved. In non-primates cooperation most commonly occurs in the context of infant
care. In primates high levels of cooperation also occurs in social contexts not directly
related to reproduction. Primates endeavour to form alliances with animals of the highest
competitive ability, compete over allies and prevent the formation of rival alliances.
Harcourt (1992) argues that primates differ from nonprimates in that coalitions are a goal
in themselves, rather than a means to an end. Harcourt suggests that this may reflect the
different cognitive abilities of primates. Reciprocal altruism between non relatives involves
complex cognitive processes such as individual recognition, memory, calculation of the
costs and benefits of different behaviours, and the ability to detect non-reciprocators
(Seyfarth and Cheney 1988). The implication is that reciprocal altruism is only possible in
animals with higher order mental abilities (Harcourt 1992).
De Waa1 (1992) compares reciprocity in macaques and chimpanzees, and
concluded that while both species reciprocated good deeds, only chimpanzees punished
those individuals that did not cooperate with them. He concludes that the more complex
and flexible patterns of alliance formation in chimpanzees may be the result of higher
cognitive capabilities. Complex cooperative strategies in other large-brained animals, such
as dolphins, also suggests that brain size may limit the evolution of cooperation.
Bottlenose dolphins live in fission-fusion societies, comparable in structure to chimpanzee
social groups (Connor 1992). Groups of two or three males form 'first order' alliances in
order to herd and mate with females. Males may take it in turns to mate with the captured
female, although in many cases they will mate with her simultaneously. The most
interesting feature of dolphin alliance systems is that they are the only known species
other than humans that form 'second order' alliances. A coalition group will enlist the
support of a second coalition group in order to steal a female that is being guarded by a
third group. These encounters between groups can be quite dangerous and involve high
levels ofrisk to the enlisted group, who often have a female oftheir own to guard and will
not gain anything from the attack. Connor found evidence of reciprocal cooperation
between first order alliances and argues that this level of cooperation requires higher level
cognitive abilities than those ofchimpanzees.
Research into the cognitive requirements of cooperation is only just beginning.
However, it is likely that different types of cooperative relationships will require different
types of cognitive mechanisms. Relationships with relatives may be mentally less
challenging than those with non-relatives whose activities must be carefully monitored and
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remembered. Interactions between males, females and their offspring may be especially
tricky since they involve a wide range of activities each of which may have very different
costs and benefits to those involved. Cooperation between females, involving the direct
reciprocation of similar altruistic acts, may be simpler to monitor than cooperation
between males. De Waal (1984) found that while female chimpanzees consistently chose
the same cooperative partners, males were rather more fickle. Males would chose their
alliances on the basis of the current social situation and would change allies if they thought
it would gain them a social advantage. Hemelrijk and Ek (1991) also found that males
were "opportunistic' in their cooperative strategies. However, Hemelrijk and Ek suggest
that since males are totally selfish in their choice of alliance partners, this may not in fact
involve particularly sophisticated mental processes (1991 p.932):
" When support is a selfish act, it is unnecessary to keep track of support
given and received, but reciprocity and cooperation may be a side-effect of
directly selfish behaviour displayed by animals with the same aim.
Nevertheless, the animals may well have the capacity to keep mental records
of support given and received, but this ability is not required to direct selfish
acts."
Even if Hemelrijk and Ek are correct, other cognitive skills are involved in these
relationships: individualsmust keep track ofwho is related to whom and who will support
whom; furthermore they must be able to recognise when the social hierarchy is liable to
disruption, and when it is best to maintain the status quo. In short, group-living primates
require a sophisticated social intelligence. The cognitive requirements of cooperation will
be further explored in chapter 6.
Probably the most surprising and interesting cooperative strategy discussed
here is non-reciprocal altruism. It has been proposed that non-reciprocal altruism
evolves when male energetic costs of reproduction are much less than female
energetic costs of reproduction. In this situation males will cooperate with females
even when females do not cooperate in return. Non-reciprocal altruism may provide
an interesting new way of viewing the evolution of paternal care and several possible
examples of non-reciprocal altruism have been suggested. Since non-reciprocal
altruism does not involve reproduction between the male and female it provides a
mechanism by which paternal care could evolve without paternity certainty. A review
of the literature suggests that paternal care can and does occur in the absence of
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paternity in a number of species. But a number of questions remain unanswered:
Exactly when can we expect non-reciprocal altruism? Why does it occur? How does it
affect male reproductive success? In order to address these questions the next chapter
focuses solely on non-reciprocal altruism. The details of the model will be examined
and checked and finally the model will be expanded to provide a more complete
scenario for the evolution of paternal care.
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CHAPTER 3
The Evolution of Non-Reciprocal Altruism
3.1: Introduction
In the previous chapter it was shown that when males and females differ in
their energetic cost of reproduction, many different cooperative strategies emerge.
Perhaps the most interesting of these is non-reciprocal altruism, where males
cooperate with females even when this cooperation is not reciprocated. This strategy
is only observed when male reproductive costs (MRC) are considerably less than
female reproductive costs (PRC). It was postulated that non-reciprocal altruism could
be involved in the evolution of paternal investment. Since many of the conclusions
of this thesis rest on this result, the first part of this chapter examines in greater detail
the conditions under which non-reciprocal altruism evolves. Firstly, in section 3.2 it
will be shown that non-reciprocal altruism is advantageous to both males and
females in terms of reducing generation time (the time it takes to create enough
offspring to replace the adult population). This means that non-reciprocal altruism
can be selected for at both an individual and a group level. Given this advantage it is
surprising that non-reciprocal altruism only evolves when MRC=100. For instance,
why does it not evolve when MRC = 200? In section 3.3 it is shown that it is not the
absolute value of MRC that is important, but rather its relative value compared with
FRC. Having established experimentally that non-reciprocal altruism occurs when
MRC <= 0.1 x FRC, section 3.4 explores the reasons for this threshold.
By exploring these questions the first aim of this chapter is to establish how
robust predictions generated in the previous chapter regarding non-reciprocal
altruism are. Its second aim is to expand these results to create a model of the
evolution of paternal investment that may have wider applicability. This is done by
focusing on the issue of paternity certainty. A model is developed where males have
a much greater likelihood of mating with females with whom they have formerly
interacted (section 3.5). In this case, if males behave as non-reciprocal altruists they
have a high chance that they are investing in the mother of their future offspring. As
might be expected, in this case non-reciprocal altruism occurs at much higher levels
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of MRC. The results are discussed in terms of a general model of the evolution of
paternal care.
3.2 Non-Reciprocal Altruism vs. Reciprocal Altruism:
Generation Times Model
3.2.1 Method
To differentiate it from the models developed here, the model presented in
chapter 2 will be called "model 1" (see section 2.3). In modell, while non-reciprocal
altruism evolved in the majority of cases when MRC = 1, it was the dominant
strategy in only a quarter of cases when MRC = 100 (fig. 2.8 d&e). Even so, this may
be a very significant result if selection can occur at the group level. Imagine the
following scenario: in a species of primates there has been strong selection for an
increase in body size which has put considerable strain on the females during the
lactation period. The females cannot wean their infants until they have reached a
certain body weight and, because the mothers cannot increase either the quality or
quantity of their food intake, the infants are weaned at a later age than they would
have been at a smaller body size. This late age at weaning has, in tum, increased the
inter-birth interval. The males must dedicate a certain amount of energy each day to
maintaining their body weight, and to competing with other males for access to
females, although they are under no energetic stress. In most groups the males and
females interact very little, however, in one group, one of the males begins carrying
the infants for the females, regardless of whether or not they are his own offspring.
This is of great benefit to the females because it reduces their energetic output, but is
a very small cost to the male who has energy to spare. In fact, the male is better off
than the other males in his group because now the females occasionally will help him
by supporting him in fights and grooming him. This behaviour spreads amongst the
males in the group and reduces the inter-birth interval by two months. This group
now has a competitive advantage over other groups in which non-reciprocal altruism
has not evolved.
This scenario is not unrealistic. Hamilton (1984) in an analysis of the costs
and benefits of male care in primates, found that benefits to the mother could be
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substantial while the costs to the male may be low. Mothers receiving male help can
reduce the costs of locomotion, temperature regulation and avoiding and threatening
others, and as a result divert more energy to infant growth and future reproduction.
Hamilton calculated that the energy cost to the male would be very small, around 2-
30/0 of his daily energy budget. Furthermore, Anderson (1992) points out that in
baboons there may be considerable advantages to an investing male in terms of
improved social position and reduced aggression from other troop members. These
advantages are independent of paternity issues. If non-reciprocal altruism reduces the
time that it takes for females to become fertile this means that the population as a
whole can reproduce more quickly. There is then, a group level advantage that
amplifies the selection pressure for this trait at an individual level. To investigate the
extent to which non-reciprocal altruism speeds up the reproductive rate of a
population a simplified set of simulations were run, based on model 1. These
simulations examine the effect of different strategies on the time it takes to create a
new generation.
Just like modell, a population of 650 agents is created which is made up of
males and females who interact and can only reproduce when they have gained
enough points to meet the cost of reproduction (MRC or FRC). Agents are chosen at
random and interact by playing 100 rounds of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Different
agents are chosen at random to reproduce. To a great extent the model is identical to
modell, the only difference is that the agents do not have strategy strings. Instead
simplifying assumptions are made, based on the results from modell, about what
types of strategies different agents employ. It is assumed that in same sex
interactions females always cooperate and males always defect. Only interactions
between males and females are variable: they can be one of three types, depending
on the male strategy (or male-type):
1) Always defect (both players score 1 point per game)
2) Reciprocal altruism (both players score 3 points per game)
3) Non-reciprocal altruism (male scores 1.5 points, female scores 4 points per game)
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It is assumed that if females meet an 'always defect' male, they will also
defect. Similarly, if females meet a reciprocal altruist male it is assumed that they
will cooperate. At the start of the experiment there are equal numbers of each type of
male. Reproduction is very simple, like model 1 it can only occur between a male
and female who have enough points, but there is no crossover or mutation. Instead,
the offspring is given the same male-type as the father. Once 650 offspring have been
created, a new population of adults is generated, where sexes are assigned at random
and all males carry the male-type of their father. The program is run for 300
generations, by which time one male-type is usually at 100% frequency. The
program then records the final frequency of each male-type and the average
generation time. The program is given in full in appendix 3. The experiments were
all run at FRC = 1000, and repeated 100 times each for :MItC = 1, :MItC = 100 and
MRC =200.
3.2.2 Results and discussion
In nearly every experiment, the population fixes onto one male-type within
the 300 generation run, if it did not it was classified as the male-type that occurred at
highest frequency at the end of the experiment. Table 3.1 shows, for each value of
MRC, the percentage of runs that evolved into each male type, and the average
generation time associated with each male type. Generation time is measured as the
number of cycles the model must run to create 650 offspring. A single cycle is
defined as one interaction phase (100 games of the Prisoner's Dilemma between a
pair of agents) and one reproduction phase.
Always Reciprocal Non-reciprocal
Defect Altruism Altruism
MRC=1 % of runs 35 33 32
Average generation time (cycles) 4416 4046 3119
MRC= 100 % of runs 22 54 24
Average generation time (cycles) 3807 3528 3338
MRC=200 % of runs 0 100 0
Average generation time (cycles) N/A 3502 N/A
Table 3.1: Comparison of the success of different male strategies.
The table shows the percentage of runs in which each male strategy was the most
successful. It also shows the average generation time associated with each strategy.
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By examining the percentage of runs in which each male strategy (male-type)
evolved, it is possible to ascertain which were the most successful strategies. When
~1RC = 1, no particular strategy emerges as best. Each strategy dominated around a
third of the runs (table 3.1). When MRC = 100, reciprocal altruism evolved in 54%
of experiments, while each of the other two strategies dominated around a quarter of
the runs. When MRC = 200, reciprocal altruism dominated all the experiments. Non-
reciprocal altruism only evolved when MRC = 1 and MRC = 100, confirming the
results found in model 1. The defector strategy did as well as non-reciprocal altruism
at lower values of MRC, and also failed at MRC = 200. This is surprising as in
model 1 male-female interactions were very competitive when MRC = 200. The
simplicity of the experiment means that the defector strategy is unlikely to succeed.
Since it is assumed that females will always defect against defecting males the
competitive advantage of defection is nullified (the temptation to defect is only
relevant if the other player is expected to cooperate).
Generation time is sensitive to population size and the magnitude of MRC
and FRC and as well as the strategies of the players. For a constant population size
(650), at any given level of reproductive costs, generation times are, as expected,
shortest for non-reciprocal altruist populations, and longest for defector populations.
For instance, when MRC = 100, reciprocal altruism evolved in 54% of experiments
with an average generation time of 3528 cycles, as compared to 3338 cycles for non-
reciprocal altruism which evolved in just 24% of experiments. This means that, even
though non-reciprocal altruism is less likely to evolve than reciprocal altruism, if it
does evolve the population can replace itself more quickly. By the time that
reciprocal altruists have completed 1000 generations, non-reciprocal altruists will
have produced 1057 generations.
These results show that while the male strategy of non-reciprocal altruism is
less likely to evolve than reciprocal altruism, at a group level it will out-compete
reciprocal altruism because of the advantage it confers in terms of shortened inter-
birth intervals. Field studies have shown the importance of male investment for
shortening the inter-birth interval. For example, Anderson (1992) found that male
help had a stronger effect on infant survivorship and inter-birth interval in chacma
baboons than either maternal age or rank. Of course, group level selection is only
possible if there are also advantages at an individual level. In this case, the
advantages to the females are clear. Males may also be better off as non-reciprocal
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altruists if the females refuse to play reciprocal altruism (see section 2.3.4). Finally,
this model confirms that males will only behave as non-reciprocal altruists when
rvIRC <= 100. Since the program structure of this model is very different from that of
modell, this indicates that non-reciprocal altruism is a true result rather than a spin-
off from a programming querk.
3.3 Absolute Versus Relative Reproductive Costs
Recent studies of paternal investment in primates have focused largely on
female costs. For example, Ross (1991) argues that in callitrichids females can only
sustain high birth rates, litter weights and high litter growth rates, if males assist in
infant transport. Dunbar (1988) also suggests that high energetic costs associated
with lactation are likely to determine whether or not males participate in infant care.
These theories assume that the magnitude of the cost of reproduction for the male is
irrelevant. It is not immediately clear from this model whether non-reciprocal
altruism is a response to absolutely or relatively high female costs. Is the threshold
below which non-reciprocal altruism can evolve l\1RC = 100, or l\1RC = 0.1 x FRC?
The 'absolute' versus 'relative' hypotheses are tested here.
3.3.1 Method
Female cost was increased to FRC = 2000 and male cost was set at values of
100, 200 and 400. These experiments were identical to those described for model 1
(section 2.3), and each was run for 20,000 generations and repeated 30 times.
Because only male-female interactions are of interest here, these are the only results
described. In fact, the male-male and female-female results are very similar to those
for model 1.
102
3.3.2 Results
When FRC = 2000 the 'absolute' hypothesis predicts that non-reciprocal
altruism will only occur at MRC <= 100. The 'relative' hypothesis predicts that when
FRC = 2000, non-reciprocal altruism will occur at MRC <= 200. Hypotheses and
results are presented in table 3.2, and the illustrated in fig. 3.1.
Female cost Male cost 'Absolute' 'Relative' Actual
prediction prediction results
2000 100 NRA NRA NRA
2000 200 competition NRA NRA
2000 400 competition competition competition
Table 3.2: Absolute vs. relative reproductive costs.
Actual results, compared to predictions, when FRC = 2000. NRA is non-reciprocal
altruism.
When MRC = 100 and MRC = 200 (fig 3.1 a & b) there is the heavy
imbalance in male and female scores which characterises non-reciprocal altruism
(section 2.3.4). Females are consistently scoring more highly than males, and in
some cases gaining more than 3.00 points per game. These results are comparable to
those when PRC = 1000 and MRC = 100 (fig. 2.8d). Only at MRC = 400 do the male
and female scores even out. From these results, and the summary in table 3.2, it is
quite clear that the 'relative' hypothesis is more accurate and that non-reciprocal
altruism is the result of relatively low male reproductive costs. The results from this
section indicate that non-reciprocal altruism will only evolve when MRC <=
O.lxFRC. This is an important result as it shows it is the relative difference between
male and female energetic costs that is relevant. The costs to both males and females
must be taken into account in developing theories regarding the evolution of paternal
care.
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Expected Observed
o
o
1
a) FRC = 2000
MRC= 100
b) FRC = 2000
MRC=200
c) FRC = 2000
MRC=400
Average score per player, per game:
o < 1.00 0 1.25 0 1.75 1...-..... 2.25 2.75 _ > 3.00
Figure 3.1: Mixed sex interactions (FRC = 2000)
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3.4 Exploring the Threshold Value
One of the most interesting things about these models is the clearly defined
thresholds between the different behavioural strategies. In the control model,
described in section 2.2, there is a definite switch to reciprocal altruism at RC = 200.
In model 1 and in the model just described in section 3.3, there is a drastic change in
male behaviour at the boundary MRC = 0.1 x FRC, from non-reciprocal altruism to
great competition with females. Why does the threshold occur here? Why not follow
the rule 'behave as a non-reciprocal altruist when MRC <= 0.3xFRC'? This is
particularly puzzling since it would seem that at male reproductive costs of 300, or
even 500, males should have plenty of energy to spare to help the females. As it turns
out, in a world where female fertility is unpredictable males have to keep their 'spare
energy' for themselves.
Imagine a wild population in which there is no birth season so that females
may come into estrous at any time. This means that males are unable to predict at
what times females will become fertile. Usually about one female comes into estrous
each month although sometimes, by chance, two or even three females come into
estrous within a short space of time. If this occurs only those males with 'energy to
spare' will stand any chance of impregnating several females. The same chance
effects occur in the model. If the generation time is, say, 3500 cycles in a population
of size 650 (see section 3.2), a male can be expected to be selected for reproduction
about 11 times', however, he will only be allowed to take the opportunity to
reproduce if he has enough points (and, of course, his partner is female and also has
enough points). In a predictable world the male would be selected once every 325
cycles, which is time enough to replenish the points spent during reproduction. In an
unpredictable world there is a chance that the interval between selections may be
very small. In which case, the male needs to quickly acquire enough points, not just
to reproduce once, but to reproduce twice in quick succession if the opportunity
anses.
In a stable population, where population size does not increase, each
individual can expect to have, on average, 1 offspring. That is, the mean number of
1 The population size is 650 and there are assumed to be 3500 cycles per generation. During each
cycle two agents are chosen, hence expected number of selections = 2 x 3500/650= 11.2.
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offspring per agent must be 1.00. In a probabilistic model it is likely that some
individuals will have no offspring, and that others will have more than 1.00
offspring. This is likely to be the case for model 1. Unfortunately, when the model
was first run, variation in offspring number was not recorded. So, in order to assess
this variation without completely re-running the experiment, Modell was run ten
times at FRC = 1000, exactly as described in section 2.4, for 5,000 generations. Two
new variables were measured: (1) The maximum number of offspring born to a
single male and a single female in each generation; (2) The standard deviation in
number of offspring born to males and females in each generation.
Every 20 generations, standard deviations and maximum number of offspring
born to one parent were measured for males and females, so that after 5,000
generations 250 sets of measurements had been taken. This was done 10 times for
each value of MRC, and MRC was varied between 100 and 600 points. Table 3.3
shows the average/ standard deviation and average maximum scores for each sex,
and each value of MRC. At all values of MRC, there is greater variation in number
of offspring born to males than females. While the most successful males can expect
to have four or five offspring over a lifetime, the most successful females will have
only three or four offspring.
MRC MALES FEMALES
SD MAX SD MAX
100 1.00 4.85 0.76 3.31
200 0.99 4.82 0.76 3.32
400 0.96 4.55 0.78 3.39
600 0.92 4.23 0.79 3.41
Table 3.3: Sex differences in reproductive success.
Average standard deviation (SD) in, and maximum number of (MAX), offspring
born to a single parent.
2 Average values were calculated over the 10 experiments for each value ofMRC.
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In order to examine the range of variation within a single experiment, one
experiment was chosen at random for each value of MRC. For these chosen
experiments, the distribution of standard deviations and maximum number of
offspring were plotted as histograms. Fig. 3.2 illustrates the distribution of standard
deviations, and shows that there is more variation in the number of offspring born to
males, than to females. As MRC increases, the difference between the males and
females decreases, although even at MRC = 600 male reproductive success is still the
most variable. The histograms for maximum number of offspring born (fig. 3.3)
show even more dramatically that males have better opportunities than females to
have many offspring. Whatever the value of MRC the maximum number of children
that anyone female is likely to have is 3, and given the low standard deviation (fig.
3.2) this is likely to be a rare occurrence. The top breeding males, on the other hand,
may have five or more offspring, and this is more likely the lower the value ofMRC.
Of course, only those players who have good strategies are able to attain
enough points to have large numbers of offspring, but it seems likely that chance will
also affect an individual's opportunities to realise its potential reproductive output.
Given this potential, at what value of MRC does non-reciprocal altruism become a
bad strategy? To calculate this easily some assumptions must be made:
1) Females always cooperate with each other, scoring 300 points each time they meet
(100 rounds at 3.00 points per round).
2) Males always defect against each other, scoring 100 points each time they meet
(100 rounds at 1.00 points per round).
3) Males are non-reciprocal altruists and will score 150 points each time they meet a
female (100 rounds at 1.50 points per round), while the female scores 400 points
(100 rounds at 4.00 points per round).
The first stage in this calculation is to estimate how many times a female
must be chosen to play the Prisoner's Dilemma before she has acquired enough
points to reproduce. When FRC = 1000, a female must be picked either 3 or 4 times
to acquire the necessary points. The exact number of times depends on whether she
plays males and/or females. The probabilities of3 or 4 picks are shown below where
M = male partner in game, F = female partner in game.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of male and female standard deviation in number of
offspring born to a single individual.
Each graph shows the results for just a single run. The standard deviation in number of
offspring born to males and females was recorded every 20 generation. Each graph
shows the distribution of standard deviations over the 5000 generations of a single
experiment. FRC = 1000 in each case.
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a) MRC = 100
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c) MRC = 400
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of maximum number of offspring born to a single male or
female.
Each graph shows the results for just a single run. The maximum number of offspring
born to a single male and a single female over the course of a generation was recorded
every 20 generations. The graphs show the distribution of results over the 5000
generations of a single experiment. FRC = 1000 in each case.
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P(3 picks):' = P(MMF) + P(MFM) + P(FMM) + P(FFM) + P(FMF) + P(MFF) +
P(MMM)
= 7/8
P(4 picks) = P(FFFF) + P(FFFM)
= 1/8
E(picks)-+ = (7/8 x 3) + (1/8 x 4) = 3 1/8
These calculations show that most females will be ready to reproduce after
three selections, hence males must also be ready to reproduce after 3 selections. The
next step is to estimate how many points a male can expect to acquire in 3 selections.
Again, this will depend on who he plays:
E(points) = «100 + 100 + 100) x P(MMM)) + «150+150+150) x P(FFF)) +
3 «100 + 100 + 150) x P(MMF)) + 3 «100 + 100 + 150) x P(FFM))
= (300 x 1/8) + (450 x 1/8) + (350 x 3/8) + (400 x 3/8)
= 375 points
This means that a male can expect to have acquired 375 points by the time he
is given an opportunity to reproduce with a female. This would suggest that males
can afford to behave as non-reciprocal altruists whenever MRC is less than 375.
However, if a male needs to keep enough points in hand to reproduce twice in quick
succession, he can only afford to play non-reciprocal altruism when:
2xMRC <= 375
This means that males should only behave as non-reciprocal altruists when
MRC is less than or equal to 187.5. Since these calculations are themselves based on
probabilities and are dependent on the strategies played between agents of the same
sex, this should be taken as a rough estimate. None the less it is very close to the
observed threshold value of 100. This calculation suggests that males can afford to
behave as non-reciprocal altruists as long as this strategy allows them to acquire
3 Probability of '3 picks' equals .
4 Expected number of picks equals .
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enough points to mate with at least two females. In other words, males will only
invest in females when doing so does not jeopardise their potential to mate with other
females. This is similar to the conclusion drawn by Maynard Smith (1977) and
Werren et al. (1980) that paternal investment can occur without paternity certainty as
long as the male does not suffer a promiscuity cost.
Two interesting conclusions have arisen from this section. Firstly, because
males invest less in each reproductive event, there is greater variation in male
reproductive success, than female reproductive success. This conclusion is well
known to biologists (Daly and Wilson 1983), and yet it is a surprising outcome from
such a simple model. Secondly, because females have the highest reproductive cost
they are likely to always be on an energetic knife edge, with very little energy in
reserve. Males should easily be able to meet their energetic needs, even when these
are quite high, but the most successful males will be those who keep enough energy
reserves to mate with multiple females. This means that males will only behave as
non-reciprocal altruists when they can aid females without seriously reducing their
own energy stores.
For the past 25 years, the received wisdom has been that a male's fitness is
limited by the number of females he can inseminate (Trivers 1972). Accordingly he
can best maximise his reproductive success by competing with other males for access
to females. By implication, access to resources is likely to have little influence on
male fitness. Yet, contrary to this, the model presented here suggests that resources
may also be very important for male reproductive success. A few recent studies lend
support to this conclusion. Bercovitch and Nurnberg (1996) found that in one
population of rhesus macaques, only 8 out of 21 males sired a single season's
offspring. When they compared sires with non-sires they found that sires were
heavier, longer, had bigger testes and higher abdominal skinfolds. As measured by
skinfold thickness, sires began the season with twice as much body fat as non-sires.
By the end of the season sires and non-sires had the same amount of body fat,
indicating high levels of energy expenditure on the part of the sires. Bercovitch and
Nurnberg state (1996, p.66):
"Our research has major implications for the view that females augment
their reproductive success by concentrating on access to food, whereas
males achieve this goal by channelling resources into access to females.
Our data confirmed that mating with more females yielded more
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offspring, but this outcome was a function of male body condition. If
obtaining and maintaining access to females is a consequence of male
quality, then male feeding behaviour has a direct, not a secondary, effect
on male reproductive success."
Two studies on birds also support a link between resources and reproductive
success. Whittingham and Lifjeld (1995a) found that in house martins the males with
the highest body weight gained the most matings. Hannon and Dobush (1997) that in
the usually monogamous willow ptarmigan that only those birds with very good body
condition and larger territories were among the 20% of males that practised polygny.
The energetic costs of reproduction for both sexes will be analysed in detail in
chapter 4.
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3.5 The Further Evolution of Non-reciprocal Altruism
{Model 2)
In the model that has been developed, when the reproductive effort required
by a male to produce an offspring is low in comparison to female reproductive effort,
males behave as non-reciprocal altruists, investing in the females of the group and
enabling them to reproduce more quickly. So far, this chapter has shown that non-
reciprocal altruism benefits females by shortening the inter-birth interval, and that
male's will participate in non-reciprocal altruism as long as MRC <= 0.1 x FRC. It
has also been shown that there is more variation in male compared with female
reproductive success, and that males should only be non-reciprocal altruists when
this behaviour does not result in missed mating opportunities.
Male non-reciprocal altruists are sacrificing energy for the benefit of the
female and her offspring. This is akin to male investment in a female and her
offspring, and suggests that the evolution of paternal investment could be triggered
by a heavy imbalance in the level of reproductive effort between the sexes. Since
there is no link between the interaction and reproduction phases of the model it is
more than likely that males are investing in the mothers of another male's future
offspring. But, if males must invest in the females they would be better off ensuring
that they are investing in the mother of their own infant. Once this link between
cooperation and reproduction is made, the males may invest even more heavily in the
females and their offspring. This hypothesis is explored in the following experiment,
'model 2'.
3.5.1 Method
The basic experiment was repeated with the difference that after a male and
female had finished interacting (playing the Prisoner's Dilemma) they were allowed
to reproduce, with the proviso that they each have enough points.'. Remember, in the
first model two agents were selected to interact (play the Prisoner's Dilemma) and
following this two different agents were chosen to reproduce. In this model, the same
5 This change was made by removing a single line ("3. select two new agents at random") from the
program outlined in fig. 2.3.
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pairs are involved in both the interaction and reproduction phases of the simulation.
This does not guarantee reproductive access for the male, since if either sex does not
have enough points to reproduce after the interaction phase they will not be allowed
to reproduce. However, in this model it is much more likely that a pair that have
interacted together will also reproduce together. Male-male and female-female
interactions proceeded as usual, without reproduction. The simulation was run 3a
times for each set of variables. As in modell, the control experiment was run with
male reproductive cost equal to female reproductive cost. The main experiment
was run with FRC =1000 and the value ofMRC was varied. As with modell, results
were analysed in terms of the average score per player per game of Prisoner's
Dilemma.
3.5.2 The control experiment: symmetric reproductive costs
In the control experiment MRC = FRC. Figure 3.4 compares the distribution
of average scores per player per game for the control experiment for modell, with
the results for this model. Linking interactions and reproduction makes almost no
difference to the outcomes. Most importantly, a reproductive cost of 200 is still the
threshold at and beyond which reciprocal altruism almost always evolves.
3.5.3 The main experiment: asymmetric reproductive costs
Figure 3.5 shows how the average score for each interaction type (male-male,
female-female, male-female and female-male) varies with the ratio ofMRC to FRC.
The results for male-male and female-female interactions are very similar (fig. 3.5a).
Regardless of the value of MRC, both male-male and female-female interactions
tend to be cooperative. In same sex interactions players gain, on average, between
2.5 and 3.00 points per game. Intra-female games score slightly higher than intra-
male games, but this difference is small. In modell, female-female interactions were
also very cooperative, however, male-male interactions were far more competitive
than is the case here. Why the males in this simulation should be so cooperative will
become clear after examining the inter-sex interactions.
The results for the inter-sex interactions strongly predict the evolution of non-
reciprocal altruism under these conditions. The greater the difference in male and
female costs the greater the divergence in their average scores. For instance, when
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Figure 3.4: The control experiments
Male and female reproductive costs are equal in each case. Each bar represents a
summary of the average scores over 30 simulations: (a) shows the distribution of the
average scores for model 2 when interactions and reproduction are linked; (b) shows the
distribution of average scores for model 1 where there is no connection between the
interaction and reproduction phases. The distributions are very similar in each case.
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Figure 3.5: Variation of average scores with MRCIFRC
The results for model 2 are shown for a) same-sex interactions, and b) mixed sex
interactions. Each point on the graph represents the average score per player per
game, averaged over 30 separate simulations.
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MRC = 200 females gained, on average, 4.74 points from their games against males
while males received just 0.38 points in return. In 730/0 of these simulations males
always cooperated while females always defected, giving females 5.00 points and
males the suckers pay-off of 0.00. That is, males have gained absolutely nothing
from their interactions with females. To differentiate this from the behaviour that
evolves in model 1, it will be called strong non-reciprocal altruism. In the other 27%
of experiments non-reciprocal altruism of the type described in Model 1 evolved.
That is, males always cooperated while females alternately cooperated and defected.
In fact, when MRC = 200, the only strategy to evolve in all experiments was non-
reciprocal altruism.
At MRC = 400 non-reciprocal altruism was the dominant strategy in all but
one simulation, although strong non-reciprocal altruism did not evolve. Even at MRC
= 600 males behaved as non-reciprocal altruists in 40% of experiments. Only at
MRC = 800 do the scores even out: both sexes played a strategy of reciprocal
altruism.
In summary, while linking interactions and reproduction has very little effect
on the outcomes of the control experiment, it greatly effects the outcomes when male
and female reproductive costs differ. When MRC <= 200, males nearly always
behave as strong non-reciprocal altruists, always cooperating with females who never
reciprocate. When MRC <= 600 there is strong selection for non-reciprocal altruism,
where males always cooperate and females alternate between cooperation and
defection. In other words, the quality of male non-reciprocal altruism has increased,
and the threshold for this behaviour is much higher than in model 1.
3.5.4 Paternity certainty and the threshold values.
Strong non-reciprocal altruism and non-reciprocal altruism can greatly
influence a female's reproductive success. Strong non-reciprocal altruists donate 5.00
points per game to females, and gain nothing in return. This means that the only way
that males can gain points is through their intra-sex interactions which explains why
male-male cooperation is so high in this model as compared with model 1. Why are
males behaving as non-reciprocal altruists, and why are the threshold values 200 and
600 for strong non-reciprocal altruism and non-reciprocal altruism respectively?
There are two possible hypotheses. Firstly it is possible that males only behave as
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non-reciprocal altruists when they can afford to do so and have enough points to
produce two offspring in quick succession. This would be in a accord with modell,
where it was found that males would only behave as non-reciprocal altruists when
there were no promiscuity costs (section 3.4). The alternative hypothesis is that
males behave in this way in response to high paternity certainty, and will invest in
females regardless of lost of mating opportunities. These hypotheses can be tested
separately for strong non-reciprocal altruism and non-reciprocal altruism by
performing similar calculations to those used in section 3.4. It will be assumed that
members of the same sex always cooperate with each other, receiving 300 points per
100 interactions.
a) Strong non-reciprocal altruism
Assuming that males are strong non-reciprocal altruists, females will gain 500 points
each time that they interact with a male (5.00 x 100 interactions), and males will get
no points in return. Females will be ready to reproduce in either 2, 3 or 4 selections,
with the following probabilities:
P(2 picks) = P(MM) = 1/4
P(3 picks) = P(MFM) + P(FMM) + P(FFM) + P(FMF) + P(MFF) = 5/8
P(4 picks) = P(FFFF) + P(FFFM) = 1/8
E(picks) = (1/4 x 2) + (5/8 x 3) + (1/8 x 4) = 2 7/8
This means that most females will be ready to reproduce after three
selections, and that males must also be ready to reproduce after 3 selections. The
next step is to estimate how many points can a male expect to acquire in 3 selections:
E(points) = ((300 + 300 + 300) x P(MMM)) + ((0 + 0 +0) x P(FFF)) +
3 ((300 + 300 + 0) x P(MMF)) + 3 ((0 + 0 + 300) x P(FFM))
= (900 x 1/8) + 0 + (600 x 3/8) + (300 x 3/8)
= 450 points
This result suggests that males can afford to be strong non-reciprocal altruists
when MRC <= 450. But, the results show that strong non-reciprocal altruism never
evolves at this value of MRC. These calculations and observations seem to support
the hypothesis that males are reserving enough points for two possible matings, with
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a threshold for non-reciprocal altruism at 225 points. The alternative hypothesis is
that at MRC = 400, even though males expect to score enough points to reproduce,
there is a high chance that if they play strong non-reciprocal altruism they will fall
short. For instance, if they are picked to play three females in a row, or one male and
two females, they will not have enough points to reproduce. The probability of not
getting 400 points within 3 selections is:
P(males do not score 400 points in 3 games) = 3 x P(MFF) + P(FFF)
= 3/8 + 1/8
= 1/2
This means that males have a 50% chance of not being able to reproduce
when they meet a fertile female. Strong non-reciprocal altruism is clearly a risky
strategy at a reproductive cost of 400. By not playing strong non-reciprocal altruism
at RC = 400 males get the double advantage of avoiding the risks of failing to get
enough points while at the same time maximising their potential for multiple
matings.
b) Non-reciprocal altruism.
The threshold for ordinary non-reciprocal altruism is between 600 and 800
points. With non-reciprocal altruism males gain 150 points each time they meet a
female, while the female gains 400 points. The females can expect to be fertile after
3 selections (see section 3.4). How many points can males expect to acquire during
this time?
E(points) = «300 + 300 + 300) x P(M1v1M)) + «150 + 150 +150) x P(FFF)) +
3 «300 + 300 + 150) x P(Ml\1F)) + 3 «150 + 150 + 300) x P(FFM))
= (900 x 1/8) + (450 x 1/8) + (750 x 3/8) + (600 x 3/8)
= 675 points
675 is very close to the observed threshold for non-reciprocal altruism. If
males were attempting to keep enough points for two matings, the threshold would
be half of this value, i.e. 337.5 points. This clearly is not the case. In other words by
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playing non-reciprocal altruism males are foregoing opportunities for multiple
matings.
These calculations are very revealing. Males will only behave as strong non-
reciprocal altruists when they can do so without jeopardising their own chances of
producing at least one offspring. There is no point in a male investing in a female to
the extent that it makes him too weak to reproduce. Non-reciprocal altruism, on the
other hand, appears to be a very good strategy even at high male reproductive costs.
Males are behaving as non-reciprocal altruists even though this means paying a cost
in terms of lost mating opportunities with other females. The likelihood of mating
with the female he is investing in is the key factor here. When a male helps a female
there is around a 57% chance that he will be the father of her offspring (see figure
3.6). The converse of this, of course, is that there is a 43% chance he will be
investing in another male's offspring. None the less it seems that paternity certainty
of 57% is enough to promote paternal care.
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Figure 3.6: Probability tree to estimate probability of paternity.
The tree shows all the possible types of interactions a single female could have over
three selections. If she meets a female she gains 300 points, if she meets a male she
gains 450 points . Her accumulated score is shown in the square brackets. At 7
different points on the tree she interacts with a male, and if she has enough points
they can reproduce. Only four out of the seven males on the diagram would be able to
reproduce (shaded in red) . This means that whenever a male meets a female, he has a
4/7 or 57% chance of breeding with her .
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3.6: The Evolution of Paternal Care
In monogamous social groups, males usually involve themselves in paternal
care of offspring (although not always, e.g. in many species of gibbon). While
monogamy occurs in 5% of mammals (Kleiman 1977), and 15% of primates
(Rutberg 1983) the reasons for its evolution are poorly understood. Clutton-Brock
(1989 p.344) describes monogamy as "one of the most puzzling of mammalian
mating systems." One possible explanation is that monogamy occurs when female
ranges are so large that males are only able to defend a single female at a time. This
hypothesis may explain monogamy in gibbons (van Schaik and van Hooff 1983) but
does not appear to have general applicability. Cockburn (1988) found no evidence in
rats that monogamous females have larger home ranges. Similarly in primates, once
the effect of body size has been controlled for, monogamous and polygynous species
have very similar home range sizes (Dunbar 1988). Furthermore, Dunbar (1988) has
shown that monogamous males would actually be capable of defending the ranges of
three or four females.
Clutton-Brock (1989) favours the hypothesis that monogamy evolves
whenever males can achieve higher reproductive success by helping a female to rear
the young. In this case monogamy serves the dual function of increasing the
reproductive rate of the female, and increasing the male's paternity certainty. For
instance, among canids, monogamy allows females to produce unusually large litters
(Gittleman 1986). Gittleman and Oftedal (1987) have shown that communal or
biparental care in carnivores is associated with high litter weights and litter growth
rates in comparison to species with only maternal care.
Marmosets and tamarin females usually give birth to twins and may produce
two litters in a single year. This high reproductive investment may only be possible
when females receive male assistance in offspring care (Feistner and Price 1990;
Ferrari 1992; Ross 1991). In marmosets, mothers without helpers reduce their
nursing frequency, and wean their infants later than those with helpers (Ximenes and
Sousa 1996). This means that in callitrichids, males may be better off helping a
single female raise twins, than mating polygamously (Dunbar 1988). However,
Goldizen (1990) has shown that the common ancestor to the callitrichids while
monogamous, only gave birth to a single offspring at a time. The pre-existence of
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monogamy and male care would have then allowed the subsequent evolution of
twinning. But, if we assume that male care giving evolved before female energetic
costs became high (due to twinning) then we can no longer use high female energetic
costs alone as our explanation for paternal care. Furthermore, this hypothesis cannot
apply to monogamous species such as sakis, titis and night monkeys where twinning
does not commonly occur. In these species Clutton-Brock (1989 p.347) describes
paternal care and monogamy as "an enigma."
At present there is no unifying theory to explain the evolution of paternal
care. In the next section a new hypothesis will be presented that is based on the
models developed in chapters 2 and 3.
3.6.1 Paternal care: evolution at the edge of chaos
This chapter has clarified and expanded the model presented in chapter 2
where it was shown that non-reciprocal altruism is one of a whole range of
cooperative strategies that can emerge in populations of mixed sex. Non-reciprocal
altruism was compared to paternal care, and it was hypothesised that if female
energetic costs of reproduction are very high then male care could occur, even in the
absence of genetic paternity. This chapter has shown that the benefits of non-
reciprocal altruism, in terms of a shorter inter-birth interval and generation time,
could be great (section 3.2). More importantly, it has shown that paternal care is not
merely a response to high female energetic costs, but that it will evolve only when
female costs are high relative to male costs (section 3.3). More specifically, we can
only expect the evolution of paternal care when male costs are 10% or less than
female costs.
The most worrying aspect of this hypothesis is that it seems very unlikely that
male reproductive costs could ever be just 10% of female costs. Male costs of
reproduction are not insignificant. In many cases males must meet the energetic costs
of male-male competition, maintenance of a larger body size and territorial defence.
In macaques, house martins and ptarmigans it has been shown that male body
condition is highly related to reproductive success (section 3.4). Given that male
reproductive costs are likely to be far greater than 10% of female reproductive costs,
is this model inapplicable?
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In times of evolutionary change unusual conditions should be expected. An
increase in body size, a climatic shift, an increase in lactation time, or an increase in
the duration of offspring dependency could all elevate female energetic costs. If
female costs become very high, even for a transitory period, the basic model predicts
that males would provide care for females and their offspring, regardless of paternity.
This is a very unstable situation. In the complexity literature the threshold MRC =
10% FRC would be called the 'edge of chaos' (Lewin 1993; Waldrop 1993). This is
the unstable part of the model, where any small change that affects the value ofMRC
or FRC will spin the model in one of two directions: no paternal care, or strong
paternal care. If male costs increase, or female costs decrease so that MRC is greater
than 100/0 of FRC, then non-reciprocal altruism will no longer be selected and it is
unlikely that paternal care will evolve. On the other hand, if female costs remain high
relative to male costs then we would expect to see a change in male behaviour.
Paternity certainty is not a condition for non-reciprocal altruism. However, in a
situation in which non-reciprocal altruism is favoured, males could maximise the
benefits to themselves by trying to invest in those females who are likely to become
mothers of their own offspring. That is, we would expect males to start to interact
with and reproduce with the same females.
This link between interactions and reproduction has been reported in a
number of primate species which are not usually monogamous or polyandrous.
Stanford et al. (1994) have shown that the presence of estrous females is the best
predictor of hunting behaviour in male chimpanzees, and bonobo males have been
reported to give food to females immediately after, or even in the midst of
intercourse (Kuroda 1984; de Waal 1987). Smuts (1985) reports that subordinate
males in a harem group often form special friendships with females, helping them in
the care and protection of offspring in the expectation of future matings. Females can
also actively encourage this link between interaction and reproduction. Anderson
(1992) suggests that in chacma baboons, females encourage male investment by
limiting mating to a single male and assuring him ofa high likelihood of paternity.
Once a link between interactions and reproduction is made, the ground rules
change and male care giving can become locked into the system. Model 2, presented
in section 3.5, shows that if interactions and reproduction are linked, then males will
invest in females as long as male reproductive costs are less than or equal to 60% of
female costs. Furthermore, males ought to invest even more heavily. Under this new
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scenario male reproductive costs could increase, but as long as they remain below
the threshold value of 600/0 FRC then paternal care will remain a stable strategy.
What is more, high levels of paternal care may allow females to invest even more in
their offspring, elevating female energetic costs still further. For example, in
tamarins male helping is such a successful strategy in overcoming the constraints of
high female costs, that female energetic costs have soared and male helpers are now
essential (Jennions and Macdonald 1994). Similarly in carnivores, the presence of
helpers in some species has released energetic constraints which means that in many
cases energetic costs have become so high that reproduction is impossible without
helpers (Creel and Creel 1991).
Field studies on the semipalmated sandpiper, Calidris pusilla, suggest that
comparison of male and female energetic costs is a constructive approach to the
evolution of paternal care. In this species, while both males and females engage in
care of the offspring, it is not unusual for the female to desert the brood leaving the
male to care for the chicks. Two separate studies have looked at this behaviour, one
on the coast of Hudson Bay, Manitoba (Gratto-Trevor 1991), the other in North
Alaska (Ashkenazie and Safriel 1979). Female desertion was more common in the
latter study, and occasional male desertion was reported in the former. Gratto-Trevor
suggests that the increased energetic stress in the harsh arctic environment was
responsible for the higher male cooperation and increased female desertion in this
study. In both studies there was clear evidence of the high energetic demands on the
female. In the Alaskan birds Ashkenazie and Safriel calculate that the female's
energetic requirement is 15% greater than the males. By the end of the breeding
season females are in a much poorer condition than males, and females leave the
brood early in order to find better feeding grounds.
This is not the first time that paternal care has been studied within the
theoretical framework of the evolution of cooperation. Ligon (1983) suggests that
monogamy is a case of reciprocal altruism, where males are trading male care for
mating opportunities. Koenig (1987) strongly disagrees with this position. He
believes that in the case of monogamy both the male and female are acting in their
own self interest. He claims that males who donate aid to females do not incur a
lifetime reduction in fitness, hence they cannot be acting altruistically. But, this
reasoning misses the point. Cooperation in terms of feeding and aiding a partner
involves high short-term costs in terms of time, energy and lost mating
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opportunities. If these short-term costs are balanced by long-term benefits then there
will be no cost in terms of lifetime reproductive success (Ligon 1991). The point is
that at any given moment a male would be better off not cooperating with the
female, but in the long term cooperation pays. Koenig also argues that monogamy
cannot be reciprocal altruism because the female does not incur any costs. This is
true, even in the short term the female does not seem to loose out by mating with her
partner. But, if males are non-reciprocal altruists then this objection is over-ruled,
since male's are predicted to be cooperative even though females do not reciprocate.
The model of paternal care developed here suggests that even a temporary
increase in female energetic costs (relative to male energetic costs) can seed the
evolution of male care-giving. These are abstract models, and the pay-offs associated
with different behaviours will vary in the real world. The point is that these models
suggest that there are two stages in the evolution of paternal care. The first stage is
concerned with the evolutionary origins of male care. In the first instance paternity
certainty is not an issue. All that is required for male care giving to evolve is that
female energetic costs should be considerably greater than male energetic costs. The
second stage is concerned with the stability and maintenance of male care giving
over many generations. Progression to the second stage will only occur if males
attempt to increase paternity certainty. If this happens, paternal care and paternity
certainty can co-evolve, raising the threshold value of MRC below which we would
expect male care-giving. In this case, paternal care will become stable as long as
there is a fair degree of paternity certainty and quite high female energetic costs in
comparison to males.
This model of paternal care will be difficult to prove because the first stage is
likely to be very short lived. Among primates, gibbons may prove to be a good test
species. Gibbons are especially interesting because, although they are usually
classified as monogamous, mate switching and copulations outside of the pair bond
also occur. Palombit (1995), in a six year study of Hylobates lar and Hylobates
syndactylus, found that only three out of seven adult females successfully
reproduced. He reports that still births, abortions, premature births and early
postpartum death are common for both species which indicates very high female
costs. The small body size of the males indicates that male costs are somewhat lower
than female costs. Palombit found that the most successful female, who had three
offspring, also had the longest lasting pair bond and suggests that the stability of the
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pair-bond is very important in determining a female's reproductive success.
Furthermore, males may be described as non-reciprocal altruists as they are more
active than females in maintaining proximity to their partner and in their aggressive
interactions with neighbours. However, pair-bonding is not always associated with
high levels of paternal care (strong non-reciprocal altruism), while some males do
carry infants into their second year this is not a universal trait. Relatively high female
reproductive costs and variability in the degree of male care suggests that gibbons
may be good animals on which to test this model.
3.6.2 Polyandry, paternal care, and paternity uncertainty
In chapter 2, considerable space was devoted to a discussion of paternity
certainty. It emerged that the correspondence between male care-giving and
probability of paternity is not as straight-forward as usually assumed. This chapter
has furthered this debate by showing that: (1) When male reproductive costs are
relatively low, males can afford to help indiscriminatingly with infant care, without
any loss of mating opportunities (section 3.4); (2) Once interactions and matings
become linked, males will help females in offspring care even if they risk losing
mating opportunities, if the probability of paternity is around 50% or more (section
3.5.4). This second prediction accords well with what we know about callitrichid
mating systems. For instance, Terborgh and Goldizen (1985) found that out of six
groups of Saguinus juscicollis, five of them contained two adult males. Both males
mated with the female to an equal extent (Goldizen 1987b) and hence they each had
a 50% chance of paternity. Presumably unaware of actual paternity of the infants,
both males donated equal proportions of time to helping the breeding female by
carrying infants and sharing of large insects and fruits.
Polyandry has clear benefits for the female as more male helpers means that
she can raise more young, but the benefits to males are unclear (Davies 1991).
Ferrari (1992) suggests that male care in callitrichids may be a form of intra-sexual
competition, where males attempt to impress the female with their care-giving skills.
However, a recent study by Tardif and Bales (1997) found no evidence that captive
common marmosets or cotton-top tamarins use infant-carrying as a courtship
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strategy. Davies predicts that polyandry will only be beneficial to males in harsh
environments, and that usually monogamy would be a better male strategy.
In callitrichids, not only are most groups polyandrous, but there is a distinct
absence of competition between males, and each male tolerates the other's
copulations with the breeding female. This combination of polyandry and male-male
tolerance has also been observed in dusky moorhens (Garnett 1980), Galapogos
hawks (Faaborg and Bednarz 1990), lammergeieers (Heredia and Donazer 1990),
pukekos (Craig and Jamieson 1990; Jamieson et al. 1994), Tasmanian native hens
(Maynard Smith and Ridpath 1972), and lions (Packer et al. 1988). In these cases, it
seems that paternity uncertainty is the force that maintains male care. On the other
hand, in the acorn woodpecker (Mumme et al. 1983; Koenig 1990), dunnocks
(Davies 1992) and stripe-backed wrens (Rabenold et al. 1990) polyandry is
associated with male competition.
Why male-male competition occurs in some polyandrous groups, and not
others, is unclear. Sherman (1995) suggests that relatedness between males will
favour mating tolerance, although there is absolutely no evidence of this. In tamarins
adult males are assumed to be unrelated (Terborgh and Goldizen 1985) and in most
other cases the genetic relatedness between male helpers is simply unknown.
Vehrencamp (1983) predicts that when breeding sites are limited, and larger groups
can maintain better sites, egalitarian groups should evolve where shared matings
encourage males to stay with the group. Alternatively, male tolerance may be the
least costly option if females specifically attempt to mask paternity. In the
polyandrous white-winged trumpeter, Sherman (1995) reports that even subordinate
males father some of the offspring. Sherman suggests that in order to equalise
paternity probability for all of her helpers, the breeding female encourages mating
attempts from subordinate males, and will occasionally discourage the dominant
male. This strategy seems to work, since the subordinate males provide more food
for the chicks than the dominant male. In callitrichids, the breeding female is
normally dominant (Ferrari 1992) which gives her control of male mating, and this
may explain the lack of competition between the males.
These discussions suggest that females may use paternity uncertainty to
maintain the interest of two or more males. While it may seem surprising that males
are willing participants in this arrangement, the models developed here suggest that a
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probability of paternity of just 500/0 IS enough to promote male care grvmg
behaviours.
Paternal care is not restricted to mammals and birds. In many insect species,
such as butterflies, costs of reproduction can be very asymmetric as females are
solely responsible for egg production. It is quite common for males to donate
nutrients, or 'nuptial gifts' to the females during mating (Boggs 1990; Karlsson
1995; Leimar et al. 1994). These male-derived nutrients are used by the female for
egg production and somatic maintenance, and represent male investment in
reproduction. Boggs (1990) suggests that male donations may be particularly
important when female feeding is restricted. Leimar et al. (1994) also show that gift-
giving buffers females against food shortages. In the language of this model, food
shortages translate to high reproductive costs. In butterflies, male care is far more
common in polyandrous species than monandrous species. In polyandrous species
the females eggs are unlikely to be fertilised by a single male, and so the males have
no way of judging how many of the female's offspring will be theirs. Like the
tamarins described above, paternal care occurs with paternity uncertainty and Leimar
et al. (1994) describe males investing as a group in females.
3.6.3 Non-reciprocal altruism in humans
Until now, discussion of cooperative and competitive strategies has been
restricted to observations on non-human primates and other animals. However,
perhaps the most intriguing evidence for non-reciprocal altruism is found in humans.
If human inter-sexual relationships are based on non-reciprocal altruism then we
would expect females to defect more often than males in Prisoner's Dilemma
situations. Casti (1994) reports that in a large number of Prisoner Dilemma
experiments females appear to defect more often than males. However, it is not clear
which types of interactions provoke defection, or that female defection is
accompanied by male cooperation. Furthermore, these types of laboratory
experiments usually involve strangers and are not really indicative of the types of
strategies individuals use in long-term relationships.
Murstein et al. (1977) compared cooperative relationships between friends
and between marriage partners. They found that cooperative relationships between
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friends tend to be highly 'exchange-orientated'. That is, they work on a reciprocal
basis, in which favours of roughly equivalent value are exchanged. However, they
found that marriages varied in the extent to which marriage partners are exchange
orientated. They comment that an exchange orientated person (1977 p.543):
"may see love as a series of reciprocal exchanges and would feel badly
if a person whom he loved did less for him than he believed he did for
his beloved."
On the other hand. a non-exchange orientated person (1977 p.543):
"is not at all concerned with keeping a mental balance sheet on just what
he has done for others and what they have done for him. For a non-
exchange orientated person, to love another is to forgive his
transgressions and to accept him unconditionally."
They found that both men and women in non-exchange orientated partnerships were
happier, and found their marriage to be more satisfactory than those in exchange
orientated marriages. Interestingly, the effect was strongest for men. It is not clear
from this study that males are necessarily non-reciprocal altruists. On the other hand,
Murstein et al. ' s research appears to suggest that unconditional cooperation may be a
recipe for a good marriage. This indicates that humans may be a good species in
which to search for strategies such as non-reciprocal altruism.
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3.6.4 Summary
In this chapter a new model for the evolution of paternal care has been
developed. It is proposed that paternal care, in the absence of paternity certainty, is
selected when the energetic cost of reproduction for the female is much greater than
the same cost for the male (MRC < = 0.1 x FRC). If this selection pressure persists,
then males will attempt to give care to their own offspring, and will thus establish
closer relationships with females. Once this occurs, then paternal care will become
an integral part of the mating system and should persist as long as MRC <= 0.6 x
FRC. While infant care will raise the costs of reproduction for the males, it also
allows for increased female investment which may further necessitate male aid. Even
in this second stage of non-reciprocal altruism, probability of paternity need only be
around 500/0. It has been suggested that in some cases, in order to prevent male
desertion, paternity uncertainty may playa key role. This certainly seems to be the
case in many polyandrous species, such as the callitrichids. This chapter has also
introduced the idea that in some instances it may pay males to invest as a group in
the females. Finally, non-reciprocal altruism may be particularly important in
understanding the cooperative strategies used in human inter-sex relationships. In the
next chapter, this model of paternal care is tested using a comparison of male and
female energy expenditure in primates. In addition, the applicability of this model to
human evolution will be explored.
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Chapter 4
------------------------
Testing the Model: An Inter-specific Comparison of Sex
Differences in the Energetic Cost of Reproduction
4.1: Introduction
In the previous two chapters theoretical models were used to show how sex
differences in the energetic cost of reproduction affect patterns of cooperation within
groups. It was shown that when females have high energetic costs they are likely to
cooperate with each other, for instance in the care of each others offspring
(allomaternal care). Furthermore, when male energetic costs are much less than
female energetic costs, male investment in females and their offspring may evolve.
Generally, hypotheses regarding the evolution of male care focus only on
female energetic costs, such as the costs of lactation (Dunbar 1988) or infant
transport (Wright 1984, see also section 1.1.1). Wright (1990) points out that the
energetic costs of infant transport are relatively higher in arboreal primates,
especially those of small body size which tend to have proportionally bigger infants.
But, the tarsier has the highest infant/maternal weight ratio of any primate that
produces a single offspring, and yet its breeding system does not involve paternal
care. Wright concludes that a combination of small body size, high litter weight, long
lactation periods and over-lapping periods of gestation and lactation selects for
paternal care, rather than anyone factor on its own. Tardif (1994), in a cross-species
analysis of the costs of lactation and infant transport in small bodied New World
monkeys, found that the relationship between infant costs and care-giving was weak.
Furthermore, Thompson et al. (1994) point out that callitrichids actually have low
overall energy requirements for their body size (measured using standard metabolic
rate).
The models developed here suggest that in order to understand the evolution
of paternal care it is necessary to consider the balance between both male and female
energetic costs. The advantage of theoretical models is that they allow the
manipulation of variables such as energetic costs, and the observation of the origins
of behaviour, in a manner which is impossible in the real world. None the less, the
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application of such models to the real world is a necessary test of their validity.
Because this is a model of the origins of male care this task is a difficult one. An
animal may be so well adapted to its environment that it is impossible to observe the
selective pressures that shaped its present behavioural repertoire. For instance, the
absence of observations of predation does not mean that group living did not evolve
as a predator-defence mechanism. To the contrary, it indicates that group living is a
very effective means of predator defence. With this caveat in mind, the purpose of
this chapter is to test the model of the evolution of paternal care developed in the
previous chapter, using data from extant primates. This will require an investigation
into male and female energetic costs and their relationship to social structure.
While several primate studies have attempted to measure energetic costs (see
for example Altmann and Samuels 1992; Coehlo 1974, 1986 ; Coehlo et al. 1979;
Dasilva 1992; Leonard and Robertson 1994, 1997; see also section 1.2.3), none have
compared male and female energy expenditure. For female mammals, the energetic
costs of reproduction are undoubtedly high since they must bear the costs of both
pregnancy and lactation. Primate infants, with their large brain sizes and extended
periods of development are likely to be an even heavier burden on the mother. As
discussed in section 1.2.3, lactation in particular, imposes enormous energetic
demands on the mother. In fact, the costs of reproduction are so great for females that
Coehlo states (1986 p.153):
"It is a physiological fact that the actual costs of reproduction
(pregnancy and lactation) are borne only be the female primate; there is
nothing physiologically comparable in the male."
But is Coehlo correct? Are male costs of reproduction negligible in
comparison with female costs? Because males do not usually contribute directly to
offspring care, male energetic costs of reproduction usually derive from the costs of
male-male competition. In many species male-male competition is manifest in the
much larger size of the males compared with females, which means that for males
the costs of body maintenance will be relatively high. It is possible that in sexually
dimorphic species, such as the gorilla, male energetic costs will be high, maybe even
as high as female energetic costs. The question is, which sex requires the most
energy to reproduce? The male gorilla who must maintain a body twice the size of
the female, or the female gorilla who must invest in long periods of gestation,
133
lactation and infant care? Darwin (1871 p.581) suggests that male and female
energetic costs are actually very similar:
"The expenditure of matter and force by the two sexes [in mating] is
probably nearly equal, though effected in very different ways and at
different rates."
But, while Darwin' s prediction makes sense in sexually dimorphic species
such as the gorilla, it is not so clearly applicable to those species in which sexual
dimorphism is low. Under these circumstances males are free from both the costs of
pregnancy and lactation, and the costs of maintaining a large body size which
suggests that male energetic costs are low in comparison to the female. If this logic
holds, then the balance of male and female energetic costs will vary with the degree
of sexual dimorphism in body size. This means that the conditions under which male
care is expected (relatively high female costs in comparison to males) will arise when
sexual dimorphism is low.
Sexual dimorphism and mating systems have been theoretically inter-linked
ever since Darwin (1871) suggested that sexual selection for large body size would
occur in species in which male competition for mates is high. This means that sexual
dimorphism is expected to be high in polygynous species in which breeding
competition is great. In birds, for instance, increased body size dimorphism is
associated with increased intra-sexual competition (Owens and Hartley 1998).
Conversely, sexual dimorphism will be low in species where male mating
competition is minimal, for instance in monogamous species. But, the sexual
selection hypothesis does not address the question of why monogamy should have
evolved in the first place. Furthermore, it is misleading in its view that sexual
dimorphism results only from changes in male behaviour and physiology. Increases
or decreases in female body size, which may profoundly affect reproductive success,
also alter levels of sexual dimorphism (Martin et al. 1994; Wilner 1989). It is
possible that the relationship between sexual dimorphism in body size and breeding
system is more complex than the sexual selection hypothesis suggests. Changes in
the level of sexual dimorphism may profoundly affect the balance of energetic costs
between the sexes which will, in turn, feed back onto the structure of the mating
system. This chapter tests the hypothesis that a decrease in body size dimorphism
leads to an increase in relative energetic costs for the female in comparison to the
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male, which in tum selects for the evolution of male care and allomaternal care. In
order to do this, a cross-species examination of the relationship between male and
female energetic costs will be conducted. This will be followed by an analysis of the
benefits of care-giving behaviours.
4.2 Defining the Energetic Cost of Reproduction
The first stage in the analysis will be to estimate the energetic costs of
reproduction. In order to develop a methodology for this, it is first necessary to arrive
at a definition of the energetic cost of reproduction. As we have already seen (section
1.2.3) there is a considerable body of evidence suggesting that both males and
females incur energetic costs due to reproduction. Female costs are associated with
the production of gametes, gestation, lactation and child-care. Male costs arise
primarily from the production of gametes, courtship, male-male competition and, in
some instances, child-care. Additionally, behaviours such as grooming allies to
stabilise coalitions, feeding to maintain a larger body size or to accumulate body fat,
food sharing and predator defence may also affect reproductive success, whether
directly or indirectly. In fact, it is difficult to isolate any single aspect of an
individual's behavioural and physiological make-up that does not contribute to
reproductive success (Morbeck 1997), and that should be excluded from an analysis
of energetic costs of reproduction. Because of this, the following definition is
proposed: The energetic cost of reproduction is the sum of the energetic costs of
every activity that contributes to the production of a single, surviving offspring.
It is assumed that there is a minimum energetic cost of reproduction and that
investments below this value will be unsuccessful. There is no theoretical maximum
energetic investment, although there is likely to be an optimal value. What this
optimal value is will depend not only on sex and species, but also habitat type and
quality, age and rank. The analysis below examines species level data and so
generates estimates of the average energetic cost of reproduction for males and
females of each species.
The definition given above of the energetic cost of reproduction is an ideal,
incorporating all behaviours which contribute to reproductive success. For practical
purposes four main categories that contribute to energetic costs can be identified:
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a) Daily body maintenance,
b) Activity expenditure on moving, social interactions, feeding, defence etc.,
c) Intra-sex competition for mates,
d) Parental care.
The costs of daily body maintenance are directly related to body size. Quite simply,
larger animals require more energy for body maintenance, although energy
requirements per unit of body weight decrease with increased body weight (Kleiber
1932, 1961). Thus, body weight data is required to estimate the cost of body
maintenance.
The energetic costs of activities such as moving, grooming or feeding depend
partly on body size, but will also vary with activity. The energy expended while
walking, for instance, is greater than the cost of feeding per unit of body weight.
Thus in order to estimate daily energy expenditure it is necessary to know how much
time an animal spends on each activity. Time budgets provide such data, and can be
translated into energetic costs using Coehlo's model (1974, 1986; Coehlo et al.
1979). Assuming that breeding competition involves increased moving and/or social
time, then time budgets also provide a rough measure of the energetic costs of intra-
sex competition.
The costs of parental care will be different for males and females. For
females they will mainly derive from the costs of lactation and gestation and these
will be important factors in calculating female energetic costs. The costs of male
care could be measured in terms of the costs of infant transport. However, we are
concerned here with using energetic data to predict those species in which male care
giving has evolved. In order to do this, we require data on what the energetic costs of
reproduction are for males and females in the absence of male care. If the energetic
costs of male care giving are included in the model, then we automatically lose the
ability to make any predictions. For this reason, male care giving will be explicitly
excluded from calculations of male energetic costs.
Within species there will be individual variation in energetic costs due to
variables such as age, rank and habitat quality. None the less, it should be possible to
predict the average energy expenditure per birth. For females, inter-birth interval can
be used to delineate the length of the time in which they are investing in each
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offspring. However, male energy expenditure per offspring born is considerably
more difficult to estimate with confidence, and is likely to be highly variable.
Bercovitch and Nurnberg (1996) found that in rhesus macaques only a small number
of males sire offspring in a single breeding season. Successful males have more body
fat at the start of the breeding season than unsuccessful males, but this is gradually
lost. By the end of the breeding season there is no difference in body fat between
sires and non-sires. This research indicates very clearly the high overall energetic
costs of mate following, guarding and male-male competition in rhesus macaques.
But, what of the energetic costs per infant? Out of 21 adult males only 8 were
successful, each siring an average of 3.25 offspring. This means that while overall
energetic costs for sires were great, high reproductive output considerably reduced
the energetic cost per infant born. In contrast, while non-sires may have expended
less energy overall, their lack of success means that all of their energy expenditure
was wasted.
Bercovitch, and Nurnberg's work on rhesus macaques is one of the only
primate studies that uses genetic methods to test paternity. It highlights the
considerable variation in male reproductive success and energetic costs, and the
difficulties in estimating male energetic costs per offspring born. In theory, males
who do not manage to reproduce should be excluded from the analysis entirely, since
they have failed to meet the minimum requirements for reproductive success. This
means that an accurate assessment of male energetic costs requires data of the type
provided by Bercovitch and Nurnberg for rhesus macaques. In the absence of such
data, it is only possible to estimate average male energetic costs. This will be done
with reference to the amount of time and energy females invest in each reproductive
event. For instance, if it takes a female one year to produce and rear offspring to
maturity, how much energy does the average male expend in this time? In other
words, how much energy does a male expend over the course of a female inter-birth
interval? Measuring male energetic costs per female inter-birth interval is not ideal,
but will provide comparable data for each sex.
In summary, the energetic cost of reproduction has been defined here as the
sum of the energetic costs of all activities which contribute to the production of a
single, surviving offspring. Using data on body mass, activity pattern, gestation
length and lactation length it should be possible to calculate the average energetic
cost of reproduction for each sex per offspring. Female inter-birth interval can be
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used to delineate the amount of time individuals contribute to each offspring.
Because we are concerned here with the origins of male care giving, the costs of
paternal care will be excluded from the analysis. Some of the problems of estimating
male energetic costs have been discussed here. Particularly problematic is accounting
for individual variation in male reproductive success and energy expenditure. Since
these data are unavailable, this analysis will be limited to consideration of average
male energetic costs.
4.3 Data
The following data were collected, and are summarised in tables 4.1a, 4.1b and 4.2:
1) Body mass (male and female).
Body mass is an important variable in determining the cost of body
maintenance, and for calculating daily energy expenditure. These data were taken
from Smith and Jungers (1997), which represents the most up to date source of body
mass estimates. These data were also used to calculate sexual dimorphism in body
size (male body weight divided by female body weight) which was transformed into
a categorical variable using the following categories: low « 1.15), medium (1.15 -
1.5), and high ( > 1.5).
2) Activity budget data.
These data were mostly gathered from the literature' (see table 4.1a for
references). The average percentage of time spent moving, resting, feeding, sleeping
and socialising per 24 hour period was recorded for each non-human primate species
and for each sex. While many papers have been published on activity budgets very
few of these present data by sex, limiting their usefulness for this study. Usually,
only one set of data was available for each species, and where there was a choice of
study sites (for example for the baboons), the population with the largest sample size
was used. Data from wild populations were used for all species except for Saguinus
oedipus, due to the practical difficulties ofobtaining data for this species in the wild.
1 I am very grateful to Mukesh Chalise, Robin Dunbar, Andreas Koenig and Volker Sommer who
kindly donated their data for the purpose of this analysis.
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--0/0 TIME SPENT ON EACH ACTIVITY
MALES FEMALES REFERENCE
feed rest move social sleep feed rest move social sleep
.
Cailltnchidae
Saguinus oedipus 7.58 37.85 2.68 1.90 50.00 9.85 34.65 2.93 2.58 50.00 Price 1992
Cebidae I
IAlouatta caraya 4.50 37.50 10.50 2.50 50.00 6.50 36.00 6.50 1.00 50.00 Bicca-Marques & Calegaro-Marques 199
Alouatta palliata 8.50 36.00 3.50 2.00 50.00 10.00 36.00 2.50 2.50 50.00 Milton 1980
Aotus trivirgatus 28.80 11.95 7.00 2.00 50.00 28.80 11.95 7.00 2.00 50.00 Wright 1978
Ateles paniscus 11.25 23.75 15.00 0.00 50.00 15.60 22.70 11.73 0.00 50.00 McFarland Symington 1988b
Brachyteles arachnoides 9.75 33.04 10.30 1.10 45.80 9.75 31.40 11.90 1.10 45.80 Strier 1987
Callicebus torquatus 11.50 16.00 6.21 12.20 54.00 12.04 23.60 6.04 4.20 54.00 Kinzey et al. 1977
Lagothrix lagotricha 13.00 9.50 26.00 3.00 50.00 9.70 9.10 30.00 1.10 50.00 Defier 1995
Cercopithecinae
Cercopithecus aethiops 15.90 22.38 8.65 3.12 50.00 19.44 15.18 10.37 4.38 50.00 Baldellou & Adan 1997
Cercopithecus mits 12.45 23.40 11.45 2.60 50.00 18.15 16.05 11.20 4.55 50.00 Lawes & Piper 1992
Erythrocebus patas 15.00 25.50 9.00 0.50 50.00 15.00 21.50 11.50 2.00 50.00 Nakagawa 1989
Macaca mulatta 5.55 22.75 6.20 15.35 50.00 8.40 21.70 4.90 15.35 50.00 Post & Baulu 1978
Macaca radiata 15.00 21.50 3.00 10.50 50.00 25.50 7.50 5.00 12.00 50.00 Singh & Vinathe 1990
Papio anubis 24.50 9.50 8.00 8.00 50.00 29.25 3.75 7.75 9.25 50.00 Bercovitch 1983
Papio cynocephalus 21.05 12.95 13.20 2.80 50.00 20.50 11.25 13.00 5.25 50.00 Rasmussen 1985
Colobinae
Colobus badius 11.00 34.00 2.00 3.00 50.00 15.50 28.00 2.00 4.50 50.00 Clutton-Brock 1974
Presbytis entel/us 16.33 32.17 1.10 0.37 50.00 16.05 29.70 1.21 3.04 50.00 Mukesh Chalise (Pers. comm.)
Hylobatidae
Hylobates lar 10.00 29.50 7.00 3.50 50.00 18.00 22.00 7.50 2.50 50.00 Nettlebeck 1993
Pongidae & Hominidae
Pongo pygmaeus 26.80 15.30 4.40 0.50 53.00 18.90 21.00 5.70 1.40 53.00 Leonard & Robertson 1997
Gorilla gorilla 30.55 15.03 3.33 1.00 50.00 29.55 15.20 3.70 1.75 50.00 Watts 1988
Pan troglodytes 27.80 8.90 6.90 3.10 53.30 30.30 8.90 4.40 3.10 53.30 Leonard & Robertson 1997
Table 4.1a: Activity budget data.
body mass (kg) gestation lactation 181 male
male female (days) (days) (years) care
Callitrichidae
Saguinus oedipus 0.42 0.40 168 50 0.58 3
Cebidae
Alouatta caraya 6.42 4.33 187 1
Alouatta palliata 7.15 5.35 186 630 1.88 1
Aotus trivirgatus 0.81 0.74 133 75 0.75 3
Ateles paniscus 9.11 8.44 824 2.88
Brachyte/es arachnoides 9.61 8.07 390 2.82 1
Callicebus torquatus 1.28 1.21 120 3
Lagothrix lagotricha 7.28 7.02 223 315 1.50 1
Cercopithecinae
Cercopithecus aethiops 4.26 2.98 163 365 1.33 1
Cercopithecus mits 7.93 4.25 140 60 0.83 1
Erythrocebus patas 12.40 6.50 168 213 1.00 1
Macaca mulatta 11.00 8.80 165 365 1.00 1
Macaca radiata 6.67 3.85 162 365 1.00 1
Papio anubis 25.10 13.30 180 420 1.12 2
Papio cynocephalus 21.80 12.30 173 365 1.75 2
Colobinae
Colobus badius 8.56 7.42 150 790 2.12 1
Presbytis entellus 15.00 10.28 200 300 1.68 1
Hylobatidae
Hylobates lar 5.90 5.34 213 730 2.69 1
Pongidae & Hominidae
Pongo pygmaeus 77.90 35.60 250 408 6.50 1
Gorilla gorilla 170.40 71.50 260 1004 3.83 1
Pan troglodytes 59.70 45.80 235 1460 5.50 1
Table 4.1b: Life history variables for species used in activity budget analysis
See text for definitions and references. ffiI is the inter-birth interval
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IBody Mass (kg) litter weight at: gestation lactation inter-birth male allomaternal
Species male female birth (kg) weaning (kg) length (days) length (days) interval (years) care care
Callitrichidae
Callimico goeldii 0.50 0.47 0.05 0.21 155.00 70.00 0.47 3 3
Callithrix jacchus 0.36 0.38 0.06 0.13 148.00 90.00 0.52 2 3
Cebuella pygmaea 0.11 0.12 0.03 0.04 137.00 90.00 0.50 3 3
/ Leontopithecus rosalia 0.62 0.60 0.10 0.12 128.60 90.00 0.50 3 3
Saguinus fuscicollis 0.34 0.36 0.08 148.50 90.00 1.00 3 3
Saguinus oedipus 0.42 0.40 0.08 0.09 168.00 50.00 0.58 3 3
Cebidae
Alouatta palliatta 7.15 5.35 0.53 186.00 630.00 1.88 1 2
Alouatta seniculus 6.69 5.21 0.53 1.30 191.30 372.00 1.39 1 2
Aotus trivigatus 0.81 0.74 0.91 0.26 133.00 75.00 0.75 3 3
Ateles fusciceps 8.89 9.16 2.92 226.00 486.40 2.25 1 1
Ateles geoffroyi 7.78 7.29 0.45 2.01 225.00 820.80 2.66 1 1
Callicebus moloch 1.02 0.96 0.74 163.50 60.00 1.00 3 3
Cebus apella 3.65 2.52 0.21 155.00 519.00 1.79 1 2
Lagothrix lagotricha 7.28 7.02 0.47 223.00 315.00 1.50 1 1
Pithecia pithecia 1.94 1.58 0.70 163.50 122.00 1.58 2 2
Saimiri sciureus 0.78 0.66 0.11 0.30 170.50 168.00 1.17 1 3
Colobinae
Colobus badius 8.56 7.42 150.00 790.40 2.12 1 1
Colobus guereza 13.50 9.20 0.57 170.00 390.00 1.00 1 3
Colobus polykomos 9.90 8.30 0.60 1.08 175.00 180.00 1.04 1 3
Presbytis entellus 15.00 10.28 0.50 200.10 300.00 1.68 1 3
Table 4.2: Data used for cross-species analysis
See text for definitions and references.
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Body Mass (kg) Iitter weight at: gestation lactation inter-birth male allomaternal
Species male female birth (kg) weaning (kg) length (days) length (days) interval (years) care care
Cercopithecae
'Cercocebus albigena 8.52 6.21 0.43 1.83 174.90 365.00 2.12 2 2
Cercopithecus aethiops 4.26 2.98 0.34 1.28 163.30 365.00 1.33 1 2
Cercopithecus ascanius 3.70 2.92 0.37 171.60 180.00 4.33 1 1 ,
/ Cercopithecus mitis 7.93 4.25 0.40 140.00 60.00 0.83 1 1
Cercopithecus neglectus 7.35 4.13 0.45 1.17 165.00 365.00 1.62 1 1
Erythrocebus patas 12.40 6.50 0.50 1.44 167.50 213.00 1.00 1 2
Macaca arctoides 12.20 8.40 0.50 1.93 178.20 300.00 1.48 1 1
Macaca fascicularis 5.36 3.59 0.34 1.35 160.30 420.00 1.07 1 1
Macaca fuscata 11.00 8.03 0.54 2.29 173.00 365.00 1.50 1 1
Macaca mulatta 11.00 8.80 0.48 1.60 165.20 365.00 1.00 1 1
Macaca nemestrina 11.20 6.50 0.46 0.95 167.00 365.00 1.11 1 1
Macaca radiata 6.67 3.85 0.40 1.60 162.00 365.00 1.00 1 1
Macaca silenus 8.90 6.10 0.48 180.00 365.00 1.38 1 1
Miopithecus ta/apoin 1.38 1.12 0.18 0.20 162.00 180.00 1.00 1 1
Papio cynocephalus 21.80 12.30 0.85 1.86 172.60 365.00 1.75 2 1
Theropithecus gelada 19.00 11.70 0.55 170.00 450.00 2.14 1 1
Hylobatidae
Hylobates lar 5.90 5.34 0.40 2.28 213.00 730.00 2.69 1 1
Pongidae & Hominidae
Pongo pygmaeus 77.90 35.60 1.81 6.13 249.50 408.37 6.50 1 1
Gorilla gorilla 170.40 71.50 2.12 15.39 260.00 1004.40 3.83 1 1
Pan troglodytes 59.70 45.80 1.85 20.56 234.50 1460.00 5.50 1 1
Table 4.2 (continued)
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Population Male Female Male Female Lactation Inter-birth t~
mass mass DEE DEE length interval References
(kg)1 (kg)2 (kcal)" (kcal)" (days]" (days)"
Ache 59.6 51.0 3186 2085 366 1095 1,2,3,4: Leonard and Robertson (1997);
(Paraguay) 5: United Nations (1987), avg. Paraguay; 6: Hill!
and Hurtado (1991) ,
Evenki (Siberia) 59.9 52.2 2849 2098 180 1967 All data: Leonard et al. (1996)
Kaul 56.3 48.1 2347 1830 720 1231 1-5: Leslie et al. (1984);
(New Guinea) 6: estimate (see text) ~
!Kung 46.0 41.0 2319 1712 1095 1343 All data: Lee (1979) ....
Lufa 57.8 50.5 2570 2245 720 1231 1-5: Leslie et a/. (1984);
(New Guinea) 6: estimate (see text)
Machiguenga 51.8 44.5 3205 1925 447 1231 1,2,3,4: Katzmarzyk et al. (1994);
(Peru) 5: United Nations (1987), avg. Peruvian; 61:
estimate (see text)
Nunoa(Peru) 55.7 48.9 1632 1420 720 1231 1-5: Leslie et a/. (1984); 6: estimate (see text)
Samoans 73.0 63.5 2909 2273 579 1231 1,2,3,4: Katzmarzyk et a/. (1994);
(Ghana) 5: United Nations (1987), avg. Ghana;
6: estimate (see text)
Scotland 65.0 55.0 2933 2294 90 960 1,2,3,4: Katzmarzyk et a/. (1994);
(students) 5,6: United Nations (1987)
Tamang (Nepal) 50.9 44.8 3110 2356 1050 1131 All data: Panter-Brick (1989, 1991, 1993, 1996)
Turkana 65.4 52.5 2162 1734 546 888 1,2,3,4: Katzmarzyk et al. (1994);
(Kenya) 5,6: Gray (1994, 1996)
Tutyo 54.6 47.6 2802 2908 540 1231 1,2,3,4: Dufour 1983; 5: Dufour (pers. comm.);
(Amazon) 6: estimate (see text)
Upper Volta 58.5 50.6 2622 2248 561 1231 1,2,3,4: Katzmarzyk et al. (1994);
(Africa) 5: United Nations (1987), avg. Africa;
6: estimate (see text).
Table 4.3: Daily energy expenditure, lactation length and inter-birth interval for human populations.
__ Source references are given for all variables: male weight (1), female weight (2), male DEE (daily energy expenditure) (3), female DEE (4), length of
~lactation(5) and inter-birth interval (6). In some cases the average (avg.) value for a country or continent is used.
3) Gestation length and foetal growth rate.
Both of these variables provide measures of the energetic costs of pregnancy.
Foetal growth rate is a measure of the energetic investment per day in gestation and
is calculated by dividing litter mass at birth (in grams) by gestation length (in days).
Data on gestation length were taken from a database compiled by A. MacLamon,
R.D. Martin, C.A. Ross and B.C.C. Rudder2 (see Ross 1988). Data on neonatal mass
were taken primarily from Smith and Leigh (1998) which is the most up-to-date
source of neonatal body mass data. Rather than differentiate by sex, as Smith and
Leigh do, the average neonatal mass for males and females was used. Neonatal
masses for Callicebus albigena, Papio cynocephalus, Theropithecus gelada,
Leontopithecus rosalia and Saguinus oedipus were taken from the MacLarnon et al.
database (see Ross 1988).
4) Lactation length and post-natal growth rate.
As with the costs of gestation, the costs of lactation are determined not only
by the length of time to weaning, but also the amount of energy transferred per day.
Post-natal growth rate is a measure of the daily cost of lactation, and is calculated by
dividing litter mass at weaning by age at weaning. These data were mostly taken
from the MacLamon et al. database (see Ross and Jones in press). The only
exception was age at weaning for Brachyteles arachnoides which was taken from
Strier (1991).
5) Inter-birth interval.
Inter-birth interval will be used to measure the time span of each reproductive
event, for both females and males (see section 4.2 for a discussion of the limitations
of this approach). If the inter-birth interval is long, it is also an indication of high
energetic costs. Again, these data were taken from the MacLarnon et al. database
(see Ross 1988), except for Brachyteles arachnoides which was taken from Strier
(1991).
2 I would like to thank MacLamon et al. for allowing me to use these data.
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6) Degree of male care, degree of allomatemal care.
The MacLamon et al. database provided both male care and allomaternal care
data (see Ross and MacLarnon submitted). Both care types are divided into three
categories, based on the percentage of care-taking (usually infant carrying) that is
performed by the male or allomother: low «50/0); medium (5-300/0), high (> 30%).
These categories are slightly less refined than those used by MacLarnon et al. who
had an extra category for care giving above 50%. Using fewer categories helps to
overcome the problem of small sample sizes.
In an ideal world, all of these data should be collected from the same
population, but this is simply not possible. In each case, data from wild populations
were used in preference to data from captive groups. All species for which a
complete data set was available for male and female body weights, male care,
allocare, gestation length, weaning age and inter-birth interval were included (table
4.2). Neonatal masses and mass at weaning (needed to calculate foetal growth rate
and post-natal growth rate) were not always available, but were included wherever
possible. Fortunately, these data cover a good cross-section of primate species: 6
callitrichidae, 10 cebidae, 16 cercopithecinae, 1 hylobatidae, 1 pongidae and 3
hominidae. Only the hylobatidae are noticeably under-represented. Seven of the total
sample show high levels of male care, all of which are New World monkeys. Thus
there are potentially problematic phylogenetic effects that need to be considered
(Harvey and Pagel 1991). The comparative method is not an appropriate tool in this
circumstance, because the number of phylogentically independent incidences of male
care are too few. None the less, when viewing the following results it must be
remembered that close relatedness between the species of interest may magnify any
positive relationships found.
Unfortunately activity budget data are available for only a small number of
species (table 4.1a). The available data encompass all primate families: 1 callitrichid,
7 cebids, 7 cercopithecines, 2 colobines, 1 hylobatid, 1 pongid and 2 hominids. The
callitrichids and hylobatids are under-represented in this sample, and unfortunately
only 2 out of 21 species show high male care. There is, then, very little variation in
male care between these species and the variation that exists is diminished because of
phylogenetic factors (Harvey and Pagel 1991).
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There have been numerous studies on humans that directly measure daily
energy expenditure. Data on male and female daily energy expenditure, male and
female body mass, gestation length, lactation length and inter-birth interval were
collected from the literature for thirteen human populations as shown in table 4.3.
Gestation length in humans is 267 days. In most cases lactation length data and
energy budget data were drawn from the same study group. In some cases, estimates
of lactation length were made on the basis of the average for that country or
continent (depending upon availability). The data on inter-birth interval is less
strong, as it was only available for six of the populations used here. The average
inter-birth interval for these six populations (1231 days) was used as an estimate for
those populations for which data were unavailable.
Activity budgets of individual animals will vary between members of the
same group, and will vary quite significantly between different groups. For instance,
the quality of the habitat and the distribution of resources will dramatically affect the
time a group spends travelling. Because of the scarcity of data, there is very little that
can be done here to correct for this ecological variation, and the assumption is made
that males and females will be affected more or less equally by the quality and
distribution of resources.
Since activity data were only available for a sub-set of the total number of
species, the following analysis will proceed in two stages. In section 4.4 the
energetic cost of reproduction will be calculated using only those species for which
there are activity budget data (tables 4.1 a & b). It will be shown that intra-sex
differences in activity budgets are minor compared with inter-species differences. In
practice, the energetic costs of any activity are largely determined by body size and
daily energetic costs can reasonably be estimated using body size. On this basis, a
second set of analyses are performed in section 4.5 using the full data set (table 4.2)
in order to overcome the small sample sizes that hamper the first analysis. The
objective of both these analyses is to determine the relationship between male and
female energetic costs of reproduction, and to determine the cause of variation in
these costs. It will be shown that sex differences in energy expenditure are closely
related to sexual dimorphism in body mass and that relative female energetic costs
are greatest in monomorphic species. On this basis, section 4.6 will look at the
impact of male care on energetic costs in species with low sexual dimorphism.
Finally, in section 4.7, the models used here to look at extant species will be applied
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to the hominids in order to ascertain how human patterns of energy expenditure may
have evolved.
4.4 A Comparison of Energetic Costs using Activity
Budget Data
-t4.1 Method
For this first analysis, activity budget data (from table 4.1) will be translated
into estimates of daily energy expenditure using Coehlo's energetic model (Coehlo
1974, 1986; Coehlo et al. 1979). Daily energy expenditure and various life history
measures will then be combined to determine the energetic cost of reproduction for
males and females of each species.
The larger an animal is in size, the more energy it requires simply to maintain
basic bodily functions. The daily energetic costs of body maintenance are expressed
as the basal metabolic rate (BMR) which is related to body mass by the following
equation (Kleiber 1961):
B = 70 W·75
where B = basal metabolism (kcal/24/hr)
W = body mass (kg)
Kurland and Pearson (1986) have shown that the Kleiber equation is appropriate for
estimating basal metabolic rate for the anthropoid primates. Activities such as sitting,
feeding and moving elevate the body's energetic requirements. Thus, in order to
estimate daily energy expenditure the following equation is used:
n
DEE =LAj
i =1
where DEE = daily energy expenditure kcal/24/hr
A = energetic costs (kcal) for an individual activity "i", and:
Ai =OJ X BMR X Ti
100
(1)
(2)
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where Di = energy constant for each activity (see table 4.4)
T, = proportion of time spent performing activity i.
Energy constant [Dil
Activity (multiples of BMR)
Sleeping 1.00
Resting 1.25
Feeding 1.38
Socialising 5.00
Table 4.4: Energetic constants for various activities.
Adapted from Leonard and Robertson 1997 table 3.
The energy constants for sleeping, resting, feeding and socialising (table 4.4)
have been taken from Leonard and Robertson's translation of Coehlo's energetic
constants (Leonard and Robertson 1997). These constants represent estimates of the
energetic costs of various activities, and are based upon studies on humans. Thus
they may not be a true reflection of actual activity costs in other primate species.
Furthermore, research on humans indicates that there can be considerable inter-
individual and inter-population differences in the energetic costs of physical
activities. Brun et al. (1988) found that the activity costs of different farming
activities performed by Chinese females varied greatly between individuals. For
example, the costs of bending and cutting rice ranged from 5.2 kJ/min to 17.9
kJ/min. Furthermore, Lawrence et al. (1988) found that the average Gambian woman
expended almost half as much energy as the average Chinese woman when bending
and cutting rice. Very little is known about the energetic costs of any activities in any
non-human primate. At present the energy constants shown in table 4.4 are the best
available estimates.
Because the energetic costs of movement depend upon method of
locomotion, speed and distance travelled, there is no energy constant for locomotion.
Leonard and Robertson (1997) use the following equation from Taylor et al. (1970)
to calculate the energy cost of moving:
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where: Aloe = energetic cost of locomotion (kcal)
W = body mass (kg)
DR = day range (km)
T10c = time spent moving
This equation can only be used if day range is known, which is rarely the
case. Given that there is likely to be great intra-species variation in day-range and
activity budgets, day ranges should be taken from the same populations as the
activity budget data. Unfortunately, attempts to find appropriate day-ranges for
species used in this analysis met with limited success. Rather than drastically
reducing an already small data set, an alternative method was sought.
The energetic cost of locomotion increases with speed and body mass
(Taylor et al. 1982) but is not greatly affected by the mode of locomotion (Taylor
1977). Taylor (1977) has shown that the transition speed between trotting and
galloping is directly related to body size, and can be considered an equivalent speed
for all animals, where:
v =1.53 WO.24
where V = cost of locomotion at the trot-gallop transition.
This means that as long as body mass is known, it is possible to calculate the
energy constant for locomotion, Dloc, at the trot-gallop transition, using the following
equation (adapted from equations 3 and 6 in Taylor 1977):
Energy cost of travelling at the trot-gallop transition
resting metabolism
(10.7 WO.4)V + 6W-Q.25
3.5WO·25
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This formula gives the energy constants for locomotion (Dloc) shown in table
4.5. Taylor (1977) shows that for mammals in general the range in predicted values
will be very small. Likewise, the range in predicted values for D10c calculated here,
from 6.03 for a female Saguinus oedipus to 9.11 for male Gorilla gorilla, is very
small, considering the differences in body size between these species.
D1oc, was used as the energy constant of locomotion in equation 2. Of course,
most animals do not spend their time travelling at the exact speed of the trot-gallop
transition and hence these constants should be regarded as estimates. Coehlo (1986)
estimates that the calorific costs of walking, running, swinging, jumping and many
other forms of locomotion in the baboon are 8.8 times greater than the costs of
sleeping, which is well within the range of values given in table 4.5, and very close
the value of 7.97 calculated here for males ofPapio anubis.
The energetic cost of each activity is summed to give the total daily energetic
cost (equation 1). The energetic cost of each activity can also be compared in order
to create an 'energy profile' for each sex and species. Energy profiles allow us to
examine the ways in which energy is used by males and females of each species and
to determine whether there are sex differences in energy use. Additionally, energy
profiles are useful in determining which species minimise energy expended on costly
activities such as locomotion.
Daily energetic costs are only part of the total energetic cost of reproduction.
Most importantly, the costs of lactation and gestation need to be accounted for.
Energy expenditure per reproductive event is calculated for males and females by
modifying the equations for daily energy expenditure. A single reproductive event is
measured by the length of the inter-birth interval. Coehlo (1974) suggests that the
extra costs of gestation and lactation for females can be accounted for by assuming
that they elevate energy requirements by 25% and 50% respectively (following
Portman 1970). These values will be used in this model.
The average lactating human female produces around 750 ml of breast milk
per day during the first few months of lactation. In order to support this output, the
FAOIWHO/UNO (1985) calculate that a female requires an extra 2100 kJ/day. This
equates to an additional energetic cost of around 25% above non-pregnant/non-
lactating levels, i.e. less than the 50% estimate to be used here. Similarly, daily
energy expenditure in pregnant women is not as high as assumed in this model
(Ulijaszek 1995). Human females use a wide variety of mechanisms to meet the
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Male Female
Species Dloe Dloe
S.oedipus 6.04 6.03
A.trivirgatus 6.31 6.26
C. torquatus 6.50 6.47
A.caraya 7.24 7.05
A.palliata 7.30 7.15
A.paniscus 7.42 7.38
L.lagotricha 7.31 7.29
B.arachnoides 7.45 7.36
C.aethiops 7.04 6.87
C.mitis 7.35 7.04
E.patas 7.58 7.25
M.mulatta 7.52 7.40
M.radiata 7.26 7.00
P.anubis 7.97 7.62
P.cyncocephalus 7.89 7.58
P.entellus 7.68 7.48
C.badius 7.39 7.31
H.lar 7.20 7.15
P.pygmaeus 8.64 8.17
G.gorilla 9.11 8.78
P.troglodytes 8.27 8.13
Table 4.5: Estimated energy constants of locomotion (D).
Estimated energy constants of locomotion (D1oc) for the primate species used in these
analyses.
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energetic demands of lactation and gestation: increased energy intake; reduced
physical activity; reduced BMR; and utilisation of body fat stores (Rogers et al.
1997; Ulijaszak). However, in comparison with other mammals, human females
appear to be unusual in the extent to which they are able to compensate for the
energetic burden of lactation (see section 4.7.3). In other mammals the costs of
lactation appear to be met primarily through elevating energy intake, which increases
by between 66 and 1880/0 in lactating compared to non-lactating females (Clutton-
Brock 1991; Gittleman and Thompson 1988). Dasilva (1992) argues that in the case
of lactation a 500/0 increase in energy expenditure should be considered a minimum
value. an observation supported by Muruthi et al. 's (1991) finding that energy intake
of pregnant or lactating female baboons was, on average, 57% higher than that of
cycling females. For most primate species, excluding humans, the assumption that
pregnancy and lactation elevate energy demands by 25% and 500/0 respectively may
provide a rather conservative estimate of actual energetic costs.
For females energetic costs per reproductive event are calculated using this
equation:
Fenergy = DEE ((Tgest X 1.25) + (T1act X 1.5) + (Tu - Tgest - T1act) ) (3)
Where: Fenergy: female energy expenditure per reproductive event (kcal)
DEE: daily energy expenditure (kcal)
Tgesf length of gestation (days)
Tlacf length of lactation (days)
Tibi: inter-birth interval (days)
Gestation time and lactation time are multiplied by 1.25 and 1.50 respectively to
account for the increased energy costs associated with these activities. The term (Tibi
- Tgest - Tlad ) reflects the amount of time spent between births in which females are
neither pregnant or lactating. In some species gestation and lactation phases of the
reproductive cycle overlap, however, this equation remains appropriate if we assume
that during this time the costs ofgestation and lactation are cumulative.
Calculating male energy expenditure per reproductive event is impossible
without knowing the reproductive success of individual males. As discussed earlier,
these data are currently unavailable. Calculation of male energy expenditure per
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female reproductive event will compromise the results in populations in which there
is great variation in male reproductive success. At best this measure will give an
indication of average male energy expenditure, at worst it will severely over-estimate
energy expenditure for some males, and equally, severely under-estimate energy
expenditure in others. None the less, this is the only measure of male energy
expenditure that is possible with the given data. Male energy expenditure is simply
calculated as:
Menergy = DEE x Tibi (4)
Where: Menergy = male energy expenditure per female reproductive event.
Table 4.6 shows the total daily energy expenditure for each sex and species.
The energetic costs of each activity provide an 'energy profile' which can be
compared intra- and inter-specifically to examine sex and species differences in
energy use which are independent from other life history parameters. Total energetic
costs, which include the costs of gestation and lactation, provide insights into the
relationship between male and female energetic costs of reproduction.
In summary: this section has shown how male and female daily energetic
costs and total energetic costs of reproduction can be calculated using activity budget
data in conjunction with data on gestation length, lactation length and inter-birth
interval. It should be noted that there are many possible sources of error in these
calculations, principally because of deficiencies in the data. It is assumed here that
gestation and lactation elevate daily energy expenditure by 25% and 50%
respectively. However these costs are likely to be variable and may often be
considerably greater, except in humans in which they are almost certainly lower.
Also, females may change their activity patterns during different parts of the
reproductive cycle. For instance, Gambian women are less active during the later
stages of pregnancy (Roberts et al. 1982) and pregnant gorilla females have been
shown to spend less time travelling (Meder 1986). Male energetic costs are difficult
to estimate because of variation in male reproductive success (see section 4.3).
Finally, inter-specific differences in the energetic costs of different activities are
simply unknown. It is assumed that all species use the same amount of energy, per
unit body mass, when sleeping, grooming, feeding and so on. This assumption is
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Male DEE (kcal) Female DEE (kcal)
Callitrichidae: S. oedipus 46.73 46.33
Cebidae: A. palliata 419.24 326.42
I
A. caraya 522.36 319.70
C. torquatus 133.84 120.39
, A. trivirgatus 92.01 85.23I
L. lagotricha 858.86 893.59
A. paniscus 758.06 646.41
B. arachnoides 687.17 632.31
I
i Cercopithecinae: C. aethiops 349.07 281.63
I C. mitis 617.58 382.65
E. patas 795.51 529.03
M mulatta 713.63 576.05
I M radiata 418.48 303.48
I
P. anubis 1398.90 857.21
P. cyncephalus 1454.27 934.18
Colobinae: C. badius 455.28 413.30
P. entellus 651.28 504.25
Hylobatidae H.lar 422.17 398.01
Hominidae: P.pygmaeus 2737.84 1589.85
G. gorilla 4576.07 3179.08
I P. troglodytes 1954.45 1461.89
,
i
Table 4.6: Estimated daily energy expenditure (DEE) by sex.
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particularly questionable when estimating energetic costs of locomotion. However
Coehlo (1986) asserts that different modes of locomotion require similar amounts of
energy ~ and an attempt has been made here to estimate an energetic constant for
locomotion.
4.4.2 Results and discussion
Energy profiles for each species and sex were created, and are summarised in
figure 4.1. This figure shows the percentage contribution of each activity to the daily
energetic costs of males and females. Note that the time spent sleeping is fairly
constant between species (see table 4.1a) and has thus been omitted from these
figures.
There is very little difference in the use of energy between males and
females of the same species. No matter what the basic social structure, differences
between male and female energy profiles are subtle. If the purpose of male care-
giving is to relieve the energetic burdens on the female it might be expected that in
monogamous species such as Saguinus oedipus, Aotus trivirgatus and Callicebus
torquatus, the female would spend more time feeding and resting, and the male more
time moving and socialising with the offspring. Some support for this hypothesis can
be derived from the energy profile of Callicebus torquatus, in which males spend
more time socialising and less time resting than females. Yet, there is no inter-gender
difference in feeding time in any of the monogamous callitrichids or cebids and in
Saguinus oedipus and Aotus trivirgatus male and female energy profiles are
practically identical.
The greatest gender related difference in energy budgets occurs in Macaca
radiata, where females spend more time feeding and moving, and less time resting
than males. But, even in this case, differences are slight in comparison with the
considerable inter-species variation. The atelines spend an enormous amount of their
energy on locomotion, reflecting both the patchy distribution of the fruit upon which
they generally feed, and their correspondingly large day range (Defler 1995).
Lagothrix lagothrica expends around 80% of its daily energy budget on movement.
In stark contrast, Saguinus oedipus spends the vast majority of both its time and
energy budget resting. This supports Thompson et al.'s (1994) assertion that the
callitrichids have low energy expenditure for their body size. The colobines Colobus
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of male and female energy profiles
badius and Presbytis enetellus also appear to maximise resting time and minimise
energy expenditure. In these cases, the even distribution of their folivorous food
supply is likely to minimise the energetic costs of locomotion. This is in agreement
with Dasilva's observation that folivory and low activity are often associated
(Dasilva 1992) and Leonard and Robertson's (1997) finding that daily energy
expenditure and day range are positively correlated with dietary quality.
It is interesting that social behaviours contribute to a very small proportion of
the total energy profile of most species, the macaques and Papio anubis being a
notable exception. In most species, in energetic terms at least, social behaviour
seems to be of little import. It may be that once social networks are established, the
day-to-day maintenance costs of social relationships are low. Many social
behaviours, such as feeding in close proximity, travelling together, carrying and
food-sharing are unlikely to be recorded as social behaviours and hence energetic
costs of social behaviours should be considered as minimum estimates.
The energy profiles of the great apes are noteworthy on two counts. Firstly,
due to their large body sizes, the total energy requirements of these species are high,
relative to other primates (table 4.6). Related to this is the considerable amount of
time and energy the great apes expend on feeding. For instance gorillas of both sexes
spend around 400/0 of their energy budget on feeding. Chimpanzee males and females
spend respectively, just over 30% and 40% of their energy budgets on feeding. This
indicates that feeding is likely to be a more severe constraint on the behaviour of the
great apes than it is on other primates. It is interesting that the energetic costs of
feeding in females are as great as, if not greater than, the feeding costs of the much
larger males. This in itself is an indication of the high energetic burden on females.
These observations support the idea that feeding efficiency is a major consideration
in the evolution of hominoid behaviour. For example, Hunt (1994) contends that
chimpanzees use bipedal posture as a mechanism for improving feeding efficiency,
and that the australopithecines may have used bipedal posture in the same context.
His hypothesis rests on the observation that chimpanzees assume a bipedal stance
during feeding more often than during any other activity. Isbell and Young (1996)
also suggest that bipedalism was an energetic response to decreased resource
availability and increased day range.
Human energy profiles are not shown in figure 4.1, since activity budgets are
not available in the same format as those for non-human primates. According to data
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given by Leonard and Robertson (1997), !Kung males and females spend around
700/0 of their daily energy budget on either walking or working. Ache males spend
920 0 of their energy budget on these activities, while Ache females spend 81%.
Assuming that most of this "walking and working" energy is channelled into
subsistence activities, it seems that humans concentrate their efforts on finding and
processing food, rather than eating it. It is likely that this foraging strategy is only
possible because the human diet usually includes food items of high energetic value,
i.e. meat and/or other animal products.
Setting aside for the moment species differences in the patterns of energy use,
figure 4.2 examines total energy expenditure in male and female non-human
primates. Logarithmic plots of daily female energy expenditure versus daily male
energy expenditure are shown in figure 4.2a. There is a close linear relationship
between male and female daily energy expenditure (~ = 0.98) where male
expenditure is, on the whole, greater than female expenditure. There is also a close
linear correlation between male and female energy expenditure per reproductive
event, as shown in figure 4.2b (r2 = 0.98). However, in this case, female energy
expenditure tends to be equal to, or greater than, male energy expenditure. These
results appear to follow patterns of sexual dimorphism in body size, as shown in
figures 4.2c and 4.2d. In sexually dimorphic species, males have a higher basal
metabolic rate than females by virtue of their large size, which means that their basic
energy requirements are also greater. Very large differences in activity budgets
would be required to equalise daily energy expenditure patterns between the sexes in
sexually dimorphic species. However, over the course of a reproductive cycle, high
male energetic costs, associated with large body size, are counter-balanced by the
energetic costs of pregnancy and lactation for the female. In species in which body
size dimorphism is low or medium, female energetic costs of reproduction equal or
exceed those of the male.
The distribution of male and female energy expenditure lends no support to
the hypothesis that relatively high female energy expenditure is related to patterns of
male care (figures 4.2e and f) but since only two closely related species are
represented that display high levels of male care this result is inconclusive.
In humans, body size dimorphism is low. Therefore, on the basis of these
results, we would expect that in humans: 1) Male daily energy expenditure will be
similar to female daily energy expenditure; 2) The total energetic cost of
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compared with female costs.
159
..-.. 't.u,----------
2.5
3.0
2.0
cu
o
.x:
a>
L.-
.2 3.5
"0
C
a>
0-
x
a>
e-,
0>
L.-
a>
c
a>
>.
cu
"0
a>
cu
E
a>
.......
--
..........
.....~
................
..~ .....
........
• •
.....~ .
...... ~ t •
............. •
•
.......
....
......
•
(c)
1.5 .
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Log (male daily energy expenditure, kcal)
3.5 4.0
-; 7.0,------------------------~
o
sc
-§ 6.5'
1:5
::J
-0
e 6.0·
0-
a>
L.-
.......
° 5.5'
+-'(J)
o
o
~ 5.0'
a>
0>
L.-
a>
55 4.5'
a>
cu
~ 4.0'
.......
--
~ .
............
.....,
......~.
*" .
A'"
.*" .
. ..
_..,
....i..... •
.~., .
.'.. ,
.'
(d)
7.06.5
0>
...J
0 3.5-1..... ·_······_··__.....----__----r .....--__-----r- -.---__--r-__----J.
..... . .. .
3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0
Log (male energetic cost of reproduction, kcal)
Body size dimorphism: • high • medium * low
Figure 4.2 (continued)
These figures are identical to figures 4.2 (a) and (b), except that individuals are scored by
level of sexual dimorphism in body mass (for definitions see text, section 4.3). Figure (c)
compares male and female daily energy expenditure, (d) compares male and female
energetic costs of reproduction.
160
__ '+.u,-----------
(U
o
~
3.0
2.0
2.5
(e)
.............
...... ..
....
.......
•.............
.*........ i"
.'
.............. £
....~..: £.
...........~. t •
.....
~-
.2 3.5
u
c
a>
0-
x
a>
>.
0)
~
a>
c
a>
>.
(U
u
a>
(U
E
~
---0)
o
~ ..*'
1.5 .
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Log (male daily energy expenditure, kcal) 3.5 4.0
(f)
......~ .
..•........ £
......
.>'
......~.....
*" ..,
",.'
.* ..'•......
-.
..··i £
~., .
...............
:*-.,
.....
*" .
-:
...... / ....
6.0·
5.5·
~ 7.0r-----------------------------"
o
.x:
-s 6.5'
.....
o
::::J
U
o
\-Q..
a>
\-
a
.....
en
o
o
~ 5.0'
a>
0)
\-
a>
55 4.5·
a>
(U
E 4.0.~
---0)
o 3.5 .
~ .. -.- -.-
3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0
Log (male energetic cost of reproduction, kcal)
6.5 7.0
Male care: • high • medium * low
Figure 4.2 (continued)
These figures are again identical to figures 4.2 (a) and (b). This time, individuals are
scored by level of male care (for definitions see text, section 4.3). Figure (e) compares
male and female daily energy expenditure, (f) compares male and female energetic costs
of reproduction.
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reproduction will be greater for females than it is for males. These predictions were
tested using the human sample (table 4.3). For the non-human primates already
discussed, there is a strong correlation between B:MR and daily energy expenditure
(fig. 4.3, r2 = 0.98). This relationship appears to be very similar for both males and
females: an independent samples t-test performed on residual daily energy
expenditure" showed no significant difference between the sexes (p < 0.05). This
means that expected daily energy expenditure can be calculated for humans from
basal metabolic rate using the following equation:
DEE = 1.45 x B:MR + 88.03 (5)
Expected daily energy expenditure for each sex was calculated for the human
populations (using equation 5) listed in table 4.3, and compared with actual daily
energy expenditure. The results, shown in figure 4.4a, deviate quite considerably
from expectations. In all human populations male daily energy expenditure exceeds
female daily energy expenditure by a greater degree than would be predicted on the
basis of body size. This is contrary to the first prediction made above. Paired sample
t-tests show that female daily energy expenditure does not differ from predicted
values. Male daily energy expenditure, on the other hand, differs significantly from
expectations (2-tailed, p < 0.01). Expected and actual daily energy expenditure were
used to calculate expected and actual total energetic cost of reproduction for each
sex, using equations 3 and 4. Once again the observed results, shown in figure 4.4b,
differ quite considerably from expectations. It is expected that females will invest
more heavily, over a reproductive cycle, than males. In actual fact there is
considerable variation between human populations, and male energetic costs of
reproduction often exceed the same costs for females. Once again male, but not
female, costs differ markedly from expectations (paired sample t-test, 2-tailed, p <
0.01). Given that the energetic costs ofgestation and lactation tend to be fairly low in
human females (see discussion in 4.4.1 above) then female energetic costs may in
fact be even lower than estimated here.
3 Residual DEE was calculated from a linear regression against basal metabolic rate.
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Comparison of (a) daily energy expenditure, and (b) energetic cost of reproduction between
males and females for a number of human populations. Each figure compares the expected
distribution of values, based on the relationships shown in non-human primates, with observed
values.
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It is important to note the differences between these findings, and those of
Leonard and Robertson (1997) who have also examined human daily energy
expenditure in comparison to other primates. They state that (1997 p.271): "human
hunter-gatherers have substantially higher expenditure levels than predicted for their
body size." This analysis has found that this is only true for males. The difference in
these two studies can be attributed to the fact that Leonard and Robertson averaged
energy expenditure values for males and females, thus obscuring sex differences.
This subtle difference in analysis leads to rather different interpretations of the
results. Leonard and Robertson's interpretation suggests that high daily energy
expenditure in humans, and probably their ancestors, was a result of a shift to a high
quality, meat-based diet involving larger home range sizes. The results presented
here indicate that this explanation can only be partially correct, since females do not
have high daily energy expenditure for their body size.
The gender difference in daily energy expenditure, and the particularly high
male values, are most likely to be due to gender differences in daily activities. In
most human populations there is a sexual division of labour, whereby males
participate in more strenuous activities, such as hunting and garden labour, while
females spend more time on less physically demanding activities such as food
preparation and child care (Katzmarzyk et al. 1994). For instance, in the Siberian
group used in this analysis (the Evenki) male activities focus on fencing, herding and
fishing, while females usually participate in less energetically expensive activities
such as food preparation and household tasks (Katzmarzyk et al. 1994). These sex
differences in physical activities translate into differences in the kinds of resources
harvested by each sex. Cross-culturally, hunting is largely, but not exclusively, a
male reserve (Hames 1989). When females do hunt, it is usually either in the
company of their husbands or on an opportunistic basis. For instance, Achuara
women hunt for an average of 83 minutes per day, but nearly all of this time is spent
assisting husbands by spotting or carrying game, or alternatively in separate
gathering activities (Hames 1989). Hames notes that amongst the Ye'kwana and
Yanamamo, women only engage in 'hunting' activities if they happen to come across
small game in the course of some other activity. Hames notes that one of the main
problems faced by would-be female hunters is the difficulty of simultaneous child
care. Similar sex differences exist in fishing activities, although fishing by women is
more frequent than hunting . Hames suggests that this is because child care and
165
fishing are not mutually exclusive. None the less, women who do fish, such as the
Y 'ke wana, generally do so close to home. Furthermore, women do not appear to be
efficient fishers: Ye'kwana women gain just 20% of the returns of male fishers over
a given time period.
The sexual division of labour appears to have had a profound effect on human
energy budgets. Male daily energy expenditure is considerably greater than
expectations and this has a knock-on effect on total energetic costs of reproduction.
The non-human primate data suggests that in humans the energetic cost of
reproduction for females should be greater than that for males. In actual fact there is
no significant difference between male and female total energetic costs of
reproduction. That is, the high daily energetic costs for males match the high
energetic costs of gestation and lactation for females.
Overall these results suggest that across primates the relationship between
male and female daily energy expenditure follows patterns of sexual dimorphism in
body size. When sexual dimorphism is high, male energetic costs are also high
relative to female energetic costs. However, in the long term, male and female
energetic costs are more similar. The energetic costs of lactation and gestation for the
female counter-balance increased energy expenditure in the male. Again, the
variation that exists seems to follow patterns of sexual dimorphism in body size. In
species with low levels of sexual dimorphism female energetic costs of reproduction
are greater than the same costs for the male. Humans appear to be exceptional in this
respect due to the very high daily energy expenditure by males. Discussion of the
sexual division of labour in humans, and how it may relate to female energetic costs
and the evolution ofpaternal care, will continue in section 4.7.
These results may have been affected by errors in the energy calculations (see
section 4.4.1). Overall female energetic costs should be considered to be
conservative estimates, since the costs of gestation and lactation may be higher than
assumed here (except in humans, in which these costs are probably lower). Also,
daily energetic costs, as calculated here, do not take into account variation over the
reproductive cycle. Male daily energy expenditure may be greater during consorting
than at other times. Female daily energy expenditure may decrease during pregnancy
and lactation (Panter-Brick 1989). Individual variation in male energy expenditure
and reproductive success are further problems. However, it is difficult to ascertain
whether male energy expenditure has been over or underestimated here. Finally, the
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energetic costs of locomotion may have been overestimated for both males and
females. The energetic cost of locomotion calculations were based upon the costs of
travelling at the trot-gallop transition (see section 4.4.1), yet it is likely that both
sexes spend much of their time travelling at slower speeds. A more confident
assessment of energetic costs will only be possible with more field studies.
The small sample size adds a frustrating element to interpretation of these
results. At this point very little can be said regarding the evolution of paternal care. A
thorough exploration of energy expenditure, and its implications in terms of
investment in offspring, requires a larger sample. The activity budget data have
shown male and female energy profiles to be very similar within species (although
quite different across species). Furthermore, since there is a close correlation
between B'MR and daily energy expenditure the latter can be reliably estimated on
the basis of body mass alone. In the next section a comparison of energy expenditure
will be performed using life history variables. This will double the sample size and
permit a more thorough analysis.
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4.5 The Relationship Between Male and Female Energetic
Costs: A Wider Analy~
4.5.1. Method
In section 4.4 it was shown that basal metabolic rate strongly affects daily
energy costs for both males and females, and can be used to estimate daily energy
expenditure using equation 5. This means that total energy expended in reproduction
can be calculated for males and females using body mass, gestation length, lactation
length and inter-birth interval following exactly the same methodology described in
section 4.4.1 (see equations 3 and 4). This was done using the larger data set in table
4.2. Humans appear to be exceptional in their patterns of energy expenditure (section
4.4) and are excluded from this stage of the analysis. In section 4.7 human
populations are considered, and discussed in the context ofhuman evolution.
4.5.2. Results
Daily energy expenditure for males and females is compared in figure 4.5a.
Not surprisingly, the relationship between these variables is very similar to that
shown in the previous section. There is a linear relationship between male and
female daily energy expenditure (~ = 0.93) where male expenditure tends to be
greater than female expenditure, presumably due to the costs of maintaining a larger
body size. When total energetic costs of reproduction for males and females are
compared (fig. 4.5b), the correlation between male and female costs remains (r2 =
0.92), but in this case, male and female energetic costs are more similar. However,
contrary to patterns of daily energy expenditure, in many cases total female energetic
costs exceed total male energetic costs.
The energetic cost of reproduction for males (menergy) was divided by the
same cost for females (fenergy) to provide a ratio of male to female total energetic
costs or energy dimorphism. This ratio is compared by level of sexual dimorphism in
fig. 4.6 and table 4.7. An energy dimorphism score below 1.00 indicates that total
female energetic costs exceed total male energetic costs. Conversely, energy
dimorphism scores greater than 1.00 indicate relatively high total male energetic
costs in comparison with females. Two-tailed Mann Whitney U-tests revealed
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of male and female energy budgets using the whole data set.
Figure (a) shows the relationship between male and female daily energy expenditure (DEE);
(b) shows the relationship between the total energetic cost of reproduction for male and
females.
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of sexual dimorphism in total energetic cost of reproduction
with sexual dimorphism in body mass.
Sexual dimorphism in body mass is calculated by dividing male body mass by female body
mass . Scores less than 1.15 are categorised as 'low', 1.15 to 1.5 as 'medium', and scores
greater than 1.5 as 'high' (see section 4.3). Sexual dimorphism in the total energetic cost of
reproduction is calculated by dividing the total male energetic cost of reproduction by total
female energetic cost of reproduction. A score of 1.00 (indicated by the dashed line)
indicates that male and female energetic costs are equal. A score of less than 1.00 indicates
relatively high female energetic costs. Conversely, a score greater than 1.00 signals
relatively high male energetic costs.
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significant differences in energy dimorphism scores between all levels of sexual
dimorphism in body size (p < 0.01). The lowest energy dimorphism scores are found
in species with low levels of sexual dimorphism in body size, which have a median
energy dimorphism score of 0.75. Species which have medium levels of body size
dimorphism have a median energy dimorphism of 0.83. That is, in those species in
which body size dimorphism is low or medium, female energetic costs of
reproduction exceed those of the male. The highest energy dimorphism scores were
recorded for species with high levels of sexual dimorphism, with a median value of
1.06. While energy dimorphism is most variable in highly sexually dimorphic species
(see table 4.7), usually total male energetic costs equal or exceed total female
energetic costs in these species.
sexual median standard . . .mean minimum maximum
dimorphism deviation
Low .74 .73 .06 .69 .86
Medium .85 .84 .09 .70 1.05
High 1.13 1.08 .22 .87 1.58
Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics of energy dimorphism.
Descriptive statistics of the ratio between male and female energetic costs for
different levels of sexual dimorphism in body size.
Earlier in this chapter it was proposed that the relationship between the male
and female energetic cost of reproduction depends upon the degree of sexual
dimorphism in body size. This hypothesis is strongly supported by these data. That
is, female energetic costs are greatest, in comparison to males, when sexual
dimorphism in body size is lowest. Using this result as a foundation, the next section
explores the following questions: What is the relationship between male care giving
and sexual dimorphism in body size? What is the relationship between allomaternal
care and sexual dimorphism in body size? What are the benefits to females of male
care-giving and allomatemal care?
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4.6 The Energetic Benefits of Helpers
In the previous section it has been shown that the ratio of male to female
energetic costs of reproduction is largely determined by the level of body size
dimorphism. In species with high levels of body size dimorphism male energetic
costs tend to be equal to, or greater than, female energetic costs over a single
reproductive event. Over this time period, the excess energetic costs to the female of
lactation and gestation are matched by the excess energetic costs to the male of
maintaining a larger body size. In species in which male body size is less than 50%
greater than female body size (i.e. medium or low levels of body size dimorphism)
female energetic costs exceed those of the male. This is particularly true in species
with low levels of body size dimorphism, in which total female energetic costs are
around 250/0 greater than total male energetic costs (see table 4.7). According to the
models being tested here, this implies that sexual dimorphism will have an effect on
patterns of cooperation within groups, by virtue of its effect on the ratio of male to
female energetic costs. In particular, in species in which body size dimorphism is
low, and thus female energetic costs are relatively high, male care giving and
allomaternal care are expected.
Table 4.8 shows the distribution of sexual dimorphism and male care
amongst the 40 species of primate used in this analysis. Male care is strongly
correlated with low sexual dimorphism (X2 = 20.02, P < 0.05). In fact, high levels of
male care never occur in intermediate or highly sexually dimorphic species. Patterns
of allomaternal care appear to follow a similar trend to patterns of male care (table
4.9). For instance, allomaternal care does not occur in highly sexually dimorphic
species. Furthermore, allomaternal care appears to occur particularly frequently in
species which show medium levels of sexual dimorphism. However, the overall
distribution of allomaternal care and sexual dimorphism in body size is not
significantly different from expected values (X2 = 9.07).
172
BODY SIZE DIMORPHISM
MALE LOW MEDIUM HIGH
CARE Obs. Exp. Obs. Exp. Obs. Exp. TOTAL
LOW 4.00 8.70 17.00 13.78 8.00 6.53 29.00
MEDIUM 1.00 1.20 2.00 1.90 1.00 0.90 4.00
HIGH 7.00 2.10 0.00 3.33 0.00 1.58 7.00
TOTAL 12.00 19.00 9.00 40.00
Table 4.8: The relationship between body size dimorphism and male care giving.
The Chi-squared test reveals significant differences between the observed (Obs.) and
expected (Exp.) distribution ofvalues (X2 = 20.02, P < 0.05).
ALLO- BODY SIZE DIMORPHISM
MATERNAL LOW MEDIUM HIGH TOTAL
CARE Obs. Exp. Obs. Exp. Obs. Exp.
LOW 8.00 7.50 9.00 11.88 8.00 5.63 25.00
MEDIUM 0.00 2.10 6.00 3.33 1.00 1.58 7
IDGH 4.00 2.40 4.00 3.80 0.00 1.80 8
TOTAL 12.00 19.00 9.00 40
Table 4.9: The relationship between body size dimorphism and allomaternal care.
The Chi-squared test does not reveal a significant difference between the observed
(Obs.) and expected (Exp.) distribution of values (X2 = 9.07).
The correlation between male care and low sexual dimorphism in body size is
well known and could be interpreted as supporting the sexual selection hypothesis
(see section 4.1). However, this simple correlation actually tells us nothing about the
factors which shape the relationship between body size dimorphism and breeding
system. If body size dimorphism can, in itself, effect breeding systems by way of its
influence on energetic costs, then the energetic benefits of male care giving in
monomorphic species should also be apparent. The challenge then, is to discover
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how male care may benefit females, and thus why this behaviour may have evolved.
Here it will be shown that male care can substantially benefit females, in terms of
shorter gestation lengths, lactation lengths and inter-birth intervals.
Gestation length, foetal growth rate, lactation length, post-natal growth rate
and inter-birth interval provide measures of the energetic stress on females. As would
be expected, each of these variables is closely correlated with body mass (table 4.10).
Note that foetal growth rate and post-natal growth rate are calculated using neonatal
mass and weaning mass data in conjunction with gestation length and lactation
length respectively (see section 4.3 and table 4.1). Thus, even though they are rates,
they are closely correlated with body mass by virtue of the variables from which they
are derived.
Parameter R2
Gestation length .57
Foetal growth rate .94
Lactation length .65
Post-natal growth rate .77
Inter-birth interval .67
Table 4.10: The correlation between body mass and various life history variables.
Values of~ for various logarithmic measures of female energetic cost, against IOglO
female body mass. See section 4.3 and table 4.2 for data sources.
In the case of foetal growth rate, body mass explains the observed variation
so well that it will be excluded from any further discussion (see also Ross and
MacLarnon 1995). For each of the remaining variables linear regression was used to
remove the effects of body mass. In the following analysis residuals of gestation
length, lactation length, post-natal growth rate and inter-birth interval are discussed.
The relationship between body size dimorphism and energy dimorphism
implies that sex differences in energetic costs arise simply from sex differences in
body mass. This is supported by the strong linear relationship between body mass
dimorphism and the ratio of male and female energetic costs (energy dimorphism), as
shown in figure 4.7 (~ = 0.73). However, at least 25% of the variation in energy
dimorphism remains unexplained by body size dimorphism. Further analysis
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Figure 4.8: Boxplots of standardised residuals against sexual dimorphism in body mass
Boxplots show residual values of (a) length of lactation and (b) length of inter-birth interval.
Figures below the dashed lines indicate gestation lengths/inter-birth intervals which are
lower than would be expected for a given body mass.
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suggests that sexual dimorphism in energy expenditure results from variation in other
factors, in addition to body mass. Figure 4.8a shows the relationship between body
size dimorphism and residual gestation length. There are significant differences in
the residual gestation lengths of species with low sexual dimorphism when compared
with species with medium or high sexual dimorphism (Mann Whitney U test, 2-
tailed, p < 0.05). Females of highly sexually dimorphic species have relatively short
gestation lengths for their body size. Accordingly, there is also a tendency for
females of highly sexually dimorphic species to have shorter inter-birth intervals for
their body size than females of less dimorphic species (fig 4.8b), although this result
is not significant. Conversely, females of monomorphic species have relatively long
gestation lengths for their body size. These results indicate that differences in the
relationship between male and female energetic costs of reproduction are not simply
a result of differences in male body size, but also arise from changes in female
energetic costs associated with gestation.
To summarise the findings so far: the total energetic costs of reproduction
have been compared in males and females. Female energetic costs are comparatively
greatest in species which are monomorphic in body size, and least in species in
which there is high sexual dimorphism (see fig. 4.6 and table 4.7 for summary
statistics). In highly sexually dimorphic species female energetic costs are, on
average, 10% less than male energetic costs. This is due to both the larger body size
of the males, and the fact that females have relatively short gestation lengths for their
body size (fig. 4.8a). Since intra-female cooperation and male non-reciprocal
altruism are only expected when female energetic costs exceed those of the male
(chapters 2 and 3), neither of these behaviours are expected in highly sexually
dimorphic species. In accordance with this, neither allomaternal or paternal care are
observed in these species (tables 4.8 and 4.9). Female energetic costs are, on average,
17% greater than male energetic costs in species with medium dimorphism, and 23%
greater in monomorphic species (table 4.7). This is due to the smaller body size of
the males in comparison to females, and the long gestation lengths of the females for
their body size (fig. 4.8a). It was predicted in chapters 2 and 3 that male care giving
and allomaternal care would arise in species in which female energetic costs are high
in comparison to the male. Thus, we would expect male care giving and allomaternal
care to arise in species with medium and low levels of sexual dimorphism in body
mass. Expected and observed occurrences of male care and allomaternal care were
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compared (tables 4.8 and 4.9). As predicted, paternal care grvmg IS strongly
associated with low body size dimorphism. But, none of the species with medium
dimorphism show high levels of paternal care. This suggests that in these species,
while female energetic costs are high relative to males, they are not high enough to
stimulate the evolution of male care giving. Therefore, one might expect, that
allomaternal care would be high in species with medium body size dimorphism.
However, no significant trend could be discerned in the distribution of allomaternal
care. Species that have low and medium levels of body size dimorphism will be
looked at separately in the following analyses, in an attempt to uncover the
advantages (if any) of allomaternal and paternal care.
Since allomaternal care only occurs in species with medium or low levels of
sexual dimorphism the following analysis is restricted to just these species. In these
cases female energetic costs are high, relative to male energetic costs, and it is
possible that a1lomaternal care is a way in which females can offset these costs. If
this is the case we would expect that females in species that practice allomaternal
care would have an advantage over females in species that do not showallomaternal
care. What sort of advantage would this be? Possibilities include: reduced energetic
costs relative to the male; reduced absolute energetic costs; shortened inter-birth
interval; shortened lactation length; shortened gestation length; or increased post-
natal growth rate. All of these possibilities were investigated, and two significant
relationships were uncovered (fig. 4.9). In general, in species in which there is no
allomaternal care females have lactation lengths, gestation lengths etc. that conform
to expectations based on body size. However, there are significant differences
between species showing medium and high levels of allomaternal care with respect
to length of lactation and length of the inter-birth interval (fig. 4.9a and b; l-tailed
Mann Whitney V-test p < 0.05). Species in which there are high levels of
allomaternal care have shorter lactation lengths and inter-birth intervals than one
would expect for their body size. On the other hand, species in which there are
medium levels of sexual dimorphism tend to have longer lactation lengths and inter-
birth intervals than would be expected on the basis of body size. Overall, there is a
(non-significant) tendency for females that receive medium levels of allomaternal
care to have higher total energetic costs, per reproductive event, than those that
receive high levels of allomaternal care (fig. 4.9c). In short: while high levels of
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Figure 4.9: Boxplots of standardised residuals against degree of allomaternal care.
For all species which have medium or low levels of sexual dimorphism in body mass, the
boxplots show residuals of (a) length of lactation, (b) length of inter-birth interval and (c) total
female energetic cost of reproduction. Values that fall below the dashed lines are lower than
expected on the basis of body mass. See section 4.3 for definitions of allomatemal care
categories. 179
allomatemal care appear to benefit females, medium levels of allomaternal care are
actually detrimental.
These seemingly contradictory results illustrate very neatly the problems in
interpreting the function of allomatemal care. As discussed in section 2.6.1,
allomatemal care has been described as both beneficial and detrimental to the mother
(Khoda 1985). Stanford (1992) found that in capped langurs allomothering allows
lactating females to spend more time feeding. Weaning usually occurs when infants
have acquired a body weight which is four times greater than the weight at birth (Lee
et al. 1991). It is possible that infants of mothers who have better feeding
opportunities will acquire this body size sooner. On the other hand, research on
chimpanzees (Nishida 1983), hanuman langurs (Hrdy 1977) and vervets (Lancaster
1971) suggests that allomothers are often young and inexperienced, and may actually
harm the offspring involved. In this case mothers should be vigilant when their
offspring is in the care of another female, which may actually disrupt feeding time.
Mann and Smuts (1998) found that in bottlenose dolphins mothers spend less time
feeding when their infant is in the care of a young, inexperienced allomother in
comparison to when the infant is alone or is being cared for by older allomothers. If
allomothering by inexperienced carers has a negative effect on feeding time, then we
would expect lactation lengths to increase. The results presented above lend some
support to this hypothesis, suggesting that high levels of allomaternal care are
associated with shorter lactation lengths and inter-birth intervals, and medium levels
of allomatemal care with longer lactation lengths and inter-birth intervals.
Male care giving only occurs in species with low sexual dimorphism in body
size (table 4.8). Twelve of the species used in this analysis have low sexual
dimorphism in body size. The similar body sizes of each sex means that males and
females have similar energy requirements for body maintenance. However, in the
longer term, females must also meet the additional costs of gestation and lactation. It
has been shown that all of these species have high female energetic costs of
reproduction, in comparison to male costs. Because of this the model predicts that
male care giving should be high in monomorphic species. Indeed, 7 of these species
show high levels of male care, and 1 shows medium levels. However, four species
show little, if any, male care giving. The monomorphic species were separated into
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two groups on the basis of presence or absence of male care4 to discover whether
male care giving confers any energetic benefits to females. The two groups were
tested for differences in lactation length, gestation length, inter-birth interval, overall
female energetic costs and post-natal growth rates (fig. 4.10). Females from species
which receive male care have significantly shorter lactation lengths and gestation
lengths in comparison with those who do not receive male care (2-tailed Mann
Whitney U test, p < 0.05). Furthermore, there is a (non-significant) tendency for
shorter inter-birth intervals in species in which paternal care occurs.
Paternal care may reduce the energetic costs to the female of care-giving
behaviours other than gestation and lactation, such as infant carrying. Furthermore,
paternal care may allow the female to increase her energetic intake over the course of
the reproductive cycle. In short, male care giving can reduce the energetic stresses of
reproduction on females, allowing them to provide sufficient resources for the
offspring in a shorter length of time. The results presented in figure 4.10 suggest that
females can greatly benefit from male care in terms of shorter periods of lactation
and gestation. Further, the tendency for shorter inter-birth intervals in species in
which males contribute to offspring care indicates that these females are able to
recover more quickly from the energetic stresses of reproduction.
In conclusion, male care giving has the potential to alleviate the energetic
costs of gestation and lactation for females. Even so, when compared with male
energetic costs, female energetic costs in monomorphic species remain high. It is
important to be clear here. Male care giving only occurs in species with high female
energetic costs relative to male costs. The principal benefit of male care giving is a
reduction in female energetic costs for her body size. Without male care giving, the
difference between male and female energetic costs per reproductive event would
presumably be even greater.
4 Since only one species exhibited 'medium' levels of male care giving, the categories of 'medium'
and 'high' male care giving were combined.
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Figure 4.10: Boxplots of standardised residuals against presence of male care.
For all species which are monomorphic in body mass, the boxplots show residuals of (a)
length of gestation, (b) length of lactation and (c) length of inter-birth interval. Values that
fall below the dashed lines indicate shorter lactation lengths/ gestation lengths / inter-birth
intervals than expected on the basis of body mass .
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4.7 Sex Differences in Energetic Costs and Hominid Evolution
4.7.1 Summary Discussion
In previous chapters it has been argued that the relationship between the
energetic cost of reproduction for males and females determines the types of
cooperative relationships that occur within social groups. In particular, when the
energetic cost of reproduction is high for females, in comparison to males, then male
care giving and allomatemal care are expected. This hypothesis has been tested in
this chapter using data from living primates.
It has been shown that the relationship between male and female energetic
costs of reproduction is largely determined by sex differences in body size. In many
primate species males are larger than females. This means that daily energy
expenditure is often greater for males due to the higher costs of body maintenance
(see fig. 4.5a). In the long term, females must meet the additional energetic costs of
gestation and lactation. This means that over a single reproductive event, female
energetic costs are greater than male energetic costs (fig. 4.5b). Only in those species
with high levels of body size dimorphism do male energetic costs of reproduction
equal or exceed female energetic costs of reproduction. Comparatively long gestation
lengths (for female body size) add an additional energetic load on females in species
with low levels of sexual dimorphism (fig. 4.8a). In short, female energetic costs are
greatest relative to male energetic costs in species with low sexual dimorphism, and
lowest compared with males in species with high sexual dimorphism (see fig. 4.6).
Ideally this model should be tested on individual populations, however, no
other primate studies to date have attempted to compare male and female energetic
costs. A study by Kenagy (1987) on energy expenditure in golden mantled ground
squirrels lends support to the hypothesis that overall energetic costs for males and
females will be similar in sexually dimorphic species. He found that daily energy
expenditure for males is much greater than females (2.5 x BMR, as opposed to 2.0 x
BMR). But, the energetic costs of lactation for the females are enormous. During
peak lactation female energy expenditure is 82% greater than at the time of mating.
Kenagy found that while males and females utilised their energy in different ways,
when all factors were considered, male and female energy requirements over a
breeding season were virtually identical.
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Female energetic costs' are greatest, relative to male costs, in species with
low sexual dimorphism. Hence it was predicted that male care giving and
allomaternal care would be found in species with low and/or medium levels of body
size dimorphism. To support this it was shown that high levels of male care only
occur in species that are monomorphic in body size (table 4.8). However, no
relationship was found between allomaternal care and sexual dimorphism in body
size. In view of these findings, section 4.6 explored the possible energetic benefits of
allomaternal and paternal care. The energetic benefits of male care giving are clear
(fig. 4.10): When males contribute to offspring care, females benefit in terms of
significantly shorter gestation and lactation lengths for their body size. While female
energetic costs are greater than male energetic costs in monomorphic species, male
care giving helps to reduce this difference by reducing the energetic burdens of
lactation and gestation. There is also a (non-significant) tendency for shorter inter-
birth intervals when males contribute to offspring care. Palombit (1995) suggests that
in siamangs male care giving may result in shorter inter-birth intervals and increased
infant survivorship. This may be a particularly interesting test case since not all male
siamangs practice paternal care.
While the benefits to the female of male care seem clear, the benefits to the
male are less obvious. An important factor may be the relative stability of primate
groups. For most primate species, age at first reproduction is high, and rates of
migration are low (Dunbar 1988). This means that the number of reproductively
mature females in a group will usually remain fairly stable over time and the
availability of fertile females will severely limit a male's mating opportunities. The
shorter the female inter-birth interval is, the better it is for the male. In harem social
groups, new alpha males use infanticide as a mechanism to abruptly shorten inter-
birth intervals (Hrdy 1977, 1979). Clearly with any degree of paternity certainty this
is a maladaptive strategy. In monogamous or polyandrous species female
reproductive output will severely affect male reproductive output, and any behaviour
that will reduce the inter-birth interval, or alleviate energetic stress on the female,
will also benefit the male.
5 For brevity, "energetic costs" refers here to the total energetic costs per reproductive event, unless
otherwise stated.
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The model has proved less fruitful in predicting female cooperation.
Allomaternal care is more common than paternal care but does not occur in highly
sexually dimorphic species where female energetic costs are low. There is some
evidence that female cooperation may be important in reducing the energetic costs of
lactation and shortening inter-birth intervals. However, when allomothering occurs at
intermediate levels the energetic costs of lactation increases, as do inter-birth
intervals (see discussion in section 4.6). Overall, these results confirm the complexity
of motivations, costs and benefits associated with allomaternal care.
4.7.2 Energy budgets and the evolution of the australopithecines
The energetic profiles, discussed in section 4.4, offer an interesting insight
into the whole problem of energy supply and demand. There is wide variation
between primates in their methods of balancing energy intake and expenditure.
Lagothrix lagothricha expends large amounts of energy on finding food, but little
energy actually on feeding. This strategy is only possible because of the high
energetic value of the food resource. Callitrichids, on the other hand, spend much of
their time resting in order to minimise their energetic demands. Apes devote more
time and energy to feeding than any other primate and are known to compromise
their behaviour in order to meet their energy requirements. For instance, gorilla
females alter their locomotor behaviour during pregnancy, by travelling less and at
slower speed (Meder 1986) and have been shown to feed for slightly longer when
pregnant or lactating (Watts 1988). Chimpanzee females have shorter day ranges
than males at Mahale (Hasegawa 1990), in the Tal forest (Doran 1989) and at Gombe
(Wrangham and Smuts 1980) although they do not necessarily spend less time
travelling (Doran 1989). Furthermore, chimpanzee females with young or in the late
stages of pregnancy have shorter day ranges than other females (Goodall 1986;
Hasegawa 1990). The high energy requirements of the apes may also have cognitive
implications: Byrne (1997) suggests apes have superior spatial-temporal skills, in
comparison with monkeys, in order to improve foraging effeciency.
Apes, because of their large size, have the highest energy demands of all
primates and compensate for this by minimising energy expenditure and maximising
energy intake. While a chimpanzee female is able to dedicate 40% of her energetic
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budget to foraging, in a patchy or poorer quality environment this would be
impossible since the energetic costs of finding food would increase. Hunt (1994)
suggests that bipedalism may have evolved in order to increase feeding efficiency.
This hypothesis is based upon the observation that chimpanzees are more likely to
adopt a bipedal stance during feeding than any other activity. It is likely that
australopithecines lived in a patchy, woodland environment (Harris 1985; White et
al. 1994), and that resources were scarcer and more highly dispersed than they are in
modern chimpanzee habitats. Isbell and Young (1996) suggest that bipedalism
provided an energetically efficient means of foraging over large distances. If
australopithecines were following an ape-like pattern of energy utilisation, dedicating
400/0 of their energy budget to feeding, then it is likely that they had pushed it to its
limit. They simply could not dedicate any more energy to feeding without sacrificing
other important aspects of their energetic budget, such as movement and socialising.
However, the evolutionary descendants of the australopithecines, members of the
genus Homo, were considerably larger and occupied a rather more arid habitat (Reed
1997; Ruff 1991). It is likely that members of the genus Homo had to adopt a
different energetic strategy compared with the australopithecines.
4.7.3 Energetic costs and the evolution of Homo
Humans appear to follow a rather different strategy of energy use compared
with other primates. On the basis of body size dimorphism alone, which is low in
humans, females should have a higher energetic cost of reproduction than males.
However, in section 4.4 it was shown that human males have far higher daily energy
expenditure than would be expected for their body size (see fig. 4.4). Female daily
energy expenditure does not deviate from expected levels and it seems likely that
high male daily energy expenditure arises from an increased work load associated
with a sexual division of labour. Over the course of a reproductive cycle male and
female energetic costs are approximately equal: that is, the high energetic costs of
gestation and lactation for the female are balanced by increased daily energy
expenditure in the male.
In one respect, the energetic costs of reproduction calculated for human
females may have been over-estimated. As will be discussed shortly, the energetic
costs ofgestation and lactation appear to be rather low in humans in comparison with
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other primates. In other respects, however, the energetic cost of reproduction for
human females is likely to have been severely underestimated in the calculations.
Over the course of human evolution there has been a considerable increase in
encephalisation (see figure 1.1). Since brain tissue is metabolically expensive,
consuming 22 times as much energy as skeletal tissue (Aiello and Wheeler 1995), an
increase in brain size is likely to have considerable energetic implications. This is
true for a number of reasons. Firstly, the costs of growing a large brained infant are
borne primarily by the mother (Martin 1996). Brain growth is rapid both during
pregnancy and over the first few years after birth, including the lactation period. This
means that females are directly responsible for providing sufficient energy to their
offspring for brain growth. Secondly, increased encephalisation has dietary
implications. Aiello and Wheeler (1995) have shown that the increase in brain size in
humans has occurred concomitantly with a decrease in the size of another
metabolically expensive organ: the gut. Aiello and Wheeler argue that the only way
that humans could meet the costs of encephalisation was by reducing gut size. This,
in turn, was only possible with a change to a higher quality, more easily processed
diet based on animal products. A reliance on animal products creates new
behavioural challenges for females. Since immature and inexperienced offspring are
unable to procure meat for themselves, this means that they are dependent upon their
mothers for food for an extended period of time (we will return to this point in
section 5.3.3). Human females must supply their offspring with food well beyond the
weaning period. Bogin and Smith (1996 p705) note the extended period of childhood
that follows weaning in humans:
" Childhood is defined as the period following weaning, when the
youngster still depends on older people for feeding and protection.
Children require specially prepared foods due to the immaturity of their
dentition and digestive tracts, and the rapid growth of their brain. These
constraints necessitate a diet low in total volume but dense in energy,
lipids and proteins. Children are also especially vulnerable to predation
and disease and thus provide protection. There is no society in which
children survive if deprived of this care provided by older individuals."
Human childhood, and thus dependency, lasts until around 7 years of age
(Bogin and Smith 1996). At this time brain growth is complete and the first
permanent molars have usually erupted allowing the processing of an adult type diet.
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Only at this age does the child gain a degree of self-sufficiency. Until this time,
considerable investment is required from the child's mother, or other adults, to
ensure survival.
Over the course of human evolution there has been a considerable increase in
female energetic costs, compared with male costs, for three reasons: a) changes in
body size dimorphism; b) increased encephalisation; c) an increased period of
offspring dependency. As we have already seen, during hominid evolution there have
also been considerable changes in male energetic costs due to the sexual division of
labour. Males engage primarily in physically demanding activities, such as hunting,
while females concentrate their efforts on less energetically expensive activities such
as gathering and childcare. Food sharing, especially of meat, is common across
hunter-gather societies (Musonda 1991).
There are three possible reasons why females do not participate in hunting
activities themselves. Firstly, Hames (1989) suggests that the reason that females do
not pursue animal resources is due to the incompatibility of simultaneous hunting
and childcare. Without some kind of help from other individuals, females are simply
unable to do both activities effectively. Second, hunting is an unpredictable foraging
strategy (Hawkes 1993; Hawkes et al. 1997a). Studies of modern hunter-gatherers
suggest that considerable day-to-day variation in hunting returns means that this is an
unreliable means of obtaining a constant source of calories. Third, hunting and other
activities carried out by males clearly have very high energetic costs: human males
have significantly higher daily energy expenditure than would be expected for
primates of their body size. Human females may be unable to increase their energy
expenditure in a similar manner because it would suppress their fertility. A large
number of studies on human females have shown that increased physical activity is
associated with reduced fecundity (Bentley 1985). Problems included a late or
delayed age of menarche, dysmenorrhea and secondary amenorrhea, abnormal
oestrogen and progesterone levels and a short luteal phase. Low fertility associated
with elevated activity levels is clearly a very large obstacle that could deter female's
from hunting for themselves.
It seems likely that the sexual division of labour, food-sharing and increased
energy expenditure by males, was a response to rapidly increasing energetic costs for
females. But when during the course of hominid evolution did these changes occur?
Put another way, when in hominid evolution did female energetic costs become
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Daily Energy Energetic Cost of Reproduction Encephalisation
Body Mass Basal Metabolic
Cost (kcal)Expenditure (kcal)(kg) Rate (kcal/ day) .
(kcal) Chimpanzee data Human data Chimp. Bumar i
I
M F M F M F M F M F data data
A. afarensis 44.6 29.3 1208.1 881.6 1904.0 1410.9 3822191 3944998 2444679 2335184 30898 1283C c
A. africanus 40.8 30.2 1130.0 901.8 1786.1 1441.4 3585597 4030455 2293353 2385768 31568 1310S'
.~ A. robustus 40.2 31.9 1117.6 939.6 1767.2 1498.5 3547735 4190094 2269137 2480264 32818 13627
"
A. boisei 48.6 34.0 1288.5 985.6 2025.3 1568.0 4065849 4384355 2600523 2595254 34339 14259
H. habilis sensu stricto 51.6 31.5 1347.7 930.8 2114.7 1485.2 4245334 4152728 2715322 2458146 243940 101293
H. habilis sensu lato 37.0 31.5 1050.2 930.8 1665.5 1485.2 3343424 4152728 2138459 2458146 243940 101293
H. rudolfensis 59.6 50.8 1501.5 1332.0 2347.1 2091.0 4711703 5846738 3013613 3460891 343449 142614
H. erectus (early African) 62.7 52.3 1565.3 1361.4 2443.4 2135.4 4905072 5970827 3137291 3534343 701477 291281
Neandertal 60.1 51.8 1511.0 1351.6 2361.3 2120.6 4740289 5929577 3031896 3509926 812736 337480
H.sapiens (early) 70.0 56.8 1602.4 1394.4 2499.4 2185.3 5017594 6110412 3209261 3616968 837522 347772
Table 4.11 Estimates of energetic costs for selected extinct hominids
Body mass data were taken from McHenry (1992a). Basal metabolic rate and daily energy expenditure were calculated using the Kleiber equation (see
section 4.4) and equation 5 (4.4.2) respectively. The energetic cost of reproduction was calculated using both chimpanzee and human values for lactation
length, gestation length and inter-birth interval. The cost of encephalisation is an estimation of the additional costs of lactation that derive from having a
~larger brain size. These estimates are based on Foley and Lee's (1991) model. 'M' and 'F' stand for 'males' and 'females' respectively.
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Figure 4.11: Estimated energy dimorphism in the hominids.
Energy dimorphism is calculated by dividing the energetic cost of reproduction for males by the energetic cost of
reproduction for females. The values obtained depend on whether a chimpanzee or human model of gestation length, lactation
length and inter-birth interval is used .
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Figure 4.12: Estimated energy dimorphism in the hominids, including cost of encephalisation.
This figure is very similar to fig . 4.11. However, an estimate of the cost of encephalisation (see text) has been included in the
calculation of female energetic costs of reproduction.
much greater than male energetic costs? In order to answer this question the
energetic cost of reproduction for various hominid species was modelled using a
similar methodology to that already applied in this chapter to extant species.
Daily energy expenditure was calculated for the hominids by applying body
weight estimates from McHenry (1992a) to equation 5. Using these estimates, the
total energetic cost of reproduction for each sex was calculated using equations 3 and
4. Of course, lactation length, gestation length and inter-birth interval for the
hominids are unknown. Thus, two estimates of total energetic costs of reproduction
were made, using chimpanzee and human life history variables. In the case of
humans, the average lactation length and inter-birth interval for all the human
populations listed in table 4.3 was used". Male energetic costs of reproduction were
divided by female energetic costs of reproduction to provide an estimate of energy
dimorphism (compare with sections 4.5.2 and fig. 4.6). Data are given in table 4.11
and results are shown in figure 4.11.
There is a distinct difference between the energy dimorphism in the
australopithecines and Homo habilis sensu lato on the one hand, and all the other
Homo species on the other. Energy dimorphism is much greater in the latter group,
indicating high female energetic costs relative to the male. It is interesting to note
also that energy dimorphism is greatest when chimpanzee life history variables are
used. It seems that the life history schedule in humans helps to reduce overall
energetic costs for the female. These data do not consider the additional energetic
costs of encephalisation to the female. Foley and Lee (1991) have calculated that
encephalisation increases the energetic costs of lactation by the following values: 1%
in australopithecines; 7.5% in early Homo; 15% in Homo erectus; 17.5% in Homo
sapiens (based on estimated increased energetic costs at 12 months of age). These
additional costs were added to the lactation stage of the model (values are included
as the 'encephalisation cost' in table 4.11), and the effect on energy dimorphism is
illustrated in figure 4.12.
Adding the costs of encephalisation serves to mark even more clearly the
distinction between the australopithecines and Homo species (excluding Homo
habilis sensu lato). That is, taking into account the costs of body maintenance,
gestation, lactation and encephalisation there is a clear transition from
6 Excluding Scottish students, who are assumed to be a-typical with respect to our hominid ancestors.
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australopithecines to Homo. In the australopithecines the energetic costs of
reproduction are very similar for males and females. In Homo the energetic cost of
reproduction for females is considerably greater than it is for males. This is
particularly true of later hominid species, such as the Neandertals, in which female
energetic costs are predicted to be between 20 and 300/0 greater than male energetic
costs, depending on which model is used. Remember, these data do not include the
additional energetic costs to the male that would occur with the sexual division of
labour which is predicted to be a response to relatively high female energetic costs.
Figure 4.12 clearly illustrates the energetic implications of having a
chimpanzee-like versus a human-like life history pattern. Using the chimpanzee
model, hominid females are predicted to have higher overall energetic costs (and thus
a lower energy dimorphism score) than when the human model is used. Why is this?
Figure 4.13 illustrates the distribution across primates of residual gestation length,
lactation length and inter-birth interval with respect to body size. Chimpanzee and
human values are compared with these distributions. Chimpanzees have long
gestation lengths, lactation lengths and long inter-birth intervals for their body size.
Humans have long gestation lengths for their body size, and inter-birth interval
conforms to expectations. However, lactation length in humans is noticeably shorter
than would be expected on the basis of body size. Furthermore, during lactation
energy demands increase by just 20-25%, considerably lower than in other mammals
(Lunn 1994). Bogin and Smith (1996) have also shown that the typical human life
cycle involves a shortened lactation (or infancy) period, followed by an extended
childhood stage.
How were hominid females able to reduce the energetic costs of lactation to
the levels seen in modem humans? One possibility, suggested by Hawkes et al.
(1997a, b, c), is that menopause, long post-menopausal life spans and
'grandmothering" evolved to help ease the burdens of lactation on hominid females.
Hawkes et al. found that senior post-menopausal Hadza women play an important
role in provisioning their daughter's offspring. The benefits of this are clear for the
child the mother and the grandmother. With more provisioning the child would be,
expected to have higher a survival rate. The mother is relieved of some of the burden
of providing food, reducing her energetic stress and shortening her inter-birth
interval. Finally, the decreased mortality of the child and the increased fecundity of
the mother equate to higher inclusive fitness for the grandmother. These
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Figure 4.13: Distribution of residual values of selected life-history variables
The distributions of (a) residual gestation length, (b) lactation length and (c) inter-birth
interval across primates. Negative figures indicate values that are lower than expected for body
size, positive figures indicate values that are higher than expected for body size. Values for
humans and chimpanzees are indicated by 'H' and 'C' respectively.
considerations suggest that grandmothers may play an important role in reducing the
energetic load on human mothers.
Hawkes and her co-workers play down the importance of male care giving in
further reducing the energetic stress on females. However, the data presented here
has shown that across primates, male care giving is correlated with a significant
reduction in lactation and gestation length (section 4.6). On this basis I propose that
the sexual division of labour in humans, involving male provisioning of resources,
especially meat, to females and their offspring, contributed substantially to the
reduction of the energetic costs of lactation in human females. This is particularly
important since the costs to the mother of encephalisation are especially high during
the lactation period (Foley and Lee 1991). Through provisioning, males may have
helped to: a) reduce the costs to the females of finding food; b) increase female
energetic intake both during and prior to lactation, in particular by providing high
quality resources such as meat; c) allow females to wean offspring without incurring
the additional costs of locating suitable foods for a weanling that would still be
largely incapable of fending for itself.
Lunn (1994) isolates 5 mechanisms by which human females meet the
energetic costs of lactation: 1) increased energy intake; 2) decreased activity;
3) decreased basal metabolic rate; 4) decreased diet-induced thermogenesis;
5) utilization of body fat. The importance of each mechanism varies between
populations. Goldberg et al. (1991) found that the main source of energy for lactation
in British women was increased energy intake (62%) followed by decreased activity
(35%). In developing countries the principal mechanism is reduced physical activity
(Lunn 1994). This has been shown to lower female energetic costs by around 15% in
Indian (McNeill and Payne 1985) and Gambian (Lawrence and Whitehead 1988)
women. The storage of body fat may also be a key mechanism by which human
females are able to meet the costs of lactation (McFarland 1997). The Committee on
Medical Aspects of Food Policy estimates that lactating females utilise around
12kcal/day from stored adipose tissue (Rogers et al. 1997), although the ability to
build up fat stores varies considerably between populations (Durnin 1988; Hytten
and Leitch 1971). Increased metabolic efficiency during lactation may also playa
role in energy conservation, although again there is considerable inter-population
variation (Rogers et al. 1997). Overall, human females clearly have at their disposal
many different means of meeting the energy demands of lactation. The influence of
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male provisioning on the effectiveness of these mechanisms is unknown.
Conceivably males may playa very important role in allowing females to increase
energy intake and reduce energy expenditure. Sustained provisioning of the females
across the reproductive cycle may further enable the development of fat reserves.
I am suggesting that in humans male provisioning of females has greatly
enabled their ability to meet the energetic costs of lactation. It is significant that in
contemporary populations male provisioning nearly always involves animal
products. As discussed earlier (section 4.4.2), females rarely participate in hunting or
fishing, possibly due to the difficulties of simultaneous childcare. Yet, a meat
component to the diet has been proposed to be of key significance in the evolution of
the human brain (see above). The provisioning of meat by males to females, during
pregnancy and lactation, and to newly weaned infants, may have been of primary
importance. Hawkes (1990, 1991, 1993; see also Hawkes et al. 1991) argues against
this view of hunting as a care-giving strategy. This is based on her finding in the
Hadza that hunting provides unpredictable returns when compared to gathering (we
will return to this argument in chapter 6). However, Hames (1989) argues that while
hunting may not be the most efficient way of gaining calories, it is a considerably
more effective way of gaining protein. In African and Amazonian societies low
levels of animal protein intake (as opposed to overall caloric intake) have been
shown to lead to high mortality and morbidity.
When, in hominid evolution, might male provisioning have arisen? In figure
4.14 the energy dimorphism of selected hominids is compared to the distribution of
energy dimorphism in living human populations. It is assumed, in the first instance,
that there is no sexual division of labour in the hominids, unlike humans, for whom
the sexual division of labour significantly increases daily energy expenditure in
males. Both Homo erectus and the Neandertals fall outside the range of human
variation. This implies that if these two species had chimpanzee-like life histories
and no provisioning by males, then females must have been under considerable
energetic stress. It seems rather more likely that Neandertals (and by implication
other archaic Homo sapiens) and possibly even Homo erectus conformed to a more
human-like life history pattern. Arguably this was made possible by male
provisioning and a sexual division of labour. Ruff (1987) asserts that sex differences
in lower limb bone structure in Neandertals are indistinguishable from those of
modern day hunter-gatherers. This suggests that Neandertals divided foraging
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Figure 4.14: Energy dimorphism in selected extinct hominids compared with
distribution of living human populations.
Energy dimorphism is calculated by dividing the energetic cost of reproduction for males by
the energetic cost of reproduction for females. The values obtained for extinct hominids
depend on whether a chimpanzee or human model of gestation length, lactation length and
inter-birth interval is used. Note that the energy dimorphism of living chimpanzees (marked
with a ' C') is 0.96.
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activities by sex in the same way that hunter-gatherers do today. With respect to life
histories, Bogin and Smith (1996) also point out the differences between human and
chimpanzee life history patterns, the former including a shorter lactation period and a
longer post-weaning, childhood period. They suggest that the transition to the
human-like pattern began in late Homo erectus, and was well established in archaic
Homo sapiens. They also suggest that a switch to a diet which included a higher
component of animal-products would have been an important factor.
The evidence presented in this chapter indicates quite clearly that there was a
transition between the australopithecines and Homo in patterns of energy expenditure
by males and females (figures 4.11 and 4.12). More contentious is the proposition
that male provisioning evolved at least 500,000 years ago, with the appearance of
archaic Homo sapiens. It is interesting to note that this is the time that the first
unequivocal evidence of large game hunting also appears in the archaeological
record, with the earliest finds at Schoningen and Boxgrove dating from between
500,000 and 400,000 years ago (Thieme 1997). Aiello (1998, in press) has also
suggested that during this period there would have been strong selection for male
cooperation, particularly for providing animal food for females and their offspring.
Yet, male care giving may have evolved even earlier. The fossil and archaeological
evidence suggests that the diet of Homo erectus also included animal products
(Shipman and Walker 1989). Leonard and Robertson (1994) and Aiello and Wheeler
(1995) also argue, on the basis of brain size considerations, that the diet of Homo
erectus must have had a meat component. If male care giving had not evolved at this
point we must assume that either: a) males were the primary meat-eaters, an unlikely
proposition if the connection made between brain size and diet is correct; or b)
females were active providers of meat for their offspring, particularly during and
after the weaning period and thus were able to meet the increased energetic demands
ofhunting and/or scavenging in addition to the costs of gestation and lactation. If this
latter scenario is correct, then it is hard to imagine how hominid females could have
met the costs of lactation by reducing activity levels and increasing energy intake, as
human women do today. On balance, we cannot rule out the possibility that some
degree of male provisioning may have occurred prior to the appearance of archaic
Homo sapiens. Intra-female cooperation (i.e. allomothering and grandmothering)
may also have played an important role. However, this analysis has found that it is
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more difficult to make accurate predictions about female cooperation based on the
kinds of data considered here. These issues will be explored further in chapter 6.
The alternative interpretation of these results is that changes in social
structure, involving male provisioning, occurred before or in parallel with changes in
sexual dimorphism in body size and encephalisation. For instance, Deacon (1997)
suggests that pair bonding evolved in the transition from australopithecines to Homo
habilis and thus the reduction in sexual dimorphism in body size, seen in Homo, was
a result of reduced breeding competition. If decreased body size dimorphism
occurred in response to changes in the breeding system, involving reduced male-
male competition, then we would expect changes in male body size alone. However,
the change in sexual dimorphism in Homo erectus was the result of changes in both
male and female body size. Both sexes have increased in size, with the greatest
increase occurring in females, possibly in response to thermoregulatory demands
(Aiello 1996a, 1996b; Wheeler 1994). This indicates that, in this case, the
relationship between body size dimorphism and breeding system is more complex
than the sexual selection hypothesis suggests.
It has been argued throughout this thesis that it is important to consider both
male and female energetic costs if we are to understand how different cooperative
behaviours arise. This approach may prove to be particularly fruitful when
considering the evolution of male provisioning in humans. Humans, because of the
energetic demands of encephalisation, face unique energetic challenges compared
with other primates. It has been argued here that this has led to two particularly
important, mutually dependent, adaptations: a) the sexual division of labour
involving male provisioning of females and their offspring with (primarily) animal-
based resources; and b) a reduction in the energetic costs of lactation. The
behavioural and cognitive ramifications of this will be discussed in chapter 6.
199
CHAPTER 5
The Effect of Habitat Quality and Seasonality on Cooperation
5.1 Introduction
In the first chapter the Prisoner's Dilemma was introduced using the story of
two individuals, Romeo and Juliet, who had simultaneously happened upon some
fruit which they would both like to eat. Each individual was given a choice between
two behaviours: to share the fruit, or to threaten the other animal in the hope of
gaining the whole lot. It has been shown, over the course of this work, that the
decision to threaten (defect) or share the fruit (cooperate) will depend on a number of
different factors: the energetic costs of reproduction for each individual, the history
of past interactions, expectations as to how many times they are likely to interact in
the future, and the relationship each individual has with other group members.
However, no consideration at all has been given to the nature of the resource for
which they are competing. For instance, would Romeo and Juliet be less or more
cooperative if they had found unripe, less desirable fruit? Or, what if the dispute was
not about fruit, but about meat? Perhaps the larger the prize, the higher the
temptation to defect. On the other hand, if the resource is large, then even a shared
meal may be enough to satisfy each individual's needs. The aim of this chapter is to
further develop the Prisoner's Dilemma model, used throughout this thesis, by setting
it within an ecological context.
Wrangham (1987a p.282) suggests that "ecological pressures bear the
principal responsibility for species differences in social behaviour." Wrangham
argues that it is particularly important for females to distribute themselves in the
environment so that they maximise their ability to gain resources. Males, on the other
hand should distribute themselves so that they maximise their ability to gain access
,
to females. According to this view, it is the dispersion of females that drives social
organisation (Trivers 1972; Goss-Custard et al. 1972; Wrangham 1987a). Patterns of
female dispersal are, in turn, dependent upon the distribution of resources. Groups of
females are favoured when food is distributed in clumps which can support many
individuals at once. If females can form groups they benefit in terms of lower
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predation risk, and the ability to defend patches of resources (Dunbar 1988). When
the food supply is more dispersed, group living may be untenable. For example,
chimpanzees, spider monkeys and orangutans react to the dispersed nature of their
food supply either by foraging in small groups (chimpanzees and spider monkeys) or
alone (orangutans) (Wrangham 1987a).
The distribution of males depends on the opportunities for monopolising
large numbers of females (Dunbar 1988). From a Darwinian perspective the ideal
would be to have sole control of a group of females and so form a harem. However,
if males are unable to monopolise matings with females, then a multi-male social
structure will emerge. Male ability to monopolise mating opportunities is largely
dependent upon the number of females there are in estrous at the same time (Dunbar
1988). This, in turn, largely depends upon whether the females are seasonal or non-
seasonal breeders. In non-seasonal breeders females may come into estrous at any
time of the year. Therefore, only one or two females are likely to be in estrous
simultaneously and dominant males are easily able to prevent other males from
gaining mating access. This means that in non-seasonal breeders males are able to
establish quite large harem groups. In seasonal breeders many females will be fertile
at the same time, leading to 'scramble competition' between the males for
reproductive access. In this instance, multi-male groups are likely. Ridley (1986) has
found this logic holds across primate species: multi-male social systems are
associated with strong seasonality and short breeding seasons, while the opposite is
true for harem systems.
Group size is another feature of social groups which is closely connected to
ecological context. Group size appears to be a compromise between at least two
environmentally determined selection factors: the necessities of predator defence
(which selects for large groups) and the problem of obtaining sufficient resources for
all individuals (which selects for smaller groups). The nature and quality of the food
source is also important. Frugivores, for instance, require larger home ranges than
folivores due to the more patchy distribution of fruit in comparison with leaves
(Mace and Harvey 1983). Higher quality habitats are able to support greater
population densities (Dunbar 1988). Also, the amount of time spent searching for
food is related to habitat quality. In baboons (Dunbar 1988) and vervet monkeys
(Struhsaker 1967) travelling time increases in poorer quality habitats.
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In short, the quality, distribution and seasonality of the environment appears
to play an important role in determining the size, distribution and structure of primate
social groups. However, Wrangham admits that (1987 p.282):
"The problem, and this is true for most animal species, is that we do not
know ~xa~tly what the relevant ecological pressures are, or which aspects
of soclal hfe they most directly effect, or how."
This chapter examines whether ecological factors effect cooperative and competitive
strategies within groups. In particular, it examines the influence of habitat quality
and seasonality, and how these factors might have differential effects on female-
female, male-male and male-female interactions.
Habitat quality affects many different aspects of social life, and for this
reason it is difficult to isolate its influence on cooperative behaviours alone. In poor
quality environments individuals are forced to forage in smaller groups, thus
lowering the potential for cooperative or competitive interactions. When resources
are of higher quality larger group sizes are possible (Dunbar 1988), increasing the
opportunities for both cooperation and competition. Folivores (e.g. colobine
monkeys) tend to live in more egalitarian groups where competition and alliance
formation occurs at a low frequency. Frugivores, on the other hand, live in groups
where competition for resources is great (e.g. macaques, baboons). In response to
this females in these groups tend to form strong kin bonds. Van Hooff and van
Schaik (1992) suggest that the differences between frugivores and folivores result
from either (a) differences in resource quality, or (b) differences in resource
distribution. There is little available evidence to distinguish between these two
possibilities. Van Hooff and van Schaik suggest that the second explanation is the
most appropriate: that is, defendable patches of high quality resources, such as fruit,
lead to high competition and thus strong female bonding. Leaves, because they are
evenly distributed, are not easy to defend and thus they provoke very little
competition or cooperation.
Intra-group competition has been related to the 'patch size' of available
resources in chimpanzees (Isabirye-Basuta 1988) and black spider monkeys
(McFarland Symington 1988a). In these cases feeding efficiency was found to
decrease as patch size increased, indicating increased intra-individual competition.
Since larger patches support greater numbers of individuals then competition would
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be expected to increase with patch size. However, there is no clear way of
determining the effect resource quality has on competitiveness. Larger patches may
be considered to be higher quality patches, and this in itself may effect competitive
versus cooperative tendencies. Computer simulations are a useful way of assessing
the effect of resource quality as opposed to resource distribution.
Resource quality may be stable throughout the year, or many fluctuate on a
seasonal basis. Animals respond to seasonal fluctuations in resource quality by
shifting dietary strategies. During times of resource scarcity alternative and less
nutritious food items are consumed (Foley 1987). In many animal populations living
in seasonal environments reproduction follows a seasonal rhythm. Often births are
timed to correspond to the period of greatest food availability (Lindburg 1987). For
example, Butynski (1988) found that in African guenons, births tended to be
coincident with wet seasons. In less seasonal environments birth seasons are either
long or only weakly related to seasonal patterns (Butynski 1988). The strength of the
association between seasonality and reproduction varies. Chimpanzees live in a
seasonal environment but are not strictly seasonal breeders. Even so, Wallis (1995)
observed seasonal patterns of anogenital swelling and conceptions in Gombe
chimpanzees. Comparisons of captive versus wild populations support the
importance of seasonal food availability in determining reproductive patterns. For
instance, captive Callimico show no birth seasonality, unlike their wild counterparts.
While Nishimura et al. (1990) report a distinct birth season in a wild woolly monkey
group, Williams (1974) found no seasonality in a captive group. In some cases
however, seasonal birth patterns continue even in the absence of environmental cues.
Bernstein (1993) found that in captive rhesus macaques birth seasonality persisted
even when the monkeys were housed indoors.
In vervet monkeys births occur most frequently during periods of high dietary
quality (Lee 1987). Lee associates this with high energetic costs during the first few
months of lactation (1987 pp. 413,419):
"Nutrition of the mother is most important during the early phase of
rapid infant growth, because at that time the energetic requirements of
lactation are high..... For a seasonal breeder such as the vervet monkey,
food supply - its quality, availability and distribution - plays a major role
in the timing of reproductive events."
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It seems logical that females should time reproductive events so that the period of
greatest energetic stress coincides with the period of greatest food availability. Given
the high energetic costs of lactation, discussed at length in chapter 4, the post-natal
period would appear to be the most energetically costly phase of the reproductive
cycle. However, in some primates resource quality appears to restrict the ability to
conceive. For example Koenig et al. (1997) found that in langurs, conceptions
peaked at the time of greatest resource quality and that the majority of births actually
occurred during periods of low resource quality. The fitness of the infants clearly
suffers because of this. Koenig et al. report slow infant growth rates and average
female age at first birth is 6.0 years, almost twice as old as in provisioned
populations (3.1 years). Why do langur females follow this strategy rather than
timing births to coincide with the time of greatest food abundance? Koenig et al.
suggest that the nutritional state of the females restricts their ability to conceive
(1997 p.230):
"At Ramnagar, conceptions occurred during, or immediately after, the
months with the best dietary quality. Conceptions occurred only during
the time of best physical condition, and females in good physical
condition were more likely to conceive than females in poor condition."
While the exact mechanisms that underlie the relationship between body weight and
ovulation are unknown in this case, Koenig et al. point out that in rhesus macaques
ovulatory frequency is directly related to body weight (Walker et al. 1983) and in
humans ovulation may be disrupted following weight loss (Frisch 1984). This
research suggests that for females there are two energetically critical periods:
conception and birth. Females should time their reproductive cycle so that they can
best meet the energetic demands ofboth conception and lactation.
In seasonal environments it is important for females to maximise their access
to resources in times of plenty, especially if this is also an important reproductive
period (whether conception or birth). Therefore, we might expect greater female-
female competition during times of food abundance. The alternative hypothesis is
that female-female competition decreases when food is plentiful, providing the
opportunity for larger foraging parties which would be advantageous in terms of both
defending resources from other groups and predator defence. Foraging group size in
chimpanzees and spider monkeys is variable and appears to track seasonal variation
204
in food supply with the largest parties forming during the fruiting season (Wrangham
1977). In orangutans, occasional group foraging occurs during periods of food
abundance (van Schaik and van Hooff 1983). If females time conceptions to coincide
with food abundance, male-male competition would be expected to be greatest at this
time. On the other hand, if births are timed to coincide with peak resource
availability, male-male interactions may not be effected.
Interactions between males and females may also be effected by seasonal
patterns of food distribution. Of particular interest is whether male care giving is
more or less likely in a seasonal or non-seasonal environment. Busse (1985) argues
that male-infant interactions are more likely to occur in non-seasonal breeders, such
as baboons and mangabeys, than seasonal breeders such as macaques and vervet
monkeys. This is because in seasonal breeders many females are in estrous
simultaneously making it impossible to monopolise matings with a given female.
Under these conditions low paternity certainty militates against male investment in
infants. However, the models developed in chapters 2 and 3 suggest that paternity
certainty is not necessarily the most crucial factor determining male care giving (see
discussion in chapter 2). Furthermore, there is a central problem with Busse's
hypothesis because it is based solely on observations of Old World monkeys. Male
care giving is far more common in New World monkeys all of which are seasonal
breeders.
All New World primates live in seasonal habitats, and all wild populations
have distinct birth periods (Kinzey 1997). The most extreme of these is Saimiri, in
which all births within a particular troop occur within a single week (Boinski 1987).
Again, timing of reproduction appears to correlate with food availability. However,
the timing of births varies across genera and there does appear to be two distinct
strategies: either to maximise energy intake at conception, or at birth. For instance, in
Aotus, Callicebus, Pithecia, Lagothrix, Leontopithecus and Saguinus birth peaks
occur in the wet season, while in Alouatta, Brachtyles, Cacajao, Saimiri and
Chiropotes the birth peaks occur in the dry season (Kinzey 1997). In those genera
which are capable of having two litters per year, such as Cebuella and Callimico,
birth peaks are bimodal. There are interesting differences in male care giving
between those New World monkeys which predominantly give birth in the wet
season, compared with those that predominantly give birth in the dry season. All of
the genera which give birth in the wet season also have high levels of male care
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giving, the only exception being Lagothrix. None of the species which give birth in
the dry season have male care. These observations suggest that the relationships
between female fertility, seasonality and male care giving are far more complex than
is currently recognised.
Social systems evolve within an ecological context. The quality or abundance
of resources is likely to effect the types of cooperative or competitive strategies that
individuals employ. Moreover, seasonal fluctuations in resource availability may
cause individuals to alter their cooperative strategies over the course of the year. In
this chapter the effects of habitat quality and seasonality on cooperative strategies are
examined.
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5.2 The Model
The concept behind this model is very similar to the earlier models (see
chapter 2). The major difference is that resource quality and variability are
incorporated into the model as features of the environment to which the agents must
respond appropriately. Resource quality and variability are featured in the models by
using multiples of the basic Prisoner's Dilemma pay-off matrix to represent 'poor' ,
'medium' and 'high' quality resources (fig. 5.1). The basic pay-off matrix, used in
previous chapters, represents the situation where resource quality is poor. When
resources are of medium quality and high quality, the pay-offs are multiplied by two
and three respectively. In this way, although the magnitude of the pay-offs varies, the
relationships between them is still a Prisoner's Dilemma. For instance, when
resources are of high quality, mutual cooperation receives a pay-off of 9.00 points,
which is higher than the pay-off if both players defect (3.00 points) but lower than
the temptation to defect (15.00 points).
The model progresses in twelve-monthly cycles, where each month is coded
as poor, medium or high quality. There are two types of experiment, seasonal and
non-seasonal. In the non-seasonal models the environment remains constant, either at
low, medium or high quality, so that each month the pay-off matrix remains the
same. In the seasonal models the resource quality (as reflected in the pay-off matrix)
cycles through the different types: poor, medium and high. The agents can detect
resource quality and alter their behaviour accordingly. For instance, an individual
could be a reciprocal altruist when pay-offs are low, and a defector when pay-offs are
high.
Group size is small, there are only 50 agents (reasons for this will become
apparent). The model proceeds on a monthly basis, where each month every agent
interacts with every other agent for one game of the Prisoner's Dilemma. At the end
of the month every individual that has enough points is given the chance to
reproduce. Because agents play against each other every month, this is still an
iterated game, even though only one bout of Prisoner's Dilemma is played between
each pair in any given month. Each agent has a memory of its interactions with all
the other agents for the last two months, and strategy choice is based on three
factors: 1) the interactions between the players in the last two months, 2) the sexes of
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Figure 5.1: Pay-ofT matrices for resources of varying quality
Pay-offs are multiples of the basic Prisoner's Dilemma matrix. 'C' and 'D' are
cooperation and defection respectively.
208
the players, 3) the quality of the resource (poor, medium, high). In this way,
strategies are highly individualised and very flexible. In order to be so flexible agents
need 12 strategy strings, from the point ofview ofthe agent these are:
1) I am male you are male, this is a poor quality resource
2) I am male you are female, this is a poor quality resource
3) I am female you are female, this is a poor quality resource
4) I am female you are male, this is a poor quality resource
5) I am male you are male, this is a medium quality resource
6) I am male you are female, this is a medium quality resource
7) I am female you are female, this is a medium quality resource
8) I am female you are male, this is a medium quality resource
9) I am male you are male, this is a high quality resource
10) I am male you are female, this is a high quality resource
11) I am female you are female, this is a high quality resource
12) I am female you are male, this is a high quality resource
The strategy strings themselves are identical to those used in model 1 (see
chapter 2). They are 21-bit strings of l'sand 0's which code instructions to cooperate
or defect respectively. Just as before, the strategy strings are a kind of look-up table,
for example:
If:
Then:
I am female and my opponent is female
and this is a high quality resource
and last month I defected and she cooperated
and the month before last she cooperated and I cooperated
Refer to gene locus DCCC on strategy string 'female-female, high quality'
which will give the instruction 0 (defect) or 1 (cooperate).
At the start of the experiment the strategy strings are randomly generated. These
strategy strings are used to play the Prisoner's Dilemma through which agents
acquire points. As before, reproduction is only possible once individuals have
enough points to pay the cost of reproduction. During reproduction the strategy
strings of the parents are crossed over, and may mutate (see chapter 2, fig. 2.1). This
means that the strategies that are the most successful at acquiring points will have
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the most offspring, and will be better represented in the next generation. The result is
that over time the model evolves the best strategies for playing the Prisoner's
Dilemma, within the parameters of the model.
This model is clearly more complicated than the original one. Agents have
three times as many strategy strings, and must remember how they interacted with all
the other agents for the last two months. Each agent has both a longer genetic code,
and a memory that records all of its interactions with the other members of the
population. The advantage of this is that each agent can respond in a flexible manner
according to its current situation. The disadvantage of this set-up is that it restricts
the population size. The larger the population, the larger an agent's memory must be
to remember all of its interactions. Group sizes larger than 50, not only vastly
increase experiment run-times, but also push the limits of the compiler in terms of
the amount of memory it can handle.
The program code is outlined and given in full in appendix 4. The actual
details of the model are slightly different to the first models, and proceed as follows:
1) At the start of the experiment the user sets the cost of reproduction for males and
females (MRC and FRC respectively) and programs the resource quality for each
month in the 12 month cycle. In a non-seasonal experiment each month would be
coded to be the same. 50 agents are created. They are assigned a sex, a score
(score = 0), and they are given 12 strategy strings which are coded randomly with
l's and O's. These represent instructions to cooperate or defect and operate
identically to the strategy strings in the earlier models (see section 2.2 and above).
2) The program progresses on a monthly basis. Each month the pay-off matrix is
updated so that it reflects the quality of the environment (poor, medium or high
quality: see figure 5.1). Every agent then plays a single game of the Prisoner's
Dilemma with every other agent in the population. As described above, agents
remember their interactions with every other player for the last two months and
base their behaviour (cooperation or defection) on the history of interactions, the
sexes of the players and the current resource quality. Each player's score increases
in accordance with the relevant pay-off matrix.
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3) At the end of each month all the individuals that have scored enough points are
given the chance to reproduce. All the females with enough points are put into a
'fertile female' array, while all the males with enough points are put into a 'fertile
male' array. Pairs are then selected randomly from each array to reproduce, until
one of the arrays is empty. After reproduction the appropriate reproductive cost
(MRC or FRC) is subtracted from an individual's score, and if they still have
enough points to pay the reproductive cost they are returned to the fertile male or
fertile female array. In this way, it is possible for an agent to reproduce more than
once in any given month. Reproduction occurs through cross-over and mutation of
each of the strategy strings (see fig. 2.1), so that two new offspring are created
during each reproductive event. The offspring are randomly assigned a sex, given
a score of 0, and then held in an offspring array.
4) The program continues to cycle through stages 2 and 3 until 50 new offspring
have been created, i.e. the generation is complete. Generation time depends upon
the costs of reproduction and the strategies of the players. In some experiments
generation time was less than 12 months, in others it was greater than 12 months
and so the yearly cycle was repeated. The offspring become the new parent
generation and the cycle begins again, always starting from month 1. This
continues for 20,000 generations.
This is an evolving model, designed to explore the relationship between
resource quality, seasonality, reproductive cost and the evolution of cooperation. For
each set of variables the experiments were repeated 30 times. These 30 runs are
collectively described in the following text as a 'set'. For each experiment, the
average score per player per game is recorded for each interaction type (male-male,
male-female, female-female and female-male) for each month. Because different
pay-off matrices are used it is no longer appropriate to summarise the results simply
using the average score. To make the results from each experiment comparable, the
average score is translated into one of the following 'strategy-types': suckers,
defectors, weak defectors, weak cooperators, cooperators and exploiters. The index
for translating average scores into strategy types is shown in table 5.1.
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Strategy Type Environment Quality
Poor Medium High
Suckers < 1.00 <2.00 < 3.00
Defectors 1.00 - 1.49 2.00 - 2.99 3.00 - 4.49
Weak defectors 1.50-1.99 3.00 - 3.99 4.50 - 5.99
Weak cooperators 2.00 - 2.49 4.00 - 4.99 6.00 - 7.49
Cooperators 2.50 - 3.00 5.00 - 6.00 7.50 - 9.00
Exploiters > 3.00 > 6.00 > 9.00
Table 5.1: Strategy types.
The range of average scores that qualify for each strategy type In different
environments.
The programs were run on 486 PCs. Extensive testing was done prior to
running the simulations in order to check for programming errors. This included
setting the strategy strings to known values and tracking the model's development
over several generations.
Four main types of experiments were performed:
1) Non-seasonal environment of uniformly low, medium or high quality; male
reproductive costs equal to female reproductive costs (section 5.3.1).
2) Non-seasonal environment of uniformly low, medium or high quality; male
reproductive costs less than female reproductive costs (section 5.3.2).
3) Seasonal environment with cycling resource quality; male reproductive costs
equal to female reproductive costs (section 5.4.1).
4) Seasonal environment with cycling resource quality; male reproductive costs less
than female reproductive costs (section 5.4.2).
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5.3 The Effect of Resource Quality in a
Non-Seasonal Habitat
5.3.1 Equal male and female reproductive costs
In all of these experiments resource quality remains constant throughout the
simulation. Resource quality was selected to be either low, medium or high and the
appropriate pay-off matrix was used (see figure 5.1). Male reproductive cost was
equal to female reproductive cost in each experiment. For each resource quality the
experiment was run using each of the following reproductive costs: MRC = FRC =
100, 200, 400, 600, 1000, 2000 and 3000. This was done separately for each resource
type: poor, medium and high quality. In total, 21 sets of experiments were performed
(3 different quality types x 7 different reproductive costs). Each of these sets
involved 30 simulations. For each set of experiments the percentage of runs where
agents evolved to be cooperators was calculated (see above and table 5.1 for
definitions of 'set' and strategy type 'cooperator').
Because males and females have equal costs of reproduction, there is
absolutely no difference between them. This was borne out by the results which were
very similar for each interaction type (male-male, female-female, male-female and
female-male). For clarity, results will be presented only for male-male interactions.
The results show that as resource quality decreases, the percentage of
cooperators increases (fig. 5.2). For any given reproductive cost (RC), cooperation is
always most likely when resource quality is poor, and least likely when resource
quality is high. For example, when RC = 3000 and resource quality is low,
cooperation evolves in around 65% of experiments. However, when RC = 3000 and
resource quality is medium or high, cooperation evolves in only 50% and 25% of
experiments respectively.
The relationship between resource quality and probability of cooperation
parallels that between reproductive cost and percentage of cooperation. In fig. 5.2 the
points at which the dashed line meets the curves indicate at which reproductive costs
cooperation is expected in 25% of experiments. This point is reached at RC = 1000
with poor quality resources (pay-off matrix xl), RC = 2000 with medium quality
resources (pay-off matrix x 2), and RC = 3000 with high quality resources (pay-off
matrix x 3). There is an inverse relationship between resource quality and
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Figure 5.2: Percentage of simulations in which cooperation evolves in the control
model.
The cost of reproduction is equal for males and females . For each reproductive cost the
model was run 30 times, and each point on the graph represents the percentage of those
runs in which cooperation evolved.
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reproductive cost. The results for low resource quality at RC = 1000 are almost
identical to those for high resource quality at RC = 3000. In effect, as resource
quality decreases the cost of reproduction becomes relatively higher.
In the first model, described in chapter 2, at all reproductive costs greater or
equal to 200 cooperation nearly always evolved. In this model, at RC = 200 there is
practically no selection for cooperation even in the poor quality environment which
has the same pay-off matrix as the original experiment. This difference in results is
not due to a fault in the model. Rather, it exposes a basic difference between the two
models. Axelrod (1984) has shown that cooperation is most likely to emerge when w
is high, where w is the probability of future interactions with the same player. If w is
low, then the best strategy is to defect since punishment in future games is unlikely.
In the first model, when a pair of agents is chosen they interact for 100 games of
Prisoner's Dilemma, which means that for most of the game w is very high. Since
agents only have a memory ofthe last two games, and they cannot keep track ofwhat
game they are on, w is in effect always very high. In this model the size of w is
dependent upon the cost of reproduction and environment quality. If the cost of
reproduction is low or resource quality is high it does not take many months to
produce a new generation of offspring. This means that w is low.
Consider, for instance, an experiment where resource quality is poor, and
where every individual defects. Every month every individual interacts with 49 other
individuals scoring 49x1 = 49 points. If the reproductive cost is 100, all agents will
have enough points to reproduce in only 3 months, and hence the population will
replace itself in a maximum of 3 months. This is not enough time to develop a
cooperative relationship based on reciprocal altruism1. What happens if the cost of
reproduction is increased to 1000? Using the same reasoning it will take defectors
21 months to gain enough points to reproduce, a fairly long time compared with
cooperators who could reproduce in just 7 months. However, even with this huge
time advantage, cooperation is unlikely because 7 months is not enough time to
foster cooperation. In this model, only at very high reproductive costs are individuals
likely to interact often enough to make cooperation possible.
1 Note that the small population size is irrelevant to this result, in fact the process speeds up in larger
populations: a population of 1000 defectors at RC = 100 could replace itself ten times over in just
one month.
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In summary, this model shows that cooperation is most likely when the cost
of reproduction is high and/or the environment quality is low.
5.3.2 Male reproductive costs lower than female reproductive costs
In the previous experiment males and females had equal reproductive costs.
In chapters 2 and 3 it was shown that differences in male and female reproductive
costs can have quite profound effects on the evolution of cooperative strategies and
there is every reason to expect that the same will apply to these models. Therefore,
the experiments were re-run with female cost kept stable at FRC = 1000, while male
cost was varied. Again, the purpose of this experiment is to look at how resource
quality effects strategy choice in a non-seasonal environment. For each set of
reproductive costs, the experiments were run separately with resources kept constant,
at either low, medium or high quality, as reflected in the Prisoner's Dilemma pay-off
matrix (fig. 5.1). For each experiment the average score per agent per game was
recorded for each interaction type, and then translated into a strategy type (see
section 5.2 and table 5.1). For each set of experiments, the percentage of runs in
which agents evolved to be suckers, defectors, weak defectors, weak cooperator,
cooperators and exploiters was recorded (see table 5.1). These results were then
compared with the results that would be expected on the basis of the previous
experiment, in which male and female reproductive costs are equal (section 5.3.1).
Female-female, male-male and male-female interactions will be discussed separately.
Female-female interactions
Figure 5.3 shows, for each set of experiments, the percentage of runs in
which each strategy type evolved, comparing both the expected and observed results.
Female reproductive cost was kept constant, at FRC = 1000, and so expected results
are drawn from the experiment where 11RC = FRC = 1000. Female-female
interactions are predicted to be uneffected by the value of 11RC, and to vary only
with resource quality. This means that we would expect females to be most
cooperative when resource quality is poor, and least cooperative when resource
quality is high.
Cooperative strategies in female-female interactions do not differ markedly
from expectations. Resource quality clearly has the expected effect: cooperation is
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Expected Observed
100% 100%
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Figure 5.3: Female-female interactions
In these experiments female reproductive cost is held constant at FRC = 1000 and male
reproductive cost (MRC) is varied . Expected values are derived from experiments where
FRC=MRC = 1000. Female-female interactions are expected to be unaffected by the
value of MRC. The results are shown for the three different resource types : poor, medium
and high quality .
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highest when resource quality is lowest and visa versa. When resource quality is high
most females evolve to be weak defectors, in contrast to the low resource quality
condition in which most females evolve to be cooperators or weak cooperators. The
value of MRC has a slight effect on female-female strategies. Referring only to the
observed results in fig. 5.3, and comparing the results when MRC = 400 or 600 with
MRC = 100 or 200, at higher values of MRC females are slightly more cooperative.
However, this is a very minor effect and resource quality clearly has the most marked
influence on strategy choice.
Male-male interactions
The results for male-male interactions are illustrated in the same manner as
those for female-female interactions (fig. 5.4). Male-male strategies are expected to
vary with both the value of MRC and resource quality. Cooperation is predicted to
increase as MRC increases and resource quality decreases. Taken as a whole, the
observed results differ from expectations. In nearly every case, males were more
cooperative than predicted (the only exception is MRC = 600 when resource quality
is poor). Comparing the observed results for poor, medium and high quality
resources shows that resource quality has a fairly weak effect. The trend is as
expected: male cooperation decreases as resource quality increases. But, even when
resource quality is high, levels of cooperation are considerably greater than expected.
In the poor quality resource condition the value of MRC has no effect on the
outcome. Males evolve to be weak cooperators in approximately 60% of runs, and
weak defectors in 40% of runs, regardless of the value of MRC. The results for
medium and high resource quality indicate that the value of MRC has quite a strong
effect: cooperation decreases as the value of MRC increases. An alternative way of
viewing this result is that male-male interactions become more similar to
expectations as MRC increases.
These experiments indicate that male-male strategies are affected by the
presence of females with higher reproductive costs. Most strikingly, males are more
cooperative than would be expected. None the less, full cooperation (as opposed to
weak-cooperation) is rare and there still seems to be considerable competition
between males for points. This competition increases as the value ofMRC increases.
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Figure 5.4: Male-male interactions
Female reproductive cost is held constant FRC = 1000 and male reproductive cost (MRC) is
varied. Expected values are derived from experiments where male and female reproductive
costs are equal. The results are shown for the three different resource types: poor, medium
and high quality .
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Mixed-Sex interactions
In the first experiments, described in chapter 2, it was found that mixed-sex
interactions are rather more complex than single sex interactions and that a range of
strategies is possible depending on the cost of reproduction for each sex. It is not
surprising therefore, that the same is true here (figure 5.5). The results are illustrated
as a series of pie charts which summarise the range of strategies that evolve
according to resource quality and gender.
In chapter 2 it was shown that when FRC = 1000 and MRC = 100 non-
reciprocal altruism can evolve. Non-reciprocal altruism describes situations in which
males always cooperate with females but females only occasionally cooperate in
return. The outcome of non-reciprocal altruism is low pay-offs to the males and high
pay-offs to the females. Exactly the same results were observed in this experiment
(fig. 5.5a). That is, regardless of resource quality, non-reciprocal altruism evolves
when MRC = 100 and PRC = 1000. For instance, when resource quality is poor
females score more than 3.00 points, and are classified as 'exploiters' in more than
half of the runs. Males, on the other hand, gain very low scores, i.e. in the range of
'suckers' and 'defectors". This pattern of very high female scores and very low male
scores is a clear indication of non-reciprocal altruism by the males. Although non-
reciprocal altruism evolves no matter what the resource quality, it is most likely
when resource quality is low.
Non-reciprocal altruism also evolves when MRC = 200 (fig. 5.5b), albeit a
diluted version. Although females gain pay-offs greater than 3.00 in only a small
number of cases, the overall pay-offs are markedly biased in favour of females. This
result is surprising, as the basic model (chapter 2) predicts male-female competition
when MRC is 20% of FRC. Resource quality has an effect on pay-offs for both
males and females. As resource quality increases females suffer lower pay-offs while
male scores increase. This is most clearly the case when the results for the high
quality experiments are compared with those for either the low or medium quality
experiments. None the less, even when resource quality is high females still gain
more points than males.
2 In this instance, the term 'defector' is misleading, since the low scores are a resultof cooperation
rather than defection.
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a) MRC =100
FRC =1000
MALES
Resource Quality
Poor Medium High
FEMALES
b) RC =200
FRC = 1000
MALES
FEMALES
Poor Medium High
Dsuckers
weak cooperators
Ddefectors
cooperators
weak defectors
_exploiters
Figure 5.5: Mixed sex interactions, FRC = 1000
Each pie chart summarises the strategies that evolve in each set of 30 experiments.
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c) MRC =400
FRC =1000
MALES
Poor
Resource Quality
Medium High
FEMALES
d) RC = 600
FRC = 1000
MALES
Poor Medium High
FEMALES
Dsuckers
weak cooperators
Ddefectors
cooperators
weak defectors
_exploiters
Figure 5.5: Mixed sex interactions, FRC = 1000 (continued)
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When MRC = 400 (fig. 5.5c) and MRC = 600 (fig. 5.5d) there is a distinct
shift in strategies. There is absolutely no evidence of non-reciprocal altruism: male
scores are, on average, very similar to female scores. Overall, interactions are more
competitive than at low values of MRC. Resource quality also has a strong effect on
strategy, which is most clearly demonstrated when MRC = 600 (fig. 5.5d). When
resource quality is poor, cooperation or weak cooperation usually evolves. However,
when resource quality is medium or high, weak cooperation and weak defection are
the most common strategies.
In order to double-check these results the experiments were repeated at FRC
= 2000. The results, shown in figure 5.6 parallel those for FRC = 1000. When MRC
= 100 (fig 5.6a), there is extremely strong selection for non-reciprocal altruism no
matter what the resource quality. Equally, when MRC = 200 (fig. 5.6 b), there is
selection for non-reciprocal altruism in all the experiments. Here selection for non-
reciprocal altruism is particularly strong when resource quality is low, and evolves in
more than 750/0 of runs. When FRC = 2000 and MRC = 400 (fig 5.6 c) the scores are
skewed favourably towards females. This is similar to the dilute form of non-
reciprocal altruism observed when FRC = 1000 and MRC = 200 (fig. 5.5 b). Fig.
5.6d shows that when MRC = 800, the advantage to females has vanished. Males and
females score an equal number of points, and interactions are notably competitive,
particularly when resources are of high quality. The similarities between these
results, and those when FRC = 1000, indicate once more that it is the relative
energetic costs of reproduction between males and females, rather than the absolute
values for either, that determines which strategies evolve. When male costs are
relatively high (in comparison to females), and when resource quality is high,
interactions are competitive. On the other hand, relatively low male costs and low
resource quality serve to increase the amount of cooperation between the sexes.
When male energetic costs are very low relative to female energetic costs, non-
reciprocal altruism evolves.
In sum: when male reproductive costs are 20% or less than female
reproductive costs, non-reciprocal altruism evolves, regardless of resource quality.
When male reproductive costs are greater than 200/0 of female reproductive costs,
mixed-sex interactions are considerably more competitive. When this is the case,
resource quality has quite a strong effect on strategy choice: strategies become less
cooperative as resource quality increases.
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a) MRC =100
FRC = 2000
Poor
Resource Quality
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b) RC = 200
FRC = 2000
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FEMALES
Dsuckers
weak cooperators
Ddefectors
cooperators
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_exploiters
Figure 5.6: Mixed sex interactions, FRC = 2000
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c) MRC =400
FRC = 2000
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d) RC =800
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weak cooperators
Ddefectors
cooperators
weak defectors
_exploiters
Figure 5.6: Mixed sex interactions, FRC = 2000 (continued)
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5.3.3 Discussion
The first experiment in this section (5.3. 1) looked at the effect of resource
quality on cooperative strategies in the absence of sex differences in energetic costs.
The principal finding was that cooperation is most likely when resource quality is
low, and least likely when resource quality is high. This finding is not significantly
altered when sex differences in energetic costs are added to the model (section 5.3.2).
Cooperation decreases as resource quality increases in both male-male and female-
female interactions. This is also true of mixed sex interactions, except when MRC is
very low. In this case non-reciprocal altruism evolves: scores are biased in favour of
females and resource quality has a relatively minor effect on strategy choice.
Sex differences in energetic costs had little effect on female-female strategies.
Female cooperation appears to be more dependent on resource quality than any other
feature of the model. Surprisingly, males were more cooperative with each other than
would be expected. This may be because males generally score so poorly in the
mixed sex interactions (especially at very low values of :MRC). However, overall
levels of male-male cooperation are still fairly low. Mixed sex interactions are
characterised by non-reciprocal altruism when male energetic costs are less than 20%
of female energetic costs. Otherwise, male-female interactions are quite competitive
although cooperation is more likely the higher the value of:MRC and the lower the
resource quality. Overall, these results mirror those found in chapters 2 and 3 for the
more basic model. This is probably due to the close and inverse relationship between
the energetic cost of reproduction and resource quality (see fig. 5.2). In effect,
increasing resource quality decreases the energetic cost of reproduction. Therefore,
all the conclusions reached in chapters 2 and 3 regarding the effect of energetic costs
of reproduction on strategy choice also hold true for resource quality.
A single, simple conclusion can be drawn from these two experiments: the
likelihood of cooperation increases as resource quality decreases. Or inversely, the
likelihood of defection increases as resource quality increases. This result is robust
whether or not sex differences in energetic costs are considered. Hauser and Schuster
(1997) have also found that in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the likelihood of defection
increases as the pay-off for defection increases. In human terms, this result makes a
lot of sense. Most of are more willing to lend an acquaintance £5.00 or buy her a
drink, than we are to lend her £100.00 or to buy her a three-course meal. The higher
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the value of the altruistic act, the greater the importance of factors such as past
relationships with that person, and expectations of future reciprocation. The key
element here may be relative risk. When resource quality is low the difference
between the highest and lowest scores is 5 points, but when resource quality is high
this difference increases to 15 points. That is, the potential benefits of defection and
costs of cooperation increase as resource quality increases.
In wild populations cooperation would be expected to be greatest when the
value of the contested resource is lowest. Recent research on the African mole rats
lends support to this prediction (Faulkes et al. 1997). There is considerable inter-
specific variation in cooperation among African mole rats. The least cooperative
species are solitary, while the most cooperative are communal breeders in which the
whole group assists in offspring care. Faulkes et al. (1997) used the comparative
method to examine the relationship between cooperation and habitat quality and
found that the most social species lived in habitats in which mean annual rainfall (a
proxy for habitat quality) was lowest. Faulkes et al. suggest that cooperation is
particularly important when habitat quality is low, because of the increased energetic
costs of locating resources.
Among primates, the resource-quality hypothesis requires formal testing
under controlled conditions. On a broad level it is possible to make some predictions.
Leaves, which contain indigestible items such as cellulose and ligin, are the least
nutritious and thus lowest quality food on which primates feed (Dunbar 1988).
Fruits, especially when ripe, are a rich source of energy. The richest energy source,
and thus highest quality foods, are insects and meat. Therefore, cooperation is
expected to be most common when folivorous resources are involved, less frequent
when frugivorous resources are involved and least frequent when meat based
resources are involved. This prediction is particularly hard to test since there are
sharp contrasts in the distributions of these different resource types. As discussed in
the introduction, folivory is associated with an egalitarian social system in which
competition for resources is low (van Hooff and van Schaik 1992). This may be
because of low diet quality, but it is also likely that the even distribution of leafy
resources makes competition pointless. Resources such as fruit, which tend to be
located in large, defendable clumps, can support larger groups and thus pre-select for
greater food-related competition.
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Mitchell et al. (1991) found that food-related aggression was 70 times more
common in a Peruvian group of squirrel monkeys, compared to a Costa Rican group.
The Peruvian group was also strongly female-bonded, unlike the Costa Rican group.
The main ecological difference between the two groups was the size and quality of
the fruiting trees. In Peru, trees tend to be large and bear large amounts of fruit and
an average of 17 animals at a time would occupy a single tree. In Costa Rica trees are
small and bear few fruits each, and groups of only 3-5 animals would cluster on each
tree. Van Hooff and van Schaik (1992) suggest that Mitchell et al. 's study supports
the resource-distribution hypothesis: increased competition and the formation of
cooperative alliances in the Peruvian group occurs because of the presence of large
patches of defendable resources. Yet, it is also possible that competition increased as
a response to the presence of valuable, higher quality, resources. This study
illustrates two difficulties in testing these models. Firstly, it is very difficult to
dissociate resource distribution and resource quality effects. Secondly, when
competition increases primates will often respond by forming alliances. Thus,
increased cooperation is expected in the same context as increased competition.
Very few studies have examined the effect of resource quality on cooperative
behaviours in the absence of other confounding variables. De Waal (1996 p.140)
reports that while chimpanzees are willing to share leafy foods, they are "hopeless"
at sharing favoured plant foods such as bananas. In fact, de Waal reports that
competition over bananas is so intense that individuals sometimes become violent
(however, see the discussion below for exceptions to this). In another study de Waal
(1997) examined food-sharing behaviour in capuchin monkeys with respect to two
different foods, apple and cucumber. Apple was found to be the preferred food for
twelve of the thirteen subjects. Therefore, food sharing ought to be greater for
cucumber than apple. Contrary to this prediction, de Waal found that the rate of food
transfer between individuals was greatest when apple was the food item. However,
this result may be due to the consistency of the food rather than its quality or
desirability. De Waal concludes (1997 p.376):
"The higher rate of food transfer when possessors had apple compared
with cucumber was most likely due to the fact that apple crumbles easily
when eaten or manipulated, whereas cucumber does not. As a result,
many more fragments of apple were laying around by the end of a test
than fragments of cucumber, which resulted in more reach-throughs by
the partner to collect scraps."
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Another study on captive brown capuchin monkeys, by Verbeek and de
Waal (1997), examined the effect of food quality on post-conflict behaviour. They
found that reconciliations were more frequent following social disputes in the
presence of low quality foods. Reconciliations were less common following
aggressive disputes over highly attractive food items. This result appears to support
the prediction that competition is greater, and cooperation (reconciliation) is lower,
when higher quality resources are in dispute. In contrast, in chimpanzees reassuring
behaviours such as embraces and kisses, are particularly common in the presence of
attractive food. Chimpanzees appear to use appeasement gestures to dampen
competition for desirable food items. De Waal (1989b) found that aggressive
competition for food increased in chimpanzees when they were unable to perform
their usual appeasement behaviours.
Across primate species animal products appear to be more widely shared than
any other food. Both capuchin monkeys (Perry and Rose 1994) and chimpanzees
(Boesch and Boesch 1989) share meat more readily than any other food item. In both
cases meat sharing is most prominent among adults (Rose 1997). This observation is
difficult to square with the prediction that cooperation should be lowest when high
quality food items, such as meat, are involved. However, in both capuchins and
chimpanzees meat sharing may be better described as ''tolerated theft" (Blurton-
Jones 1987) than true altruism. When an individual allows another to take a portion
of food because the costs and practicalities of defending it are too great, it is
described as tolerated theft. For example, capuchin monkeys occasionally capture
coati pups, which are quite large and are eaten alive (Perry and Rose 1994). The
screams of the coati attract the attention of other groups members who beg for a
portion of the meat. The sharing of meat by capuchin monkeys may simply be
unavoidable under these circumstances.
In contrast to capuchins, hunting In chimpanzees often involves many
individuals. The extent to which such group hunting is really cooperative appears to
vary between chimpanzee populations. Busse (1978) argues that Gombe
chimpanzees do not hunt cooperatively. Busse found that hunting success was not
improved by hunting in groups, and that 'group' hunting was probably due to many
individuals simultaneously attempting to catch the same animal. In this case meat
sharing that occurred after capture was more akin to tolerated theft. However, in
other populations group hunting and food-sharing does appear to be cooperative. Tal
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chimpanzees appear to coordinate their hunting efforts, in the sense that different
individuals take on different but complementary roles in the group hunt (Boesch and
Boesch 1989). Meat is shared among the hunters, while males that were uninvolved
in the kill receive little if anything. Females also receive a share and hunting is most
frequent when females are in estrous (Stanford et al. 1994). This suggests that males
are sharing their food with females, in the hope of gaining mating opportunities.
Tutin (1979) found that males who shared meat were preferred as sexual partners and
it is possible that access to meat improves female reproductive success (McGrew
1992). But, a firm link between male hunting success and male mating success is yet
to be demonstrated. None the less, these observations indicate that meat sharing in
Tal chimpanzees may be one aspect of a wider range of reciprocal, cooperative
strategies.
Food-sharing in non-human primates is most common between adults and
infants. In captive capuchins adults allow infants to take food, although in the wild
food sharing, especially of plant foods, is reported to be uncommon (Fragaszy and
Barb 1997). Sharing of plant foods mainly occurs between adults and infants in
chimpanzees although McGrew (1992) reports occasional sharing by adults males
with females. As noted earlier, bananas, a highly valued food source, often provoke
aggressive competition in chimpanzees. However at Gombe provisioned bananas are
frequently shared between mothers and offspring (Rose 1997). Nishida and Turner
(1996) found that in the Mahale mountains infants succeeded in their attempts to
procure food from their mothers on 65% of occasions. Interestingly, the greatest
success rate occurred when infants solicited items that were difficult for them to
obtain themselves. Fragaszy and Barb (1997) suggest that food sharing is particularly
important for weanling chimpanzees, which depend upon the same food items as
adults, but are inexperienced foragers and dentally immature. They note that
maternal sharing of food items is particularly common during the nursing period and
the first year after weaning.
Adult cotton-top tamarins actively share food with infants, and allow infants
to take food from them (Feistner and Price 1990). The sharers include the mother, the
father and older siblings. Feistner and Price found that begging success increased
when a highly preferred food was involved in the transaction. In fact, in callitrichids
in general, food-sharing increases when preferred food items are involved (Feistner
,
and Chamove 1986; Feistner and Price 1990). This result defies expectations, since
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we would expect food-sharing to decrease when food quality is increased. Obviously,
in this context food-sharing yields inclusive fitness benefits to the sharers. However,
if the benefits of food-sharing are simply measured in terms of kin-selection then we
would expect it to be a common behaviour. In fact, across primate species food-
sharing is extremely rare, even between mothers and offspring. Why then is food-
sharing so prevalent in callitrichids? The nature of the shared food, often live prey,
may be the key to understanding this behaviour. Live prey are the most frequently
transferred food items in buffy-headed marmosets (Ferrari 1987), tassel-eared
marmosets (Feistner and Price 1990), cotton-top tamarins (Feistner and Price 1990)
and black-mantled tamarins (Izawa 1978). Feistner and Price (1990 p.43) comment
on the great importance of food-sharing to callitrichid infants:
''Prey capture requires skill, and weanlings in need of protein and fat
(which will be provided only in steadily decreasing amounts by their
mother's milk) are unable to capture large insects and small vertebrates.
Thus, their only means of acquiring food is from others."
The crucial factor here is that weanlings are unable to forage for themselves due to
the nature of the food resource. Sharing of food items such as fruit is of less
importance since these are easily acquired. Significantly, the only other non-primate
mammals which practice extensive food sharing are the social carnivores
(Macdonald and Moehlman 1982). The link between an animal-based diet and
cooperation is clearly demonstrated in brown hyenas.
Brown hyenas live in clans of several adult females, a dominant male, and
several subordinate males, adolescents and infants. Emigration and immigration by
both sexes means that not all clan members are related. All infants older than 3
months are raised in a communal den (Owens and Owens 1979, 1984). Owens and
Owens describe female cooperation as the glue that holds the clan together, and all
females participate in offspring care, regardless of rank or kinship. Lactating females
suckle all cubs, regardless of whether they are their own, and all clan females bring
food to the communal den, feeding pups indiscriminatingly. As in many primate
species, the social life of the hyena is of paramount importance. Strong bonds
develop between group members and protracted greeting and appeasement displays
maintain group harmony. It is the hyena's dependence upon meat that appears to
make cooperation a vital part of their reproductive strategy. Meat is an elusive
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resource, and scavenger hunts may take females more than 30 kilometres away from
the den. Furthermore, it takes a long time to become an effective hunter or scavenger,
which means that weanlings are unable to acquire food for themselves and are reliant
on adults for up to two years (Owens and Owens 1979, 1984). Without communal
provisioning, few hyena pups would survive.
Thiollay (1991) uses a similar line of reasoning to explain communal living
In the red-throated Caracara, Daptrius americanus. These raptors share food,
cooperate in group mobbing of predators and guard the communal nest as a group.
These birds are primarily insectivorous (rather than carnivorous) feeding mostly on
insect nests. This is a scarce resource and considerable experience is required to
become a proficient hunter. Adults help young birds find their own food by
signalling prey locations, partial food sharing and allofeeding. A similar teaching
process occurs in blackbacked jackals, in which helpers teach young pups to hunt
(Moehlman 1979).
Observations of social carnivores suggest, therefore, that communal care has
evolved because of the necessities of provisioning inexperienced weanlings.
Alternatively, Riedman (1982) suggests that it is the necessities of group hunting or
foraging that select for communal rearing. Many communal breeders are cooperative
foragers or hunters, for example mongooses, lions, hyenas, coyotes, jackals, African
wild dogs and wolves. Bednarz and Ligon (1988) believe that the necessities of
cooperative hunting have determined social structure in Harris' hawk. These hawks
live in social units of up to six birds (Bednarz, 1988) . They rely on highly co-
ordinated attacks such as 'the surprise pounce' and 'relay attack' to capture their
prey. Typically four birds will participate in the attack, and once caught the prey is
divided between the members of the group. Most of the adult birds participate in
rearing the young, regardless of relatedness and Bednarz and Ligon believe that this
cooperation is an outcome of group hunting. The group members benefit through
cooperative hunting of large and potentially dangerous prey, such as jackrabbits
which may be three times heavier than a male hawk. Bednarz and Ligon emphasise
the influence of group hunting, rather than offspring care, in shaping social structure.
However, they also comment on the importance of cooperation to young hawks who
have yet to become experienced hunters. In fact, the young are allowed first access to
carcasses.
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While most team hunters are social breeders, not all social breeders are team
hunters. For instance the highly cooperative brown hyena, described above, is a
solitary hunter. In fact, group hunting is often no more profitable individually than
solitary hunting, and it is likely that in most cases co-ordinated hunting is a
consequence, not a cause of communal living (Macdonald, 1983; Packer and Ruttan
1988). Most predators are also scavengers, and scavenging from con-specifics is
common (Packer and Ruttan 1988). Letting other individuals take the risks of
hunting is clearly an attractive strategy and potential for cheating is high. In
conclusion, it seems most likely that communal living evolved firstly as a response to
the needs ofweanlings in species in which skill and experience is required in order to
capture food. Communal care may help to establish the ground rules of cooperation
that some species have then harnessed for the purposes of hunting.
In summary: This discussion has focused on the prediction that cooperation is
least likely when resource quality is high, and most likely when resource quality is
low. Little support has been found for this hypothesis. Fruits may provoke greater
competition than folivorous resources due to their high energetic value. However,
because the distributions of frugivorous and folivorous resources are so different it is
not possible to determine whether this result is due to the quality of the foods
involved, or their spatial distribution. Animal resources, which are of high energetic
value, are predicted to be less widely shared than other foods. This expectation is
contradicted by the available evidence which suggests that animal and insect prey are
more widely shared than any other resource. However, the sharing of animal prey
appears to be a special case for one very important reason: weanlings are unable to
forage for these food items themselves. Infants simply would not survive to an age in
which they have the necessary skills to hunt for themselves, without provisioning
from older individuals. Finally, food sharing almost always occurs in the context of
other cooperative behaviours such as group hunting and communal care of offspring
(e.g. defence of the den in brown hyenas, infant carrying in callitrichids). The
necessity of providing food for inexperienced young provides an environment in
which other types of cooperative behaviours can develop.
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5.4 Cooperation in a Seasonal Environment
The models developed in the previous section suggest that the quality of the
resource under dispute affects the types of cooperative strategies that individuals
employ. Cooperation is less likely the higher the quality of the resource. In a
seasonal environment resource quality fluctuates in a fairly regular manner.
Therefore, we might expect individuals to be most cooperative during the poorest
months and least cooperative during the richest months. This hypothesis will be
tested in the following models. The first, in section 5.4.1, looks at the effect of
seasonality on cooperation when male and female reproductive costs are equal. The
second, in section 5.4.2, develops this model by looking at how sex differences in
reproductive costs effect the results. The basic format of these simulations is exactly
the same as in the first two experiments (see section 5.2). However, instead of having
the same resource quality throughout each simulation, resource quality was
programmed to fluctuate over a 12 month cycle in the following way:
Months 1-3: Poor quality
Months 4-5: Medium quality
Months 6-8: High quality
Month 9: Medium quality
Months 10-12: Poor quality
When the 12 month cycle is complete, it begins again at month 1. When a new
generation begins, the cycle starts again from month 1. For each month, the
appropriate pay-off matrix is used to reflect resource quality (see figure 5.1).
The average pay-offs were calculated each month, and these pay-offs were
then combined to provide three average scores: one each for poor, medium and high
resource qualities. For example, over 20,000, generations the average score was
calculated for months 1, 2, 3, 10, 11 and 12 to provide an average score when
resource quality is poor. Note that only those scores for the first 12 months of each
generation were taken into consideration when the average scores were calculated,
even though some generations lasted considerably longer than this. Simulation
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lengths vary depending on the magnitude of the reproductive costs, and the strategy
used. Also, generation times vary within a simulation. If, for instance, agents are
very uncooperative at the start of the experiment then generations take many months
to complete (let's say, for example, that they take 20 months). If agents become more
cooperative, generation times will be considerably shorter (let's say they take 10
months). This means that the average scores for the later months (in this example
months 11-20) will only reflect those generations in which individuals were
uncooperative. By only taking into account the first 12 months of each generation,
this problem is avoided. This is an acceptable solution, since if individuals are being
uncooperative, this will be apparent within the first 12 months of the simulation.
5.4.1 Equal male and female reproductive costs
In these runs male reproductive cost is equal to female reproductive cost. The
experiment was run 30 times using each of the following reproductive costs: ~C =
FRC = 1000, 2000 and 3000. For each set of experiments the average scores were
calculated for poor, medium and high quality months. These scores were then
translated into strategies using table 5.1. Actual results were compared to expected
results. Expected results were drawn from the first experiment, in which resource
quality was stable over the whole simulation. For instance, during those months in
which resource quality is poor, the same amount of cooperation is expected as
occurred when resource quality was poor over the whole simulation for the same
reproductive cost (see section 5.3.1). Although the results were analysed for each
interaction type (male-male, female-female, male-female), because males and
females have identical reproductive costs the results for each type are very similar.
To avoid repetition only the results for male-male interactions are discussed here.
Figure 5.7 compares expected and observed results. We would expect that:
(1) cooperation will be more likely at higher reproductive costs (RC); and (2)
cooperation will be greatest when resource quality is poor, and least when resource
quality is high. The first prediction is upheld. Cooperative strategies evolve at the
greatest frequency when RC = 3000, and the lowest frequency when RC = 1000.
However, in the seasonal model resource quality does not have the expected effect
whatever the value of RC. While there is a slight tendency for agents to be less
cooperative when resource quality is high, overall strategies are very similar whether
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5.7 Expected versus observed strategies in the seasonal model (MRC = FRC)
Figures show the range of expected and observed strategies at different reproductive costs
(Re).
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Figure 5.8: Cooperation in a seasonal environment (MRC = FRC)
Figures compare the expected percentage of runs in which cooperation evolves, with the
actual percentage of runs in which cooperation evolves. Cooperation is much lower than
expected in each case.
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resource quality is poor, medium or high. Moreover, strategies are less cooperative
than expected and full cooperation is very unusual. Figure 5.8 compares the
expected and observed frequencies of experiments in which full cooperation evolved.
In all cases, agents are very uncooperative in comparison to expectations. For
instance, when reproductive cost (RC) is 1000 (fig. 5.8a), cooperation is expected
when resource quality is poor in at least 25% of runs, but in fact cooperation never
evolves. When RC = 2000 (fig 5.8b) high levels of cooperation are expected for all
resource qualities but in fact cooperation is minimal. For instance, when resource
quality is poor cooperation would be expected in 65% of experiments, but in
practice cooperation never evolves. Only at RC = 3000 (fig 5.8 c) does cooperation
really appear, and then at much lower levels than expected: cooperation occurs in
less than 20% of runs, regardless of resource quality.
These results indicate that in a seasonal environment, in which resource
quality varies, cooperation is much harder to establish than in a non-seasonal
environment in which resource quality is stable. Interestingly, the observed amount
of cooperation is very similar when resource quality is low, medium or high.
Moreover, the observed level of cooperation is most similar to the expected level of
cooperation when resource quality is high. For instance, when MRC= FRC= 3000
(fig. 5.7c) the expected amount of cooperation when resource quality is high is
around 20%. In the seasonal model, cooperation evolves in between 15 - 20% of
experiments, no matter what the environment quality. The likelihood of cooperation
in the months when resource quality is high appears to determine the likelihood of
cooperation in all the other months. In other words, strategy choice when resource
quality is high appears to determine strategy choice in all other situations.
Let us assume that individuals can choose one of four strategies (cooperation,
weak cooperation, weak defection and defection) for each resource quality (poor,
medium, high) over the course of a 12 monthly cycle. This means that there are
many different possible 'compound strategies'. For instance, players could cooperate
during the 'poor' part of the cycle, weakly cooperate over the' medium' part, and
defect over the 'high' part. Alternatively, they could defect during poor, medium and
high phases. Or they could cooperate over the poor phase and defect over the other
two phases of the cycle, and so on. In total there are 64 different compound
strategies that players could use. However, only a very small sub-set of these are
actually used. Table 5.2 shows the compound strategies that evolved when
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reproductive cost was 3000. Only 9 out of the possible 64 compound strategies ever
evolved. The most common compound strategy, which evolved in 37% of
experiments, was to weakly cooperate over all resource qualities. The next most
common strategy, which evolved in 13% of experiments, was to weakly defect over
all resource qualities. Full cooperation over all resource qualities evolved in 7% of
experiments. In other words, in more than half of the experiments, the same strategy
evolved for each resource quality. Mixed compound strategies only ever involved
two different strategy types, for instance cooperation and weak cooperation. These
results support the proposition, made above, that strategy choice during periods of
high quality resources determines strategy choice during other parts of the cycle.
This results in very similar strategies for each resource quality. Most of these
strategies involve a combination of weak defection and weak cooperation. Full
cooperation only features in 20% of the compound strategies (see table 5.2).
Resource Quality Percentage of
Low Medium High experiments
Weak cooperation Weak cooperation Weak cooperation 37
Weak defection Weak defection Weak defection 17
Weak cooperation Weak defection Weak defection 13
Weak defection Weak cooperation Weak cooperation 10
Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation 7
Weak cooperation Cooperation Cooperation 7
Cooperation Weak cooperation Weak cooperation 3
Weak cooperation Cooperation Weak cooperation 3
Weak cooperation Weak cooperation Weak defection 3
Table 5.2: Compound strategies used in a seasonal environment
Out of 64 possible compound strategies, only these nine evolved. The table shows
the percentage of experiments in which each type of compound strategy evolved. For
definitions of strategy types (i.e. 'weak cooperation', 'weak defection' etc.) see table
5.1.
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Why should strategy choice during high quality periods have such a strong
effect on strategy choice at other times? The answer lies in the high temptation to
defect during periods when resource quality is high. As shown in section 5.3.1,
cooperation is least likely when resource quality is high. Therefore, even if two
players have cooperated when resource quality is low and medium, there is a good
chance that they will defect when resources switch to high quality. However, strategy
choice at any time depends not only on resource quality, but also on the history of
interactions between two players. If an agent defects during periods of high quality
resources, its opponent will remember that defection and will respond accordingly in
the following months. If the players are using any kind of TIT-FOR-TAT strategy,
the occasional defection during the periods of high pay-offs will result in
recriminating defections in the months that follow. This means that strategy choice,
and the likelihood of defection when pay-offs are high, sets the tempo for the rest of
the simulation.
In summary, variability in resource quality dramatically lowers the likelihood
that cooperation will evolve, even at very high reproductive costs. Big temptations to
defect when resource quality is high makes cooperation very difficult to establish.
The result of this is that strategies are very similar in poor, medium and high quality
situations. Most commonly, strategies involve weak defection and weak cooperation.
5.4.2 Male reproductive costs lower than female reproductive costs
The previous experiment was repeated, except in this case female
reproductive cost was kept stable at FRC = 1000, while male reproductive cost was
varied. As before, resource quality fluctuated in a 12-monthly cycle. Average pay-
offs were calculated for poor, medium and high quality months (see beginning of this
section). Expected pay-offs were derived from experiment 2 (section 5.3.2), in which
there were also sex differences in reproductive costs but resource quality was held
constant. For example, the pay-offs for male-male interactions at~C = 100 during
the poor months of the seasonal model are predicted to be identical to the pay-offs at
MRC = 100 when resource quality was poor all year round. Results will be analysed
by interaction type.
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Femate-remate interactions
The results for female-female interactions are very similar to expectations
(fig. 5.9). The value of MRC has very little effect on the outcomes, females employ
very similar strategies whatever the value of MRC. Seasonality in resource quality
has the expected effect on outcomes. That is, females are most cooperative during
poor quality months, and least cooperative during high quality months. In the
previous experiment it was found that a high temptation to defect when resource
quality is high causes low levels of cooperation throughout the whole cycle. This
does not seem to occur here, although full cooperation almost never evolves.
Male-male interactions
Male-male interactions do not differ greatly from expectations (fig. 5.10). As
with female-female interactions, the likelihood of cooperation depends on resource
quality. Males are most cooperative during the low quality months of the cycle.
However, full cooperation is unusual.
Mixed sex interactions
The results for mixed sex interactions are quite dramatically different from
expectations (fig. 5.11). Resource quality, as well as male and female reproductive
costs, have a marked effect on the outcomes.
When MRC = 100 (fig. 5.11a) non-reciprocal altruism is expected no matter
what the resource quality, and the likelihood of males being non-reciprocal altruists
is expected to diminish as resource quality increases. The observed results are
absolutely opposite to these expectations. This is most clearly demonstrated by the
pattern of pay-off to females (pay particular attention to the black bars which indicate
very high pay-offs). When resource quality is poor non-reciprocal altruism evolves in
about 30% of experiments, less than expected. Males, on the other hand, receive
more points than expected. As resource quality increases, non-reciprocal altruism
becomes more and more likely: when pay-offs are highest, males are non-reciprocal
altruists in all but one experiment. Note the very low pay-offs to the male and very
high pay-offs to the female when resource quality is high.
These results are repeated for MRC = 200 (fig. 5.11b). When resource quality
is low, males and females score similar numbers of points. In comparison with
expectations, females score less highly than expected while males score more highly
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Figure 5.9: Female-female interactions in a seasonal habitat FRC = 1000
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Figure 5.10: Male-male interactions in a seasonal habitat FRC = 1000
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Figure 5.11 (a): Mixed sex interactions in a seasonal habitat, FRC = 1000,
MRC= 100
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Figure 5.11 (b): Mixed sex interactions in a seasonal habitat, FRC = 1000,
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Figure 5.11 (c): Mixed sex interactions in a seasonal habitat, FRC = 1000,
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Figure 5.11 (d): Mixed sex interactions in a seasonal habitat, FRC = 1000,
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than expected. As resource quality increases, female scores increase while male
scores decrease. Quite remarkably, when resource quality is high males are non-
reciprocal altruists in 90% of experiments.
When MRC = 400 (fig. 5.llc), results are much closer to expectations,
although the same trends emerge: males tend to do better than expected when
resource quality is low, while females get higher pay-offs when resource quality is
high. Finally, when MRC = 600 (fig. 5.lld), the observed results are very similar to
expectations.
The most interesting result that emerges from this experiment is that seasonal
fluctuations in resource quality can have a profound effect on the pattern of male-
female interactions. When male reproductive costs are low females cooperate with
males during the poor quality months. In return, males are extremely cooperative
with females during the high quality months. Males appear to help females during
those times when they will benefit the most. This result is extremely robust. Figure
5.12 plots the results of the first six simulations performed when MRC = 200 and
FRC = 1000. The simulations are extremely similar'. During those months in when
resource quality is low, males and females obtain very similar scores. As resource
quality increases the scores diverge, so that in the months when resource quality is
highest (months 6-8) females obtain vastly greater scores than males.
It is possible that the observed strategies are a result of the simulation design.
A reproductive cost of say, 200 points is very low. Even if all individuals defect,
males will acquire this number of points by the end of month 4. Therefore, the
number of points scored after this time may be irrelevant. This means that the
strongest selection pressures on males are at the start of the yearly cycle, when
resource quality is low. For males, scoring as many points as possible, and as soon as
possible, during this initial period is of prime importance. Selection pressures on
females are strong throughout the simulation, especially during the high season when
potential pay-offs are greatest. The high incidence of non-reciprocal altruism when
resource quality is high may be the result of the high temptation for females to defect
at this time, rather than any genuine altruism on the part of the male. In short, if all
males have to do is gain 200 points, then there is no real cost to being a non-
3 Note that the other 24 simulations done for MRC = 200 were also very similar.
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reciprocal altruist when resource quality is high. However, as we shall see, this
argument is incorrect.
In chapter 3 (section 3.4) it was shown that when male reproductive costs are
less than female reproductive costs there is more variation in male reproductive
success than female reproductive success: the most successful males sired 5 offspring
in a generation while the most successful females sired just 3 offspring. It was argued
that it is not enough for a male to acquire enough points to reproduce just once.
Successful males will be those that acquire enough points to sire many offspring. The
same is true here. The model is designed in such a way that during reproduction,
pairs of males and females are chosen at random from all those males and females
that have enough points. After reproduction, the cost of reproduction is deducted
from each agent's score. If they still have enough points to reproduce they are
returned to the population of "fertile" agents. Every month pairs are chosen at
random to reproduce until either the number of fertile males or fertile females is zero
(see section 5.2). This means that at MRC = 200, a male with 600 points could
produce 3 offspring in a single month (if there are enough fertile females available).
In other words, even though the cost of reproduction for males may be low, it is still
an advantage to acquire as many points as possible.
The key to the high level of non-reciprocal altruism in the high season (when
resource quality is greatest) may lie in the high levels of cooperation between males
and females in the low season (when resource quality is lowest). Let us consider a
population which contains two types of males: cooperators and defectors.
Cooperators cooperate with females when resource quality is low and, assuming that
this cooperation is reciprocated, score highly. Defectors defect at all times and,
assuming that females defect in return, receive comparatively low scores. At the end
of the low season, the cooperative male will have acquired many more points than
the defector. However, the cooperator can only take advantage of his high point
scoring if there are fertile females available. This means that it is in the cooperator's
interest for females to be fertile as soon as possible. The best way to do this is to be a
non-reciprocal altruist when resource quality is high. From the female's point of
view cooperating with males when resource quality is low is an excellent strategy,
since this provides an incentive for males to be non-reciprocal altruists when
resource quality is high.
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I am arguing t?at non-reciprocal altruism can be a good strategy for both
sexes. Female cooperation with males in the low season provides males with enough
points to produce several offspring, while male non-reciprocal altruism in the high
season allows females to reproduce sooner. This appears to be a very robust strategy
at low values of MRC (figure 5.12). But, at what value of MRC should males stop
being non-reciprocal altruists? In order to answer this question a few simplifying
assumptions need to be made:
1) During periods of low and medium quality resources males and females cooperate.
Both males and females score 3.0 points per game in low quality months, and 6.0
points per game in medium quality months.
2) During periods of high quality resources males are non-reciprocal altruists.
Therefore, in high quality months males score 4.5 points per games, females score
12.0 points per game.
3) Females always play weak-cooperation against each other, scoring 2.0, 4.0 and 6.0
points per game in poor, medium and high quality months respectively.
4) Males always defect against each other, scoring 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0 points per game
in poor, medium and high quality months respectively.
5) There are 25 males and 25 females in the population.
On the basis of these assumptions, it is possible to calculate the cumulative
score for each sex each month. These are shown in table 5.3. The crucial factor is
that females would be expected to obtain enough points to reproduce (1000) at the
end of month 6. At this point, if males are non-reciprocal altruists, they will have
gained 878 points. If MRC = 200, males already have enough points to reproduce 4
times. But, if MRC = 400, males can only reproduce twice. Worse still, at MRC =
600 males can only afford to reproduce once. Assuming that successful males will be
those that can reproduce many times over, non-reciprocal altruism is a risky strategy
at values ofMRC greater than 400.
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Figure 5.12: Variation in male and female average scores when FRC = 1000 and
MRC = 200
The graphs plot average scores per player per game over 6 typical simulations. Each
graph tells a very similar story: During months 1-3, when resource quality is low, males
and females score similar numbers of points. During months 4, 5 and 9 resource quality is
medium, and during months 6-8 resource quality is high. During periods of high quality
resources females always gain substantially higher scores than males.
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Month Female score Male score
(quality)
1 (low) 48 (FF) + 75 (MF) = 123 24 (MM) + 75 (MF) =99
2 (low) 123 + 48 (FF) + 75 (MF) =246 99 + 24 (FF) + 75 (MF) = 198
3 (low) 246 + 48 (FF) + 75 (MF) = 369 198 + 24 (FF) + 75 (MF) =297
4 (medium) 369 + 96 (FF) + 150 (MF) = 615 297 + 48 (MM) + 150 (MF) = 495
5 (medium) 615 + 96 (FF) + 150 (MF) = 861 495 + 48 (MM) + 150 (MF) = 693
6 (high) 861 + 144 (FF) + 300 (MF) = 1305 693 + 72 (MM) + 113 (MF) = 878
7 (high) 1305 + 144 (FF) + 300 (MF) = 1749 878 + 72 (MM) + 113 (MF) = 1063
Table 5.3: Male and female scores assuming males are non-reciprocal altruists.
The table shows the cumulative scores for each sex, on the basis of the assumptions
given in the text. The scores are based on a population of 25 males and 25 females,
and calculations are shown by interaction type: female-female (FF), male-male
(MM) and male-female (MF).
In conclusion, these results have built upon those from previous chapters. It
has been shown, once more, that non-reciprocal altruism evolves when male
reproductive costs are considerably less than female reproductive costs. In addition,
in a seasonal environment non-reciprocal altruism is strongly selected during those
parts of the yearly cycle in which resource quality is high.
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5.4.3 Discussion
These two experiments have examined the effect of seasonal variation in
resource quality on the development of cooperation. It has been shown that when
resource quality fluctuates, strategy choice at the times of highest quality resources
determines strategy choice at all other times (section 5.4.1). Because there is a high
temptation to defect when resource quality is high, overall levels of cooperation in a
seasonal environment are less than would be expected. This is true even during
periods when resource quality is low. In stark contrast to this, cooperation between
males and females increases in a seasonal environment (section 5.4.2). If male
reproductive costs are considerably less than female reproductive costs, a special
kind of non-reciprocal altruism evolves. During periods of low resource quality
males and females cooperate with each other, then when resource quality improves
males cooperate while females defect (non-reciprocal altruism). Therefore, it 1S
possible to make two predictions regarding cooperation in a seasonal environment:
1) Cooperation is more difficult to establish when the quality of the resource in
question varies over time.
2) In a seasonal environment, males are most likely to be non-reciprocal altruists
when resource quality is high.
These predictions will be discussed here. As in previous chapters, an
extensive search of the literature has been conducted in order to ascertain the
potential value of these predictions. Overall, I found if very difficult to find any
studies that clearly support or contradict either of them. The main problem is that
seasonality can have a multitude of effects on behaviour which are very difficult to
untangle. First of all there is the problem (already discussed at length in sections 5.1
and 5.3.3) that changes in resource quality are almost always accompanied by
changes in resource distribution. Large patches of high quality resources are able to
support more individuals, and thus create more opportunities for both competition
and cooperation. Moreover, large food patches may promote group defence of
resources from other competing groups.
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A second difficulty in interpreting these results is that in seasonal habitats
there is usually a distinct breeding season during which male-male competition for
females is intense (Bernstein 1993). Increased rates of male transfer during the
breeding season in some primate groups (e.g. rhesus macaques) would also lead to
increased competition at this time (Bernstein 1993). The manner in which breeding
season effects competitive and cooperative interactions will vary between groups.
For instance, when males are much bigger than females, males may behave quite
aggressively towards females and thus coerce them into sexual interactions (Smuts
and Smuts 1993). On the other hand, when females and males are similar in size,
females usually approach males to initiate copulations (Stevenson et al. 1994). In
rhesus monkeys, changes in both female-male and female-female behaviours such as
grooming, sexual behaviour, aggression and proximity occur in the transition to the
breeding season (Maestripieri and Scucchi 1989). The problem is that affiliative and
competitive behaviours that arise because of breeding season effects will obscure
possible affiliative and competitive behaviours that arise because of seasonal changes
in resource quality. Few studies have been able to dissociate these effects (but see
Schiml et al. 1996). Despite these problems, the following discussion attempts to
bring together a number of studies that have looked at aspects of cooperation and
competition in a seasonal environment.
1) Cooperation is more difficult to establish when the quality of the resource in
question varies over time.
The experiments performed here strongly suggest that cooperation is difficult
to establish when resource quality fluctuates, as it does in a seasonal habitat. The
high temptation to defect when resource quality is high prevents future cooperation
when resource quality is low. In effect, the level of cooperation when resource
quality is high determines how much cooperation is expected at all other times.
Therefore in a seasonal habitat cooperation should be more or less the same,
throughout the year. Moreover, cooperation should be greater in less seasonal
environments. Intra-population differences in food sharing in capuchin monkeys
appear to support this hypothesis. Rose (1997) has observed that meat sharing in
capuchins is more frequent in less seasonal habitats. Also, Gould (1996) found no
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differences in male-female agonistic and affiliative interactions in ringtailed lemurs
with respect to seasonal availability of food. On the other hand, Stevenson et al.
(1994) found that feeding tolerance in woolly monkeys varied with respect to food
availability. During periods of food scarcity males excluded non-lactating females
and juveniles from fruiting trees.
One possible test of the model is to look at how cooperative relationships
such as grooming vary over the wet and dry season. Dunbar (1988) found no
differences in grooming time between the wet and dry seasons for a large number of
baboon populations. Taken at face value, this result would appear to support the
model. However, such a conclusion would be premature. Grooming is a very
important activity in baboon groups (see figure 4.1 and discussion in section 4.4.2).
Dunbar (1988) believes that baboons use grooming as a way of servicing their social
relationships, establishing friendships and forming alliances. In fact, baboons will
sacrifice feeding and resting time rather than lose time spent grooming. This
indicates that baboons have very good reasons for maintaining high levels of
grooming throughout the year that have nothing to do with resource quality.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the pay-offs associated with cooperative
behaviours such as grooming vary in any predictable way with habitat quality. This
means that, it is unlikely that grooming itself confers greater benefits to the recipient
or incurs greater costs to the donor at certain times of the year, unless it can be
shown that the number of parasites in the fur varies according to season. Bitetti
(1997) found that in Cebus apella grooming sessions were less frequent during the
winter than at other times of the year. However, Bitetti concluded that this was due to
seasonal differences in the opportunities for grooming created by different resource
distributions. This model only applies if the pay-offs for different cooperative acts
vary in a seasonal manner. Unless it can be definitively shown that the costs and
benefits of grooming vary in this way, this method of testing the hypothesis is
invalid.
At this point, attempts to apply the model directly to living populations have
been disappointing. However, the model will apply to any situation in which the pay-
offs of cooperation and competition vary. Therefore, its power may lie not in looking
at cooperation in seasonal environments, but at looking at cooperation in groups
where individuals regularly cooperate/compete over different resources with
different pay-offs. In some situations the benefits and risks associated with
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cooperation and competition may be low, this is similar to the poor resource quality
situation. In other situations, the benefits and risks of cooperation and competition
may be high, as in the high resource quality situation. As we have already seen in
chapters L 2 and 3, most group living primates cooperate in a wide variety of
situations: infant care, coalitionary support, tolerance at a feeding site, coordinating
activities, grooming, food sharing and so on. This model would predict that if
individuals establish a cooperative relationship in a high risk / high pay-off situation
(e.g. coalitionary support) they should also cooperate in a low risk / low pay-off
situation (e.g. grooming). Conversely, failure to cooperate in a high risk / high pay-
off situation should cause the break-down of cooperation in the low risk / low pay-
off situation. Chimpanzees may be aware of this type of social rule. Verbeek and de
Waal (1997) found that chimpanzees engage in reassuring behaviours in the presence
of particularly attractive food items, such as bananas. They suggest that chimpanzees
are careful to ensure cooperation in the presence of highly desirable resources, in
order to ensure that cooperation is maintained in other social contexts.
Reconciliation following aggressive disputes occurs in wide variety of
primate species including chimpanzees, capuchins, macaques, guenons and patas
monkeys (Verbeek and de Waal 1997). In some species special 'peace-making'
gestures have evolved. For instance, stump-tailed macaques have a special hip-
holding gesture that is used to ease social tensions following conflicts (de Waal
1996). It appears that primates have evolved mechanisms to promote good relations
even in high cost/high benefit situations such as aggressive contests so that social
harmony can be maintained at other times. After all, simply staying together as a
group involves cooperation in terms of group coordination of activities such as, when
and where to eat, sleep and travel. In other words, the occurrence of reconciliation in
many primates species is evidence that the most crucial aspect of a good cooperative
strategy is to ensure that competition in high cost/high benefit situations does not
ruin the chances of cooperation in low cost/low benefit situations.
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2) In a seasonal environment, males are most likely be non-reciprocal altruists
when resource quality is high.
The model presented in section 5.3.2 confirmed the finding of previous
chapters that non-reciprocal altruism is most likely to evolve when male reproductive
costs are much less than female reproductive costs. If non-reciprocal altruism is
likened to male care giving then we can now make the additional prediction that, in a
seasonal environment, seasonal patterns of paternal care will emerge. In a seasonal
environment male care giving is most likely during periods when resource quality is
high. Most seasonal environments can be roughly divided into a wet and a dry
season. According to the model, male care giving should peak in the wet season,
when resource abundance is greatest. Therefore, if females give birth in the wet
season they stand a greater chance of extracting male care giving than they would if
they gave birth in the dry season.
Male care giving occurs most in New World monkeys, all of which live in a
seasonal habitat and are seasonal breeders (Kinzey 1997). Among the New World
monkeys there are approximately equal numbers of species in which females give
birth in the wet and dry seasons. Male care giving never occurs in those species
which give birth in the dry season. In contrast, male care giving does occur in most
of the species which give birth in the wet season (Lagothrix species being the
exception). These observations appear to support the model. That is, species from
genera such as Aotus, Callicebus, Pithecia, Leontopithecus and Saguinus time their
birth season to coincide with (a) the period of highest resource availability, and (b)
the period in which males are most likely to provide parental care.
Why do females from genera such as Alouatta, Brachtyles, Cacajao, Saimiri
and Chiropotes time births to coincide with the dry season, rather than the wet season
when the likelihood of male care giving is greatest? Very little work has been done in
this field. Among the Old World monkeys, rhesus macaques also give birth in the dry
season (Koenig et al. 1997). Koenig et al. suggest that in this case females are
constrained by the energetic demands of conception, rather than lactation. It may be
that certain New World monkeys are unable to meet the energetic requirements of
conception in the dry season and thus are forced to conceive in the wet season. This
indicates that dry season birth peaks may be unavoidable and have the effect of
militating against male care giving.
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Observations of New World monkeys support the prediction that male care
giving will be greatest when resource quality is greatest. That is, in New World
monkeys, male care giving only occurs when females give birth during the wet
season. Of course, this is not a sufficient condition for male care. Energetic costs for
females must be considerably greater than energetic costs for males if paternal care is
to evolve (in chapter 4 it was shown that this condition is satisfied in many New
World monkeys). The point is, that if female energetic costs are very much higher
than male energetic costs then seasonal birth peaks at times of resource abundance
enhance the opportunities for male care giving.
Male care giving in chacma baboons, which peaks during times of food
scarcity, appears to contradict the model. Anderson (1992) studied male care giving
in chacma baboons at the Suikerobsrand nature reserve in South Africa. These
baboons live in a harsh, mountainous and seasonal habitat. The severe environment
puts the baboons under high energetic stress, especially during the winter when food
is low in both quality and quantity. At these times resting metabolic rate is around
14% higher than expected. Furthermore, during the winter travel time increases
greatly and, given the mountainous terrain, locomotor costs are high. Given these
environmental constraints, it would be fair to surmise that this is a low quality,
highly seasonal habitat, where energetic costs are high. Male assistance in infant
transport and protection occurs in some, but by no means all, chacma baboon
populations. Levels of paternal care-giving in Anderson's study group are high, and
the advantages to females are clear. Male investment alone has greater influence on
improving survival rates and shortening inter-birth interval than any other factor. In
this case, male care appears to be a response to high female energetic costs in a poor
quality habitat. Anderson found that male carrying was greatest in the winter, and
when predation risk is high. Furthermore, males were more likely to carry the
heavier, more burdensome infants. In other words, males tailor their cooperation to
the times of greatest female need. Overall, the results of this study contradict our
expectations that male care will be greatest during times of resource abundance. It
seems that the severe winter conditions overwhelm all other considerations.
At this point it would be premature to draw any firm conclusions on the basis
of these models. The simulations themselves are fairly complex, involving 12
different strategy strings and variable pay-off matrices. However, in the real world,
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variation in resource quality has far reaching effects, which are considerably more
complex and inter-dependent than can be captured in these models. Controlled
experiments are required to investigate cooperative and competitive strategies when
pay-offs vary, as they do in the seasonal model. It has been suggested here that the
model may be particularly relevant in looking at paternal care in New World
monkeys, all of which live in highly seasonal habitats. Male care giving only occurs
in those species that give birth in the wet season. Males may be less able to afford the
costs of care giving when females give birth in the dry season. It is not clear why
females should give birth in the dry season at all, since this means that the
energetically costly lactation period coincides with the period of low resource
availability. It is suggested here that these females may be less able to conceive in
the dry season, although this hypothesis remains to be tested. The available literature
indicates that very little consideration has been given to the possible effects of
seasonality on male care giving or cooperation in general. The simulations discussed
in this chapter suggest that future research into the relationship between resource
quality, seasonality and cooperation would yield interesting results.
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CHAPTER 6
Cooperation and the Evolution of Human Social
Intelligence
6.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have emphasised the extent to which human societies are
similar to those of other animals, especially other primates. The social world of most
primates is complex, involving cooperative and competitive interactions between
individuals of different age, sex and rank. Yet, the structure of human social groups
involves larger numbers and types of cooperative relationships than are seen in any
other single primate group. Humans live in large multi-male, multi-female societies
which involve extensive cooperative networks. Within these groups, human males and
females form pair-bonds which are almost always formalised by marriage (Buss and
Schmitt 1989). The cooperative bonds between marriage partners differ in quality and
permanence across human societies. None the less, marriage is almost always
associated with a division of labour between husband and wife, and male investment
in his wife and her offspring. However, Deacon (1997) points out that male care
giving and pair bonding are extremely unlikely within the context of large multi-male,
multi-female societies because the opportunities for extra-pair matings are great.
This research has shown that in order to understand the evolution of such an
unusual social system, we need to consider how the energetic costs of reproduction
have changed for males and females over the course of human evolution. In this
section we will briefly review how changes in climate, sexual dimorphism, diet and
brain size may have led to profound changes in the energetic costs to Homo females
and how these changes may have led to changes in social structure. However, the
main purpose of this chapter is to show that the evolution of human cooperative
strategies must have been accompanied by the co-evolution of cognitive support
mechanisms. As we shall see, the development of cooperative relationships between
males and females in particular, may have placed special cognitive demands on our
hominid ancestors.
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6.1.1 The evolution of human social groups
In the previous chapter it was argued that the environmental context in which
animals exist effects the kinds of cooperative strategies that evolve. This suggests that
the climatic context of hominid evolution may yield important clues with regard to the
evolution of cooperative behaviour. While researchers differ in the extent to which
they regard climatic change during human evolution as important in shaping
speciation and extinction events (see, for example, Vrba 1988, Foley 1994), there is a
general consensus regarding the kinds of climatic changes that were involved. Homo
erectus almost certainly lived in a drier, more open habitat than the australopithecines
(Reed 1997; Ruff 1991), who appear to have lived in more closed, wooded
environments. The australopithecine skeleton exhibits a number of adaptations to a
partially arboreal lifestyle (Ruff 1991; Stern and Susman 1983) and is short and squat
when compared with a human skeleton, possibly reflecting adaptations to a wetter
environment. In contrast, the postcranial skeleton ofHomo erectus shows no arboreal
adaptations and is considerably taller and slimmer than that of the australopithecines.
Ruff(1991) argues that these body proportions indicate that Homo erectus lived in an
open, arid environment. Wheeler (1994) also argues that the body shape of Homo
erectus is a thermoregulatory adaptation. The larger, slimmer and taller Homo would
have been able to withstand greater heat stress, and would have been able to conserve
water better than its shorter, squatter ancestors.
There are a number of reasons to believe that the transition from a closed wet
habitat to open, dry conditions would have promoted an increase in cooperation.
Firstly, the models used in the previous chapter predict that cooperation is more likely
when resource quality is low. It follows, that the arid conditions in which Homo
erectus evolved would have selected for more cooperative strategies. Secondly, Aiello
and Dunbar (1993) point out that predation pressures tend to be greater in open
environments and that other primates, such as baboons, respond to this by increasing
group size. Aiello and Dunbar suggest that the move to more open habitats by early
Homo may have selected for larger group sizes, and intensified the need for
cooperative strategies that promote group cohesion. Thirdly, Hawkes et al. (1998;
pers. comm.) suggest that in a more arid environment there may be an increased
reliance on embedded food resources, such as tubers, that are difficult for young
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children to acquire for themselves. Food sharing, especially with young weanlings,
may have become an important part of the behavioural repertoire of Homo erectus.
Finally, the transition from the closed, wet environments of the australopithecines to
the open, dry habitats of early Homo also involved considerable skeletal adaptations,
including an increase in body size (McHenry 1992a, 1992b, 1996). While both males
and females increased in size, the change was most marked in females. McHenry
(1996) estimates that Australopithecus afarensis males were 50% bigger than
females. Homo erectus males were just 20% heavier than females, indicating an
important shift in the balance of energetic costs between the sexes. The increased
energetic load on females, in comparison to males, would have contributed to a
change in social behaviour involving more cooperation both between females and
between males and females.
In addition to changes in climate and postcranial anatomy, the other major
change during human evolution has been a three-fold increase in the size of the brain
(see figure 1.1). This has had important energetic implications (Aiello and Wheeler
1995; Aiello 1997). Because brain tissue is metabolically expensive, Aiello and
Wheeler argue that brain expansion must have involved a trade off with another
energetically expensive tissue: the gastrointestinal tract. This would only have been
possible if the changes in gut size were accompanied a change to a diet containing a
higher percentage of animal products which are less bulky, of higher quality and are
more easily digested than plant foods. The adaptive complex of an increase in brain
size and a reduction in gut size, mediated by a change to an animal-based diet, implies
a profound change in the energetic costs of reproduction for females. This is due to
the direct costs to the mother of providing enough energy to her infant for brain
growth (Foley and Lee 1991; Martin 1981, 1983, 1996). In addition, a change to a
diet with a high meat component requires that females provision their offspring until
they have gained the necessary skills to acquire meat for themselves (see discussion in
section 5.3.3; Aiello 1998). The dual loads of extensive food-sharing between mother
and offspring, and the training necessary for the offspring to find its own resources
would significantly increase the period of maternal investment beyond the weaning
period.
There were two main periods of brain size increase during hominid evolution.
The first occurred during the transition from australopithecines to early Homo. This
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period of brain expansion also coincided with changes in climate and body size and
taken together these factors are indicative of a considerable change in hominid
energetic and cooperative strategies. I believe that at the very least, Homo erectus
societies would have involved extensive cooperation between females. The second
period of brain expansion occurred from around 500,000 - 100,000 years ago. Brain
expansion during this time was exponential, indicating rapidly increasing female
energetic costs. In chapter 4 it was argued that the archaic Homo sapiens living
during this time must have lived in highly cooperative social groups in which male
provisioning played an important role. Skeletal evidence that Neandertal males led
more active lives and were more skeletally robust than females supports the
proposition that there was a sexual division of labour at this time (Ruff 1987). Thus, I
am proposing a two stage model of the evolution of human social organisation. The
first transition occurring between the australopithecines and Homo erectus, involving
increased female cooperation. The second occurring between 500,000 and 100,000
years ago and involving the addition of male care giving, the formation of pair bonds
and the sexual division of labour within the context of a wider cooperative network.
Possibly the most important cooperative endeavour in the hominids was the
provisioning of offspring, especially young weanlings. Cooperation in the care and
feeding of offspring is especially important in the callitrichids and social carnivores
because of the special difficulties faced by a weanling who does not have the
experience to capture its own food. Similarly, a shift to a meat-based diet or increased
reliance on embedded food items is likely to have selected for increased cooperation
in the hominids. Hawkes et al. (1997a, b, c, 1998) stress the importance of female
provisioning of offspring, especially by related females such as aunts and
grandmothers. They suggest that menopause and long post-menopausal life spans may
have evolved as part of such a cooperative strategy. This hypothesis is based on the
finding that senior post-menopausal Hadza women play an important role in
provisioning their daughter's offspring. The benefits of this are clear for the child, the
mother and the grandmother. With more provisioning the child would be expected to
have higher survival. The mother is relieved of some of the burden of providing food,
reducing her energetic stress and shortening her inter-birth interval. Finally, the
decreased mortality of the child and the increased fecundity of the mother equate to
higher inclusive fitness for the grandmother.
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Because of the changes in female energetic costs, it seems likely that increased
female cooperation would have evolved fairly early in the evolution of the Homo
genus. There may have been selection for menopause and increased post-reproductive
lifespans (Aiello 1998; in press) as well as other features such as concealed ovulation,
reproductive synchrony and increases in subcutaneous fat (Power and Aiello 1997;
Power et al. 1997; Stern and McClintock 1998; Turke 1984). However, paternal
investment may also have been important, especially if an increased meat component
to the diet is involved. There are a number of reasons why females may be unable to
provide meat for their offspring themselves. Firstly, hunting is an unpredictable
foraging strategy (Hawkes 1993; Hawkes et al. 1997a). Hunting may provide as many
calories per day on average as other foraging strategies. However, studies of modern
hunter-gatherers suggest that there is considerable day-to-day variation in hunting
returns, and on any given day there is a high chance of failure. Secondly, hunting
especially of large animals is incompatible with childcare. If hominid females were
pursuing a hunting strategy, than they must have been dependent on other females for
offspring care in their absence. Finally, hunting is an energetically costly activity (see
chapter 4) which may prohibit female participation due to the adverse affects that high
energy expenditure has on fertility (Bentley 1985). On the other hand, high daily
energetic costs on the part of human males appears to reflect a strategy of male
investment in females and their offspring.
It seems that climate change provoked changes in the energetic strategies of
our hominid ancestors. In response to escalating female energetic costs and
deteriorating environment quality, Homo spp. must have adopted a range of
cooperative strategies including increased female-female and male-female
cooperation. Unfortunately, cooperative behaviours do not leave a mark on the fossil
record. Yet, I believe that cooperation played such an important role in the evolution
of human society, that it has left a mark on the human mind. That is, humans appear
to have specially evolved cognitive mechanisms for managing a social world in which
balancing the benefits of cooperation, the temptations of cheating and avoiding
exploitation is of paramount importance. These cognitive adaptations are in
themselves evidence of the kinds of selective pressures that shaped hominid evolution.
Just as cooperative behaviours have their origins in non-human primates, so
do the cognitive support mechanisms for these behaviours. Thus, the next section will
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briefly review the primate basis of human cognition. This discussion will provide a
baseline for looking at human intelligence.
6.2 The Primate Basis of Human Cognition
Most primates live in social groups which contain individuals of different age,
sex, rank and kinship. As we have seen throughout this thesis, individuals within
groups cooperate and compete over a wide variety of different resources in a wide
variety of social situations. However, decisions about when to cooperate or compete
depend not only on the age, sex and rank of the two animals directly involved in a
situation, but the ages, sexes and ranks of their allies. In vervet monkeys, a fight
between two individuals is often followed by aggressive encounters between their
relatives (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990, 1992). Therefore, it is very important for each
animal to know who is related to who, and who is allied with whom (Cheney and
Seyfarth 1986). The evidence suggests that primates are well aware of the
relationships between other group members. Dasser (1988a, b) showed macaques
pictures of adult females and juveniles from their social group and found that they
could classify pictures based on relatedness. Cheney and Seyfarth (1990) used vocal
play-back experiments to show that when an infant screams, adults look to the infant's
mother for a response. Cheney and Seyfarth suggest (1992 p.142):
"in their social interactions monkeys do not simply associate some
individuals with others but instead classify relationships into types.
"Mother-offspring bonds" or "bonds between the members of family X"
are abstractions that allow different relationships to be compared with
one another...... the monkeys' ability to represent social relationships
has evolved because it offers the most accurate means of predicting the
behaviour ofothers."
In other words, monkeys appear to have a cognitive map of the social relationships
within their group which they use to predict the consequences of their social
interactions.
Apes may have a more sophisticated social intelligence than monkeys. De
Waal and Luttrell (1988) examined reciprocal altruism in monkeys and apes, and
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found an interesting difference. While monkeys would reciprocate cooperative acts,
they would not necessarily punish noncooperative behaviours. Apes, on the other
hand, not only reciprocate cooperation but they also appear to have a "system of
revenge" (de Waal 1996 p.157). That is, chimpanzees will punish those who have
opposed them. Even females will occasionally attack a dominant male that has failed
to support them during a confrontation. De Waal and Luttrell (1988) suggest that the
lack of revenge system in monkey groups may either reflect differences in cognition
or in social flexibility. The latter explanation may be the most likely. In species such as
macaques there is a strict dominance hierarchy, and retaliation for a wrong-doing may
be very costly. For instance, if a subordinate challenges a dominant animal, then he or
she is likely to face the aggression of the whole of the dominant animal's kin-group.
Chimpanzee groups tend to have a much looser dominance hierarchy than macaque
groups and chimpanzees may simply have more freedom to express their anger than a
macaque does. Subordinate macaques will sometimes attack the less-dominant
relative of the animal with which they had a confrontation. This suggests that it is
social rather than intellectual factors that prevent macaques from reciprocating nasty
as well as nice behaviours.
One area in which apes are almost certainly more advanced than monkeys is
theory of mind. The term 'theory of mind' refers to the ability to understand the
mental state of others (Premack and Woodruff 1978). An individual that has a theory
of mind is able to interpret and respond to the beliefs and desires of another
individual. Monkeys appear to be very good at recognising and reacting to different
social relationships and they attempt to manipulate the behaviour of others. However,
there is little evidence that monkeys are aware of, or attempt to influence, the mental
states of other animals (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990, 1992). Cheney and Seyfarth assert
that monkeys are unable to distinguish between their own state of mind, and the state
of mind of other animals. They are unable to recognise another animal's ignorance or
that another animal has knowledge that they do not have. This is reflected in the fact
that while monkeys use observation and trial-and-error to learn new tasks, they never
imitate or teach each other. Monkeys appear to find it very difficult to take on the role
of others in manipulative tasks. Furthermore, while monkeys almost certainly
experience emotions such as fear and grief, there is little evidence that they recognise
these emotions in others. Cheney and Seyfarth conclude that (1992 p.144) "monkeys
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do not know what they know and cannot reflect upon their knowledge, their emotions
or their beliefs."
The evidence that apes, especially chimpanzees, have a theory of mind is much
stronger than it is for monkeys. Premack and Woodruff (1978) conducted the first
experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind. They showed a chimpanzee a film of a
human unsuccessfully attempting to solve a problem. They then presented the
chimpanzee with several photographs, one of which showed the solution to the
problem. Chimpanzees were found to be quite good at selecting the appropriate
solution, indicating that they had understood the problem from the human's point of
view. Other 'seeing and knowing' experiments indicate that chimpanzees understand
that different individuals have different states of mind (Premack 1988). The
experimental set-up involves two trainers and a chimpanzee. A piece of food is
hidden, and the chimpanzee is able to observe that one of the trainers sees the food
being hidden, while the other is prevented from doing so (this trainer was either
excluded from the room, hidden behind a screen or had a bag over his or her head).
The chimpanzee must then choose one of the trainers. Premack found that the
chimpanzees recognised which humans were knowledgeable about the whereabouts of
the food, and which were ignorant. In other words, the monkeys were able to
understand that the two trainers had different states of mind. Povinelli et al. (1990)
conducted a similar series of tests on chimpanzees, and reached the same conclusion.
However, Povinelli (1994) later reanalysed the data and found that in the first trial,
the success rate of the animals was no better than would have been achieved by
chance. This indicates, that chimpanzees may have learnt to succeed in the test
through associative learning, rather than by understanding mental states.
The extent to which chimpanzees and other apes possess a theory of mind
remains a point of considerable debate. However, there is less doubt that there are
differences between monkeys and apes in their abilities to attribute mental states to
others. These differences have been demonstrated in a test by Povinelli et al. (1992a,
b) who set rhesus monkeys and chimpanzees a cooperative task involving a special
apparatus with several handles. Two individuals are required to work the apparatus
successfully: one individual can see which handle to pull in order to deliver food to
both animals but is unable to operate it; the other cannot see which handle is
appropriate but can reach all the handles. Pairs of rhesus monkeys and pairs of
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chimpanzees were taught to operate the machine successfully. The individual roles
within the pairs were then switched, so that viewers became pullers and visa versa.
Here the cognitive differences between monkeys and chimpanzees became apparent.
Each monkey had to be trained from scratch in their new role. However, the
chimpanzees were able to assume their new roles without training. It seems that the
chimpanzees were able to imagine themselves in the other role and behave
appropriately, although Byrne (1995) questions the extent to which this requires an
understanding of the mental state of another animal.
Byrne and Whiten (1992) collated anecdotal evidence of deception in
primates. They found that most cases of deception in monkeys could be explained
without attributing theory of mind to the perpetrator. However, there were instances
of deception in the apes which were difficult to explain without attributing some
knowledge of mental states to the performer. As an example, consider the following
anecdote reported by Savage-Rumbaugh (1980). The scenario concerns two male
chimpanzees, Austin and Sherman. Sherman would often bully Austin, but Austin
discovered that Sherman was afraid of noises from outside their sleeping quarters.
Thereafter, whenever Sherman became overly aggressive Austin would run outside
and make a commotion and then return indoors, whimpering. Austin's pretence at
being scared was successful, and Sherman would invariably respond with panic,
looking to Austin for comfort. Byrne and Whiten (1992) argue that it is more
parsimonious to conclude that Austin was aware of and was manipulating Sherman's
view of the world, than to try to explain such a scenario simply by reference to
learned behaviours.
There are two possible advantages of having a theory of mind. Firstly, theory
of mind increases an individual's ability to manipulate the state of mind of other
animals. For this reason, theory of mind is often associated with 'Machiavellian'
intelligence (Byrne and Whiten 1988; Whiten and Byrne 1997) and the most
convincing demonstrations of theory of mind involve deception. However, theory of
mind may also enhance an individual's opportunities for cooperation since it allows a
better assessment of another individual's intentions, whether cooperative or
exploitative (Byrne and Whiten 1997b). It is of prime importance for cooperators to
be able to identify fellow cooperators and to avoid individuals who might exploit
them. The extent to which theory of mind is relevant to cooperative interactions in
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non-human primates is unknown, principally because it is much harder to observe
theory of mind at work in a cooperative, as opposed to a deceptive, context.
The preceding discussion indicates that haplorhine primates have evolved
special mental abilities for negotiating the social world, although these abilities may
differ between monkeys and apes. Therefore, we should expect that there will be parts
of the brain that are specifically adapted for social problem-solving. Dunbar (1992,
1993) argues that social intelligence is located primarily in the neocortex and that the
larger, and more complex the social world, the larger the neocortex that is required
(see section 1.1.2). To support this, Dunbar (1993) shows that the size of the
neocortex, relative to the size of the rest of the brain (the neocortex ratio), is closely
correlated with group size (Dunbar 1993). Furthermore, neocortex ratio is also
related to the use of tactical deception (Byrne 1996).
The 'social intelligence hypothesis' suggests that managing social relationships
IS a considerable cognitive challenge. For this reason primates have evolved a
sophisticated social intelligence with which to negotiate the social world. This is not
to deny the importance of ecological problems in shaping the primate brain.
Frugivores, for instance, appear to have larger brains than folivores, due to the greater
difficulties in locating fiuit compared with leaves (Barton 1996; Clutton-Brock and
Harvey 1980). Tool use may also contribute to cognitive differences between apes
and monkeys (Byrne 1997; Parker and Gibson 1979; Tomasello and Call 1994; see
also discussion in section 1.1.2). The point is, that social intelligence is a very
important aspect of primate cognition and appears to be limited by brain size, or more
specifically neocortex size. Not only has the human brain expanded three-fold over the
course of human evolution, but the neocortex in particular is considerably larger than
would be expected. In fact, the human neocortex is around 200% larger than would
be expected for a primate of our body size (Deacon 1997). Under these
circumstances, we should not be surprised that social intelligence may also have
played an important role in the evolution of the human brain.
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6.3 The Evolution of Human Cognition
"We need an explanation for why we are moral. How did our moral rules
evolve? Having evolved, why do they survive? The theory of repeated
games has contributed enormously to our understanding of these
questions. If moral rules did not exist, game theorists would have to
invent them in order to shift society from equilibria with bad properties
to equilibria with good ones."
(Binmore et al. 1993a p.5)
Cooperation is a fundamental aspect of human behaviour. In fact part of the
appeal of models such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, and concepts such as reciprocal
altruism, is that they describe a social situation which most of us find ourselves in
every day. As has been shown in this research, there are many possible outcomes to
the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Reciprocal altruism is by no means the only
solution. Moreover, when pay-offs vary then cooperation is actually very hard to
achieve (section 5.4). None the less, reciprocal altruism is part and parcel of human
life. Binmore comments (1990 p.24):
"Those who live in New York may not agree, but to a considerable extent
people tell the truth, keep their word, respect property rights, and help old
ladies across the road. Why do they behave this way?"
Why do humans cooperate? It is unlikely that humans become reciprocal
altruists through some process of rational deduction, in the sense used by game
theorists (Binmore 1993). The social world is so complex that it is impossible to have
complete information about the problem at hand and thus to calculate the possible
consequences of different actions, or the rationality and motivation of other
individuals. Even in experimental situations in which it is possible to acquire complete
information, Binmore (1993) reports that subjects use 'rules of thumb' or notions of
'fairness' to make strategic decisions, rather than a logical process of deduction. This
leads Binmore (1993; Binmore et al. 1993a,b), to suggest that humans have in-built
rules, or morals, that help us to achieve good solutions, such as reciprocal altruism.
The advantage of game theory, is that it helps assess what these 'good solutions'
might be.
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Binmore (1991) suggests that social rules, or morals, may be hard-wired
directly into our minds and behaviour, but that in humans they are more likely to be
socially transmitted. Because the calculations required to assess the appropriate action
in a given situation are complex, and vary from one situation to the next, it would be
very difficult to imagine how appropriate rules could be hard-wired into our genetic
code by evolutionary processes. None the less, in this section it will be shown how
biological (as well as social) evolution has equipped us with the mental apparatus
required for solving social problems specifically related to cooperation. Theory of
mind. for instance, may have evolved for exactly this purpose. We will return to the
question of social versus biological conditioning at the end of this section. First, this
section examine why cooperation may have become so important in human societies.
We will then examine the kinds of cognitive mechanisms required to support this
cooperation.
Cashdan (1985) views reciprocity as a kind of insurance against lean times. By
sharing resources, especially food items, there is less risk that on any given day
someone will go hungry. Cashdan (1985) found that amongst the Nata, sharing of
food items, especially grains, increased during the poorest parts of the season. This
observation accords well with the prediction that cooperation is most likely when
resource quality is low (see section 5.3). Cashdan (1980) points out that food-sharing
is particularly important in hunter-gatherer groups whose lifestyle prevents the long-
term storage of food items. This type of cooperative relationship is a kind of
'generalised' exchange (Sahlins 1972). Food is given and received by many different
members of a community, and is not restricted to directly reciprocal exchanges
between two individuals. In fact, Sahlins comments that interactions over food are
explicitly non-reciprocal (1972 p.215):
"direct and equivalent returns for food are unseemly in most social
settings: they impugn the motives both of the giver and of the recipient."
There is, however, a fundamental flaw in this food-sharing strategy. A system of
generalised exchange is open to exploitation by 'freeloaders' who can take the
benefits of sharing without paying the costs (Smith 1988). Smith argues that the only
way to prevent cheating is if the system is supported by mechanisms for monitoring
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and punishing freeloaders. As we shall see, the ability to detect cheats and identify
cooperators appears to be a part of our evolved psychology.
The view that food-sharing is not reciprocal may be false. This is because
reciprocity is difficult to distinguish from unconditional altruism unless it is disrupted
in some way. An example of this is provided by Dwyer and Minnegal (1997) who
studied the sharing of sago flour in a village in lowland Papua New Guinea. By
custom, village residents (land-owners) share sago flour with 'guests' who may
remain in the village for several years. At first sight, the guests would appear to be
freeloaders, since in the short-term they do not return the favour. However, over the
course of several years villages are disbanded, and reformed on new land. This means
that former residents become guests in a new community and former guests may re-
claim previously owned land. Dwyer and Minnegal (1992) hypothesised that in the
long term the sharing of sago flour was reciprocated. However, the most convincing
support for this hypothesis only emerged when the community they had been
researching met with unusual circumstances (Dwyer and Minnegal 1997). Usually a
village will dissolve within a few years, however, by 1995 this particular community
had remained stable for nine years. Dwyer and Minnegal found that under these new
circumstances cooperation between residents and guests was severely diminished.
They conclude that (1997 p.89): "once the potential for reciprocation was lost the
"sago game" broke down."
The advantages of food-sharing extend beyond the immediate nutritional
benefits identified by Cashdan. Sahlins (1972) points out that food sharing is a way of
establishing and maintaining good social relationships. Equally, not sharing food may
damage previously good relationships. He notes (1972 p.215):
''Food dealings are a delicate barometer, a ritual statement as it were, of
social relations, and food is thus employed instrumentally as a starting, a
sustaining, or a destroying mechanism of sociability."
Human cooperative relationships are multidimensional. Humans create a vast web of
cooperative relationships, each of which supports the others. Failure to cooperate in
one circumstance may lead to the breakdown of cooperation in many other
circumstances. The models presented in the previous chapter (section 5.4) showed
that the high temptation to cheat when resource quality is high can destroy what
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would otherwise have been a cooperative relationship. In humans it is very important
to resist the short-term temptation to cheat, in order to preserve longer-term
cooperation. This point is emphasised by Palmer (1991) who studied information
sharing among Maine lobstermen. The lobstermen sometimes exchange information
regarding the location of good fishing sites. This information is clearly highly
beneficial to the recipient, and is costly to the giver, since it will lead to a depletion
the stock of fish available to him. Palmer found that while kin selection and reciprocal
altruism explain some of the situations in which individuals either exchanged or
withheld information, the rules of reciprocation were more strongly mediated by the
costs of deceit. Palmer explains that the consequences of deceit may have severe
effects on other aspects of an individual's social relationships, beyond the fishing
context (1991 p.231):
"the consequences of secrecy and deceit may go far beyond the economic
loss of future information exchanges..... Blatant lies and selfish secrecy,
even if economically advantageous, are likely to be incompatible with the
diplomacy needed in such social environments .... Southern Harbor
lobstermen have a high percentage of competitors who are also friends
and neighbours."
Palmer provides us with the following example (1991 p.232):
"I have observed one lobsterman's brother helping another lobsterman's
neighbour's son find a job, while another lobsterman repairs a different
lobsterman's cousin's car. Such interactions may involve people beyond
the local community, and may influence interactions of individuals who
have never met either of the two lobstermen."
In many instances humans cooperate because they understand that not doing so
could lead to the break-down of other cooperative relationships. By foregoing the
short-term benefits of cheating, it is possible to harvest the long term benefits of
cooperation. The pervasiveness of cooperation in human societies is quite striking. In
fact, sometimes humans are almost "irrationally" cooperative. In experimental games
in which there is no chance that an individual who chooses the highest paying,
deceptive strategy will be discovered, human subjects are still likely to cooperate
(Caporael et al. 1989; Frank 1988; Frank et al. 1993). For example, Frank (1988)
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conducted an experiment in which wallets containing money and personal papers were
left lying around in the street for passers-by to find. People who found the wallets
could keep the money without being found out. None the less, 45% of the wallets
were returned by post.
The pervasive cooperation that is so typical of human societies is a puzzle.
Although cooperation is a good strategy in the long term, in the short term it requires
foregoing immediate benefits. Ainslie (1975) has shown that in many instances people
are more attracted to short term benefits that are certain, compared with long term
benefits that may be uncertain. This is because of a factor known as the 'matching
law' (Ainslie 1975). Ainslie conducted the following two experiments. In the first,
subjects were offered either $100 in 28 days time, or $120 in 31 days times. Most
subjects chose the second option. In the second experiment, subjects were offered
either $100 today, or $120 in three days time. This time, even though the amounts
and days apart were the same as in the first experiment, most subjects chose the
immediate pay-off of $100. The subjects were obeying the matching law, whereby the
attractiveness of the reward is inversely related to its delay. The matching law explains
why, for instance, dieting or giving up smoking is so difficult. The short term rewards
of a chocolate bar or cigarette often appear more attractive than the long term
benefits of resistance. According to the matching law, people will always be attracted
by the short term benefits of cheating, compared with the long term, less certain,
benefits of cooperation. How, then, do humans manage to maintain cooperative
relationships?
Humans vary in cooperative and deceptive tendencies. Tests for
'Machiavellian' intelligence are designed to reveal how manipulative people are
(Wilson et al. 1996, 1998)1. People who score highly on these tests (high-Machs), are
more deceptive in nature compared with those who gain low scores (low-Machs).
Wilson et al. (1996) argue that high-Machs use more deceptive strategies in social
situations, and compare them to defectors in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Low-
Mach individuals tend to use nicer social strategies, following a rule similar to TIT-
1 These tests assume that Machiavellian intelligence refers only to those aspects of intelligence that
are involved with manipulation or deception. However, in some instances Machiavellian intelligence
may also refer to cooperative aspects of cognition (see, for example, Byrne and Whiten 1988 and
Whiten and Byrne 1997).
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FOR-TAT. These different strategies were demonstrated by Harrel and Hartnagel
(1976) who conducted an experiment in which subjects were given the opportunity to
steal in the presence of a supervisor. The supervisor was portrayed as being either
distrustful or trusting. The behaviour of people who were rated as high-Machs was
unaffected by the disposition of the supervisor. The majority of high-Machs (more
than 800/0) stole from the supervisor in both situations. However, the behaviour of the
low-Machs was very different depending on how trustful the supervisor was perceived
to be. While the majority of low-Machs (more than 80%) stole from the distrustful
supervisor. only 24% of them stole from the trusting supervisor. Wilson et al.
comment that (1996 p.290):
"Low-Machs seem to be guided by a tit-for-tat strategy in which the
distrustfulness of the supervisor is perceived as an act of defection which
calls for overt retaliation."
High-Machs, by contrast, will defect whenever there is an opportunity. Moreover,
high-Machs are perceived by others as social charmers. High-Machs are judged to be
more attractive and intelligent than other people, and perform well in bargaining and
alliance-forming situations. Christie and Geis (1970 p.339) comment that:
"high Machs are preferred as partners, chosen and identified as leaders,
judged as more persuasive, and appear to direct the tone and content of
interaction - and usually the outcome."
Because high-Machs are socially attractive, their manipulative tendencies may
be difficult to identify, especially in the short term. Wilson et al. (1998) conducted an
experiment that was designed to uncover the 'real' motivations ofhigh-Machs that are
usually well disguised. Subjects were asked to write fantasy stories and the main
characters in these stories were then judged by other subjects. Wilson et al. report
that low-Mach authors created characters that were trustworthy, cooperative and
helpful. In sharp contrast, high-Mach authors created characters that were selfish,
uncaring, judgmental, untrustworthy, aggressive, undependable and suspicious. Not
surprisingly, most people felt that they would prefer a character created by a low-
Mach, rather than a high-Mach author as a social partner.
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The preceding discussion presents us with the following paradox. The
matching law suggests that it is always more attractive to cheat in the short term than
cooperate in the long term. Furthermore, human society contains people that are both
socially attractive and manipulative (i.e. high-Machs) and are likely to exploit
cooperators. But despite this, cooperation is pervasive throughout human societies.
How then, do cooperators overcome the short-term temptation to defect?
Furthermore, how do cooperators guard against exploitation? In the following
discussion I argue that a whole range of cognitive mechanisms have evolved as
scaffolding for cooperative strategies, these include: a) inhibition mechanisms; b)
emotional constructs such as guilt, trust, anger and honour; c) cheat detection
mechanisms; and d) social intelligence including theory ofmind.
Humans appear to be able to inhibit cheating behaviours. That is, faced with a
situation in which cheating is not only possible, but highly advantageous, many people
will resist the temptation. Of course, this is not true of everyone, as we have already
seen people vary in their tendency to be cooperative. But even high-Machs will
commonly find themselves in situations in which it is advantageous to inhibit cheating.
Deacon (1997) suggests that the prefrontal cortex is extremely important in inhibiting
behavioural responses. The greatly expanded human prefrontal cortex stops us from
literately doing the first thing that comes into our minds. Other animals have much
smaller prefrontal cortex's for their body size, and are very poor at inhibiting
behaviour responses. For example, Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin (1994) discuss an
experiment involving a language-trained bonobo, Kanzi, who had to choose between
two piles of sweets, one of which was larger than the other. Whichever pile Kanzi
chose was given to another bonobo. Kanzi himself was given the pile of sweets which
he did not choose, and so it was to his advantage to choose the smaller pile. However,
no matter how many times the test was repeated Kanzi always chose the larger pile.
The look of disappointment on Kanzi' s face when the larger pile was then given to the
other animal indicates that Kanzi was not being altruistic! Rather, Kanzi was simply
unable to inhibit his immediate attraction to the larger pile of sweets.
The greatly expanded human prefrontal cortex may be involved in inhibiting
the desire to cheat in cooperative contexts. Interestingly, inhibition may also be
involved in the development of language, symbolism (Deacon 1997) and sexual
strategies (Bjorklund and Kipp 1996) although such a discussion is tangential to the
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immediate concerns of this chapter. However, while Deacon (1997) stresses the
importance of inhibition in helping us to 'stop and think' about our actions, it is not
clear that inhibition alone would be enough to stimulate a cooperative response.
According to the matching law, short-term considerations tend to outweigh long term
benefits. Frank (1988) argues that cooperation is far more likely to be established if
cheating bears short-term costs and cooperation short-term benefits. That is, humans
need short-term incentives to cooperate. Frank argues that we have an emotional
system which fulfils exactly this requirement. In simple terms, cooperation makes us
feel good and deception makes us feel bad. Frank provides the following example
(1988 p.53 his italics):
"Consider, for example, a person capable of strong guilt feelings. This
person will not cheat even when it is in her material interests to do so.
The reason is not that she fears getting caught but that she simply does
not want to cheat. Here aversion to feelings of guilt effectively alters the
payoffs she faces."
The point is, that most people suffer from a guilty conscience if they deceive
someone else. If cheating makes us feel bad, then this may be enough to ensure that in
most instances we will refrain. On the other hand, giving gifts, returning a lost wallet,
giving to charity and sharing a meal are all actions that make us feel good.
Furthermore, these types of acts establish an individual's reputation as a cooperator
(Frank 1988 p.82):
"It is often prudent to refrain from cheating, as the tit-for-tat and
reciprocal altruism theories have ably demonstrated. On such occasions,
there will be advantage in being able to suppress the impulse to cheat.
We can thus imagine a population in which people with consciences fare
better than those without. The people who lack them would cheat less
often if they could, but they simply have greater difficulty solving the
self-control problem. People who have them, by contrast, are able to
acquire good reputations and cooperate successfully with others of like
disposition."
If you are a cooperator, it is important to gain a reputation as such in order to
attract other cooperators with whom to interact. In fact, Roberts (1998) describes a
scenario in which individuals compete for cooperative partners by being altruistic.
Roberts calls this 'competitive altruism' and describes altruism as a handicap (after
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Zahavi 1977). The handicap principal provides an explanation for traits that are
seemingly maladaptive, such as the peacock's tail. These traits indicate that the bearer
of the trait is of such high quality that they can afford to send out very costly signals.
By extension. an altruist who performs an act, such as giving blood, is sending out the
signal "look at me: I am so willing to cooperate that I will even given my blood to a
total stranger." It is important to understand that humans do not cooperate because
they wish to establish a good repuation, or because they feel guilt if they cheat
(Binmore 1990). Rather, because cooperation is a good strategy in situations like the
Prisoner's Dilemma, the desire to establish a good reputation and guilt have evolved
to ensure that this good strategy is executed.
Frank argues that a person who cooperates, even when it would pay them to
be selfish and defect, unconsciously develops verbal and facial signals of their
willingness to cooperate. For example, an individual who blushes or stammers when
they think they have done something wrong sends a clear signal that they are
conscientious. Thus, even if we have not observed a person cooperate or cheat, we
may able to judge their character by other means. Frank points out that there are
numerous cues to another person's feelings (Frank 1988 p.8):
"Posture, the rate of respiration, the pitch and timbre of the voice,
perspiration, facial muscle tone and expression, and movement of the
eyes, are among the signals we can read. We quickly surmise, for
example, that someone with clenched jaws and a purple face is enraged,
even when we do not know what, exactly, may have triggered his anger.
And we apparently know, even if we cannot articulate, how a forced
smile differs from one that is heartfelt."
Humans appear to be very good at interpreting these signals. Frank et al. (1993)
found that when human subjects are given half an hour to get to know each other,
their ability to predict which people will defect and which will cooperate in the
Prisoner's Dilemma is much better than would be expected by chance. The way we
speak, our body language, our facial expressions and our behaviour signal our
cooperative tendencies to others. But, by signalling their willingness to cooperate,
altruists are very vulnerable. Selfish individuals will be easily able to identify
cooperators and may exploit them. If these exploiters are able to mimic cooperators,
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then it may be very difficult to avoid them. Therefore, cooperators must also have a
defence system.
Exploiters are more likely to be found outside of a group, than within it.
Individuals within a group interact with each other on a daily basis, and are able to
assess each others cooperativeness by their behaviour. Because the chances of
interacting again are high, cooperation is more likely to develop. In the first instance,
therefore, we tend to expect individuals within our own group to be cooperative. On
the other hand, Sahlins (1972) notes that reactions to strangers are often negative, and
that altruistic relationships are unlikely to emerge. This is because it is easier to
exploit a stranger who has not had the opportunity to witness past encounters and
may not have the opportunity in the future to punish any misdemeanours (Dugatkin
and Wilson 1991). This reasoning suggests that it is very important to recognise and
cooperate with individuals from within your group. A feeling of group belonging,
even on the most superficial grounds, substantially enhances cooperation in
experimental games (Caporael et al.1989). For example, Taijfel (1970; see also
Taijfel and Billig 1974) randomly assigned subjects into two groups, on the pretext
that they were divided on the basis of a task (e.g. whether they had over- or under-
estimated the numbers of dots in a display). Even though none of the subjects ever
met each other, they still behaved preferentially towards other members of their own
group. If group members are allowed to interact then cooperation increases even
more. In experimental situations discussion between individuals can increase the
incidence of cooperation to nearly 100%, even when there is no possibility of cheating
being detected (Caporael et al. 1989).
Language itself may be a very interesting facilitator of cooperation. Dunbar
(1993; see also Aiello and Dunbar 1993) argues that language in humans serves the
same function as grooming does in primates, that is language is used to establish and
maintain social relationships. The advantage of language, over grooming, is that it is
much more efficient, since it is possible to talk to many people at one time and talk to
more people over a period of time. Dunbar argues that language may have evolved
first as a sort of 'vocal grooming' through which social cohesion could be maintained
within large groups. Furthermore, dialects may help us to identify individuals with
whom we wish to cooperate (Nettle and Dunbar 1997). Because dialects are difficult
to fake, they provide a reliable indicator of social origin. Thus, even in large groups,
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language and dialect make it possible to establish and maintain cooperative
relationships.
By selectively interacting with group members it is possible to establish
cooperative relationships within social groups. None the less, even within groups it is
important for cooperators to be able to identify potential cheats. Tooby and Cosmides
(1992: Cosmides 1989) believe that over the course of evolution the human mind has
evolved mechanisms specifically for cheat detection. They show that while humans are
very poor at solving abstract problems, they are very good at solving social problems
particularly those that involve identifying cheats. Similarly, Mealey et al. (1996) found
that people are better at remembering the faces of people they perceive to be potential
cheats, compared with faces that are judged to be neutral or trustworthy.
Binmore (1990; see also Binmore et al. 1991) points out that in
cooperative/competitive situations, it is important to be able to assess the strategies of
others in order to determine which strategy is best for oneself In order to do this, it is
necessary to see the situation from the other person's view point. This requires theory
of mind. In the previous section it was argued that apes may have some theory of
mind abilities. The apes are capable of more elaborate deceptive tactics than monkeys,
and Byrne and Whiten (1992) suggest that theory of mind plays an important role in
this. While there is still considerable debate as to the extent to which apes have theory
of mind, there is no doubt that most humans have theory of mind abilities that surpass
those of both apes and monkeys (Dunbar 1996; Frith 1989; Happe 1994). Most
humans acquire a theory of mind at around 3-4 years of age. Most adults regularly use
this ability to see the world from another individual's point of view. Clearly, theory of
mind could greatly enhance an individual's ability to assess the motivations of others.
This would be useful for high-Machs who wish to deceive gullible low-Machs, and
low-Machs who need to be able to identify and avoid exploitative individuals.
Furthermore, theory of mind may play an important role in purely cooperative
exchanges. For example, Davis notes that when exchanging gifts it is very important
to assess the needs and desires of the other person and to provide a gift of appropriate
value (1992 p.ll):
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'"'We expect that givers put themselves in our shoes, and they should try
to calculate our utility. It is not a matter of calculating the true or
objective value, but of imagining someone else's evaluation: in jargon, it
involves inter-subjectivity."
In other words, providing gifts requires a theory of mind.
This discussion indicates that many different cognitive mechanisms have
evolved to help humans deal with a complex social world. Emotions, inhibition
mechanisms, language and dialects, predispositions towards members of one's own
group, cheat detection mechanisms and theory of mind may all be parts of human
social intelligence. Some of these processes, such as theory of mind and inhibition, are
biological characteristics that have been shaped by biological evolution. Other
processes, such as in-group favorouitism, the tendency to be manipulative, or feeling
guilty following deception, may be more strongly controlled by the social
environment. In most cases, it is likely that both evolutionary and social forces shape
cooperative and competitive behaviours.
The point is, that evolution has armed our minds with the skills required to
solve the problem of when to cooperate, and when to cheat. These skills may have
evolved as an evolutionary arms race between high-Machs (who need to seek out
gullible cooperators) and low-Machs (who need to seek out fellow cooperators while
defending themselves against exploiters). Indeed Trivers (1971) suggests that the
expansion of the human brain may have been the result of a cognitive arms race
fuelled by the evolution of cooperation. But, as we have already seen, other primates
live in a "complex social world", and also have sophisticated social intelligence. Why,
then, do human cooperative relationships require this extra cognitive support? Many
of the elements that have contributed to the evolution of human cooperation have
already been discussed. Hominid evolution occurred in an arid environment, in the
context of increased dependency on animal based products and escalating female
energetic costs. This research has shown that all of these factors have contributed to
the evolution of cooperation in humans, and thus the evolution of human social
intelligence. However, I believe that it was the evolution of cooperation between
males and females in particular, that placed the greatest cognitive demands on our
hominid ancestors. This reasons for this will become clear in the next section.
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6.4 The Mental Battle of the Sexes
In the previous section is was shown that people differ in their cooperative and
manipulative tendencies. Because of this, it was argued that the necessities of
assessing the social strategies of others has driven many different aspects of human
intelligence. If this is the case, it implies that there are features of the human social
world that are more complex than the social worlds of other primates, including the
chimpanzee. Dunbar (1993) argues that the greater complexity of human social lives
is due to the large size of human social groups. Humans require a more advanced
social intelligence simply to keep track of large numbers of different social
relationships. However, many New World monkeys live in groups as large as, or
larger than, those of humans and do not appear to require larger brains in order to
keep track of other group members. More importantly, it is not clear why a greater
quantity of social relationships would select for specific cognitive devices such as
theory of mind. It seems more likely that different types of social relationships will
impose different cognitive demands. For instance, the rules "always cooperate with
sisters" or "always defect against strangers" may be very effective without requiring
sophisticated mental processes. In contrast, the rule "only cooperate with non-
relatives if they cooperated with you in the past over a resource of similar value" may
require rather more sophisticated mental processes to employ successfully.
Which types of social relationships are the most cognitively demanding?
Barber and Raffiled (unpublished text, cited in Wilson et al. 1996) looked at different
types of social relationships in order to assess how manipulative they tend to be. They
found that female-female interactions were the least manipulative and that male-male
interactions tended to be highly manipulative. Most interestingly, manipulative
behaviour by both sexes was greatest during male-female interactions. This suggests
that inter-sex interactions may be more cognitively demanding than same sex
interactions. This section explores why this should be, and examines some of the
mental mechanisms that may have evolved in order to support inter-sex relationships.
I have argued in this thesis that the sexual division of labour, whereby males
provide animal food for females and their offspring, evolved as a response to high
female energetic costs (compared with male energetic costs). That is, male
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provisioning is a paternal care strategy. Hawkes (1990, 1991, 1993, see also Hawkes
et al. 1991) argues that large animal hunting by males is not a paternal care strategy at
all. Rather, it is a method of intra-sexual competition, whereby successful hunters hope
to gain status and attract mates (Hawkes 1993 p.341):
"If those who provide public goods [large game] are listened to and
watched more closely than others and favored as neighbors and
associates, they have a larger, readier pool ofpotential allies and mates."
Hawkes and her co-workers argue that among the Hadza the purpose of
hunting is to attract females. This hypothesis is based on their analysis of Hadza
foraging strategies. Among the Hadza, hunting large game benefits the group as a
whole by providing more calories per head than other hunting or foraging strategies.
But, at an individual level it is a risky strategy because the likelihood of catching an
animal on any given day is very low. The problem is that big game hunting is
unpredictable. Among the Hadza, big game hunting yields average returns of 4.9 kg
per day. However, as a group, hunters killed or scavenged only one large animal every
four days, and each individual hunter could only expect to take one large animal per
month (Hawkes et al. 1991). Hawkes et al. argue that other foraging strategies such
as pursuing small game or gathering plant products would provide more reliable
returns than big game hunting. They point out that men appear to target resources
that are widely shared (Hawkes 1991, 1993; Hawkes et al. 1991). For instance, while
Ache men gain about 1,340 kcallhr through hunting large animals and gathering honey
only 13% of these food sources provision their own family (Hawkes 1993). In
contrast, Ache women earn about 1,220 kcallhr gathering plant foods but around 48%
is consumed by their own family. Since men seem to pursue large game at the expense
of more reliable foraging strategies, Hawkes et al. conclude that the purpose of
hunting is to "show off" to potential mates.
Hill and Kaplan (1994) disagree with Hawkes and colleagues. They argue that
among the Ache large game hunting is a very successful foraging strategy. Because
meat is widely shared Ache men contribute greater than 85% of the total caloric
intake of the group (Hill et al. 1987). Hill and Kaplan emphasise the nutritional
benefits of large game hunting, and stress its importance as part of a network of
reciprocal relationships which may also involve sexual access. In contrast, Hawkes
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and her co-workers play down the nutritional benefits of big game hunting, stressing
that meat is an unpredictable, and thus unreliable resource. However, it is difficult to
understand why hunting would be a good way of "showing off" your value as a mate,
if meat was not a resource desired by females. Riches explicitly links meat, prestige
and mating success in Northwest Coast Indian societies, arguing (1984, p.240):
"hunters who claim prestige competitively advance their superiority as
food suppliers. Since the provisioning of food - and especially the meat of
'prestigious' big game - reflects the complementarity of male and female
tasks, the reason for which hunters promote prestige values is, I argue, to
distinguish themselves as especially desirable partners in marriage."
It seems clear that in some societies, such as those described by Hawkes and
Riches, hunting is a good mate-attraction strategy. In these societies, males tend to
devote little time to direct child care (e.g. holding, playing and carrying),
concentrating their efforts on hunting (Hurtado and Hill 1992). Draper and
Harpending (1988, see also Draper 1989) refer to these groups as 'father absent' and
point out that among hunter-gatherers they are most common in rich, stable
environments. Other hunter-gatherer groups which are 'father present' tend to be
found in harsher, highly seasonal or less stable habitats. An example of a father-
present society is the Hiwi of Southwestern Venezuela (Hurtado and Hill 1992).
These people live in an environment in which food availability is low, and malnutrition
is a considerable risk. Male provisioning is an important determinant of child mortality
among the Hiwi, and during the poor season males provide around 90% of the food
items consumed. Hiwi males participate in other aspects of child care, such as holding
and monitoring, in addition to their provisioning activities. Other populations in which
paternal investment appears to be high are the Iflaluk (Betzig and Turke 1992) and
the Aka pygmies (Hewlett 1992).
Hurtado and Hill (1992) compared the social systems of the Hiwi and the
Ache and concluded that both mating and paternal investment are important aspects
of male reproductive strategies. Whether males choose to be show-offs (or Cads in
Dawkins' (1989) terminology) or provisioners (Dads) depends upon the
socioecological context. If the opportunities for extra-pair matings are great, then it
pays for males to invest more time and energy in attracting mates. On the other hand,
under harsh environmental conditions male investment may be essential in order to
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insure offspring survival. It is interesting to note, in this context, that the models
presented in the previous chapter would also predict that paternal care is most likely
in poorer and/or more seasonal habitats.
The literature on male mating strategies seems to suggest that each human
group can be characterised by a single male strategy, whether Cad or Dad (see, for
example Draper 1989: Draper and Harpending 1988; Hawkes 1990, 1991, 1993;
Hawkes et al. 1991; Hewlett 1992; Hurtado and Hill 1992). However, it is likely that
both Cads and Dads will be found within single populations. For instance, Bleige Bird
and Bird (1997) have found the presence of both male strategies among the Merriam
of the Torres Strait. A large part of the Merriam diet is made up of turtle meat, and
turtle hunting is carried out all year round. During the turtle's feeding and mating
season turtle hunting can be risky and expensive, involving (Bleige Bird and Bird
1997 p.54): "long travel times, high speed pursuits in motorised craft and dangerous
hand-capture methods." Only a few, usually young, males participate in these hunts
and the fiuits of their labour are widely shared during feasts, rather than being used
for household consumption. During the nesting season the energetic costs of hunting
and the risks involved are low, since turtles are easy to find and capture. During this
season the majority of the turtle meat is shared only with close neighbours for
household consumption. Bleige Bird and Bird conclude that two different
reproductive strategies are practised by the Merriam men, which are associated with
age and marital status. Young, unmarried men engage in high-risk hunting from which
they gain very little nutritional reward, but great social status through their generous
distribution of the meat. Married men, on the other hand, concentrate on low risk
hunting through which they can provide meat for their family and closest neighbours.
Males, therefore, appear to hunt for two rather different reasons: showing off
(the Cad strategy) or provisioning (the Dad strategy). Some males may follow one or
other strategy for the whole of their lives. Other males may switch strategies
depending on age, status and opportunity. These two hunting strategies correspond
with the two sexual strategies identified by Buss and Schmitt (1993, see also Buss
1989). Buss and Schmitt describe males as either short-term strategists, who pursue
short-term relationships with the aim of mating with as many females as possible, or
alternatively, as long term strategists who invest heavily in a single female with a view
to long-term, exclusive mating access. Both long-term and short-term strategies have
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costs and benefits (Buss and Schmitt 1993), and both strategies may be practised by a
single male at different life stages.
In the previous section it was argued that the presence of low-Machs and
high-Machs in the same population creates complex social conundrums. Similarly, the
presence of two male strategies presents complex reproductive scenarios for both
sexes (Buss 1989: Buss and Schmitt 1993). Male short-term strategists require the
social skills to deceive females into believing they are willing to provide resources in
the long-term. A female who mates with a short-term strategist faces high costs, since
there will be little investment from the male and she may deter other potential long-
term strategists. Thus, females require the skills necessary to identify and avoid male
Cads. On the other hand, the ideal scenario for a female may be to mate with a short-
term strategist (for his 'good genes') but to form a long-term relationship with a long-
term strategist (for his investment). This in tum presents a problem for male long-term
strategists who must avoid being cuckolded, a strong possibility in a large, mixed sex
group. For both males and females it is important to be able to identify the real
motivations of potential mates. Just as humans appear to have evolved psychological
mechanisms for dealing with cooperative relationships in general, we also appear to
have mental processes designed specifically for our interactions with members of the
opposite sex.
Both males and females appear to have evolved mate preferences which reflect
sex differences in mating strategies. Buss (1989) in a study spanning 37 different
cultures, found that females consistently prefer males who possess traits associated
with high resource acquisition potential. That is, females seek those males who will
best be able to invest in themselves and their offspring. Males, on the other hand, tend
to seek females who possess attributes, such as youth, that signal high fertility.
However, Buss and Schmitt (1993) found that when males were divided into short-
term and long-term strategists there were some telling differences. Short-term
strategists rated physical attractiveness as a more desirable trait in a mate than long-
term strategists did. Furthermore, short-term strategists rated previous sexual
experience as a positive trait. In contrast, long term strategists rated commitment,
faithfulness and sexual loyalty as very important traits in potential partners.
The deceptive tactics employed during courtship appear to have evolved to
exploit the sexual strategies of others. Males attempt to persuade females of their
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resource acquisition potential, while females seek to enhance features that indicate
fertility. Tooke and Camire (1991) found that in inter-sexual interactions male
deceptive tactics include feigned commitment, sincerity, trust and resource acquisition
ability. Female deceptive tactics focus on physical appearance, particularly those
aspects linked to youth. Tooke and Camire describe female deception as passive, in
contrast to the active attempts at deception performed by males. This is not to imply
that all male reproductive strategies involve deception. It is to the advantage of males
who wish to enter into long term partnerships to advertise their intentions honestly.
Hirsch and Paul (1996a,b) asked male subjects to rate different male courtship
behaviours as either honest or deceitful and as pursuing a long-term or a short term
mate. Strategies used to pursue long-term relationships were judged to be honest.
These included interacting with friends and family on dates, talking about plans and
goals, discussing children and wanting a friendship before embarking on a sexual
relationship. Particularly important was the amount of time, energy and money
invested in the relationship. Hirsch and Paul argue that high investment is an honest
signal of a man's commitment to the relationship. In contrast, behaviours attributed to
short term strategists were judged to be manipulative, exploitative and threatening.
Hirsch and Paul (1996b) point out that when males are pursuing a long-term
strategy then the interests of males and females are congruent. However, when males
pursue a short-term strategy, the interests of males and females are likely to be
diametrically opposed. Thus, it is particularly important for females to be able to
detect deception in males. Tooke and Camire suggest that over the course of
evolution male deception tactics and female detection abilities have co-evolved (1991
p.361):
"As deceptive self-presentation by males in ancestral environments
became a more and more successful strategy for obtaining copulations, it
is reasonable to assume that it was countered by an increase in the ability
of females to detect increasingly more subtle verbal and non-verbal cues
correlated with male deception."
While female success at detecting the true intentions of males is mixed (Tooke
and Camire 1991), several lines of evidence suggest strong selection for detection
mechanisms in females. Females are consistently better than males at picking up on
non-verbal cues associated with deception (Tooke and Camire 1991). Females are
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also better than males at verbal tasks (Kimura 1993). In the face recognition tests,
discussed in the previous section, Mealey et al. (1996) found that females were
particularly good at remembering the faces of low-status threatening males and high-
status trustworthy males. Females in this experiment may be picking out males that
they perceive to be short-term or long-term strategists. Overall, these observations
suggest that females may be better than males at using verbal and non-verbal
behaviour to ascertain motivations.
Tooke and Camire (1991) suggest that females may have better theory of
mind abilities than males. They assert that the ability to accurately appraise another
person's intentions may be particularly important to females during mixed sex
interactions. While there is no clear evidence that females do have superior theory of
mind ability, females are more likely than males to take another person's view during
interactions (Tooke and Camire 1991). However, theory of mind would clearly also
be advantageous to males during inter-sexual interactions. Male Cads need to be able
to identify gullible females, while Dads need to be able to assess the potential fertility
and faithfulness of prospective mates. At the bottom line, the consequences of failing
to accurately determine the intentions of a prospective mate could be dire for long-
term strategists of both sexes: Male Dads could end up investing in another male's
offspring; females who mate with Cads could be stranded with minimal investment
from the male and with diminished prospects of attracting a long-term mate. It would
seem difficult to underestimate the usefulness of theory of mind when choosing a
mate.
In conclusion, there is considerable variation in the sexual strategies used by
males and females both between and within populations. Male hunting strategies may
serve two rather different purposes: provisioning or mate-competition. Similarly, male
mating strategies may be categorised as seeking 'quality' or 'quantity'. When mixed
sexual strategies are present within a population, it is very important for individuals to
be able to identify the true intentions of others. This is especially true when pair-
bonding occurs within groups containing many other adults ofboth sexes, as it does in
humans. Avoiding mate desertion and ensuring paternity certainty are considerable
problems for females and males respectively. For these reasons, interactions between
males and females may be the most cognitive1y challenging of all. Failure to
successfully manage these relationships may have more disastrous consequences in
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terms of reproductive success, than failure in relationships with individuals of the
same sex. I proposed earlier that male provisioning would have become an important
aspect of human social organisation between 500,000 and 100,000 years ago. If this is
true, then the 'mental battle of the sexes' would also have taken place at this time. As
brain size began to increase, and the energetic costs of reproduction for females
increased, then so began the co-evolution of mate attraction strategies, deceptive
strategies, detection techniques and theory of mind. These abilities in themselves may
have also selected for increasing brain size creating a feedback loop between these
different processes.
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6.5 Concluding Remarks
This thesis has demonstrated the usefulness of game theory in investigating the
evolution of social groups in humans and other animals. It has also shown the
importance of recognising that individuals differ in their motivations due to
differences in characteristics such as age, sex and status. It is these differences that
create the complex behaviours that we see in the living world. This research has
focused on just one of these differences: sex. It has shown that we should expect
males and females to differ in their cooperative and competitive strategies, both with
their own sex and in their interactions with the opposite sex. This is because the
energetic cost of producing offspring differs for males and females. It has also been
shown that the evolution of paternal care can be understood as part of this
cooperative framework. That is, when the energetic cost of reproduction for the
female greatly exceeds that for the male, then male care giving may evolve.
In seeking to understand the evolution ofany animal society, it is vital to study
male and female anatomy, biology, behaviour and cognition not as individual entities
but in terms of how they relate to each other. This research has shown that this
approach can be constructive in studying the evolution of hominid social groups. In
the transition from the australopithecines to early Homo there were likely to have
been profound changes in hominid social structure due to changes in the relationship
between male and female energetic costs of reproduction. Female energetic costs are
predicted to have increased, compared with male energetic costs, due to changes in
body size dimorphism, brain size and diet. To compensate for these elevated female
costs, it is proposed that at this time there was an increase in female cooperation. An
increase in male cooperation is likely to have occurred between 500,000 to 100,000
years ago due to further increases in female energetic costs related to an exponential
increase in brain size. This suggests that the social groups of archaic Homo sapiens
involved male care giving, the formation of pair bonds and the sexual division of
labour. In this final chapter it has been proposed that this new social structure would
have presented new cognitive challenges to both sexes. Future research in this area
should yield interesting results.
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APPENDICES
The following appendices provide the computer codes for the models used in this
thesis. All the programs were written in C, and compiled using the Borland Turbo
C++ compiler. An outline is given for each program in English. These oulines are not
comprehensive, but serve as a basic guide to the programs.
Each program has several parts: (1) A main program which manages the flow of the
code; (2) a definitions file (e.g. dilemdef.h) which defines basic structures and
variables; (3) one or more calls files (e.g. dilcalls.h) which activiates all the sub-
routines.
291
Appendix 1: Control Program (1)
~---~-
Almendix 1: Control Program
A1.1. Basic Outline
start
user sets cost of reproduction (RC)
set run counter = 0
While run counter < 30 do this:
{
Generate 650 agents at random, where each agent has
- 1 strategy string
- score = 0
set generation counter = 0
set offspring counter =0
While generation counter < 20,000 do this:
{
while offspring counter < 650 do this:
{
Basic outline
1. Pick two agents at random
2. These agents play 100 games of the Prisoner's
Dilemma according to their strategy strings. Each
game is scored according to the Prisoner'd Dilemma
pay-off matrix. Points gained are added to each
agent's score
3. Pick two new agents at random
4. If each agent has enough points to reproduce (RC)
they reproduce by crossover and mutation of their
strategy stri ngs
Two new offspring are added to a separate offspring
RC is subtracted from each player's score
The offspring counter is increased by +2
}
Replace adult population with offspring
Set offspring counter =0
Set all scores = 0
Generation counter is increased by +1
}
Collate and print results
run counter is increased by +1
}
End
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A1.2. Main program
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "dildef1.h"
#include "dilcaIl1.h"
int size;
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
size = atoi(argv[1]);
Main program
r population size (= 650) */
Agents *adults = (Agents *) calloc(size, sizeof(Agents»; /*create arrays of agents & offspring */
Agents *offspring = (Agents *) calloc(size, sizeof(Agents»;
Sumstrat *stratarray = (Sumstrat *) calloc(RUN, stzeotrsumstran):
Avgscore *avgarray = (Avgscore *) calloc(RUN, sizeof(Avgscore»; /*to calculate results
*/
*/
check_arrays(adults, offspring, stratarray, avgarray);
int rescount = 0;
int gen = 1;
int reprocost;
int end;
int i,j;
int offno = 0;
int run = O·,
int a =O·,
int lasta = 0;
float average = 0;
int avgcount =0;
float stratsummary[STRATSIZE];
srand(time(NULL»;
user(&reprocost, &end);
while (run < RUN)
{
printf("\nRUN %d: ", run);
init_adults(adults, size);
while (gen <= end)
{
while (offno < size)
{
i = 1+ (randO%(size-1»;
do{
j = 1+ (randO%(size-1»;
} while U==i);
average += dilemma(adults, i, j);
/* check memory space */
/* results conter */
/* generation counter */
r cost of reproduction, RC */
/* no. generations to run (= 20000) */
/* general counters */
/* offspring counter */
/* run number */
r to keep track of results */
r records strategies used */
/* seed random number generator*/
r set parameters */
/* initialise results files */
r RUN = 30 */
r start of a new run */
r generate adult strategies at random*/
/* start of new generation */
r pick pairs at random to interact */
/* play Prisoner's Dilemma
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avgcount +=2;
i = 1+ (randO%(size-1»;
do{
j = 1+ (randO%(size-1»;
} while G==i);
Main program
/* and calculate results */
r pick pairs at random to reproduce */
r Have the agents gained enough points to reproduce? */
if «adults[i].score >= reprocost) && (adultsU).score >= reprocost)
{
}
reproduction(adults, i, j, offspring, offno);
adults[i].score -= reprocost;
adultsO).score -= reprocost;
offno += 2',
}
}
r record results every ten generations */
if «gen ==1) II (gen%50 == 0»
{
avgarray[run].avg[a] = (float) average/avgcount;
a++',
countmoves(adults, stratarray, size, run);
rescount++;
}
if (gen% 1000 == 0)
printf('GEN %d, ", gen);
average= 0;
avgcount = 0;
swap(adults, offspring, size);
offno = 0;
gen++;
/* reproduction */
/* Players score decreased by RC
r increase offspring counter */
/* reset values */
/* end of run, print results */
for (i=0; i < STRATSIZE; i++)
{
stratarray[run].strat[i] = (float) stratarray[run].strat[i] / rescount;
}
printstratsum(stratarray, run);
}
run++;
rescount = 0;
lasta = a;
a =O',
gen = 1;
}
printavg(avgarray, run, lasta);
return (0);
/* reset values */
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A1.3. Definitions [dildef1.h}
#define STRATSIZE 22
#define LASTROUND 100
#define RUN 30
struct agents {
int strategy[STRATSIZE];
int score;
};
typedef struct agents Agents;
struct avgscore{
float avg[500];
};
typedef struct avgscore Avgscore;
struct sumstrat{
long float strat[STRATSIZE];
};
typedef struct sumstrat Sumstrat;
dildefl.h
/* Length of Strategy string (21 +1) */
r Number of rounds of PD */
/* Number of runs
/* for playing Pris. dilem. */
/* tally of score */
r For results */
r For results */
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A1.4. Functions [dilcaIl1.h]
/* Function prototypes */
dilca1l1.h
void check_arrays(Agents *A, Agents *off, Sumstrat *strat, Avgscore *avg);
void init_adults(Agents *adults, int size);
void user(int *cost, int *Iast);
float dilemma(Agents *player, int one, int two);
int score(int p1, int p2);
void reproduction (Agents *parents, int male, int female, Agents *child, int childno);
void swap(Agents *parents, Agents *children, int size);
void countmoves(Agents *chromosome, Sumstrat *sum, int size, int run);
void printavg(Avgscore *adults, int lastrun, int gencount);
void printstratsum(Sumstrat *strat, int run);
void init_files(void);
II check_arrays: Check that there is enough memory for the arrays
void check_arrays(Agents *A, Agents *off, Sumstrat *strat, Avgscore *avg)
{
if (A == NULL){
printf("Error allocating memory for adults\n");
exit(1 );
}
if (off == NULL){
printf("Error allocating memory for offspring\n");
exit(1 );
}
if (strat == NULL){
printf("Error allocating memory for strategy array\n");
exit(1 );
}
if (avg == NULL){
printf("Error allocating memory for average array\n");
exit(1);
}
}
/* init_adults: intialise adults */
void init adults(Agents *adults, int size)
{
int i, j;
adults[i].strategyU] = randO%2;
for(i=1; i < size; i++)
{
for 0=1; j < STRATSIZE; j++)
{
}
adults[i].score = 0;
}
}
r init_files: open results files */
void init files(void)
{
FILE *avgptr;
/*randomly fill array with 1sand Os*/
/* initial score = 0 */
r files to store results */
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FILE *stratptr;
stratptr = fopen("sumstrat.dat","w");
avgptr = fopen("average.dat", "W") ;
fclose(stratptr) ;
fclose(avgptr);
}
dilcall1,h
r user: asks user for variables i.e. cost of reproduction, number of generations */
void user( int *cost, int *Iast)
{
printf("\nEXPERIMENT ONE\n");
printf("\n\nPlease enter the cost of reproduction:\n");
scanf("%d", cost);
printf("\nHow many generations would you like to run?\n");
scanf("%d", last);
}
1* dilemma: playing the Prisoner's Dilemma "t
/* Note: 'round two' and 'score ref are game templates which indicate to the players which
position on their strategy array they should refer to for their next move. ego In the score ref
array: position 1 = mymove; position 2 = my opponents move; position3 = my move on
previous round; position 4 = opponents move in previous round. 1 = cooperation, °=
defection . Position 5 tells me where to look on my strategy array for my next move, position
6 tells my opponent where to look on its array.*/
float dilemma(Agents *player, int one, int two)
{
int round = 1;
int moves[4] = {a}; r records last two moves of each agent */
int roundtwo[4][4] = {{1 ,0,2,3},{O,1,3,2},{1,1,4,4},{0,0,5,5}};
int scoreref(16][6] = {{1,1,1,1,6,6}, {0,1,1,1,7,8}, {1,O,1,1,8,7}, {1,1,0,1,9,10},
{1 ,1,1,0,1 O,9},{1,1,O,O,11,11}, {0,0,1 ,1,12,12}, {1,0,0,1,13, 14},
{0,1,1 ,0,14,13}, {O,1 ,0,1,15, 16},{1 ,0,1,0,16,15}, {1,O,O,0, 17,18},
{O,1,O,O,18, 17}, {O,O,1 ,0,19,20}, {O,O,O,1,20,19}, {O,O,O,O,21 ,21}};
int i;
int initscore1 = player[one].score;
int initscore2 = player[two].score;
float addavg = 0;
/* take first turn */
/* agents refer to first position in their strategy array */
r initial scores */
/* for results */
if (round == 1)
{
moves[O] = player[one].strategy[1];
moves[1] = player[two].strategy[1];
player[one].score += score(moves[O], moves[1]); /* Add points won to scores */
player[two].score += score(moves[1], moves[O]);
moves[2] = moves[O];
moves[3] = moves[1];
round++;
}
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r Round 2 */
r Previous moves are compared to 'roundtwo' reference array to determine behviour
in this round */
if (round == 2)
{
for(i=O; i <=3; i++)
{
if«roundtwo[i][O] == moves[2]) && (roundtwo[i][1] == moves[3]»
{
moves[O] = player[one].strategy[(roundtwo[i][2])];
moves[1] = player[two].strategy[(roundtwo[i][3])];
break;
}
}
player[one].score += score(moves[O], moves[1]); /* Add points won to scores */
player[two].score += score(moves[1], moves[O]);
round++;
}
/* All other rounds */
/* The moves made by each player in the last two rounds are compared to
the scoreref reference array to determine behaviour in the current round*/
for (round = 3; round <= LASTROUND; round++)
{
for 0=0; i <=15; i++)
{
if«scoreref[i][O] == moves[O]) && (scoreref[i][1] == moves[1]) &&
(scoreref[i][2] == moves[2]) && (scoreref[i][3] == moves[3]»
{
moves[2] = moves[O];
moves[3] = moves[1];
moves[O] = player[one].strategy[(scoreref[i][4])];
moves[1] = player[two].strategy[(scoreref[i][5])];
break;
}
}
player[one].score += score(moves[O], moves[1]);
player[two].score += score(moves[1], moves[O]);
}
r calculate average socre per player per game, and retum value to main program */
addavg = «float)(player[one].score - initscore1)/LASTROUND);
addavg +=«float)(player[two].score - initscore2)/LASTROUND);
retum addavg;
}
/* score: calculate scores */
int score(int p1, int p2)
{
int addscore = 0;
if «p1 == 1) && (p2 == 1»
{
addscore = 3;
/* both cooperate */
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}
if «p1 == 1) && (p2 == 0»
{
addscore = 0; /*0*/
}
if «p1 == 0) && (p2 == 1»
{
addscore = 5; /*5*/
}
if «p1 == 0) && (p2 == 0»
{
addscore =1;
}
return (addscore);
}
dilca1l1.h
/* P1 cooperates, opponent does not.
P1 receives suckers payoff */
r P1 defects, its opponent coops */
/* both defect */
/* Reproduction */
/* Two agents cross their startegy codes to create two new offspring.*/
/* There is a small chance of mutation */
void reproduction (Agents *parents, int male, int female, Agents *child, int childno)
{
int crossno = 0;
int c,i;
int mutate;
crossno = randO%STRATSIZE; r randomly select crossover point */
for(c=1; c <=crossno; c++)
{
child[childno].strategy[c] = parents[male].strategy[c]; /* crossover */
child[childno+1 ].strategy[c] = parents[female].strategy[c];
}
for(c= crossno+1; c < STRATSIZE; c++)
{
child[childno].strategy[c] = parents[female].strategy[c];
child[childno+1 ].strategy[c] = parents[male].strategy[c];
}
if (randO% 10000 <= 2)
{
mutate = (1+ randO%21);
if (child[childno].strategy[mutate] == 0)
{ child[childno].strategy[mutate] = 1; }
else
{ child[childno].strategy[mutate] = 0; }
}
if (randO%10000 <= 2)
{
mutate = (1+ randO%21);
if (child[childno+1 ].strategy[mutate] == 0)
/* mutation?? */
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{ child[childno+1 ].strategy[mutate] = 1; }
else
{ child[childno+1].strategy[mutate] = 0; }
}
}
1* Swap: Replace parent generation with offspring */
1* When enough offspring have been created to replace the parent generation,
then offspring become the new adults */
void swap(Agents *parents, Agents *children, int size)
{
int i,j;
for(i=1; i< size; i++)
{
for(j=1; j < STRATSIZE; j++)
{
parents[i].strategy[j] = children[i].strategy[j];
}
parents[i].score = 0;
}
}
dilcallJ.h
/* Countrnoves: Calculates the percentage of agents cooperating for each gene in the
strategy array */
void countmoves(Agents *chromosome, Sumstrat *sum, int size, int run)
{
float onecount = 0;
int i,j;
for(i=O; i < STRATSIZE; i++)
{
for(j = 0; j < size; j++)
{
if(chromosome[j].strategy[i] == 1)
{ onecount++;}
}
onecount = «onecount/size)*100);
sum[run].strat[i] += onecount;
onecount = 0;
}
}
/* Printavg: Records the average scores in results files */
void printavg(Avgscore *adults, int lastrun, int gencount)
{
FILE *avgptr;
int i=O;
int run = 0;
if«avgptr = fopen("average.dat", "a"» == NULL)
printf("the average male file cannot be opened\n");
else
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for(i=O; i < gencount; i++)
{
for(run=O; run < lastrun; run++)
fprintf(avgptr, " %.2f,", adults[run].avg[i]);
fprintf(avgptr, "\n");
}
fclose(avgptr);
}
dilca1l1.h
/* Printstratsum: Records the %cooperate alleles at each locus on the strategy string
*/
void printstratsum(Sumstrat *strat, int run)
{
FILE *stratptr;
int i;
if«stratptr = fopen("sumstrat.dat", "a"» == NULL)
printf("file cannot be opened");
else
{
for (i=0; i < STRATSIZE; i++)
fprintf(stratptr, " %.2f,", strat[run].strat[i]);
}
fprintf(stratptr, "\n");
fclose(stratptr);
}
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AQpendix 2: Model 1 (The Prisoner's Dilemma in a Mixed Sex
Environment
A2.1. Basic Ouline
start
user sets cost of reproduction for males (MRC) and females (FRC)
set run counter =°
While run counter < 30 do this:
{
Generate 650 agents at random, where each agent has
- sex (M/F)
- 4 strategy strings
- score = 0
set generation counter = 0
set offspring counter =°
While generation counter < 20,000 do this:
{
while offspring counter < 650 do this:
{
1. Pick two agents at random
2. These agents play 100 games of the Prisoner's
Dilemma according to their strategy strings. The
strategy strings used depend on the sex of each
player. Each game is scored according to the
Prisoner's Dilemma pay-off matrix. Points gained are
added to the each agent's score
3. Pick two new agents at random
4. If the agents are of opposite sex, and each agent has
enough points to reproduce (FRC or MRC) they
reproduce by crossover and mutation of their strategy
strings
Two new offspring are added to a separate offspring
FRC is subtracted from the female's score, and MRC
is subtracted from the male's score
The offspring counter is increased by +2
}
Replace adult population with offspring
Set offspring counter = °
Set all scores = °
Generation counter is increased by +1
}
Collate and print results
run counter is increased by +1
}
End
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A2.2. Main program
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "dildef2.h"
#include "dilcaI2.h"
int size;
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
size =atoi(argv[1]);
int rcmale, rcfemale;
int end;
int i,j;
user(&rcmale, &rcfemale, &end);
int run =O·,
Main program
1/ reads size from command line
1/ costs of reproduction, set by user
1/ no. generations to run (= 20,000)
1/ user sets parameters
II Define variables for adults, offspring and results. 'Agents' are the basic type, and each
II agent has four strategy strings corresponding to the four interaction types 1: male-male
112: male-female interactions, 3: female-female, 4: female-male. The results arrays
record
II strategies and average scores per game.
Agents *adults =(Agents *) calloc(size, sizeof(Agents»;
Agents *offspring = (Agents *) calloc(size, sizeof(Agents»;
Strategy *malemale = (Strategy *) calloc(size, sizeot(Strateqyj):
Strategy *offmalemale =(Strategy *) calloc(size, slzeoftstrateqyj):
Strategy *malefem = (Strategy *) calloc(size, sizeof(Strategy»;
Strategy *offmalefem = (Strategy *) calloc(size, sizeof(Strategy»;
Strategy *femfem = (Strategy *) calloc(size, sizeof(Strategy»;
Strategy *offfemfem =(Strategy *) calloc(size, sizeof'(Strateqyj);
Strategy *femmale = (Strategy *) calloc(size, sizeof(Strategy»;
Strategy *offfemmale = (Strategy *) calloc(size, slzeoftatrateqyj);
Sumstrat *stratmm = (Sumstrat *) calloc(RUN, sizeof(Sumstrat»;
Sumstrat *stratmf =(Sumstrat *) calloc(RUN, sizeoftaurnstratj):
Sumstrat *stratff =(Sumstrat *) calloc(RUN, sizeof(Sumstrat»;
Sumstrat *stratfm =(Sumstrat *) calloc(RUN, sizeot(Sumstratj):
Avgscore *avgmm =(Avgscore *) calloc(RUN, sizeof(Avgscore»;
Avgscore *avgmf =(Avgscore *) calloc(RUN, sizeof(Avgscore»;
Avgscore *avgff =(Avgscore *) calloc(RUN, sizeof(Avgscore»;
Avgscore *avgfm =(Avgscore *) calloc(RUN, sizeof(Avgscore»;
Avgscore *males = (Avgscore *) calloc(RUN, sizeof(Avgscore»;
Avgscore *females =(Avgscore *) calloc(RUN, sizeof(Avgscore»;
check_arrays(adults, malemale, offmalemale, malefem, offmalefem, II check memory space
avgmm, avgmf, males, stratmm, stratmf);
check_arrays(offspring, femfem, offfemfem, femmale, offfemmale,
avgff, avgfm, females, stratff, stratfm);
int gen = 1;
int offno = 0;
int reproflag = 0;
int rescount = 0;
int a =0;
int lasta;
II generation counter
II reproduce when set to 1
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float avgarray[6] = {O};
mm int avgcount[6] = {O};
init_filesO;
srand(time(NULL»;
Main program
II avg. results array:
/I O:males 1: females 2:
/I 3: mf, 4: ff, 5: fm
/I initialise results files
/I seed random number generator
while (run < RUN) /I start new run
{
printf("\nRUN %d..... ", run);
init_adults(adults, size); /I initialise agents
init_strategies(malemale, malefem, femfem, femmale, size);
while (gen <= end)
{
while (offno < size)
{
i = randO%size;
do{
j = randO%size;
} while U==i);
/I start of new generation
/I pick pairs at random to interact
prisdilem(adults, malemale, malefem, femfem, femmale, i,j, avgarray,
avgcount);
i = randO%size;
do{
j = randO%size;
} while U==i);
/I pick pair at random to reproduce
/I test if different sex, and have enough points, if 'yes' then reproflag = 1
/I reproduction involves crossover and mutation of all 4 strategy strings
reproflag = repro_test(adults,i,j, rcmale, rcfemale);
if (reproflag == 1)
{
reproduction(malemale, offmalemale, i, j, offno);
reproduction(malefem, offmalefem, i, j, offno);
reproduction(femfem, offfemfem, i, j, offno);
reproduction(femmale, offfemmale, i, j, offno);
reproflag = 0;
offno += 2;
}
}
if «gen ==1) II (gen%40 == 0»
{
for(i=O; i < 6; i++)
{
avgarray[i] = (float) avgarray[i]/avgcount[i];
}
males[run].avg[a] = avgarray[O];
females[run].avg[a] = avgarray[1];
avgmm[run].avg[a] = avgarray[2];
avgmf[run].avg[a] = avgarray[3);
avgff[run].avg[a) = avgarray[4);
avgfm[run).avg[a) = avgarray[5);
/I record average scores
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a++',
countmoves(malemale, stratmm, size, run);
countmoves(malefem, stratmf, size, run);
countmoves(femfem, stratff, size, run);
countmoves(femmale, stratfm, size, run);
rescount++;
}
if (gen% 100 == 0)
{
printf("Gen%d, ", gen);
}
gen++;
swap(malemale, offmalemale, size);
swap(malefem, offmalefem, size);
swap(femfem, offfemfem, size);
swap(femmale, offfemmale, size);
init_newgen(adults, size);
offno = O·,
for (i=O; i < 6; i++)
{
avgarray[i] = 0;
avgcount[i] = 0;
}
}
Main program
II examine strategies
II offspring become new generation
II calculate % alleles at each locus over entire simulation
for(i=O; i < STRATSIZE; i++)
{
stratmm[run].strat[i] = (float) stratmm[run].strat[i] I rescount;
stratmf(run].strat[i] = (float) stratmf[run].strat[i] I rescount;
stratffIrun].strat[i] = (float) stratff[run].strat[i] I rescount;
stratfm[run].strat[i] = (float) stratfm[run].strat[i] I rescount;
}
}
printstratsum(stratmm, stratmf, stratff, stratfm, run);
run++;
rescount = 0;
lasta = a;
a =O',
gen = 1;
II print strategies
II reset variables
II all 30 runs complete
II print averages
printavg(males, females, avgmm, avgmf, avgff, avgfm, run, lasta);
return (0);
}
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A2.3. Definitions [dildef2.h)
#define STRATSIZE 21
#define LASTROUND 100
#define RUN 30
struct agents{
int score;
int sex;
};
typedef struct agents Agents;
struct strategy{
int strat[STRATSIZE];
};
typedef struct strategy Strategy;
struct avgscore{
float avg[600];
};
typedef struct avgscore Avgscore;
struct sumstrat{
long float strat[STRATSIZE];
};
typedef struct sumstrat Sumstrat;
dildef2.h
//100 rounds of prisoners dilemma per game
II number of runs
110= male, 1 =female
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A2.4. Functions [dilcaI2.h)
dilca1l2.h
void check_arrays(Agents *A, Strategy *S1, Strategy *S2, Strategy *S3, Strategy *S4, avgscore
*AS1,Avgscore *AS2, Avgscore *AS3, Sumstrat *SS1, Sumstrat *SS2);
void user(int *mcost, int *fcost, int *Iast);
void init_adults(Agents *players, int popsize);
void init_newgen(Agents *players, int popsize);
void init_strategies(Strategy *boyboy, Strategy *boygirt, Strategy *girtgirl, Strategy *girlboy,
int popsize);
void prisdilem(Agents *adults, Strategy *malemale, Strategy *malefem, Strategy *femfem,
Strategy *femmale, int i,int j, float average[], int avgcount[]);
float homodilem(Agents *adults, Strategy *player, int one, int two);
void heterodilem(Agents *adults, Strategy *player1, Strategy *player2, int one, int two, float
averageD);
int score(int p1, int p2);
int repro_test(Agents *adults,int p1,int p2, int malecost, int femcost);
void reproduction(Strategy *chromosome, Strategy *child, int p1, int p2, int childno);
void swap(Strategy *parents, Strategy *children, int size);
void countmoves(Strategy *chromosome, Sumstrat *sum, int size, int run);
void printavg(Avgscore *male, Avgscore *fem, Avgscore *mm, Avgscore *mf, Avgscore
*ff, Avgscore *fm, int run, int gencount);
void printstratsum(Sumstrat *mm, Sumstrat *mf, Sumstrat *ff, Sumstrat *fm, int run);
void init_files(void);
1/ Check_arrays: Check that there is enough memory for the arrays
void check_arrays(Agents *A, Strategy *S1, Strategy *S2, Strategy *S3,
Strategy *S4, Avgscore *AS1,Avgscore *AS2, Avgscore *AS3,
Sumstrat *SS1, Sumstrat *SS2)
{
if (A == NULL){
printf("Error allocating memory for adults\n");
exit(1);
}
if (S1 == NULL){
printf("Error allocating memory for malemalestrategy\n");
exit(1);
}
if (S2 == NULL){
printf("Error allocating memory for malemalestrategy\n");
exit(1);
}
if (S3 == NULL){
printf("Error allocating memory for malefem strategy\n");
exit(1);
}
if (S4 == NULL){
printf("Error allocating memory for malefem strategy\n");
exit(1);
}
if (AS1 == NULL){
printf("Error allocating memory for avgscores\n");
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exit(1);
}
if (AS2 == NULL){
printf("Error allocating memory for avgscores\n");
exit(1);
}
if (AS3 == NULLH
printf("Error allocating memory for avgscores\n");
exit(1);
}
if (S51 == NULL){
printf("Error allocating memory for femmale strategy\n");
exit(1);
}
if (SS2 == NULLH
printtr'Error allocating memory for femmale strategy\n");
exit(1);
}
}
/I init_files: clear the files for a new set of results
void init_files(void)
{
FILE *malesptr;
FILE *femsptr;
FILE *mmptr;
FILE *mfptr;
FILE *ttptr;
FILE *fmptr;
FILE *stratmmptr;
FILE *stratmfptr;
FILE *stratttptr;
FILE *stratfmptr;
malesptr =fopen("males.dat","w"); /* open results files */
femsptr =fopen("females.dat","w");
mmptr = fopen("mm.dat","w");
mfptr =fopen("mf.dat","w");
ttptr =fopen("ff.dat", "w");
fmptr =fopen("fm.dat", "w");
fclose(malesptr);
fclose(femsptr) ;
fclose(mmptr);
fclose(mfptr) ;
fclose(ttptr) ;
fclose(fmptr);
stratmmptr =fopen("stratmm.dat","w");
stratmfptr =fopen ("stratmf. dat" ,"w");
stratttptr = fopen("stratff.dat","w");
stratfmptr =fopen("stratfm.dat","w");
fclose(stratmmptr) ;
fclose(stratmfptr) ;
fclose(stratffptr) ;
dilca1l2.h
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fclose(stratfmptr) ;
}
II user: Set costs of reproduction and number of generations
void user(int *mcost, int *fcost, int *Iast)
{
printf("\nEXPERIMENT TWO\n");
printf("\n\nPlease enter the cost of reproduction for males\n");
scanf("%d", mcost);
printf("\n\nPlease enter the cost of reproduction for females\n");
scanf("%d", fcost);
printf("\nHow many generations would you like to run?\n");
scanf("%d", last);
}
IIlnit adults: Initialise adults for score and sex
void init_adults(Agents *players, int popsize)
{
int i;
dilcall2.h
}
for(i=O; i < popsize; i++)
{
players[i].sex = randO%2;
players[i).score = 0;
}
/* 0: male, 1: female */
/* initial score = 0 */
II new_gen: Each generation, assign each agent a sex and a score
void init_newgen(Agents *players, int popsize)
{
int i;
for(i=O; i < popsize; i++)
{
players[i].sex = randO%2;
players[i].score = 0;
}
}
r 0: male, 1: female */
/* initial score = 0 */
II Init_strategies: For first generation only, randomly set strategy strings to 1s and Os
void init_strategies(Strategy *boyboy, Strategy *boygirl, Strategy *girlgirl,Strategy *girlboy,
int popsize)
{
int i,j;
for (i=0; i < popsize; i++)
{
for 0=0; j < STRATSIZE; j++)
{
boyboy[i].stratU] = randO%2;
boygirl[i].stratU] = randO%2;
girigirl[i].stratU] = randO%2;
girlboy[i].stratU] = randO%2;
}
}
}
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/* prisdilem: Manages the playing of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Checks each players
sex, and then sends the appropriate strategy string to the appropriate sub-rountine.
The average score per player per game is recorded in a results array.
void prisdilem(Agents *adults, Strategy *malemale, Strategy *malefem, Strategy *femfem,
Strategy *femmale, int i,int j, float average[], int avgcount[])
{
float addavg = 0;
if «adults[i].sex == 0) && (adultsU].sex == 0»
{
addavg = homodilem(adults, malemale, i, j);
average[O] += addavg;
average[2] += addavg;
avgcount[O] += 2;
avgcount[2] += 2;
}
if «adults[i].sex == 1) && (adultsU].sex == 1»
{
addavg = homodilem(adults, femfem, i, j);
to
average[1] += addavg;
average[4] += addavg;
avgcount[1] += 2;
avgcount[4] += 2;
}
1/ addavg: points scored in games
1/ if both players are male .....
1/ ... send malemale strategy strings to
1/ homodilem sub-routine
1/ add scores to male results
1/ add scores to malemale results
II if both players are female ......
1/ ... send femfem strategy strings
II homodilem sub-routine
II female scores
II femfem scores
if «adults[i].sex == 0) && (adultsU).sex == 1» II .. if player1 is male, player 2 female ...
{ heterodilem(adults, malefem, femmale, i, j, average); II ... send strategy strings to heterodilem
sub-rountine, send the male player first
1/ add results within sub-routine
avgcount[O]++;
avgcount[1 ]++;
avgcount[3]++;
avgcount[5]++;
}
if «adults[i].sex == 1) && (adultsU].sex == 0»
{ . . )heterodilem(adults, malefem, femmale, J, I, average;
avgcount[O]++ ;
avgcount[1 ]++;
avgcount[3]++;
avgcount[5]++;
}
}
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/I homodilem: Prisoner's Dilemma played between agents of the same sex. The main
difference between this and heterodilem is that it in the latter case, average scores
must be recorded within the program. In this case, calculation can be left to the
prisdilem program. In both cases, the logic behind the programming is exactly the
same as in the control, described in Appendix 1.
float homodilem(Agents *adults, Strategy *player, int one, int two)
{
int round = 1;
int moves[4] = {O}; /* records last two moves of each agent */
int roundtwo[4][4] = {{1,O,1,2},{O,1,2,1 },{1,1,3,3},{O,0,4,4}};
int scoreref[16][6] = {{1,1,1,1,5,5}, {O,1,1,1,6,7}, {1,O,1,1,7,6}, {1,1,O,1,8,9},
{1,1,1,O,9,8},{1,1,O,O,1 0,1O}, {O,O,1,1,11,11}, {1,O,O,1,12,13},
{O,1,1,O,13,12}, {O,1,O,1,14,15},{1,O,1,O,15,14}, {1,O,O,O,16,17},
{O,1 ,0,0,17,16}, {O,O,1,O,18,19}, {O,O,O,1,19,18}, {O,O,O,O,20,20}};
int i;
int previousi = 99; /* dummy number. Previous i indicates if
agents are 'locked in'to a type of play */
int initscore1 = adults[one].score;
int initscore2 = adults[two].score;
float addavg = 0;
r initial scores */
/* for results */
/* take first tum */
/* agents refer to first position in their strategy array */
if (round == 1)
{
moves[O] = player[one].strat[O];
moves[1] = player[two].strat[O];
adults[one].score += score(moves[O], moves[1]);
adults[two].score += score(moves[1], moves[O]);
moves[2] = moves[O];
moves[3] = moves[1];
round++;
}
/* Round 2 */
/* Previous moves are compared to 'roundtwo' reference array to determine
behviour in this round */
if«roundtwo[i][O] == moves[2]) && (roundtwo[i][1] == moves[3])
{
moves[O] = player[one] .strat[(roundtwo[i][2])];
moves[1] = player[two].strat[(roundtwo[i][3])];
break;
if (round == 2)
{
for(i=O; i <=3; i++)
{
}
}
adults[one].score += score(moves[O], moves[1]);
adults[two].score += score(moves[1], moves[O]);
round++;
}
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1* All other rounds *1
1* The moves made by each player in the last two rounds are compared to
the scoreref reference array to determine behvaiour in the current round*1
for (round = 3; round <= LASTROUND; round++)
{
for (i=O; i <=15; i++)
{
if«scoreref[i)[O] == moves[O]) && (scoreref[i)[1] == moves[1]) &&
(scoreref[i][2] == moves[2]) && (scoreref[i][3] == moves[3]»
{
moves[2] = moves[O];
moves[3] = moves[1];
moves[O] = player[one].strat[(scoreref[i][4])];
moves[1] = player[two].strat[(scoreref[i][5])];
break;
}
}
/* calculate scores *1
adults[one].score += score(moves[O], moves[1]);
adults[two].score += score(moves[1], moves[O]);
}
addavg = «f1oat)(adults[one].score - initscore1)/LASTROUND);
addavg += «f1oat)(adults[two].score - initscore2)/LASTROUND);
return addavg;
}
1/ Heterodilem: Prisoner's Dilemma when agents are of different sex
void heterodilem(Agents *adults, Strategy *player1, Strategy *player2,
int one, int two, float averaqejl)
{
int round = 1;
int moves[4] = {a}; /* records last two moves of each agent *1
int roundtwo[4][4] = {{1 ,0,1,2},{O,1,2,1},{1, 1,3,3},{0,0,4,4}};
int scoreref[16][6] = {{1,1,1,1,5,5}, {O,1,1,1,6,7}, {1,O,1,1,7,6},
{1,1,0,1,8,9}, {1,1,1,0,9,8},{1,1 ,0,0,10,1 O},
{0,0,1 ,1,11,11}, {1,0,0,1,12,13}, {O,1,1,0,13,12},
{O,1 ,0,1,14,15},{1 ,0,1,0,15,14}, {1,O,0,0,16,17},
{O,1,O,0,17,16}, {O,O,1,0,18,19}, {O,O,O,1,19,18}, {0,0,O,O,20,20}};
int i;
int previousi = 99; r dummy number. Previous i indicates if
agents are 'locked in'to a type of play "l
int initscore1 = adults[one].score; 1* initial scores */
int initscore2 = adults[two].score;
I" take first tum "I
/* agents refer to first position in their strategy array */
if (round == 1)
{
moves[O] = player1 [one].strat[O];
moves[1] = player2[two].strat[O];
adults[one].score += score(moves[O], moves[1]);
adults[two].score += score(moves[1], moves[O]);
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moves[2] = moves[O];
moves[3] = moves[1];
round-»:,
}
1* Round 2 *1
1* Previous moves are compared to 'roundtwo' reference array to determine
behviour in this round *1
if (round == 2)
{
for(i=O; i <=3; i++)
{
if«roundtwo[i][O] == moves[2]) && (roundtwo[i][1] == moves[3]»
{
moves[O] = player1 [one].strat[(roundtwo[i][2])];
moves[1] = player2[two].strat[(roundtwo[i][3])];
break;
}
}
adults[one].score += score(moves[O], moves[1]);
adults[two].score += score(moves[1], moves[O]);
round-«:I
}
1* All other rounds *1
1* The moves made by each player in the last two rounds are compared to
the scoreref reference array to determine behvaiour in the current round*1
for (round = 3; round <= LASTROUND; round++)
{
for (i=O; i <=15; i++)
{
if«scoreref[i][O] == moves[O]) && (scoreref[i][1] == moves[1]) &&
(scoreref[i][2] == moves[2]) && (scoreref[i][3] == moves[3]»
{
moves[2] = moves[O];
moves[3] = moves[1];
moves[O] = player1 [one].strat[(scoreref[i][4])];
moves[1] = player2[two].strat[(scoreref[i][5])];
break;
}
}
1* calculate scores *1
adults[one].score += score(moves[O], moves[1]);
adults[two].score += score(moves[1], moves[O]);
}
average[O] += «f1oat)(adults[one].score - initscore1)/LASTROUND);
average[3] += «float)(adults[one].score - initscore1)/LASTROUND);
average[1] += «float)(adults[two].score - initscore2)/LASTROUND);
average[5] += «float)(adults[two].score - initscore2)/LASTROUND);
}
dilcall2.h
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/* score: calculate scores */
int score(int p1, int p2)
{
int addscore =0;
dilca1l2.h
if «p1 == 1) && (p2 == 1»
{
addscore = 3;
}
if «p1 == 1) && (p2 == 0»
{
addscore =0; /*0*/
}
if «p1 == 0) && (p2 == 1»
{
addscore =5; /*5*/
}
if «p1 == 0) && (p2 == 0»
{
addscore =1;
}
return (addscore);
}
/* both cooperate "t
/* P1 cooperates, opponent does not.
P1 receives suckers payoff */
/* P1 defects, its opponent coops */
r both defect */
/I reprotest: checks to see if pair are of different sexes and have enough
/I points to mate. If yes, points are subtracted from scores.
int repro_test(Agents *adults,int p1 ,int p2, int malecost, int femcost)
{
int flag =0;
if «adults[p1 ].sex == 0) && (adults[p2].sex == 1»
{
if «adults[p1 ].score >= malecost) && (adults[p2].score >= terncost)
{
flag = 1;
adults[p1 ].score -= malecost;
adults[p2].score -= femcost;
}
}
if «adults[p2].sex == 0) && (adults[p1].sex == 1»
{
if «adults[p2].score >= malecost) && (adults[p1].score >= terncostj)
{
flag = 1;
adults[p2].score -= malecost;
adults[p1 ].score -= femcost;
}
}
return flag;
}
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II reproduction: reproduction by crossover and mutation of strategy strings
void reproduction(Strategy *parents, Strategy *child, int male, int female, int childno)
{
int crossno = 0;
int c,i;
int mutate;
crossno = randO%STRATSIZE; 1* randomly select crossover point *1
for(c=O; c <=crossno; c++)
{
child[childno] .strat[c] = parents[male].strat[c];
child[childno+1 ].strat[c] = parents[female].strat[c];
}
for(c= crossno+1; c < STRATSIZE; c++)
{
child[childno] .strat[c] = parents[female].strat[c];
child[childno+1 ].strat[c] = parents[male].strat[c];
}
r mutation, 1/5000 probability *1
if (randO%10000 <= 2)
{
mutate = randO%21;
if (child[childno].strat[mutate] == 0)
{ child[childno].strat[mutate] = 1; }
else
{ child[childno].strat[mutate] = 0; }
}
if (randO%10000 <= 2)
{
mutate = randO%21;
if (child[childno+1 ].strat[mutate] == 0)
{ child[childno+1].strat[mutate] = 1; }
else
{ child[childno+1 ].strat[mutate] =0; }
}
}
II When enough offspring have been created to replace the parent generation,
IIthen offspring become the new adults
void swap(Strategy *parents, Strategy *children, int size)
{
int i,j;
for(i=O; i< size; i++)
{
forO=O; j < STRATSIZE; j++)
{
parentslll.stratljl = children[i].stratm;
}
}
}
315
,~ .j')fppendtx: s: ModeI 1 dilcall2.h
r Countmoves: Counts the percentage of agents co-operating for each gene in the
strategy array */
void countmoves(Strategy *chromosome, Sumstrat *sum, int size, int run)
{
float onecount = 0;
int i,j;
for(i=O; i < STRATSIZE; i++)
{
forO = 0; j < size; j++)
{
if(chromosomeU).strat[i] == 1)
{ onecount++;}
}
onecount = «onecount/size)*100);
sum[run].strat[i] += onecount;
onecount = 0;
}
}
II printavg: print average scores to files
void printavg(Avgscore *male, Avgscore *fem, Avgscore *mm, Avgscore *mf,
Avgscore *ff, Avgscore *fm, int lastrun, int gencount)
{
FILE *malesptr;
FILE *femsptr;
FILE *mmptr;
FILE *mfptr;
FILE *ffptr;
FILE *fmptr;
int i=O',
int run = 0;
if«malesptr = fopen("males.dat", "a"» == NULL)
printf("the average male file cannot be opened\n");
else
for(i=O; i < gencount; i++)
{
for(run=O; run < lastrun; run++)
{
fprintf(malesptr, II %.2f,", male[run].avg[i]);
}
fprintf(malesptr, "\n '');
}
fclose(malesptr);
if«femsptr = fopen("females.dat", "a"»== NULL)
printf("the average male file cannot be opened\n");
else
for(i=O; i < gencount; i++)
{
for(run=O; run < lastrun; run++)
{
fprintf(femsptr, II %.2f,", fem[run].avg[i]);
}
fprintf(femsptr, "\n");
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}
fclose(femsptr) ;
if«mmptr = fopen("mm.dat", "a"» == NULL)
printf("the average male file cannot be opened\n");
else
for(i=O; i < gencount; i++)
{
for(run=O; run < lastrun; run++)
{
fprintf(mmptr, " %.2f,", mm[run].avg[i]);
}
fprintf(mmptr, "\n");
}
fclose(mmptr);
if«mfptr = fopen("mf.dat", "a"» == NULL)
printf("the average male file cannot be opened\n");
else
for(i=O; i < gencount; i++)
{
for(run=O; run < lastrun; run++)
{
fprintf(mfptr, " %.2f,", mf[run].avg[i]);
}
fprintf(mfptr, "\n");
}
fclose(mfptr);
if«ffptr = fopen("ff.dat", "a"» == NULL)
printf("the average male file cannot be opened\n");
else
for(i=O; i < gencount; i++)
{
for(run=O; run < lastrun; run++)
{
fprintf(ffptr, " %.2f,", ff[run].avg[i]);
}
fprintf(ffptr, "\n");
}
fclose(ffptr) ;
if«fmptr = fopen("fm.dat", "a"» == NULL)
printf("the average male file cannot be opened\n");
else
for(i=O; i < gencount; i++)
{
for(run=O; run < lastrun; run++)
{
fprintf(fmptr, " %.2f,", fm[run].avg[i]);
}
fprintf(fmptr, "\n");
}
fclose(fmptr);
}
dilcall2.h
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/I Printstratsum: print strategies to files
void printstratsum(Sumstrat *mm, Sumstrat *mf, Sumstrat *ff, Sumstrat *fm, int run)
{
FILE *stratmmptr;
FILE *stratmfptr;
FILE *stratffptr;
FILE *stratfmptr;
int i;
if«stratmmptr = fopen("stratmm.dat", "a"» == NULL)
printf("file cannot be opened");
else
{
for (i=0; i < STRATSIZE; i++)
fprintf(stratmmptr, " %.2f,", mm[run].strat[i]);
}
fprintf(stratmmptr, "\n");
fclose(stratmmptr);
if«stratmfptr = fopen("stratmf.dat", "a"» == NULL)
printf("file cannot be opened");
else
{
for (i=O; i < STRATSIZE; i++)
fprintf(stratmfptr, " %.2f,", mf[run).strat[i]);
}
fprintf(stratmfptr, "\n");
fclose(stratmfptr) ;
if«stratffptr = fopen("stratff.dat", "a"» == NULL)
printf("file cannot be opened");
else
{
for (i=O; i < STRATSIZE; i++)
fprintf(stratffptr, " %.2f,", ff[run].strat[i]);
}
fprintf(stratffptr, "\n'');
fclose(stratffptr) ;
if«stratfmptr = fopen("stratfm.dat", "a"» == NULL)
printf("file cannot be opened");
else
{
for (i=O; i < STRATSIZE; i++)
fprintf(stratfmptr, " %.2f,", fm[run).strat[i]);
}
fprintf(stratfmptr, "\n");
fclose(stratfmptr) ;
}
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A3.1. Basic Ouline
Basic Outline
start
user sets cost of reproduction for males (MRC) and females (FRC)
set run counter = 0
While run counter < 30 do this:
{
Generate 650 agents at random, where each agent has:
- sex (M/F)
- a male-type: defect (D), reciprocal altruist (RC) or
non-reciprocal altruist (NRA)
- score = 0
set generation counter = 0, set generation time counter =a
set offspring counter = 0
While generation counter < 1000 do this:
{
while offspring counter < 650 do this:
{
1. Pick two agents at random
2. These agents play 100 games of the Prisoner's
Dilemma. Females always score 3x100 = 300 against
each other; males always score 1x100 = 100 against
each other. Mixed sex interactions are scored
according to male type: D both score 1; RA both score
3; NRA male scores 1.5, female scores 4. Points
gained are added to the each agent's score
3. Pick two new agents at random
4. If the agents are of opposite sex, and each agent has
enough points to reproduce (FRC or MRC) they
reproduce. The male-type of the male is recorded.
FRC is subtracted from the female's score, and MRC
is subtracted from the male's score.
The offspring counter is increased by +1
4. Generation time counter is increased by +1
}
Replace adult population with offspring in the proportions of
successful male-types.
Set offspring counter = 0
Set all scores = 0
Generation time is recorded, generation time counter set to 0
Generation counter is increased by +1
}
Collate and print results (average generation time)
run counter is increased by +1
}
End
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A3.2. Program
Main
/I Three types of males exist: coopertors, defectors and super cooperators. Which males
are best, and how does male strategy affect generation time?
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
struct results{
float prop[3];
float time;
};
typedef struct results Results;
II Function calls
void init_var(int *female, int *male, int *inter, int *popsize);
void init_score(float *ff, float *mm, float *fm, float *mf);
void init_pop(int sexl], int scorej], int popno, int type[], float props[]);
void interact(int sexj], int scorejl, int p1, int p2, int I, float ff, float mm, float fm,
float mf, int poptype[]);
int repro_test(int sexj], int score[], int p1, int p2, int malecost, int femcost);
void init_maletype(f1oat prop[3]);
void update_type(int poptype[], int p1, float tally[]);
void create_child(int childtype[], int parenttype[], int dad, int child);
void newpop(int sexl], int score[], int oldtype[], int newtype[], int popsize);
void count_type(int poptype[], int popsize, Results *result, int runno);
int another(void);
void print_results(Results *result, int end);
IImain program
rnaint)
{
Results result[150];
int popsex[1 001];
int popscore[1 001];
int poptype[1 001];
int childtype[1001];
int N = 1000;
int FRC = 1000, MRC = 1000, 1=100;
float FF = 3, MM = 3;
float FM = 4.5, MF = 1.5;
long int t = 1;
long int tavg = 0;
int childno = 0;
int gametype = 0;
srand(time(NULL)+550);
int i, j;
int reproflag = 0;
int gen = 1;
int lastgen = 1;
float maletype[3];
/I 0: male, 1: female
II records scores
II Male strategies: 0 (DO), 1 (CC), 2 (NRA)
II pop. size
II female RC, male RC, iteraction no.
II scoring between same sex
II scoring for NRA interactions
/I time
II average generation time
1* seed random number generator*1
IIRecords props.O defects, 1 coops, 3 NRAs
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printf("\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n");
printf("***************SUCKERS AND SUPERMEN******************\n\n\n");
init_var(&FRC, &MRC, &1, &N); II set parameters
init_score(&FF, &MM, &FM, &MF); II initialise scores
init_maletype(maletype); /I set proportions of males of each type
int lastrun = 1;
int run = 1",
printf("\nWould you like to link interactions and mating, O=no, 1=yes");
scanf("%d", &gametype);
printf("\nHow many generations per experiment would you like?\n");
scanf("%d", &Iastgen);
printf(lI\nAnd how many experiments should I run in total?(max 150)");
scanf("%d", &Iastrun);
II in this case "no",
do{
init_pop(popsex, popscore, N, poptype, maletype);
run = 1;
tavg = 0;
while (gen <= lastgen)
{
II start of new run
II initialise population
II start of new generation
1* pick pairs at random to interact *1i = randO%N;
do{
j = randO%N;
} while O==i);
interact(popsex, popscore, i, j, I , FF, MM, FM, MF, poptype);
t++;
while (childno < N)
{
if (gametype == 0)
{
i = randO%N;
do{
j = randO%N;
} while O==i);
II pick pairs at random to reproduce
}
reproflag = repro_test(popsex, popscore,i,j, MRC, FRC);
if (reproflag == 1)
{
if(popsex[i] == 0)
create child( childtype, poptype, i, childno);
else
create_child( childtype, poptype, j, childno);
childno++;
}
}
tavg += t; II records generation time
childno = 0;
newpop(popsex,popscore,poptype,childtype, N);
t = 1;
++;
}
result[run].time = (float)tavg/(gen-1);
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I
r
count_type(poptype,N,result,run);
if(run%10 == 0)
printfC'\nExpt %d ", run);
run++;
}while(run <= lastrun);
print_results(result, lastrun);
return 0;
}
II Init_var: Intialise variables for cost of reproduction and population size
void init_var(int *female, int *male, int *inter, int *popsize)
{
printf("\nPlease enter the COST OF REPRODUCTION");
printf("\nFirst for FEMALES:");
scanf("%d", female);
printf("\nAnd now for MALES:");
scanf("%d", male);
printf("\nHow many INTERACTIONS (rounds) per game?:");
scanfC'%d", inter);
printf("\nWhat is the POPULATION SIZE?(max 1000):");
scanf("%d", popsize);
}
Main
II Init_score: Enter the scores for the different interaction types
void init_score(float *ff, float *mm, float *fm, float *mf)
{
printf("\n\nPlease enter the scores....");
printf("\n1) For female:female interactions:");
scanf("%f', ff);
printf("\n2) For male:male interactions:");
scanf("%f', mm);
printf("\n3) For a female playing a male (FM):");
scanf("%f', fm);
printf("\n4) For a male playing a female (MF):");
scanf("%f', mf);
}
II equal to 3.00
//1.00
II 4.00
II 1.50
II init_pop: Give players a score, sex, and a 'type' - defector, reciprocal altruist or
NRA. This 'type' will only be applied to males playing females
void init_pop(int sex[], int score[], int popno, int type[], float props[])
{
int i;
int x;
for (i=0; i < popno; i++)
{
sex[i] = randO%2;
score[i] = 0;
x = randO%1000;
if (x < (props[O]*1 0»
{ type[i] = 0;
}
II 0 is male, 1 is female
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type[i] = 2;
}
}
if «x >= (props[0]*10) ) && (x < (1 0*(props[0]+props[1 ]))
{ type[i] = 1;
}
if (x >= (10*(props[0]+props[1]))
{
}
1/ Scores gained from the Prisoner's Dilemma. Poptype is male-type (defector, RA or
NRA. I = number of games (usually 100).
void interact(int sex[], int score[], int p1, int p2, int I, float ft, float mm, float fm, float mf, int
poptype[])
{
if (sex[p1] == 0)
{
if (sex[p2] == 0)
{
score[p1] += I*mm;
score[p2] += I*mm;
}
else
{
if (poptype[p1] == 0)
{
score[p1] += 1*1;
score[p2] += 1*1;
}
if (poptype[p1] == 1)
{
score[p1] += 1*3;
score[p2] += 1*3;
}
if (poptype[p1] == 2)
{
score[p1] += I*mf;
score[p2] += I*fm;
}
}
}
else
{
if (sex[p2] == 1)
{
score[p1] += I*ft;
score[p2] += I*ft;
}
else
{
if (poptype[p2] == 0)
{
score[p1] += 1*1;
score[p2] += 1*1;
}
if (poptype[p2] == 1)
{
score[p1] += 1*3;
1/ male-male interaction
/I male-fern interaction
II defector male
1/ reciprocal altruism
/I NRA
/I mf = 1.5
1/ fm = 4.0
/I female-female interactions
/I fern-male interactions
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score[p2] += 1*3;
}
if (poptype[p2] == 2)
{
score[p1] += I*fm;
score[p2] += I*mf;
}
}
}
}
Main
1/ Repro-test: Are the players of opposite sex? Do they have enough points to pay
MRC or FRC? If answers to both questions are yes, then they can reproduce
int repro_test(int sex[], int score[], int p1, int p2, int malecost, int femcost)
{
int flag =0;
if «sex[p1] == 0) && (sex[p2] == 1»
{
if «score[p1] >= malecost) && (score[p2] >= ferncost)
{
flag =1;
score[p1] -= malecost;
score[p2] -= femcost;
}
}
if «sex[p2] == 0) && (sex[p1] == 1»
{
if «score[p2] >= malecost) && (score[p1] >= terncostj)
{
flag =1;
score[p2] -= malecost;
score[p1] -= femcost;
}
}
return flag;
}
IIlnit_maletype: Set proportions of each male-type, usually 1/3 of each
void init_maletype(f1oat prop[3])
{
do{
printf("\n Enter initial number of defecting males:");
scanf("%f', &prop[O]);
printf("\n Enter initial number of cooperating males:");
scanf("%f', &prop[1]);
printf("\n Enter initial number of super-cooperating males:");
scanf("%f', &prop[2]);
} while«prop[O] + prop[1] + prop[2]) != 100);
}
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II count-type: records results
void count_type(int poptypel], int popsize, Results *result, int runno)
{
int i;
float tally[3] = {O};
for(i=O; i < popsize; i++)
{
if (poptype[i] == 0)
tally[O] ++;
if (poptype[i] == 1)
{tally[1] ++;}
if (poptype[i] == 2)
{tally[2] ++;}
}
for(i=O; i <3; i++)
{
tally[i] = (float)tally[i]/popsize*100;
result[runno].prop[i] = tally[i];
}
}
II Create_child
void create_child(int childtypej], int parenttypej], int dad, int child)
{
childtype[child] = parenttype[dad];
}
II new_pop: Reset for new population
void newpop(int sex[], int score[], int oldtype[], int newtype[], int popsize)
{
int i;
for (i=0; i < popsize; i++)
{
sex[i] = randO%2;
score[i] = 0;
oldtype[i] = newtype[i];
}
}
int another(void)
{
int again = 0;
printf("\nWould you like to repeat this experiment? (O=NO, 1=YES)");
scanf("%d",&again);
return(again);
}
void print_results(Results *result, int end)
{
FILE *suckerptr;
int i,j;
if«suckerptr = fopen("suckers.dat","w"» == NULL)
Main
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'- M, .. --M1?
printf("\nThe suckers file cannot be opened, sucker");
else
for(i=1; i <= end; i++)
{
forG=O; j <3; j++)
{
fprintf(suckerptr, "%.2f,", result[i].propU]);
}
fprintf(suckerptr, "%.2f\n", result[i].time);
}
fclose(suckerptr) ;
}
Main
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AJ;mendix 4: Seasonality and Resource Quality
A4.1. Basic Outline
start
user sets cost of reproduction for males (MRC) and females (FRC)
set run counter = 0
set environment quality (poor, medium or high) for each of the 12 months
(Note: in a stable experiment, resource quality remains constant)
While run counter < 30 do this:
{
Generate 650 agents at random, where each agent has:
- sex (M/F)
- 12 strategy strings for each interaction type and environment quality
- score = 0
- a memory of it's games with all other players for the last two months
set generation counter = 0
set offspring counter =0
set generation time counter =0
While generation counter < 20,000 do this:
{
set month =1, i.e. it is the first month
while offspring counter < 50 do this:
{
1. Every member of the population plays 1 round of the
Prisoner's Dilemma with every other member. Play is based on
the interactions between players in the last two months, their
sexes and the environment quality for that month. Players gain
pay-offs according to fig. 5.1.
2. Every agent that as enough points to reproduce (MRC or FRC,
according to gender) is put in to a 'fertile male' or 'fertile female'
array. Pairs are chosen at random, from the 2 arrays, to reproduce
by crossover and mutation of strategy strings. 2 new offspring are
created each time. Reproduction continues until there either the
male or female fertile array is empty. Agents may reproduce more
than once, if they have enough points.
3. When reproduction is complete, the offspring counter is updated.
4. Month is increased by 1. If month = 13, then reset to Month = 1.
}
Replace adult population with offspring
Set offspring counter =0
Set all scores = 0
}
Collate and print results (average scores)
run counter is increased by +1
}
End
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A4.2. Main program
main program
1* This program is designed to look at how the quality and seasonality of environmental affects
the evolution of cooperative strategies. The Prisoner's Dilemma pay-off matrix is adjusted for
the season and the quality of the environment. Three qualities are possible, where 1 is the
poorest quality. Each individual has a strategy based on environment quality. Environments
may be stable or seasonal. See chapter 5. *1
1* Please note: I have not included the funtion files (seasdef.h, seascall.h etc) in this
appendix. This is because these files are very long, and are extemely similar to those used
in previous programs. *1
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "seasdef.h"
#include "seascall.h"
#include "prisoner.h"
#include "repro.h"
#include "results.h"
maint)
{
Agents *adults = (Agents *) calloc(SIZE, sizeof'(Aqentsj);
Strategy *s1 =(Strategy *) calloc(SIZE, sizeof(Strategy»;
Strategy *s2 =(Strategy *) calloc(SIZE, sizeof(Strategy»;
Strategy *s3 = (Strategy *) calloc(SIZE, sizeof'(Strateqyj);
Memory *mem =(Memory *) calloc(SIZE, sizeof(Memory»;
Strategy *s10ft = (Strategy *) calloc(SIZE, sizeof(Strategy»;
Strategy *s20ft =(Strategy *) calloc(SIZE, sizeof(Strategy»;
Strategy *s30ft = (Strategy *) calloc(SIZE, sizeof(Strategy»;
check_arrays(adults, s1, s2, s3, mem); II check memory
check_arrays(ad ults, stoft, szott, s30ft, mem);
Data results;
int rcmale, rcfemale;
int end;
int i,j;
int run =0;
int gen =1;
int oftno =0;
int environ[12];
int month =0;
int t =0;
float rescount[MONTHS] ={O};
float monthavg[MONTHS];
float s1avg;
float s2avg;
float s3avg;
srand(time(N ULL»;
user(&rcmale, &rcfemale, &end);
set_environ(environ);
init filesO;
while (run < RUN)
{
cleanresults(&results);
II cost of reproduction, set by user
1/ total no. generations to run
1/ run number
1/ generation no.
II Set environement quality for 12 months
II measures generation time
II to record results
II results in poor quality habitats
1/ results in medium quality
II results in high quality
r seed random number generator*1
1* set parameters *1
/I set environment quality
II clear results files
/I start of new run
II start a new set of results
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init_adults(adults);
init_strategies(s1,s2,s3);
while (gen <= end)
{
while (offno < SIZE)
{
if«t <24) && (gen%100 == 0) )
{
main program
II create a new adult population
II intialise strategies
II start of new generation
II record results
recordresults(adults, &results, s1, s2, s3, environ[month], t,mem);
rescount[t] ++;
II What is the env. type?
}
switch (environ[month])
{
case(1):
prisdilem(adults, s1, environ[month], t, mem);
break;
case(2): prisdilem(adults, s2, environ[month], t, mem);
break;
case(3): prisdilem(adults, s3, environ[month], t, mem);
break;
II poor?
II play PO
II medium?
II play PO
II high? play PO
II reset variables
II offspring become new gen.
}
II Reproduction
offno = repromanager(adults, s1, s2, s3, rcmale, rcfemale, s1off, s2off, ssott, offno);
t++;
month +=1;
if (month >= 12)
month = 0;
}
if(gen% 100 == 0)
{
printf(" .... GEN%d ",gen);
}
gen ++;
swap(s1, s1off);
swap(s2, s2oft);
swap(s3, s3oft);
init_aduIts(aduIts);
offno = 0;
month = 0;
t =O·,
}
updateresults(&results, rescount);
run++;
printf("\n\nNew Run %d",run);
gen = 1;
}
return 0;
}
329
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aiello, L.C. (1996a): Hominine preadaptions for language and cognition. In P. Mellars and
K.Gibson (eds.) Modelling the Early Human Mind, pp.89-99. Cambridge: McDonald
Institute Monograph Series.
Aiello. L.C. (1996b): Terrestriality, bipedalism and the origin of language. Proceedings of
the British Academy 88 pp.269-289.
Aiello, L.C. (1997): Brains and guts in human evolution: the expensive tissue hypothesis.
Brazilian Joumal ofGenetics 20 pp.141-148.
Aiello, L.C. (1998): The expensive tissue hypothesis and the evolution of the human
adaptive niche: A study in comparative anatomy. In 1. Bayley (ed.) Science in
Archaeology, pp. 25-36. HBMC Archaeology Reports Series, English Heritage.
Aiello, L.C. (in press): The foundations ofhuman language. In N.Jablonski and L.C.
Aiello (eds.) The Origin and Diversification ofLanguage. San Francisco, California:
California Academy of Sciences.
Aiello, L.C. and R.I.M. Dunbar (1993): Neocortex size, group size and the evolution
of language. Current Anthropology 34 pp.184-193.
Aiello, L.C. and P.Wheeler (1995): The expensive tissue hypothesis: the brain and the
digestive system in human and primate evolution. Current Anthropology 36 pp.199-
221.
Ainslie, G. (1975): Specious reward: A behavioural theory of impulsiveness and
impulse control. Psychological Bulletin 21 pp.485-489.
Alberts, S.C., 1. Altmann and M.L.Wilson (1996): Mate guarding constrains foraging
activity of male baboons. Animal Behaviour 51 pp.1269-1277.
Alexander, R.D. (1987): The Biology ofMoral Systems. New York: Aldine.
Alexander, R.D. and K.M. Noonan (1979): Concealment of ovulation, parental care,
and human social evolution. In N.A. Chagnon and W. Irons (eds.) Evolutionary
Biology and Human Social Behaviour: An Anthropological Perspective, pp.430-461.
North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press.
Altmann, J. (1980): Baboon Mothers and Infants. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Altmann, 1. and S. Alberts (1987): Body mass and growth rates in an Old World
primate population. Oecologia 72 pp.15-20.
Altmann, 1. and P. Muruthi (1988): Differences in daily life between semiprovisioned
and wild feeding baboons. American Journal ofPrimatology 15 pp.213-221.
330
Altmann, 1. and A. Samuels (1992): Costs ofmaternal care: infant-carrying in
baboons. Behavioural Ecology and Sociobiology 29 pp.391-398.
Altmann, 1., S.A. Altmann, G. Hausfater and S.A. McCuskey (1977): Life history of
yellow baboons: Physical development, reproductive parameters and infant mortality.
Primates 18 pp.315-330.
Altmann, S.A.(1991): Diets of yearling female primates (Papio cynocephalus) predict
lifetime fitness. Proceedings of the National Academy ofSciences, U.S.A. 88 pp.420-
423.
Anderson, C.M. (1992): Male investment under changing conditions among chacma
baboons at Suikerbosrand. American Journal ofPhysical Anthropology 87 pp.479-
495.
Ashkenazie, S. and U.N. Safriel (1979): Time-energy budget of the semipalmated
sandpiper Calidris pusilla at Barrow, Alaska. Ecology 60 pp.783-799.
Axelrod, R. (1984): The Evolution ofCo-operation. New York: Penguin.
Axelrod, R. and D. Dion (1988): The further evolution of co-operation. Science 242
pp.1385-1390.
Axelrod, R. and W.D. Hamilton (1981): The evolution of cooperation. Science 211
pp.1390-96.
Baldellou, M. and A. Adan (1997): Time, gender and seasonality in vervet activity: A
chronobiological approch. Primates 38 pp.31-43.
Bales, K.B. (1980): Cumulative scaling ofpaternalistic behavior in primates.
American Naturalist 116 pp.454-461.
Barton, R.A. (1996): Neocortex size and behavioural ecology in primates.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Series B 263 pp.173-177.
Bednarz, 1.C. and 1.D.Ligon (1988): A study ofthe ecological bases of cooperative
breeding in the Harris' hawk. Ecology 69 pp.1176-1187.
Beecher, M. (1988): Kin recognition in birds. Behavioural Genetics 18 pp.465-482.
Bentley, G.R. (1985): Hunter-gatherer energetics and fertility: A reassessment of the
!Kung San. Human Ecology 13 pp.79-109.
Bercovitch, F.B. (1983): Time budgets and consortships in olive baboons (Papio
anubis). Folia Primatologia 41 pp.180-190.
Bercovitch, F.B. (1987): Female weight and reproductive condition in a population of
olive baboons (Papio anubis). American Journal ofPrimatology 12 pp.189-195.
331
Bercovitch, F.B. (1988): Coalitions, cooperation and reproductive tactics among adult
male baboons. Animal Behaviour 36 pp.1198-1209.
Bercovitch, F.B. (1989): Body size, sperm competition and determinants of
reproductive success in male savanna baboons. Evolution 43 pp.1507-1521.
Bercovitch, F.B. and P. Nurnberg (1996): Socioendocrine and morphological
correlates of paternity in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Journal of
Reproduction and Fertility 107 pp.59-68.
Berenstain, L., P.S. Rodman and D.G. Smith (1981): Social relations between fathers and
offspring in a captive group of rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Animal Behaviour 29
pp.1057-1063.
Bernstein, I.S. (1993): Seasonal influences on rhesus monkey (Macaca mulatta)
behaviour. International Journal ofPrimatology 14 pp.383- 403.
Betzig, L. and P. Turke (1992): Fatherhood by rank on Ifaluk. In B.S. Hewlett (ed.)
Father-child Relations, pp.111-130. New York: AIdine de Gruyter.
Bicca-Marques, J.C. and C. Calegaro-Marques (1994): Activity budget and diet of
AIouatta caraya: An age-sex analysis. Folia Primatologica 63 pp.216-220.
Binfold, L.R. (1981): Bones: Ancient Men and Modem Myths. New York: Academic
Press.
Binmore, K. (1990): Essays on the Foundations ofGame Theory. Cambridge, MA:
Basil Blackwell.
Binmore, K. (1991): Evolution and Convention: Social Contract IV. University College
London Discussion Paper 91-09.
Binmore, K. (1992): Fun andGames. Lexington, Massachesetts and Toronto: D.C. Heath
and Company.
Binmore, K. (1993): De-Bayesing game theory. In K.Binmore, A. Kirman and P. Tani
(eds.) Frontiers ofGame Theory, pp.321-339. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Binmore, K. (1994): Game Theory and the Social Contract Voll. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Binmore, K., A Kirman and P. Tani (1993a): Frontiers of Game Theory. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Binmore, K., P. Morgan, A. Shaked and J. Sutton (1991): Do people exploit their
bargaining power? An experimental study. Games and Economic Behaviour 3
pp.295-322.
Binmore, K. and L. Samuelson (1997): Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection.
Journal ofEconomic Theory 74 pp.235-265.
332
Binmore, K., J. Swierzbinski, S. Hsu and C. Proulx (1993b): Focal points and bargaining.
Discussion Papers in Econonics No. 93-03, University College London.
Bitetti, M.S. (1997): Evidence for an important social role ofallogrooming in a
platyrrhine primate. Animal Behaviour 54 pp.199-211.
Bjorklund, D.F and K. Kipp (1996): Parental investment theory and gender
differences in the evolution of inhibition mechanisms. Psychological Bulletin 120
pp.163-188.
Bliege Bird, R.L and D.W. Bird (1997): Delayed reciprocity and tolerated theft: The
behavioural ecology of food-sharing strategies. Current Anthropology 38 pp.49-78.
Blurton-Jones, N.G. (1987): Tolerated theft, suggestions about the ecology and evolution
of sharing, hoarding and scrounging. Social Science Information 26 pp.31-54.
Boesch, C. and H. Boesch (1989): Hunting behaviour of wild chimpanzees in the TaI
National Park. American Journal ofPhysical Anthropology 78 pp.547-573.
Bogin, B. and B.H. Smith (1996): Evolution of the human life cycle. American Journal of
Human Biology 8 pp.703-716.
Boinski, S. (1987): Mating patterns in squirrel monkeys (Saimiri oerstedii). Implications
for seasonal sexual dimorphism. Behavioural Ecology and Sociobiology 21 pp.13-21.
Boinski, S. (1994): Affiliation patterns among male Costa-Rican squirrelmonkeys.
Behaviour 130 pp.191-209.
Boggs, C.L. (1990): A general model of the role of male-donated nutrients in female
insect reproduction. The American Naturalist 5 pp.598-617.
Boyd, R. (1988): Is the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma a good model of reciprocal altruism?
Ethology and Sociobiology 9 pp.211-222.
Boyd, R (1992): The evolution of reciprocity when conditions vary. In A.H. Harcourt
and F.B.M. de Waal (eds.) Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animals,
pp.473-489. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Boyd, R. and J. Lorberbaum (1987): No pure strategy is evolutionary stable in the
repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Nature 327 pp.58-59.
Brown, K. and D.S. Mack (1978): Food sharing among captive Leontopithecus
rosalia. Folia Primatologica 29 pp.268-290.
Brun, R.A., J. Daxun and C. Geissler (1988): Food Consumption and Work Capacity
in a Tropical Environment in China. Paris: INSERM.
333
Burke, T., N.B. Davies, M.W. Bruford and B.J. Hatchwell (1989): Parental care and
mating behaviour of polyandrous dunnocks, Prunella modularis, related to paternity
by DNA fingerprinting. Nature 338 pp.249-251.
Buss, D.M. (1989): Sex differences in human mate preferences: Evolutionary
hypotheses tested in 37 cultures. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 12 pp.1-49.
Buss, D.M. and D.P. Schmitt (1993): Sexual strategies theory: An evolutionary
perspective on human mating. Psychological Review 100 pp.204-232.
Busse, C.D. (1978): Do chimpanzees hunt cooperatively? American Naturalist 112
pp.767-770.
Busse, C.D. (1985): Paternity recognition in multi-male primate groups. American
Zoologist 25 pp.873-881.
Busse, C.D. and W.J. Hamilton III. (1981): Infant carrying by male chacma baboons.
Science 212 pp.1282-1283.
Butynski, T.M. (1988): Guenon birth seasons and correlates with rainfall and food. In
A. Gautier-Hion, F. Bourliere, J.P. Gautier and J. Kingdon (eds.) A Primate
Radiation: Evolutionary Biology of the African Guenons, pp.284-322. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Byrne, R.W. (1995): The Thinking Ape: Evolutionary Origins ofIntelligence.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Byrne, R.W. (1996): Relating brain size to intelligence in primates. In P. Mellars and
K. Gibson (eds.) Modelling the Early Human Mind, pp.49-56. Cambridge: McDonald
Institute for Archaeological Research Monographs.
Byrne, R.W. (1997): The technical intelligence hypothesis: an additional evolutionary
stimulus to intelligence? In A. Whiten and R.W. Byrne (eds.) Machiavellian
Intelligence II: Extensions and Evaluations, pp.289-311. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Byrne, R.W. and A. Whiten (1988): Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and
the Evolution ofIntellect in Monkeys, Apes and Humans. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Byrne, R.W. and A. Whiten (1992): Cognitive evolution in primates: evidence from
tactical deception. Man 27 pp.609-627.
Byrne, R.W. and A. Whiten (1997a): Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions and
Evaluations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Byrne, R.W. and A. Whiten (1997b): Machiavellian intelligence. In A. Whiten and
R.W. Byrne (eds.) Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions and Evaluations, pp.1-
23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
334
Byrne, R.W., A. Whiten and S.P. Henzi (1990): Social relationships ofmountain
baboons: leadership and affiliation in a non-female-bonded-monkey. American
Journal ofPrimatology 20 pp.313-329.
Caporael, L.R., R.M. Dawes, lM. Orbell and lC. van de Kragt Alphons (1989):
Selfishness examined: Cooperation in the absence of egoistic incentives. Behavioural
and Brain Sciences 12 pp.683-739.
Cashdan, E. (1980): Egalitarianism among hunters and gatherers. American
Anthropologist 82 pp.117-120.
Cashdan, E. (1985): Coping with risk: reciprocity among the Basawa ofNorthern
Botswana. Man 20 pp.454-474.
Casti, lL. (1994): Cooperation: the ghost in the machinery of evolution. In J. Casti and A.
Karqvist (OOs.) Cooperation and Conflict in General Evolutionary Processes, pp.63-87.
New York: Wiley.
Chapais, B. (1983): Structure of the birth season relationship among adult male and
female rhesus monkeys. In R.A. Hinde (ed.) Primate Social Relationships: An
Integrated Approach, pp.200-208. Oxford: Blackwell.
Chavez, A. and C. Martinez (1973): Nutrition and development of infants from poor
rural areas. III. Maternal nutrition and its consequences on fertility. Nutritional
Reports International 7 pp.l-B.
Cheney, D.L. (1983): Extra-familial alliances among vervet monkeys. In R.A. Hinde
(ed.) Primate Social Relationships: An Integrated Approach, pp.278-286. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Cheney, D.L. and R.M. Seyfarth (1980): Vocal recognition in free-ranging vervet
monkeys. Animal Behaviour 28 pp.362-367.
Cheney, D.L. and R.M. Seyfarth (1986): The recognition of social alliances by vervet
monkeys. Animal Behaviour 34 pp.1722-1731.
Cheney, D.L. and R.M. Seyfarth (1990): How Monkeys See the World: Inside the
Mind ofAnother Species. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cheney, D.L. and R.M. Seyfarth (1992): Precis ofHow monkeys see the world.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 pp.135-152.
Cheney, D.L., R.M. Seyfarth, S.l Andelman and P.C. Lee (1988): Reproductive
success in vervet monkeys. In T.H. Clutton-Brock (ed.) Reproductive Success:
Studies ofIndividual Variation in Contrasting Breeding Systems, pp.384-402.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
335
Chivers, D.J. (1977): The feeding behaviour ofsiamangs (Symphalangus
syndactylus). In T.H. Clutton-Brock (ed.) Primate Ecology: Studies ofFeeding and
Ranging Behaviour ofLemurs, Monkeys and Apes, pp.355-382. New York:
Academic Press.
Christie, R. and F. Geis (1970): Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Academic
Press.
Clarke, M.F. (1984): Cooperative breeding by the Australian bell miner, Manorina
melanophyrs Latham: A test of kin selection theory. Behavioural Ecology and
Sociobiology 14 pp.137-146.
Clutton-Brock, T.H. (1974): Activity patterns of red colobus (Colobus badius
tephrosceles). Folia Primatologia 21 pp.161-187.
Clutton-Brock, T.H. (1989): Mammalian mating systems. Proceedings ofthe Royal
Society London, Series B 236 pp.339-372.
Clutton-Brock, T.H. (1991): The Evolution ofParental Care. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Clutton-Brock, T.H. and P.H. Harvey (1980): Primates, brains and ecology. Journal
ofZoology 190 pp.309-323.
Clutton-Brock, T.H., S.D. Albon and F.E. Guinness (1988): Reproductive success in
male and female red deer. In T.H. Clutton-Brock (ed.) Reproductive Success, pp.325-
343. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cockburn, A. (1988): Social Behaviour in Fluctuating Populations. London: Croom
Helm.
Coe, C.L., A.C. Connolly, H.C. Kraemer and S. Levine (1973): Reproductive
development and behavior of captive female chimpanzees. Primates 20 pp.571-582.
Coelho, A.M. Jr. (1974): Socio-bioenergetics and sexual dimorphism in primates.
Primates 15 pp.263-269.
Coelho, A.M. Jr. (1986): Time and energy budgets. In G.Mitchell and JErwin (eds.)
Comparative Primate Biology Vol 2, Part A: Behaviour, Conservation and Ecology,
pp.141-166. New York: Alan R. Liss.
Coelho, A.M., C.A.Bramblett and L.B.Quick (1979): Activity patterns in howler and
spider monkeys: An application of socio-bioenergetic methods. In I.S. Bernstein and
E.O. Smith (eds.) Primate Ecology and Human Origins, pp.175-200. New York and
London: Garland STPM Press.
Collins, D.A (1986): Triadic interactions among male and infant chacma baboons. In
D.M. Taub (00.) Primate Paternalism, pp.186-212. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
336
Connor, R.C. (1995): Altruism amongst non-relatives: alternatives to the 'Prisoner's
Dilemma'. Trends in Ecology and Evolution 10 pp.84-86.
Connor, R.C. and R.L. Cuny (1995): Helping non-relatives: a role for deceit? Animal
Behaviour 49 pp.389-393.
Connor, R.C., R. A. Smolker and A.F. Richards (1992): Dolphin alliances and coalitions.
In A.H. Harcourt and F.B.M. de Waal (eds.) Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and
Other Animals, pp.415-445. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Conrad, M. and M.M. Rizki (1989): The artificial worlds approach to emergent evolution.
Biosystems 23 pp.247-260.
Cosmides, L. (1989): The logic of social exchange. Cognition 31 pp.187-276.
Craig, J.L and I.G. Jamieson (1990): Pukeko: different approaches and some different
answers. In P.B. Stacey and W.D. Koenig (eds.) Cooperative Breeding in Birds:
Long Term Studies ofEcology and Behaviour, pp.387-412. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Creel, S.R. and N.M. Creel (1991): Energetics, reproductive suppression and obligate
communal breeding in carnivores. Behavioural Ecology and Sociobiology 28 pp.263-
270.
Daly, M. and M. Wilson (1983): Sex, Evolution andBehavior. Belmont, California:
Wadsworth.
D~ C.R. (1871): The Descent ofMan and Selection in Relation to Sex. London:
Murray. Reprinted New York: Random House.
Dasilva, G.L. (1992): The western black-and-white colobus as a low-energy
strategist: activity budgets, energy expenditure and energy intake. Journal ofAnimal
Ecology 61 pp.79-91.
Dasser, V. (1988a): A social concept in Java-monkeys. Animal Behaviour 36 pp.225-
230.
Dasser, V. (1988b): Mapping social concepts in monkeys. In R.W. BYrne and A. Whiten
(eds.) Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in
Monkeys, Apes andHumans, pp.85-93. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Davies, N.B. (1991): Mating systems. In J.R. Krebs and N.B. Davies (eds.)
Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach, third edition, pp.263-300. Oxford:
Blackwell Scientific Publications.
Davies, N.B. (1992): Dunnock Behaviour and Social Evolution. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Davis, J. (1992): Exchange. Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press.
337
Davis, R.B., C.F. Herreid II and H.L. Short (1962): Mexican free-tailed bats in Texas.
Ecological Monograph 32 pp.183-200.
Dawkins, R. (1989): The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deacon, T. (1997): The Symbolic Species. London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press.
Deag, I.M. and I.H. Crook (1971): Social behaviour and "agonistic buffering" in the
wild barbary macaque, Macaca sylvana. Folia Primatologica 14 pp.183-200.
Defter, T.R. (1995): The time budget ofa group of wild woolly monkeys (Lagothrix
lagotricha). International Journal ofPrimatology 16 pp.107-120.
Delgado, H., A. Lechtig, R. Marorell, E. Brineman, and R.E. Klein (1978): Nutrition,
lactation and postpartum amenorrhea. American Journal ofClinical Nutrition 31
pp.322-337.
Dietz, I.M, A.I. Baker and D. Miglioretti (1993): Seasonal variation in reproduction,
juvenile growth and adult body mass in golden lion tamarins (Leontopithecus rosalia).
American Journal ofPrimatology 34 pp.115-132.
Dixon, A., D. Ross, S.L.C. O'Malley and T. Burke (1994): Paternal investment
inversely related to degree of extra-pair paternity in the reed bunting. Nature 371
pp.698-699.
Doran, D. (1989): Chimpanzee and Pygmy Chimpanzee Positional Behaviour: The
Influence ofEnvironment, Body Size, Morphology and Ontogeny on Locomotion and
Posture. Stony Brook: Ph.D. dissertation, State University ofNew York.
Douglas-Hamilton, 1. and O. Douglas-Hamilton (1975): Among the Elephants. New
York: Viking Press.
Draper, P. (1989): African marriage systems: Perspectives from evolutionary ecology.
Ethology and Sociobiology 10 pp.145-169.
Draper, P. and Harpending, H. (1988): A sociobiological perspective on the
development of human reproductive strategies. In K. MacDonald (ed.)
Sociobiological Perspectives on Human Development, pp.340-372. New York:
Springer-Verlag.
Dufour, D.L. (1983): Nutrition in the Northwest Amazon: household dietary intake
and time-energy expenditure. In R.B. Hames and W.T. Vickers (eds.) Adaptive
Responses ofNative Amazonians, pp.329-356. New York: Academic Press.
Dugatkin, L.A. (1997): Cooperation Among Animals. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
338
Dugatkin, L.A. and D.S.Wilson (1991): ROVER: A strategy for exploiting cooperators in
a patchy environment. The American Naturalist 138 pp.687-701.
Dugatkin, L.A., M. Mesterton-Gibbons and A.I. Houston (1992): Beyond the Prisoner's
Dilemma: toward models to discriminate among mechanisms of cooperation. Trends in
Ecology and Evolution 7 pp.202-205.
Dunbar, R.I.M. (1988): Primate Social Systems. London and Sydney: Croom Helm.
Dunbar, R.I.M. (1992): Neocortex size as a constraint on group size in primates. Journal
ofHUm(01 Evolution 22 pp.469-493.
Dunbar, R.I.M. (1993): Co-evolution of neocortex size, group size, and language in
humans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 pp.681-734.
Dunbar, R.I.M. (1996): Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution ofLanguage. London
and Boston: Faber and Faber.
Dunbar, R.I.M. and P. Dunbar (1988): Maternal time budgets of gelada baboons.
Animal Behaviour 36 pp.970-980.
Durnin, lV.G.A. (1988): The energy requirements of pregnancy and lactation. In B.
Schurch and N.S. Scrimshaw (eds.) Chronic Energy Deficiency: Consequences and
Related Issues, pp.135-152. Lausannes: Nestle Foundation.
Dwyer, P.D. and M. Minnegal (1992): Ecology and community dynamics ofKubo
people in the tropical low-lands ofPapua New Guinea. Human Ecology 20 pp.21-55.
Dwyer, P.D. and M. Minnegal (1997): Sago games: cooperation and change among
sago producers ofPapua New Guinea. Evolution and Human Behaviour 18 pp. 89-
108.
Erdal, E. and A. Whiten (1996): Egalitarianism and Machiavellian intelligence in
human evolution. In P. Mellars and K. Gibson (eds.) Modelling the Early Human
Mind, pp.139-152. Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research
Monographs.
Ewer, R.F. (1973): The Carnivores. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Faarborg, land lC. Benarz (1990): Galapogos and Harris' hawks: Divergent causes
of sociality in two raptors. In P.B. Stacey and W.D. Koenig (eds.) Cooperative
Breeding in Birds: Long Term Studies ofEcology and Behaviour, pp.357-383.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fairbanks, L.A. (1980): Relationships among adult females in captive vervet monkeys:
testing a model of rank-related attractiveness. Animal Behaviour 28 pp.853-859.
FAOIWHOIUNU (1985): Energy and protein requirements. Technical Report Series
72. Geneva: World Health Organisation.
339
Faulkes, e.G., N.C. Bennett, M.W. Bruford, H.P. O'Brien, G.H. Aguilar and lU.M.
Jarvis (1997): Ecological constraints drive social evolution in the African mole-rats.
Proceedings of the Royal Society London Series B 264 pp.1619-1627.
Fedigan, L.M. (1997): Changing views offemale life histories. In M.E. Morbeck, A.
Galloway and A.L. Zihlman (eds.) The Evolving Female: A Life-history Perspective,
pp.15-26. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fedigan, L.M. and L.M. Rose (1995): Interbirth interval variation in three sympatric
species ofneotropical monkey. American Journal ofPrimatology 37 pp.9-24.
Feistner, A.T.C. and A.S. Chamove (1986): High motivation toward food increases
food-sharing in cotton-top tamarins. Developmental Psychobiology 19 pp.439-452.
Feistner, A.T.e. and E.C. Price (1990): Food-sharing in cotton-top tamarins
(Saguinus oedipus). Folia Primatologica 54 pp.34-45.
Feistner, A.T.C. and E.C. Price (1991): Food offering in New World primates: Two
species added. Folia Primatologica 1991 pp.165-168.
Ferrari, S.F. (1987): Food transfer in a wild marmoset group. Folia Primatologica 48
pp.203-206.
Ferrari, S.F. (1992): The care of infants in a wild marmoset (Callithrixflaviceps)
group. American Journal ofPrimatology 26 pp.l09-118.
Foley, R.A. (1987): The influence of seasonality on hominid evolution. In S.l
Ulijaszek and S.S. Strickland (eds.) Seasonality and Human Ecology, pp.17-37.
Cambridge; Cambridge University Press.
Foley, R.A. (1994): Speciation, extinction and climatic change in hominid evolution.
Journal ofHuman Evolution 26 pp.275-289.
Foley,R.A and P.C. Lee (1989): Finite social space, evolutionary pathways and
reconstructing hominid behaviour. Science 243 pp.901-906.
Foley, R.A. and P.C. Lee (1991): Ecology and energetics of encephalization in
hominid evolution. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London B 334
pp.223-232.
Foley, R.A. and P.C. Lee (1996): Finite social space and the evolution of human
social behaviour. In J. Steele and S. Shennan (eds.) The Archaeology ofHuman
Ancestry, pp.47-66. London and New York: Routledge.
Foltz, D.W. (1981): Genetic evidence for long-term monogamy in a small rodent
Peromyscus polionotus. American Naturalist 117 pp.665-675.
Forbes, G.B. (1987): Human Body Composition: Growth, Aging, Nutrition and
Activity. New York: Springer-Verlag.
340
Fragaszy, D .M. and K. Barb (1997): Comparison of development and life history in
Pan and Cebus. International Journal ofPrimatology 18 pp.683-701.
Frank, R.H. (1988): Passions Within Reason. New York: W.W. Norton and
Company.
Frank, R.H., T.Gilovich and D.T. Regan (1993): The evolution of one-shot co-
operation: an experiment. Ethology and Sociobiology 14 pp.247-256.
Frean, M. (1996): The evolution of degrees of cooperation. Journal of Theoretical
Biology 182 pp.549-559.
Freeman-Gallant, C.R. (1997): Extra-pair paternity in monogamous and polygynous
Savannah sparrows Passerculus sandwichensis. Animal Behaviour 53 pp.397-404.
Frisch, R.E. (1984): Body fat, puberty and fertility. Biological Review 59 pp.161-188.
Frisch, R.E. (1988): Fatness and fertility. Scientific American 258 pp.70-77.
Frisch, R.E. and R. Revelle (1970): Height and weight at menarche and a hypothesis
of critical body weight and adolescent events. Science 169 pp.397-399.
Frith, U. (1989): Autism: Explaining the Enigma. Oxford: Blackwell.
Garber, P.A. (1997): One for all and breeding for one: cooperation and competition
as a tamarin reproductive strategy. Evolutionary Anthropology 5 pp.187-199.
Garnett, S.T. (1980): The social organization of the dusky moorhen, Gallinula
tenebrosa (Aves: Rallidae). Australian Wildlife Research 7 pp.103-112.
Gautier-Hion, A. (1980): Seasonal variations of diet related to species and sex in a
community of Cercopithecus monkeys. Journal ofAnimal Ecology 49 pp.237-269.
Gigerenzer, G. (1997): The modularity of social intelligence. In A. Whiten and R.W.
Byrne (eds.) Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions and Evaluations, pp.264-288.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gittleman, lL. (1986): Carnivore life history patterns: Allometric, phylogenetic and
ecological associations. American Naturalist 127 pp.744-721.
Gittleman, Ll, and O.T.Oftedal (1987): Comparative growth and lactation energetics
in carnivores. In A.S.1. Loudon and P.A. Racey (eds.) Reproductive Energetics in
Mammals, pp.41-70. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gittleman, J'L and S.D. Thompson (1988): Energy allocation in mammalian
reproduction. Amercan Zoologist 28 pp.863-875.
Glander, K.E. (1974): Baby-sitting, infant sharing and adoptive behaviour in mantled
howling monkeys. American Journal ofPhysical Anthropology 41 p.482 [abstract].
341
Goldberg, D.E. (1989): Genetic Algorithms in Search, Optimisation and Machine
Learning, Reading: Addison-Wesley.
Goldberg, G., A.M. Prentice, W.A. Coward, H.L. Davies, P.R. Murgatroyd, M.B.
Sawyer, 1. Ashford and A.E. Black (1991): Longitudinal assessment of the
components of energy balance in well-nourished lactating women. American Journal
ofClinical Nutrition 54 pp.788-798.
Goldizen, A.W. (1987a): Facultative polyandry and the role of infant-carrying in wild
saddle-back tamarins (Saguinus fusciollis). Behavioural Ecology and Sociobiology
20 pp.99-109.
Goldizen, A.W. (1987b): Tamarins and marmosets: communal care of offspring. In
B.B. Smuts, D.L. Cheney, R.M. Seyfarth, R.W. Wrangham and T.T. StruhsakerPrimate
Societies, pp.34-43. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Goldizen, A.W. (1990): A comparative perspective on the evolution of tamarin and
marmoset social systems. International Journal ofPrimatology 11 pp.63-83.
Gompper, M.E., 1.L. Gittleman and R.K. Wayne (1997): Genetic relatedness,
coalitions and social behaviour ofwhite-nosed coatis, Nasua narica. Animal
Behaviour 53 pp.781-797.
Goodall,1. (1965): Chimpanzees of the Gombe Stream Reserve. In I. de Vore (ed.)
Primate Behaviour, pp.425-473. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Goodall, 1. (1986): The Chimpanzees ofGombe: Patterns ofBehaviour. Cambridge
MA: Harvard University Press.
Goss-Custard, 1., R. Dunbar and P. Aldrich-Blake (1972): Survival, mating and
rearing strategies in the evolution of primate social structure. Folia Primatologica 17
pp.I-19.
Gould, L. (1996): Male-female affiliative relationships in naturally occuring ringtailed
lemurs (Lemur catta) at the Beza-Mahafaly Reserve, Madagascar. American Journal
ofPrimatology 39 pp.63-78.
Gould, L. (1997): Intermale affiliative behaviour in ringtailed lemurs (Lemur catta) at
the Beza-Mahafaly Reserve. Primates 38 pp.15-30.
Gouzoules, H. (1975): Maternal rank and early social interactions of infant stumptail
macaques, Macaca arctoides. Primates 16 pp.405-418.
Gouzoules, H. (1984): Social relations of males and infants in a troop of Japanese
monkeys: a consideration of causal mechanisms. In D.M. Taub (ed.) Primate
Paternalism, pp.127-145. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
Gratto-Trevor, C.L. (1991): Parental care in semipalmated sandpipers Calidris
pusilla: brood desertion by females. IBIS 133 pp. 394-399.
342
?ray, SJ. (1994): Comparison of effects ofbreast-feeding practices on birth-spacing
In three societies of nomadic Turkana, Gainj and Quechua. Journal ofBiosocial
Science 26 pp.69-90.
Gray, S.l (1996): Ecology ofweaning among nomadic Turkana pastoralists of
Kenya: maternal thinking, maternal behaviour and human adaptive strategies. Human
Biology 3 pp.437-465.
Hall, K.R.L. and B. Mayer (1967): Social interactions in a group of captive patas
monkeys (Erythrocebus patas). Folia Primatologica 5 pp.213-236.
Hames, R. (1989): Time, effeciency and fitness in the Amazonian protein quest.
Research in Economic Anthropology 11 pp.43-85.
Hamilton, W.D. (1964a): The genetical evolution of social behaviour, I. Journal of
Theoretical Biology 7 pp.I-16.
Hamilton, W.D. (1964b): The genetical evolution of social behaviour, II. Journal of
Theoretical Biology 7 pp.17-52.
Hamilton, W.D. (1984): Significance of paternal investment by primates to the
evolution of adult male-female associations. In D. Taub (ed.) Primate Paternalism,
pp.309-335. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
Hannon, S.l and G. Dobush (1997): Pairing status of male willow ptarmigan: is
polygyny costly to males? Animal Behaviour 53 pp.369-380.
Happe, F. (1994): Autism. London: UCL press.
Harcourt, AH. (1992): Coalitions and alliances: are primates more complex than non-
primates. In AH. Harcourt and F.B.M. de Waal (eds.) Coalitions and Alliances in
Humans and Other Animals, pp.445-472. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harcourt, A.H., D. Fossey and J. Sabeter-Pi (1981): Demography of Gorilla gorilla.
Journal ofZoology (London) 195 pp.215-233.
Harrel, W.A. and T. Hartnagel (1976): The impact ofMachiavellianism and the
trustfulness of the victim on laboratory theft. Sociometry 39 pp.157-165.
Harris, lM. (1985): Age and palaeoecology of the upper Laetoli beds, Laetoli,
Tanzania. In E. Delson (ed.) Ancestors: The Hard Evidence, pp.76-81. New York:
Alan R. Liss.
Harrison, M.J.S. (1983): Age and sex differences in the diet and feeding strategies of
the green monkey, Cercopithecus sabaeus. Animal Behaviour 31 pp.969-977.
Harvey, P.H. and M.D. Pagel (1991): The Comparative Method in Evolutionary
Biology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
343
Hasegawa, T. (1990): Sex differences in ranging patterns. In T.Nishida (ed.)
Chimpanzees of the Mahle Mountains, pp.115-132. Tokyo:University of Tokyo
Press.
Hauser, C.H. and H.G. Schuster (1997): Effects of increasing the number of players
and memory size in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: a numerical approach.
Proceedings of the Royal Society London Series B 264 pp.513-519.
Hawkes, K. (1990): Why do men hunt? Some benefits for risky strategies. In E.
Cashdan (ed.) Risk and Uncertainty, pp.145-166. Boulder: Westview Press.
Hawkes, K. (1991): Showing-off: Tests ofa hypothesis about men's foraging goals.
Ethology and Sociobiology 12 pp.29-54.
Hawkes, K. (1993): Why hunter-gatherers work: An ancient version of the problem of
public goods. Current Anthropology 34 pp.341-361.
Hawkes, K., J.F. O'Connell and N.G. Blurton Jones (1991): Hunting income patterns
among the Hadza: big game, common goods, foraging goals, and the evolution of the
human diet. Philosophical Transactions ofthe Royal Society London Series B 334
pp.243-251.
Hawkes, K., J.F. O'Connell and N.G. Blurton Jones (1997a): Menopause:
evolutionary causes, fossil and archaeological consequences. Journal ofHuman
Evolution 32 pp.A8-A9 (abstract).
Hawkes, K., J.F. O'Connell and N.G. Blurton Jones (1997b): Hadza women's time
allocation, offspring provisioning, and the evolution of long post-menopausal
lifespans. Current Anthropology 38 pp.551-577.
Hawkes, K., J.F. O'Connell, N.G. Blurton-Jones, H. Alvarez and E.L. Chamov
(1998): Granmothering, menopause, and the evolution of human life histories.
Proceedings ofthe National Academy ofSciences USA 95 pp.1336-1339.
Hawkes, K, J.F. O'Connell and L. Rogers (1997): The behavioral ecology ofmodern
hunter-gatherers, and human evolution. Trends in Ecology and Evolution 12 pp.29-
32.
Hawkes, K., J.F. O'Connell, N.G. Blurton Jones, H. Alvarez and E.L. Chamov
(1998): Grandmothering, menopause, and the evolution of human life histories.
Proceedings of the National Academy ofScience, USA 95 pp.1336-1339.
Hemelrijk, C.K. (1990): Models of and tests for, reciprocity, unidirectionality and
other social interaction patterns at a group level. Animal Behaviour 39 pp.1013-1029.
Hemelrijk, C.K. (1994): Support for being groomed in long-tailed macaques, Macaca
fascicularis. Animal Behaviour 48 pp.479-481.
344
Hemelrijk, C.K. and A. Ek (1991): Reciprocity and interchange ofgrooming and
"support' in captive chimpanzees. Animal Behaviour 41 pp.923-935.
Heredia, R. and J. A. Donazar (1990): High frequency of polyandrous trios in an
endangered population of Lammergeiers Gypaetus barbatus in northern Spain.
Biological Conservation 53 pp.163-171.
Hewlett, B.S. (1992): Husband-wife reciprocity and the father-infant relationship
among Aka pygmies. In B.S. Hewlett (ed.) Father-Child Relations, pp.153-176.
New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Hill, D.A. (1994): Affiliative behaviour between adult males of the genus macaca.
Behaviour 130 pp.293-307.
Hill, K. and A.M. Hurtado (1991): The evolution of premature reproductive
senescence and menopause in human females: an evaluation of the "grandmother"
hypothesis. Human Nature 2 pp.313-350.
Hill, K. and H. Kaplan (1994): On why male foragers hunt and share food. Current
Anthropology 34 pp.701-706.
Hill, K., K. Hawkes, H. Kaplan and A.M. Hurtado (1987): Foraging decisions among
Ache hunter-gatherers: new implications for optimal foraging models. Ethology and
Sociobiology 8 pp.I-36.
Hinde, R.A. (1976): Interactions, relationships and social structure. Man 11 pp.I-17.
Hinde, R.A. (1983): A conceptual framework. In R.A. Hinde (ed.) Primate Social
Relationships, pp.I-7. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications.
Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, M. (1997): Development of sex differences in nonhuman
primates. In M.E. Morbeck, A. Galloway and A.L. Zihlman (eds.) The Evolving
Female: A Life-history Perspective, pp.69-75. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hirsch, L.R. and L. Paul (1996a): Human male mating strategies: I. Courtship tactics
of the "quality" and "quantity" alternatives. Ethology and Sociobiology 17 pp.55-70.
Hirsch, L.R. and L. Paul (1996b): Human male mating strategies: II. Moral codes of
"quality" and "quantity" strategists. Ethology and Sociobiology 17 pp.71-86.
Hogeweg, P. (1988): MIRROR beyond MIRROR, puddles of life. In C. Langton (ed.)
Artificial Life, pp.297-315. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
Hogeweg, P. (1989): Simplicity and complexity in MIRROR universes. Biosystems 23
pp.231-246.
Hogeweg, P. and B. Hesper (1985): Socioinformatic processes: MIRROR modelling
methodology. Journal ofTheoreticalBiology 113 pp.311-330.
345
Holland, lH. (1992a): Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Cambrdige,
MA: MIT Press.
Holland, lH (1992b): Genetic Algorithms. Scientific American 267 pp.66-72.
van Hooff lA.R.A.M. and C.P. van Schaik (1992): Cooperation and competition: the
ecology of primate bonds. In A.H. Harcourt and F.B.M. de Waal (eds.) Coalitions and
Alliances in Humans and Other Animals, pp.357-390. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
van Hooft: J.A.R.A.M. and C.P. van Schaik (1994): Male bonds: affiliative relationships
among nonhuman primate males. Behaviour 130 pp.309-337.
Hrdy, S.B. (1974): Male-male competition and infanticide among the langurs
iPresbytis entellus) of Abu, Rajistan. Folia Primatologica 22 pp.19-58.
Hrdy, S.B. (1976): Care and exploitation of nonhuman primate infants by conspecifics
other than the mother. In J. Rosenblatt, R. Hinde, E. Shaw and C. Bier (eds.)
Advances in the Study ofBehaviour, vol 6 pp.l 01-158 . New York: Academic Press.
Hrdy, S.B. (1977): The Langurs ofAbu. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Hrdy, S.B. (1979): Infanticide among animals: a review, classification and
examination of the implications for the reproductive strategies of females. Ethology
and Sociobiology 1 pp.13-40.
Hunt, K.D. (1994): The evolution of human bipedality - ecology and functional
morphology. Journal ofHuman Evolution 26 pp.183-202.
Hunte, W. and lA. Horrocks (1987): Kin and non-kin interventions in the aggressive
disputes ofvervet monkeys. Behavioural Ecology and Sociobiology 20 pp.257-263.
Hurtado, A.M. and K.R. Hill (1992): Paternal effect on offspring survivorship among
Ache and Hiwi Hunter-Gatherers: implications for modeling pair-bond stability. In
B.S. Hewlett (ed.) Father-Child Relations, pp.31-56. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Hytten, F.E. and 1. Leitch (1971): The Physiology of Human Pregnancy, 2nd edn.
Oxford: Blackwell Scientific.
Ikegami, T. (1993): Genetic fusion and evolution of strategies in the iterated Prisoner's
Dilemma game. Working Paper Presented at Santa Fe.
Ingold, T. (1986): The Appropiration ofNature: Essays on Human Ecology and
Social Relations. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Isaac, G.L. (1978): The food-sharing behaviour of protohuman hominids. Scientific
American 238 pp.90-108.
346
Isaac, G.L. (1983): Bones in contention: competing explanations for the juxtaposition
of early Pleistocene artifacts and faunal remains. In J. Clutton-Brock and C. Grigson
(eds.) Animals and Archaeology, vol 1, pp.3-19. British Archaeological Report.
Isabirye-Bauta, G. (1988): Food competition among individuals in a free-ranging
chimpanzee community in Kibale Forest, Uganda. Animal Behaviour 105 pp.135-147.
Isbell, L.A. and T.P. Young (1996): The evolution ofbipedalism in hominids and
reduced group size in chimpanzees: alternative responses to decreasing resource
availability. Journal ofHuman Evolution 30 pp.389-397.
Izawa, K. (1978): A field study of the ecology and behaviour of the black-mantled
tamarin (Saguinus nigricollis). Primates 19 pp.241-274.
Jamieson, I.G., J.S. Quinn, P.A. Rose and B.N. White (1994): Shared paternity
among non-relatives is a result of an egalitarian mating system in a communally
breeding bird, the pukeko. Proceedings of the Royal Society London, Series B 257
pp.271-277.
Jennions, M.D. and D.W. Macdonald (1994): Cooperative breeding in mammals.
Trends in Ecology and Evolution 9 pp.89-93.
Jones, T. and S. Forrest (1993): An Introduction to SFI Echo. Santa Fe: Santa Fe
Institute.
Kaplan, H. and K. Hill (1985): Food sharing among Ache foragers: tests of
explanatory hypotheses. Current Anthropology 26 pp.223-246.
Karlsson, B. (1995): Resource allocation and mating systems in butterflies. Evolution
49 pp.955-961.
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992): BeyondModularity: A Developmental Perspective on
Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1993): Self-organisation and cognitive change. In M.H. Johnson
(ed.) Brain Development and Cognition, pp.592-618. Oxford: Blackwell.
Katzmarzyk, P.T., W.R. Leonard, M.H. Crawford and R.I. Sukernik (1994): Resting
metabolic rate and daily energy expenditure among two indigenous Siberian
Populations. American Journal ofHuman Biology 6 pp.719-730.
Kempenaers, B. and B.C. Sheldon (1996): Why do male birds not discriminate
between their own and extra-pair offspring? Animal Behaviour 51 pp.1165-1173.
Kenagy, GJ. (1987): Energy allocation for reproduction in the golden-mantled
ground squirrel. In A.S.1. Oudon and P.A. Racey (eds.) Reproductive Energetics in
Mammals, pp.259-273. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
347
Kenagy. G.J and S.C. Tombulak (1986): Size and function of mammalian testes in
relation to body size. Journal ofMammology 67 pp.1-22.
Khoda, M. (1985): AIlomothering behaviour ofNew and Old World monkeys.
Primates 26 pp.28-44.
Kimura, D. (1993): Sex differences in the brain. In Mind and Brain, Readingsfrom
Scientific American, pp.78-89. New York: Freeman and Company.
Kinzey, W.G. (1997): New World Primates. New York: AIdine de Gruyter.
Kinzey, W.G., A.L. Rosenberger, P.S. Heisler, D. L. Prowse and r.s. Trilling (1977):
A preliminary field investigation of the yellow handed titi monkey, Callicebus
torquatus torquatus, in Northern Peru. Primates 18 pp.159-181.
Kleiman, D. (1977): Monogamy in mammals. Quarterly Review ofBiology 52 pp.39-
69.
Klein, H. (1983): Parental Care and Kin Selection in Yellow Baboons, Papio
Cynocepahlus. Ph.D. dissertation, University ofWashington, Seattle.
Kleiber, M. (1932): Body size and metabolism. Hilgardia 6 pp.315-353.
Kleiber, M. (1961): The Fire ofLife: An Introduction to Animal Energetics.
Huntington, New York: Kreiger.
Kleiman, D. (1977): Monogamy in mammals. Quartely Review ofBiology 52 pp.39-
69.
Klopfer, P.H. and K. Boskoff(1979): Maternal behaviour in prosimians. In G.A.
Doyle and R.D. Martin (eds.) The Study ofProsimian Behaviour, pp.123-156. New
York: Academic Press.
Knight, C.D. (1991): Blood Relations. Menstruation and the Origins ofCulture. New
Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Knight, C.D., C. Power and 1. Watts (1995): The human symbolic revolution: a
Darwinian approach. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 5 pp.75-114.
Koenig, A., C. Borries, M.K. Chalise and P. Winkler (1997): Ecology, nutrition and
the timing of reproductive events in an Asian primate, the Hanuman Langur (Presbytis
entellus). Journal ofZoology, London 243 pp.215-235.
Koenig, W.D. (1987): Reciprocal altruism in birds: a critical review. Ethology and
Sociobiology 9 pp.73-84.
Koenig, W.D. (1990): Opportunity of parentage and nest destruction in
polygyandrous acorn woodpeckers, Meanerpes fornicivorus. Behavioural Ecology 1
pp.55-61.
348
~oe~lag., .lH. (1997): S~x, the Prisoner's Dilemma game, and the evolutionary
inevitability of cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology 189 pp.53-61.
Kurland, lA. (1977): Kin Selection in the Japanese Monkey. Basel: Karger.
Kurland, lA. and SJ. Beckerman (1985): Optimal foraging and hominid evolution:
labor and reciprocity. American Anthropologist 87 pp.73-93.
Kurland, lA. and LD. Pearson (1986): Ecological signficance of hypometabolism in
nonhuman primates: Allometry, adaptation and deviant diets. American Journal of
Physical Anthropology 71 pp.445-457.
Kuroda, S. (1984): Interactions over food among pygmy chimpanzees. In R. Susman
(ed.) The Pygmy Chimpanzee, pp.301-324. New York: Plenum.
Kunz, T.R., A.L. Allgaier, J.S. Seyjagat and R. Caligiuri (1994): Allomaternal care:
helper-assisted birth in the Rodrigues fruit bat, Pteropus roricensis (Chiroptera:
Pteropodidae). Journal ofZoology, London 232 pp.691-700.
Lancaster, J. (1971): Play-mothering: the relations between juvenile females and
young infants among free-ranging vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops). Folia
Primatologica 15 pp.161-182.
Lawes, M.J. and S.E. Piper (1992): Activity patterns in free-ranging samango
monkeys (Cercopithecus mitis erythrarchus Peters, 1852) at the southern range limit.
Folia Primatologica 59 pp.186-202.
Lawrence, M. and R.G. Whitehead (1988): Physical activity and total energy
expenditure of child-bearing Gambian village women. European Journal ofClinical
Nutrition 42 pp.145-160.
Lawrence, M., F. Singh, F.Lawrence and R.G. Whitehead (1988): Energy
requirement of pregnancy and lactation: the energy costs of common daily activities in
The Gambia. Annual Report, MRC Dunn Nutrition Unit, UK and Keneba, Gambia.
Lausanne: Nestle Foundation.
Lee, R.B. (1979): The IKung San: Men, Women and Work in a Foraging Society.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lee, P.C. (1984): Ecological constraints on the social development ofvervet
monkeys. Behaviour 91 pp.245-262.
Lee, P.C. (1987): Nutrition, fertility and maternal investment in primates. Journal of
Zoology 213 pp.409-422.
Lee, P.C., P. Majlufand I.J. Gordon (1991): Growth, Weaning and Maternal
Investment from a Comparative Perspective. Journal ofZoology 225 pp.99-114.
349
Leimar, 0., B. Karlsson and C.Wiklund (1994): Unpredictable food and sexual size
dimorphsim in insects. Proceedings ofthe Royal Society London Series B 258
pp.121-125.
Leonard, W.R. and M. Robertson (1994): Evolutionary perspectives on human
nutrition: the influence ofbrain and body size on diet and metabolism. American
Journal ofHuman Biology 6 pp.77-88.
Leonard, W.R. and M.Robertson (1997): Comparative primate energetics and
hominid evolution. American Journal ofPhysical Anthropology 102 pp.265-281.
Leonard, W.R., P.T. Katzmarzyk and M.H. Crawford (1996): Energetics and
population ecology of Siberian herders. American Journal ofHuman Biology 8
pp.275-289.
Leslie, P.W., JR. Bindon and P.T. Baker (1984): Caloric requirements of human
populations. Human Ecology 12 pp.137-159.
Leutenegger, W. (1980): Monogamy in callitrichids: a consequence ofphyletic
dwarfism? International Journal ofPrimatology 1 pp.95-98.
Lewin, R.L. (1993): Complexity. London: 1M Dent Ltd.
Ligon, JD. (1983): Cooperation and reciprocity in avian social systems. American
Naturalist 121 pp.366-384.
Ligon, JD. (1991): Cooperation and reciprocity in birds and mammals. In P.G.
Hepper (ed.) Kin Recognition, pp.30-59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lindburg, D.G. (1987): Seasonality of reproduction in primates. In G. Mitchell and J
Erwin (eds.) Comparative Primate Biology. 2B: Behavior, Cognition, and
Motivation, pp.167-218. New York: Alan R. Liss.
Lindgren, K. (1991): Evolutionary phenomena in simple dynamics. In C.G. Langton,
JD. Farmer, S. Rasmussen and C. Taylor (eds.) Artificial Life II, pp.295-312.
Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley.
Lott, D.F. (1991): Intraspecific Variation in the Social Systems of Wild Vertebrates.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lovejoy, C.O. (1981): The origin of man. Science 211 pp.341-350.
Lunn, P.G. (1994): Lactation and other metabolic loads affecting human
reproduction. In K.L. Campbell and J W. Wood (eds.) Human Reproductive Ecology:
Interactions ofEnvironment, Fertility and Behaviour, pp.77-85. New York: New
York Academy of Sciences.
MacDonald, D.W. (1983): The ecology of carnivore social behaviour. Nature 301
pp.379-384.
350
MacDonald, D.W. and P.D. Moehlman (1982): Cooperation, altruism and restraint in
the reproduction of carnivores. In P.P.G. Bateson and P.H. Klopfer (eds.)
Perspectives in Ethology Vol 5 Ontogeny, pp.433-467. New York: Plenum Press.
Mace, G.M. and P.H. Harvey (1983): Energetic constraints on home range size.
American Naturalist 121 pp.120-132.
Maestripieri, D. and S. Scucchi (1989): Seasonal changes in social relationships in an
all-female rhesus monkey (Macaca mulatta) group. Behaviour 110 pp.l06-114.
Mann, 1. and B.B. Smuts (1998): Natal attraction: allomaternal care and mother-
infant separations in wild bottlenose dolphins. Animal Behaviour 55 pp.l097-1113.
Manson, J.H. (1994): Mating patterns, mate choice and birth season heterosexual
relationships in free-ranging rhesus macaques. Primates 35 pp.417-433.
Marsh. C.W. (1979): Female transfer and mate choice among the Rana river red
colobus. Nature 281 pp.568-569.
Martin, R.D. (1981): Relative brain size and metabolic rate in terrestrial vertebrates.
Nature 393 pp.57-60.
Martin, R.D. (1983): Human brain evolution in an ecological context. sr' James
Arthur Lecture on the Evolution of the Brain. American Museum ofNatural History.
Martin, R.D. (1996): Scaling of the mammalian brain: the maternal energy hypothesis.
News in Physiological Sciences 11 pp.149-156.
Martin, R.D., L.A. Wilner and A.Dettling (1994): The evolution of sexual size
dimorphism in primates. In R.V. Short and E. Balaban (eds.) The Differences
Between the Sexes, pp.159-202. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Maynard Smith, J. (1977): Parental investment: a prospective analysis. Animal
Behaviour 25 pp.I-9.
Maynard Smith, 1. and G. Price (1973): The logic of animal conflict. Nature 246
pp.15-18.
Maynard Smith, 1. and M.G. Ridpath (1972): Wife sharing in the Tasmanian native
hen, Tribonyx mortierii. a case of kin selection? American Naturalist 106 pp.447-
452.
McFarland, R. (1997): Female primates: fat or fit? In M.E. Morbeck, A. Galloway
and A.L. Zihlman (eds.) The Evolving Female, pp.163-178. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
McFarland Symington, M. (1988a): Food competition and foraging party size in the
black spider monkey (Ateles paniscus chamek). Animal Behaviour 105 pp.117-134.
351
McFarland Symington, M. (1988b): Demography, ranging patterns and activity
budgets ofblack spider monkeys (Ateles paniscus chamek) in the Manu National
Park, Peru. American Journal ofPrimatology 15 pp.45-67.
McGrew, w.e. (1992): Chimpanzee Material Culture: Implicationsfor Human
Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McHenry, H.M. (1992a): Body size and proportion in the early hominids. American
Journal ofPhysical Anthropology 86 pp.407-431.
McHenry, H.M. (1992b): How big were early hominids? Evolutionary Anthropology
1 pp.15-19.
McHenry, H.M. (1996): Sexual dimorphism in fossil hominids and its socioecological
implications. In J. Steele and S.Shennan (eds.) The Archaeology ofHuman Ancestry,
pp.91-103. London: Routledge.
McNeill, G. and P.R. Payne (1985): Energy expenditure of pregnant and lactating
women. Lancet vol. 2 no. 8466 pp.1237-1238.
Mealey, L., C. Daood and M. Krage (1996): Enhanced memory for faces of cheaters.
Ethology and Sociobiology 17 pp.119-128.
Meder, A. (1986): Physical and activity changes associated with pregnancy in captive
lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla). American Journal ofPrimatology 11
pp.11-16.
Mesterton-Gibbons, M. and L.A. Dugatkin (1997): Cooperation and the Prisoner's
Dilemma: towards testable models ofmutualism versus reciprocity. Animal Behaviour
54 pp.551-557.
Milton, K. (1980): The Foraging Strategy ofHowler Monkeys: A Study in Primate
Economics. New York: Columbia University Press.
Mitani, lC. and D. Watts (1997): The evolution of non-maternal caretaking among
anthropoid primates: do helpers help? Behvioural Ecology and Sociobiology 40
pp.213- 220.
Mitchell, C.M., S. Boinski and C.P. van Schaik (1991): Competitive regimes and
female bonding in two species of squirrel monkeys (Saimiri oerstedii and S.sciureus).
Behavioural Ecology and Sociobiology 28 pp.55-60.
Mithen, S. (1996): The Prehistory ofthe Mind. London: Thames and Hudson.
Moehlman, P.D. (1979): Jackal helpers and pup survival. Nature 277 pp.382-383.
Meller, A.P. and T.R. Birkhead (1993): Certainty of paternity covaries with paternal
care in birds. Behavioural Ecology and Sociobiology 33 pp.261-268.
352
Morbeck, M.E. and A.L. Zihlman (1988): Body composition and limb proportions in
orangutans. In 1. Schwartz (ed.) Orang-utan Biology, pp.285-297. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Morbeck, M.E, A. Galloway and A.L. ZiWman (1997): The Evolving Female: A
Life-History Perspective. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mori, A. (1979): Analysis of population changes by measurement ofbody weight in
the koshima troop of Japanese monkeys. Primates 20 pp.371-397.
Mumme, R.L., W.D. Koenig and F.A. Pitelka (1983): Mate guarding in the acorn
woodpecker: within group reproductive competition in a cooperative breeder. Animal
Behaviour 31 pp.1094-11 06.
Murstein, B.I., M. Cerreto and M.G. MacDonald (1977): A theory and investigation
of the effect of exchange-orientation on marriage and friendship. Journal ofMarriage
and the Family 39 pp.543-548.
Muruthi, P., J. Altmann and S. Altmann (1991): Resource base, parity and
reproductive condition affect females' feeding time and nutrient intake within and
between groups ofa baboon population. Ociologia 87 pp.467-472.
Musonda, F.B. (1991): The significance of modem hunter-gatherers in the study of
early hominid behaviour. In R.A. Foley (ed.) The Origins ofHuman Behaviour,
pp.39-51. London: Unwin Hyman.
Nakagawa, N. (1989): Activity budget and diet of patas monkeys in Kala Maloue
National Park, Cameroon: a preliminary report. Primates 30 pp.27-34.
Nettelbeck. A.R. (1993): Zur oko-ethologiefFreiblebender Weisshandgibbons
(By/obates lar) in Thaliland. M.Sc. thesis, Zoologisches Institut und museum,
Universitat Hamburg.
Nettle, D. and R.I.M. Dunbar (1997): Social markers and the evolution of reciprocal
exchange. Current Anthropology 38 pp.93-99.
Nishida, T. (1983): Alloparental behaviour in wild chimpanzees of the Mahale
Mountains, Tanzania. Folia Primatologica 41 pp.1-33.
Nishida, T. and L. Turner (1996): Food transfer between mother and infant
chimpanzees of the Mahale Mountains National Park, Tanzania. International Journal
ofPrimatology 17 pp.947-968.
Nishimura, A., A. Wilches and C. Estrada (1990): Reproductive behaviours ofwoolly
monkeys, Lagothrix lagotricha, viewed from long term studies. XIIIth Congress of
the International Primatological Society, Abstracts pp.313-314. Nagoya, Japan.
353
Noe, R. (1986): Lasting alliances among adult male savannah baboons. In J.G. Else and
P.C. Lee (eds.) Primate Ontogeny, Cognition and Social Behaviour, pp.381-392.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Noe, R. (1990): A veto game played by baboons: a challenge to the use of the Prisoner's
Dilemma as a paradigm for reciprocity and cooperation. Animal Behaviour 39 pp.78-90.
Noe, R. (1992): Alliance formation among male baboons: shopping for profitable partners.
In A.H. Harcourt and F.B.M. de Waal (eds.) Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and
Other Animals, pp.285-321. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Noe, R. and P. Hammerstein (1994): Biological markets: supply and demand determine
the effect of partner choice in cooperation, mutualism and mating. Behavioural Ecology
and Sociobiology 35 pp.l-l1.
Nowak, M. and K. Sigmund (1992): Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations. Nature 355
pp.250-252.
Nowak, M. and K. Sigmund (1993): A strategy ofwin-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-
for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Nature 364 pp.56-58.
Nunney, L. (1985): Group selection, altruism and structured-deme models. American
Naturalist 126 pp.212-230.
O'Farrell, M.J. and E.H. Studier (1973): Reproduction, growth and development in
Myotis thysanodes and M lucifugus (Chiroptera: Vespertilionidae). Ecology 54 pp.23-
30.
Owens, D.O. and M.J. Owens (1979): Communal denning and clan associations in
brown hyenas (Hyaena brunnea, Thunberg) of the central Kalahari Desert. African
Journal ofEcology 17 pp.35-44.
Owens, D.O. and M.J. Owens (1984): Helping behaviour in brown hyenas. Nature
308 pp.843-845.
Owens, P.F. and I.R. Hartley (1998): Sexual dimorphism in birds: why are there so
many different forms of dimorphism? Proceedings ofthe Royal Society London Series
B 265 pp.397-407.
Packer, C. (1977): Reciprocal altruism inPapio anubis. Nature 265 pp.441-443.
Packer, C. (1980): Male care and exploitation of infants in Papio anubis. Animal
Behaviour 28 pp.512-520.
Packer, C. and A. Pusey (1985): Asymmetric contests in social mammals: respect,
manipulation and age-specific aspects. In P .H. Greenwood, P .H. Harvey and
M.Slatkin (eds.) Evolution: Essays in the Honour ofJohn Maynard Smith, pp.173-
186. Cambrdge: Cambridge University Press
354
Packer, C. and L. Ruttan (1988): The evolution of cooperative hunting. American
Naturalist 132 pp.159-198.
Packer, C., L. Herbst and A.E. Pusey (1988): Reproductive success in lions. In T.H.
Clutton-Brock (ed.) Reproductive Success: Studies ofIndividual Variation in
Contrasting Breeding Systems, pp.363-384. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Packer, C., S. Lewis and A. Pusey (1992): A comparative analysis ofnon-offspring
nursing. Animal Behaviour 43 pp.265-281.
Packer, C., D. Gilbert, A.E. Pusey and S. O'Brien (1991): A molecular genetic
analysis of kinship and cooperation in African lions. Nature 373 pp.60-63.
Pagel, M. (1997): Desperately conealing father: a theory of parent-infant resemblance.
Animal Behaviour 53 pp.973-981.
Palombit, R.A. (1995): Longitudinal patterns of reproduction in wild female siamang
iHylobates syndactylus) and white-handed gibbons (Hylobates lar). International
Journal ofPrimatology 16 pp739-760.
Palombit, R.A., R.M. Seyfarth and D.L. Cheney (1997): The adaptive value of
'friendships' to female baboons: experimental and observational evidence. Animal
Behaviour 54 pp.599-614.
Palmer, C.T. (1991): Kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, and information sharing
among Maine Lobstermen. Ethology and Sociobiology 12 pp.221-235.
Panter-Brick, C. (1989): Motherhood and subsistence work: the Tamang of rural
Nepal. Human Ecology 17 pp.205-228.
Panter-Brick, C. (1991): Lactation, birth spacing and maternal work-loads among two
castes in rural Nepal. Journal ofBiosocial Science 23 pp.137-154.
Panter-Brick, C. (1993): Seasonality of energy expenditure during pregnancy and
lactation for rural Nepali women. American Journal ofClinical Nutrition 57 pp.620-
628.
Panter-Brick, C. (1996): Physical activity, energy stores and seasonal energy balance
among men and women in Nepali households. American Journal ofHuman Biology 8
pp.263-274.
Parish, A.R. (1994): Sex and food control in the uncommon chimpanzee - how
bonobo females overcome a phylogentic legacy of male dominance. Ethology and
Sociobiology 15 pp.157-179.
Parker, S. and D.R. Gibson (1979): A developmental model for the evolution of
language and intelligence in early hominids. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 pp.367-
407.
355
Paul, A., J. Kuester and J. Arnemann (1992): DNA fingerprinting reveals that infant
care by male barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus) is not paternal investment. Folia
Primatologica 58 pp.93-98.
Perry, S. (1997): Male-female social relationships in wild white-faced capuchins
(Cebus capucinus). Behaviour 134 pp.477-510.
Perry, S. and L. Rose (1994): Begging and transfer of coati meat by white-faced
capuchin monkeys, Cebus capucinus. Primates 35 pp.409-415.
Peterson, N. (1993): Demand sharing: recipocity and the pressure for generosity
among foragers. American Anthropologist 95 pp.860-874.
Poirier, F.E. (1968): The Nilgiri langur (Presbytis johnii) mother-infant dyad.
Primates 9 pp.45-68.
Pollock, G.B. (1991): Crossing Malthusian boundaries: Evolutionary stability in the finitely
repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal ofQuantitativeAnthropology 3 pp.159-180.
Pond, C.M. (1997): The biological origins of adipose tissue in humans. In M.E.
Morbeck, A. Galloway and A.L. Zihlman (eds.) The Evolving Female: A Life-history
Perspective, pp.147-162. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Portman, O.W. (1970): Nutritional requirements of non-human primates. In R.S.
Harris (ed.) Feeding and Nutrition ofNon-human Primates, pp.87-115. New York:
Academic Press.
Post, W. and J. Baulu (1978): Time budgets ofMacaca mulatta. Primates 19 pp.125-
140.
Povinelli, D.l (1994): Comparative studies of mental state attribution: a reply to
Heyes. Animal Behaviour 48 pp.239-241.
Povinelli, D.l, K.E. Nelson and S.T. Boysen (1990): Inferences about guessing and
knowing by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal ofComparative Psychology 104
pp.203-210.
Povinelli, D.l, K.E. Nelson and S.T. Boysen (1992a): Comprehension of role reversal
in chimpanzees: evidence of empathy? Animal Behaviour 43 pp.633-640.
Povinelli, D.l, K.A. Parks and M.A. Novak (1992b): Role reversal by rhesus
monkeys; but no evidence of empathy. Animal Behaviour 44 pp.269-281.
Power, C. and L.C. Aiello (1997): Female proto-symbolic strategies. In: L.D. Hager (ed.)
Women in Human Origins, pp. 153-171. London: Routledge.
Power, C., C. Authur and L.C. Aiello (1997): On seasonal reproductive synchrony as an
evolutionary stable strategy in human evolution. Current Anthropology 38 pp.88-91.
356
Power, C. and 1. Watts (1996): Female strategies and collective behaviour. In J.
Steele and S. Shennan (eds.): The Archaeology ofHuman Ancestry, pp.306-330.
London and New York: Routledge.
Premack, D. (1988): Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Revisited. In R. W.
Byrne and A. Whiten (eds.) Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the
Evolution ofIntellect in Monkeys, Apes and Humans, pp.160-179. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Premack, D. and G. Woodruff(1978): Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 pp.515-526.
Prentice, A.M., A. Paul, A. Prentice, A.E. Black, TJ. Cole and R.G. Whitehead
(1986): Cross-cultural differences in lactational performance. In M. Hamosh and A.S.
Goldman (eds.) Human Lactation 2. Maternal and Environmental Factors, pp.13-44.
New York: Plenum Press.
Price, E.C. (1992): Changes in the activity of captive cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus
oedipus) over the breeding cycle. Primates 33 pp.99-106.
Rabenold, P.P., K.N. Rabenold, W.H. Piper, l Haydock and S.W. Zack (1990):
Shared paternity revealed by genetic analysis in cooperatively breeding tropical wrens.
Nature 348 pp.538-540.
Raleigh M.l and M.T. McGuire (1989): Female influences on male dominance
acquisition in captive vervet monkeys, Cercopithecus aethiops sabaeus. Animal
Behaviour 38 pp.59-67.
Ransom, T.W. and S.B. Ransom (1971): Adult male-infant relations among baboons
(Papio anubis). Folia Primatologica 16 pp.179-195.
Rasmussen, S.L.R. (1985): Changes in the activity budgets of yellow baboons (Papio
cynocephalus) during sexual consortships. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 17
pp.151-170.
Reed, K.E. (1997): Early hominid evolution and ecological change through the
African Plio-Pleistocene. Journal ojHuman Evolution 32 pp.289-322.
Reiter, J. (1997): Life history and reproductive success of female northern elephant
seals. In M.E. Morbeck, A. Galloway and A.L. Zihlman (eds.) The Evolving Female:
A Life-history Perspective, pp.46-52. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Reyer, H. (1980): Flexible helper structure as an ecological adaptation in the pied
kingfisher (Ceryle rudis rudis). Behavioural Ecology and Sociobiology 6 pp.219-227.
Reyer, H. (1984): Investment and relatedness: a cost/benefit analysis ofbreeding and
helping in the pied kingfisher (Ceryle rudis). Animal Behaviour 32 pp.1163-1178.
357
Riches, D. (1984): Hunting, herding and potlatching: towards a sociological account
of prestige. Man 19 pp.234-251.
Ridley, M. (1986): The number of males in a primate troop. Animal Behaviour 34
pp.1848-1858.
Riedman, M.L. (1982): The Evolution of alloparental care and adoption in mammals
and birds. The Quarterly Review of Biology 57 pp.405-435.
Roberts, G. (1998): Competitive altruism: from reciprocity to the handicap principle.
Proceedings of the Royal Society London Series B 265 pp.427-431.
Roberts, S.B. and W.A. Coward (1985): Lactational performance in relation to
energy intake in the baboon. American Journal ofClinical Nutrition 41 pp.1270-
1276.
Roberts, S.B., A.A. Paul, T.J. Cole and R.G. Whitehead (1982): Seasonal changes in
activity, birth weight and lactational performance in rural Gambian women.
Transactions of the Royal Society ofTropical Medicine and Hygience 76 pp.668-
678.
Rogers, I.S., J. Golding and P.M. Emmett (1997): The effects of lactation on the
mother. Early Human Development 49 Supplement, pp.SI91-S203.
Rose, L.M. (1997): Vertebrate predation and food-sharing in Cebus and Pan.
International Journal ofPrimatology 18 pp.727-765.
Rosenblum, L.A. (1971): Infant attachment in monkeys. In R. Shaffer (ed.) The
Origins ofHuman Social Relations, pp.85-109. New York: Academic Press.
Ross, C. (1988): The intrinsic rate of natural increase and reproductive effort in
primates. Journal of the Zoological Society ofLondon 214 pp.199-219.
Ross, C. (1991): Life history patterns of New World monkeys. International Journal
ofPrimatology 12 pp.481-502.
Ross, C. and K.E. Jones (in press): Evolution of primate reproductive rates. In P.C.
Lee (ed.) Primate Socioecology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ross, C. and A. MacLarnon (submitted.): Evolution of non-maternal care In
haplorhine primates: a test of the hypotheses. Folia Primatologica.
Rowell, T.E. (1963): The social development of some rhesus monkeys (1961
seminar). In B.M. Foss (ed.) Determinants ofInfant Behaviour, vol II pp.35-49.
London: Methuen.
Ruff: C.B. (1987): Sexual dimorphism in human lower limb bone structure:
relationship to subsistence strategy and sexual division of labour. Journal ofHuman
Evolution 16 pp.391-416.
358
Ruff, C.B. (1991): Climate and body shape in hominid evolution. Journal ofHuman
Evolution 21 pp.81-105.
Rutberg, A.T. (1983): The evolution of monogamy In primates. Journal of
Theoretical Biology 104 pp.93-112.
Rutenberg. G.W., A.M. Coehlo Jr., D.S. Lewis, K.D. Carey and H.C. McGill Jf.
(1987): Body composition in baboons: evaluating a morphometric method. American
Journal ofPrimatology 12 pp.275-285.
Rylands, A.B. (1996): Habitat and the evolution of social and reproductive behaviour
in Callitrichidae. American Journal ofPrimatology 38 pp.5-18.
Sahlins, M. (1972): Stone Age Economics. London: Routledge.
Salsbury, C.M. and K.B. Armitage (1995): Reproductive energetics of adult male
yellow-bellied marmots (Marmota flaviventris). Canadian Journal ofZoology 73
pp.1791-1797.
Sauther, M.L. and L.T. Nash (1987): Effect of reproductive state and body size on
food consumption in captive Galago senegalensis braccatus. American Journal of
Physical Anthropology 73 pp.81-88.
Savage-Rumbaugh, S. (1980): Ape Language: From Conditioned Response to
Symbol. New York: Oxford University Press.
Savage-Rumbaugh, S. and R. Lewin (1994): Kanzi, The Ape at the Brink ofthe
Human Mind. London: Doubleday.
van Schaik, C.P. and J. van Hooff(1983): On the ultimate causes of primate social
systems. Behaviour 85 pp.91-117.
Schaller, G.B. (1972): The Serengeti Lion: A Study ofPredator-Prey Relations.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Schaub, H. (1996): Testing kin altruism in long-tailed macaques (Macaca
fascicularis) in a food-sharing experiment. International Journal ofPrimatology 17
pp.445- 467.
Schiml, P.A., S.P. Mendoza, W. Saltzman, D.M. Lyons and W.A. Mason (1996):
Seasonality in squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus), social facilitation by females.
Physiology and Behavior 60 pp.1105-1113.
Sekulic, R. (1983): Male relationships and infant death in red howler monkeys (Alouatta
seniculus). Zietschrift fur Tierpsychologie 61 pp.185-202.
Seyfarth, RM. (1976): Social relationships among adult female baboons. Animal
Behaviour 24 pp.917-938.
359
Seyfarth, R.M. (1977): A model of social grooming among adult female monkeys. Journal
ofTheoretical Biology 65 pp.671-698.
Seyfarth, R.M. (1980): The distribution of grooming and related behaviours among adult
female vervet monkeys. Animal behaviour 28 pp.298-813.
Seyfarth, R.M. (1983): Grooming and social competition in primates. In R.A. Hinde (ed.)
Primate Social Relationships, pp.182 -190. Sunderland, Massachusetts: Sinauer
Associates Incorporated.
Seyfarth, R.M. and F.L. Cheney (1984): Grooming alliances and reciprocal altruism in
vervet monkeys. Nature 308 pp.541-543.
Seyfarth, R.M. and F.L. Cheney (1988): Empirical tests of reciprocity theory: problems in
assessment. Ethology and Sociobiology 9 pp.181-187.
Shennan, P.T. (1995): Social organization of cooperatively polyandrous white-
winged trumpeters (psophia leucoptera). The Auk 112 pp.296-309.
Shipman, P. and A. Walker (1989): The costs ofbecoming a predator. Journal of
Human Evolution 18 pp.373-392.
Sigmund, K. (1995): Games ofLife: Explorations in Ecology, Evolution and Behaviour.
London: Penguin.
Silk, lB. (1982): Altruism among female Macaca radiata: explanations and analysis
of patterns of grooming and coalition formation. Behaviour 79 pp.162-188.
Silk, lB. (1986): Eating for two: behavioural and environmental correlates of
gestational length among free-ranging baboons Papio cyncopephalus. International
Journal ofPrimatology 7 pp.583-602.
Silk, LB. (1992a): Patterns of intervention in agonistic contests among male bonnet
macaques. In A.H. Harcourt and F.B.M. de Waal (eds.) Coalitions and Alliances in
Humans and other Animals, pp.215-232. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Silk, LB. (1992b): The patterning of intervention among male bonnet macaques:
reciprocity, revenge and loyalty. Current Anthropology 3 pp.318-325.
Silk, lB. (1994): Social relationships of male bonnet macaques: male bonding in a
matrilineal society. Behaviour 130 pp.271-291.
Singh, M. and S. Vinathe (1990): Inter-populations differences in the time budgets of
bonnet monkeys (Macaca radiata). Primates 31 pp.589-596.
Smith, C.C. (1977): Feeding behaviour and social organization in howler monkeys. In
T.H. Clutton-Brock (ed.) Primate Ecology: Studies ofFeeding and Ranging
Behaviour in Lemurs, Monkeys and Apes, pp.96-106. London: Academic Press.
360
Smith, E.A. (1988): Risk and uncertainty in the "original affluent society":
evolutionary ecology of resource-sharing and land tenure. In T. Ingold, D. Riches and
1. Woodburn (eds.) Hunters and Gatherers: History, Evolution and Social Change,
pp.222-251. Oxford: Berg.
Smith, R.I. and W.L. Jungers (1997): Body mass in comparative primatology.
Journal ofHuman Evolution 32 pp.523-559.
Smith, R.I. and S.R. Leigh (1998): Sexual dimorphism in primate neonatal body mass.
Journal ofHuman Evolution 34 pp.173-195.
Smuts, B.B. (1985): Sex and Friendship in Baboons. New York: AIdine.
Smuts, B.B. and D.I. Gubernick (1992): Male-infant relationships in non-human
primates. In B.S. Hewlett (ed.) Father-Child Relations, pp.I-30. New York: Aldine
de Gruyter.
Smuts, B.B. and R.W. Smuts (1993): Male aggression and sexual coercion of females
in nonhuman primates and other mammals. Advances in the Study ofBehaviour 22
pp.1-63.
Soffer, O. (1994): Ancestrallifeways in Eurasia - the Middle and Upper Paleolithic
records. In M.H. Nitecki and D.V. Nitecki (eds.) Origins ofAnatomically Modern
Humans, pp.101-119. New York: Plenum.
Soltis, 1., R. Boyd and P. Richerson (1995): Can group-functional behaviours evolve
by cultural group selection? An empirical test. Current Anthropology 36 pp.473-494.
Stammbach, E. (1978): On social differentiation in groups of captive female
hamadryas baboons. Behaviour 67 pp.322-338.
Stammbach, E (1987): Desert, forest and mountain baboons: Multilevel societies. In B.B.
Smuts, D.L. Cheney, R.M. Seyfarth, R.W. Wrangham and T.T. Struhsaker (eds.) Primate
Societies, pp.112-120. Chicago: The University ofChicago Press.
Stanford, C.B. (1992): Costs and benefits of allomothering in wild capped langurs
(presbytis pileata). Behavioural Ecology and Sociobiology 30 pp.29-34.
Stanford, C.B., 1. Wallis, E. Mpongo and 1.Goodall (1994): Hunting decisions in wild
chimpanzees. Behaviour 131 pp. 1-18.
Starin, E.D. (1994): Philopatry and affiliation among red colobus. Behaviour 130
pp.253-270.
Steele, J. and S. Shennan (1996): The Archaeology ofHuman Ancestry. London:
Routledge.
Stein, D.M. (1984): The ontogeny of infant-adult male relationships during the first
year of life for yellow baboons (Papio cyncephalus). In D.M. Taub (ed.) Primate
Paternalism, pp.213-243. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
361
Stern, IT. and R.L. Susman (1983): The locomotor anatomy ofAustralopithecus
afarensis. American Journal ofPhysical Anthropology 60 pp.279-317.
Stern, K. and M.K. McClintock (1998): Regulation of ovulation by human
pheromones. Nature 392 pp.177-179.
Stevenson, P.R.~ MJ. Quinones and lA. Ahumada (1994): Ecological strategies of
woolly monkeys (Lagothrix lagotricha) at Tinigua National Park, Colombia.
American Journal ofPrimatology 32 pp.123-140.
Strier, K.B. (1987): Activity budgets of woolly spider monkeys, or Muriquis
(Brachyteles arachnoides). American Journal ofPrimatology 13 pp.385-395.
Strier, K.B. (1991): Demography and conservation of an endangered primate,
Brachyteles arachnoides. Conservation Biology 5 pp.214-218.
Struhsaker, T.T. (1967): Ecology ofvervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops) in the
Masai-Amboseli game reserve, Kenya. Ecology 48 pp.891-904.
Struhsaker, T.T. (1977): Infanticide and social organisation in the redtail monkey
(Cercopithecus ascanius schmidti) in the Kibale forest, Uganda. Zietschrift fur
Tierpsychologie 45 pp.75-84.
Strum, S.C. (1984): Why males use infants. In D.M. Taub (ed.) Primate Paternalism,
pp.146-185. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
Strum, S.C. and W. Mitchell (1987): Baboon models and muddles. In W.G. Kinzey
(ed.) The Evolution ofHuman Behavior: Primate Models, pp.87-104. Albany: State
University ofNew York Press.
Strum, S.C. and D. Western (1982): Variation in fecundity with age and environment
in olive baboons. American Journal ofPrimatology 3 pp.61-76.
Strum, S.C., D. Forster and E. Hutchins (1997): Why Machiavellian intelligence may
not be Machiavellian. In A. Whiten and R.W. Byrne (eds.) Machiavellian
Intelligence II: Extensions and Evaluations, pp.50-85. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Sugiyama, Y. (1981): Observations on the population dynamics and behavior of wild
chimpanzees at Bossou, Guinea in 1979-1980. Primates 22 pp.435-444.
Taijfel, H. (1970): Experiments in intergroup discrimination. Scientific American 223
pp.96-102.
Taijfel, H. and M. Billig (1974): Familiarity and categorization in intergroup behavior.
Journal ofExperimental Social Psychology 10 pp.159-170.
Takahata, Y. (1982): Social relations between adult males and females of Japanese
monkeys in the Arashiyam B troop. Primates 23 pp. 1-23.
362
Tanner, N.M. (1981): On Becoming Human: A Model of the Transitionfrom Ape to
Human and the Reconstruction ofEarly Human Social Life. New York and London:
Cambridge University Press.
Tanner, N.M. (1987): The chimpanzee model revisited and the gathering hypothesis.
In W.G. Kinzey (ed.) The Evolution ofHuman Behavior: Primate models, pp.3-27.
Albany: State University ofNew York Press.
Tardif, S.D. (1994): Relative energetic cost of infant care in small-bodied neotropical
primates and its relation to infant-care patterns. American Journal ofPrimatology 34
pp.133-143.
Tardif, S.D. and K. Bales (1997): Is infant-carrying a courtship strategy in callitrichid
primates? Animal Behaviour 53 pp.l00l-l007.
Tardif, S.D., M.L. Harrison and M.A. Simek (1993): Communal infant care in
marmosets and tamarins: relation to energetics, ecology and social organization. In
A.B. Rylands (ed.) Marmosets and Tamarins: Systematics, Behaviour and Ecology,
pp.220-234. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Taub, D.M. (1980): Testing the "agonistic buffering" hypothesis I. Dynamics of
participation in the triadic interaction. Behavioural Ecology and Sociobiology 6
pp.187-197.
Taylor, C.R. (1977): The energetics ofterrestriallocmotion and body size in
vertebrates. In T.1. Pedley (ed.) Scale Effects in Animal Locomotion, pp.127-142.
London: Academic Press.
Taylor, C.R., N.C. Heglund and G.M.O.Maloiy (1982): Energetics and mechanics of
terrestrial locomotion. Journal ofExperimental Biology 96 pp.1-21.
Taylor, C.R., K. Schmidt-Nielsen and R.L. Raab (1970): Scaling of energetic cost of
running to body size, I. mammals. American Journal ofPhysiology 219 pp.1104-
1107.
Terborgh, M. J. and A. Goldizen (1985): On the mating system of the cooperatively
breeding saddle-backed tamarin (Saguinus fuscicollis). Behavioural Ecology and
Sociobiology 16 pp.293-299.
Thieme, H. (1997): Lower palaeolithic hunting spears from Germany. Nature 385
pp.807-810.
Thiollay, 1.(1991): Foraging, home range use and social behaviour of a group-living
rainforest raptor, the red-throated Caracara Daptrius americanus. IBIS 133 pp.382-
393.
Thompson, P.R. (1975): A cross-species analysis of primate, carnivore and hominid
behavior. Journal ofHuman Evolution 4 pp.113-124.
363
Thompson, P.R. (1976): A behavioral model for Australopithecus africanus. Journal
ofHuman Evolution 5 pp.547-558.
Thompson, S.D., M.L. Power, C.E. Rutledge and D.G. Kleiman (1994): Energy
metabolism and thermoregulation in the golden lion tamarin. Folia Primatologica 63
pp.131-143.
Tomasello, M. and 1. Call (1994): Social cognition of monkeys and apes. Yearbook of
Physical Anthropology 37 pp.273-306.
Tooby, J. and L. Cosmides (1992): The psychological foundations of culture. In J.
Barkov, L. Cosmides and 1. Tooby (eds.) The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary
Psychology and the Generation ofCulture, pp.19-136. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Tooby, J. and I. DeVore (1987): The reconstruction of hominid behavioral evolution
through strategic modeling. In W.G. Kinzey (ed.) The Evolution ofHuman Behavior:
Primate Models, pp.183-238. Albany: State University ofNew York Press.
Tooke, W. and L. Camire (1991): Patterns of deception in intersexual and intrasexual
mating strategies. Ethology and Sociobiology 12 pp.345-364.
Trivers, R.L. (1971): The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of
Biology 46 pp.35-57.
Trivers, R.L. (1972): Parental investment and sexual selection. In B. Campbell (ed.)
Sexual Selection and the Descent ofMan, pp.249-264. London: Heinemann.
Turke, P.W. (1984): Effects of ovulatory concealment and synchrony on
protohominid mating systems and parental roles. Ethology and Sociobiology 5 pp.33-
44.
Tutin, C.E.G. (1979): Mating patterns and reproductive strategies in a community of
wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii). Behavioural Ecology and
Sociobiology 6 pp.29-38.
Ulijaszek, SJ. (1995): Human Energetics in Biological Anthropology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs (1987):
Population Studies No.1 00, Fertility Behaviour in the Context ofDevelopment,
Evidence from the World Fertility Survey. New York: United Nations.
Verbeek, P. and F.B.M. de Waal (1997): Postconflict behavior of captive brown
capuchins in the presence and absence of attractive food. International Journal of
Primatology 18 pp.703-725.
Vehrencamp, S.L. (1983): A model for the evolution of despotic versus egalitarian
societies. Animal Behaviour 31 pp.667-682.
364
Vrba, E. (1988): Late Pliocene climatic events and human evolution. In F. Grine (ed.)
Evolutionary Hisotry of the "Robust" Australopithecines, pp.405-426. New York:
Aldine de Gruyter.
de Waal, F.B.M. (1982): Chimpanzee Politics. London: Allenand Unwin.
de Waal, F.B.M. (1984): Sex differences in the formation of coalitions among
chimpanzees. Ethology and Sociobiology 5 pp.239-255.
de Waal, F.B.M. (1987): Tension regulation and nonreproductive functions of sex
among captive bonobos. National Geographic Research 3 pp.318-335.
de Waal, F.B.M. (1989a): Peacemaking among primates. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
de Waal, F.B.M. (1989b): Food sharing and reciprocal obligations among
chimpanzees. Journal ofHuman Evolution 18 pp.433-459.
de Waal, F.B.M. (1992): Coalitions as part of reciprocal relations in the Arnhem
chimpanzee colony. In A.H. Harcourt and F.B.M. de Waal (eds.) Coalitions and
Alliances in Humans and Other Animals, pp.233-257. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
de Waal, F.B.M. (1996): Good Natured. Cambrdige, MA and London: Harvard
University Press.
de Waal, F.B.M. (1997): Food-tranfers through mesh in brown capuchins. Journal of
Comparative Psychology 111 pp.370-378.
de Waal, F.B.M. and F. Aureli (1996): Consolation, reconciliation, and possible
cognitive difference between macaques and chimpanzees. In A.E. Russon, K.A. Bard
and S. Taylor Parker (eds.) Reaching into Thought: The Minds of the Great Apes.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
de Waal, F.B.M. and L.M. Luttrell (1986): The similarity principle underlying social
bonding among female rhesus monkeys. Folia Primatologica 46 pp.215-234.
de Waal, F.B.M. and L.M. Luttrell (1988): Mechanisms of social reciprocity in three
primate species: symmetrical relationship characteristics or cognition? Ethology and
Sociobiology 9 pp.101-118.
de Waal, F.B.M. and R. Ren (1988): Comparison of the reconciliation behavior of
stump-tailed and rhesus macaques. Ethology 78 pp.129-142.
de Waal, F.B.M. and A. Roosmalen (1979): Reconciliation and consolation among
chimpanzees. Behavioural Ecology and Sociobiology 5 pp.55-66.
de Waal, F.B.M, L.M. Luttrell and M.E. Canfield (1993): Preliminary data on
voluntary food sharing in brown capuchin monkeys. American Journal of
Primatology 29 pp.73-78.
365
Waldrop, M.M. (1992): Complexity. London: Viking.
Walike, B.C., CJ. Goodner, DJ. Koerker, E.W. Chiceckel and L.W. Kalnasky
(1977): Assessment of obesity in pigtailed monkeys. Journal ofMedical Primatology
6pp.151-162.
Walker, M.L., T.P. Gordon and M.E. Wilson (1983): Menstrual cycle characteristics
of seasonally breeding rhesus monkeys. Biology ofReproduction 29 pp.841-848.
Wallis, J. (1995): Seasonal influences on reproduction in chimpanzees of Gombe
National Park. International Journal ofPrimatology 16 pp.435 - 451.
Waser, P. (1977): Feeding, ranging and group size in the mangabey (Cercocebus
albigena). In T.H. Clutton-Brock (ed.) Primate Ecology: Studies ofFeeding and
Ranging Behaivour ofLemurs, Monkeys and Apes, pp.183-222. New York:
Academic Press.
Washburn, S.L. and I. deVore (1961): Social behaviour ofbaboons and early man. In
S. Washburn (ed.) Social Life ofEarly Man, pp.91-105. Chicago: AIdine-Atherton.
Watanabe, K., A. Mori and M. Kawai (1992): Characteristic features of the
reproduction ofKoshima Monkeys, Macaca fuscata fuscata: A summary of thirty-
four years of obsevation. Primates 33 pp.1-32.
Watts, D.P. (1988): Environmental influences on mountain gorilla time budgets.
American Journal ofPrimatology 15 pp.195-211.
Werren, J.H., M.R. Gross and R.Shine (1980): Paternity and the evolution of male
parental care. Journal of Theoretical Biology 82 pp.619-631.
Westneat, D.F., AB. Clark and K.C. Rambo (1995): Within-brood patterns of paternity
and paternal behaviour in red-winged blackbirds. Behavioural Ecology 4 pp.66-77.
Wheeler, P. (1994): The thermoregulatory advantages of heat storage and shade-
seeking behaviour to hominids foraging in equatorial savannah environments. Journal
ofHuman Evolution 26 pp.339-350.
White, T.D., G. Suwa and B. Asfaw (1994): Australopithecus ramidus, a new species of
early hominid from Aramis, Ethiopia. Nature 371 pp.306-312.
Whiten, A. and R.W. Byrne (1997): Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions and
Evaluations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Whittingham, L.A. and J.T. Lifjeld (1995a): Extra-pair fertilizations increase the
opportunity for sexual selection in the monogamous house martin Delichon urbica.
Journal ofAvian Biology 26 pp.283-288.
366
Whittingham, L.A. and IT. Lifjeld (1995b): High paternal investment in unrelated young:
extra-pair paternity and male parental care in house martins. Behavioural Ecology and
Sociobiology 37 pp.l03-108.
Wilkinson, G.S. (1984): Reciprocal food sharing in the vampire bat. Nature 308 pp.181-
184.
Wilkinson, G.S. (1985): The social organization of the common vampire bat. Il. Mating
systems, genetic structure and relatedness. Behaviour Ecology and Sociobioloy 17
pp.123-134.
Wilkinson, G.S. (1990): Food sharing in vampire bats. Scientific American 262 pp.76-82.
Wilkinson, G.S. (1992a): Communal nursing in the evening bat, Nycticeius humeralis.
Behavioural Ecology and Sociobiology 31 pp.225-235.
Wilkinson, G.S. (1992b): Information transfer at evening bat colonies. Animal Behaviour
44 pp.501-518.
Williams, L. (1974): Monkeys and the Social Instinct: An interliving study from the
Woolly Monkey Sanctuary. Looe (Cornawall), UK: Monkey Sanctuary Publications.
Williamson, D. (1997): Systems Models ofEarly Hominid Socioecology. Ph.D.
dissertation, University College London.
Wilner, L.A. (1989): Sexual Dimorphism in Primates. Ph.D. dissertation, University
College London.
Wilson, D.S., D. Near and R.R. Miller (1996): Machiavellianism: a synthesis of the
evolutionary and psychological literatures. Psychological Bulletin 119 pp.285-299.
Wilson, D.S., D.C. Near and R.R. Miller (1998): Individual differences in
Machiavellianism as a mix of cooperative and exploitative strategies. Evolution and
Human Behavior 19 pp.203-212.
Wolf: K.E. and 1.G. Fleagle (1977): Adult male replacement in a group of silvered
Japanese macaques (Macacafuscata). Primates 18 pp.949-955.
Wrangham, R.W. (1977): Behaviour of feeding chimpanzees in the Gombe National
Park, Tanzania. In T.R. Clutton-Brock (ed.) Primate Ecology pp.503-538. London:
Academic Press.
Wrangham, R.W. (1980): An ecological model of female-bonded primate groups.
Behaviour 75 pp.262-300.
Wrangham, R.W. (1987a): Evolution of social structure. In B.B. Smuts, D.L. Cheney,
R.M. Seyfarth, R W. Wrangham and T.T. Struhsaker (eds.) Primate Societies, pp.282-
298. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
367
Wrangham, R.W. (1987b): African apes: The significance of African apes for
reconstructing human social evolution. In W.G. Kinzey (ed.) The Evolution ofHuman
Behaviour: Primate Models, pp.51-71. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Wrangham, R.W. and B. Smuts (1980): Sex differences in the behavioural ecology of
chimpanzees in the Gombe National Park, Tanzania. Journal ofReproduction and
Fertility (supplement) 28 pp.13-31.
Wright, P.C. (1978): Home range, activity pattern, and agonistic encounters of a
group of night monkeys (Aotus trivirgatus) in Peru. Folia Primatologia 29 pp.43-55.
Wright, P.C. (1990): Patterns of paternal care in primates. International Journal of
Primatology 11 pp.89-101.
Ximenes, M.F.F.M. and M.B.C. Sousa (1996): Family composition and the
characteristics of parental care during the nursing phase of captive common
marmosets (Callithrixjacchus). Primates 37 pp.175- 183.
Zahavi, A. (1977): Reliability in communication systemes and the evolution of
altruism. In B. Stonehouse and C.M. Perrins (eds.) Evolutionary Ecology, pp.253-
259. London: Macmillan Press.
Zhao, Q. (1996): Male-infant-male interactions in Tibetan macaques. Primates 37
pp.135-143.
368
